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ABSTRACT
A great deal o£ psychological and educational practice 
over the last twenty years has been based on the belief that 
creative abilities are present to some extent in all children, 
and tests of divergent thinking (D.T.) have been widely used 
as criteria of ’creativity’ in the research literature.
The first part of this study considers the theoretical 
background to the above statement, and expresses some doubts 
about the reliability and validity of D.T. tests. The iden­
tification of D.T. tests as tests of ’creativity’ was consi­
dered unwarranted though some theoretical association was 
claimed in this respect, and a review of previous researches 
lent some support to this view.
Considering the problems involved in scoring D.T. tests, 
the varied information on reliability and construct validity, 
and the limited reports of long-term stability and criterion- 
related validity, an attempt was made to investigate each of 
these aspects, with three D.T. tests, ’Circles’, ’Uses’, and 
’Consequences’, The main investigation involved 161 eleven- 
year-old children, and the long-term stability results were 
obtained from a follow-up study after nearly five years, of 
139 pupils of 15 and 16 years of age.
The findings gave some positive support to each aspect 
investigated, though limitations and variations between 
different tests and between the sexes were also observed.
In general the D.T. tests emerged, after considerable scrutiny, 
as reasonably reliable measures of an intellectual ability 
which was relatively independent of intelligence, showed 
development and stability of relative ranking over time, and 
was positively related to creative behaviour.
Though the identification of D.T, tests as ’creativity’ 
tests was rejected, both theoretically and experimentally, a 
limited amount of association between D.T. and creative beha­
viour was demonstrated, and the evidence should provide some 
basic support for teachers who regard the fostering of D.T, 







THE R E L IA B IL IT Y  AND VA LID ITY  OF DIVERGENT THINKING
t e s t s : p r o b le m s  a n d  p e r s p e c t iv e s  1
1.1 Introduction ............................................. 1
1.2 V a l i d i t y ................................................ 6
1.21 Concurrent and Predictive Validity .. .. 10
1.22 Construct V a l i d i t y ..............................  16-^
1.3 Reliability ..........................................  23
1.31 Test-retest Reliability ........................  25
1.32 Alternate-form Reliability ..................... 27
1.33 Internal Consistency ........................  27^
1.34 Discussion ....................................  30
1.35 Long-term Stability   38 T
1.36 Scorer Reliability   39^
1.4 S u m m a r y ..................................................  42
CHAPTER TWO
C R EA TIV ITY , DIVERGENT THINKING AND CLASSROOM LEARNING 44
2.1 Creativity and the Development of Creative Abilities
in the Classroom ....................................  44
2.11 Defining Creativity ........................  46
2.12 Educational Implications .................. 55
2.2 Divergent Thinking Tests - not ’Creativity' Tests 59
CHAPTER THREE
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CREATIVE THINKING 67
3.1 Divergent Thinking and Guilford’s Structure-of- 
Intellect Theory ....................................  68
3.11 The Category of Divergent Thinking .. .. 71
3.12 Discussion ....................................  76
3.2 Creative Thinking and Problem Solving ............. 80
3.3 Unconscious Drives and Motives in Creative Thinking 84
3.4 Association and Creative Production ............. 89
3.5 Gestalt Approaches to Creative Thinking .. .. 95
3.6 Styles of T h i n k i n g ....................................... 100
Page
3.7 Psychometric Approaches to Creative Thinking .. 107
3.8 Conclusion .. ..    118
CHAPTER FOUR
REVIEW OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE VA LID ITY  AND 
R E LIA B IL ITY  OF DIVERGENT THINKING TESTS 121
4.1 Introduction   121
4.2 Empirical Evidence for the Validity of Divergent 
Thinking Tests based on the Claims of Torrance
( 1 9 7 4 ) ................................................  122,
4.3 Further Studies of the Validity of Divergent Tests 132^
4.4 Studies of the Relationship between Divergent 
Thinking and Intelligence ..........................  143
4.5 Evidence for the Test-retest Reliability of 
Divergent Thinking Tests ......................... .. 147
4.6 Studies of Validity and Reliability by Bennett
(1973), Dewing (1970) and Vernon (1972) .. .. 149^
4.7 Summary .........................................  159^
CHAPTER FIVE
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 161
5.1 Introduction   161
5.2 The Main 11-year-old S a m p l e ........................  161
5.3 Testing Material .................................... 164
5.31 Divergent Thinking Tests ................... 164
5.311 Circles Test ........................  164
5.312 Uses Test ..............................  165
5.313 Consequences Test ................... 166
5.314 Representative Nature of the Tests .. 167
5.32 Criteria of Creative Interests and Behaviour 170
5.321 Teacher Ratings of Creative Behaviour 170
5.322 Creative Leisure Activities Checklist 171
5. 323 Interests ..............................  171
5.324 Creative Motivation Scale .............  173
5. 325 The Board Game ........................ 173
5.3251 Introduction ................... 173
5.3252 Description and Administration 175
5.3253 Development and Assessment of 
Performance ................... 17 8
5.3254 Categories of Performance .. 181
Page
5.33 Convergent Thinking ........................  183
5.331 Intelligence (VRQ) ................... 183
5.332 Academic Performance in English and 
Mathematics   184
5.34 Personality and Attitudes ................... 185
5.341 Junior Eysenck Personality Inventory 185
5. 342 Self Concept ........................  185
5.343 Teacher Ratings of Children’s Personality 
and Pleasurability ................... 186
5.344 Attitudes to School and School Work .. 186
5.4 Organisation..........................................  190
5.41 General Organisation ........................  190
5.42 Testing Sessions .............................. 191
5.43 Preparatory Lesson and the Board Game .. .. 192
CHAPTER SIX
THE SCORING OF DIVERGENT THINKING TESTS 195
6.1 Introduction..........................................  195
6.2 The Reporting of Scoring Procedures in Divergent 
Thinking Research ....................................  198
6.3 Review and Practical Procedures for Scoring for / \
Fluency, Flexibility and O r i g i n a l i t y .............  201,/
6.31 Fluency   201
6.311 Relevance of Responses ............. 205
6.32 F l e x i b i l i t y ...............................  210
6.321 Practical Details of Flexibility Scoring 215
6.33 O r i g i n a l i t y ....................................  219
6.331 Use of a Sample of Scripts for Listing
Uncommon Responses ................... 224
6. 332 Summary ..............................  227
6.333 Practical Details of Originality Scoring 228
6.4 A Note on the Time Involved in Scoring Divergent
Tests ................................................  234
6.5 Synopsis of Scoring Details for the Divergent 
Thinking Tests ....................................  238
6.51 Circles Test   .. 238
6.52 Squares Test   .. .. 240
6.53 Uses Test .................................... 241
6.54 Consequences Test .. ..   242
6.55 Selection of the Distribution Sample for 
Assessing Uncommon Responses   243
6.56 Examples of Common and Uncommon Responses to




7.1 Introduction....... .....................................  246/'/ - ...7.2 Scorer Reliability in the Present Study .. .. (,253
7.21 Selection of the Sample.......................... 253
7.22 Procedure .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 254
7.23 Results and Discussion........................... 255
7.3 Conclusion ...........................................  263
-A.
CHAPTER EIGHT
TEST-RETEST RELIABILITY OF TESTS OF DIVERGENT THINKING 266
8.1 Intro d u c t i o n .....................................  .. 266
8.2 Results and Discussion....... .........................  268
8.21 Level of Reliability .........................  268
8.22 Comparison with other Studies .. .. .. 270
8.23 Levels of Performance from Test to Retest .. 275
8.24 Reliability Coefficients and Distribution
of V a r i a n c e   .. 279
8.3 Summary   ., 283
CHAPTER NINE
LONG-TERM STABILITY OF DIVERGENT THINKING 285
9.1 Background ...........................................  285
9.2 Tests and Procedures .. .. .. .. .. .. 290
9.21 Divergent Tests.............................  .. 290
9.22 Intelligence Tests .........................  291
9.23 Administration ...............................  291
9.3 Results ...........................................  293
9.31 Introduction ...............................  293
9.32 Sex Differences in Divergent Thinking -
1969 and 1974 ...............................  294
9.33 Long-term Test-retest Reliabilities 1969-1974 296
9.331 296
9.332 Comparison with Previous Researches .. 298>
9.34 Levels of Performance on Divergent Tests 
1969-1974 .....................................  302
9.35 Correction for Attenuation .................. 304
9.36 Relationship with Intelligence .............  308
9.37 Intercorrelations between Divergent Thinking
Tests 1969 and 1974 .........................  312 ̂
9.4 S u m m a r y ............................................  317
Page
CHAPTER TEN
RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CONCURRENT
V A LID ITY  OF TESTS OF DIVERGENT THINKING 319
10.1 Introduction   319
10.2 Results and Discussion   321
10.21 Intercorrelations between the Divergent
Tests and between the Creative Criteria .. 321
10.22 Basic Validity Coefficients ............. 325
10.23 An Appraisal of the Validity Coefficients 
for each Divergent Thinking Measure in 
Conjunction with Sex Differences and the
Effect of Intelligence ..................  335
10.231 Validity Coefficients with Teacher 
Ratings of Children’s Creative 
Behaviour ........................  335
10.232 Validity Coefficients with Torrance’s 
Leisure Interests Checklist .. .. 340
10.233 Validity Coefficients with Golann’s 
Creative Motivation Scale .. .. 344
10.234 Validity Coefficients with Imaginative 
Interests ........................  348
10.235 Validity Coefficients with Logical/
Analytic Interests   351
10.236 Concurrent Validity of Divergent 
Thinking Tests in Relation to the
Board Game   .. 354
10.24 Categorical Analysis of the Validity of the
Divergent Tests in Relation to the Board Game 358
10.25 Relative Performance of Convergers and 
Divergers on the Board Game ............. 367
10.26 An Illustration of the Potential of Divergent 
Thinking Tests and I.Q. in Forming a Multiple 
Validity Coefficient ........................  371
10.3 Summary and Conclusions ........................  374
10.31 General Evidence for Concurrent Validity .. 374/
10.32 The Effect of Intelligence on the Validity 
Coefficients of the Divergent Tests .. .. 375
10.33 Sex Differences and Validity Coefficients
with Individual Criteria ................... 377
10.34 The Board G a m e .................. ,. .. 380
10.35 Individual Variations in the Validity
of the Divergent Tests ................... 381
10.36 General Appraisal of the Evidence Presented 385
Page
CHAPTER ELEVEN
RESULTS OF THE FACTORIAL INVESTIGATION OF _
CONSTRUCT V A LID ITY  390
11.1 Introduction .................................... 390
11.2 Results and Discussion ......................... 398
11.21 Identification of the F a c t o r s ..............  401
11.22 Discussion   402
11.221 Convergent Thinking and Divergent 
T h i n k i n g ..............................  402
11.222 Attitudes and Divergent Thinking .. 408
11.223 Creative Activities and Divergent 
Thinking .. ......................... 413
11.224 Divergent Thinking and Personality 
Variables ......................... 417
11.3 Summary and Conclusions ......................... 422
CHAPTER TWELVE





Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations 460
Main 11-year-old Analysis:
Means and Standard Deviations, Boys, Girls and 
Whole Population ..............................  461
Intercorrelations between all Variables:
(i) Girls (n = 8 4 ) ..........................  462
(ii) Boys (n = 7 7 ) ........................... 463
(iii) Whole population (n = 161) .. .. 464
Factor Analysis:
(i) Girls ............................... 465
(ii) Boys ............................... 466
Interscorer Reliability:
Marks Awarded by Scorer 1 and Scorer 2 .. 467
2. Samples of Materials Used in Scoring the Divergent
   ---
Flexibility Categories for the Circles Test and the 
Squares T e s t ..........................................  470
Frequency Distribution of Responses to the
Circles T e s t ..........................................  472
Page
Frequency Distribution of Responses to the 
Squares Test ...............................
Frequency Distribution of Responses to the 
Uses Test ...............................
Frequency Distribution of Responses to the 
Consequences Test .........................
3. Board Game
Photographs of each Category of Response 
Pupil’s ’report’ on the Preliminary Lesson 
Record Sheet for Observing Children’s Performance
4. Test Materials
(i) Divergent Thinking Booklet
(as used for the 15-year-old group) & ’Squares’
(ii) Attitudes: ’What I think about School’
(iii) Self Concept: ’What I am Like’
(iv) Teacher Ratings, (a) ’Children’s School Work
and Personality’
(b) ’Indicators of Creative 
Behaviour’
(v) Creative Motivation Scale:
’Things I Would Like to do Most’
(vi) Creative Leisure Interests:
’Things You have done in your Spare Time’

















THE R E L IA B IL ITY  AND VA LID ITY  OF DIVERGENT THINKING TESTS:
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Based largely on the rationale presented by Guilford 
(1950) and encouraged by the relevance to the classroom of 
many of the creativity writings of the early 1960’s 
(Torrance, 1962, 1963; Getzels & Jackson, 1962; Hudson, 
1966), tests of divergent thinking have been regarded, on 
both sides of the Atlantic, as potentially valuable instru­
ments in a climate of educational interest in creative 
ability.
With the growing demands of science and technology for 
people with the ability to think openly and creatively, and 
the pressures on education to encourage and develop such 
talents, it is not surprising that Guilford's plea for a 
renewal of interest in creativity, coupled with his sugges­
tions for identifying and measuring creative abilities, 
should have become the springboard for the vast increase in 
educational and psychological research into creative abili­
ties that has taken place since his now famous Presidential 
address on 'Creativity' to the American Psychological Asso­
ciation (Guilford, 1950).
Guilford first established the word 'divergent* to 
describe a particular area of thinking abilities in his 
'structure of intellect model* (Guilford, 1956). In this 
he formalises views he had expressed earlier that a study 
of intellectual abilities needs a multidimensional approach 
which should include components of creative talent such as
2.
originality, fluency of ideas, and flexibility, including 
the ability to change direction in one’s thinking, to depart 
from well-worn paths, and to revise the apparent restric­
tions of rigid rules and methods. These abilities he places 
firmly in a category of divergent thinking.
Similar abilities have figured prominently in accounts 
of creative expression and invention over the centuries, 
though the sources of inspiration and originality were often 
regarded as being beyond the comprehension of ordinary men, 
and to be characteristic of a race of men apart, whose crea­
tivity manifested itself in some recognisable product of the 
highest order. Since Galton (1869), in his investigations 
into hereditary genius, suggested that such abilities are a 
matter of degree rather than kind, more attention has been 
given to the measurement and development of exceptional 
talent.
Before the stimulus of Guilford’s (1950) paper however 
most investigations of creative talent this century concen­
trated on high intelligence as the supreme index of creative 
ability, and while, as even Getzels and Jackson (1962)
acknowledge "IQ ....... remains one of the best predictors of
academic achievement we have", there has been growing con­
cern that too great an emphasis on the type of logical acti­
vity associated with intelligence tests may discourage spon­
taneous and imaginative thinking of a kind which might con­
tribute to the development of future original creation.
Guilford (1956) suggests that the concept of intelligence 
should be widened to cover abilities of both types, and in his 
structure of intellect model includes a wide range of abili­
ties in five categories, cognition, memory, divergent production.
3.
convergent production and evaluation. He claims, however, 
that "it is in the divergent thinking category that we find 
the abilities that are most significant in creative thinking 
and invention" (Guilford, 1958). Such claims have led to a 
widespread use of divergent thinking tests in investigations 
of creative abilities to the extent that they have tended to 
become synonymous with tests of creativity in the research 
literature. The creativity tests of Torrance alone (Torrance, 
1962, 1974) are among the testing instruments most frequently 
cited by publications in the latest, 7th, Mental Measurements 
Yearbook (Buros, 1972). The theoretical justification for 
such tests is appealing, but as yet there is little real 
evidence to support it, and the tests themselves have been 
subject to far less investigation than one might assume con­
sidering their predominance.
It is hoped that the present study will provide some 
worthwhile evidence regarding both their validity and relia­
bility. It must be pointed out however that the whole 
psychological study of creativity covers a much wider range 
than studies based simply on the use of divergent thinking 
tests. Reviewing the field, Golann (1963) emphasises the 
diversity of interests, motives and approaches characteristic 
of the many investigations of creative ability. He suggests 
that four main emphases are apparent: an emphasis on crea­
tive productivity in technological and industrial settings; 
the creative process and its associated mental activity; 
measurement, focussing on the work of Guilford and Torrance; 
and personality studies including psychodynamic approaches 
and personality characteristics. A further emphasis on 
children's thinking and school learning has appeared to
4.
build up since Golann's review.
The emphasis in the present study is on the role of 
divergent thinking as indices of a mental activity related 
to a 'process' definition of creativity. That it is also 
relevant to the classroom is implicit in its consideration 
of children's thinking, but this link will be made specific, 
in the view, as suggested by Vernon (1964), that schools 
can do much to stimulate and foster, or else to inhibit, 
creative talent. It is also the view of the writer that 
such talent involves skills of divergent thinking and that 
these skills can be developed in the classroom. Some recent 
research by the writer and B.D, Franklin reported elsewhere 
(Franklin and Richards, 1977) lends some support to this 
view.
It is suggested that research into particular divergent 
thinking skills is likely in practice to be more profitable 
than research done under the umbrella title of 'creativity'. 
Different definitions, theories and means of evaluation of 
'creativity' have in fact been responsible for much of what 
Yamamoto (1965) describes as the 'confused abundance', and 
others, (Klein et al^ 1967), the 'complete chaos' of creati­
vity research. Divergent thinking tests have contributed to 
the confusion by being widely used as indices and criteria 
of creativity when in the opinion of some researchers "there 
is scarcely a shred of factual support for this". (Hudson, 
1966).
It is suggested by Cronbach (1970) that although the 
greatest amount of creativity research has accumulated 
around divergent thinking tests, especially those designed 
by Torrance (1959, 1962), "most of the tests have been
5.
announced to the world prior to any solid validity studies". 
More quantitatively, Nuttall (1972), claims that until 
recently for every ten studies using divergent tests and 
accepting the validity of the title ’creativity', only one 
attempted an empirical validation of the tests against cri­
teria of creativity and few of these met with any great 
success.
While not disparaging further research into relation­
ships between divergent tests and other abilities, both 
Burt (1962) and Vernon (1964) also question the tests validity 
and reliability, and more specifically Cropley (1967) points 
out that such tests have been shown to have "unsatisfactorily 
low reliabilities".
Brown (1976) commenting on the evidence for validity 
and reliability concludes that the reliability is "lower 
than desirable", and that "no clear pattern of validity 
results has emerged". Butcher (1972) referring to creativity 
in terms of "creativeness in real life as shown by, for 
example, scientific or artistic achievement" questions the 
assumption that high ability on divergent thinking tests is 
evidence of such achievement. He also questions whether 
various measures of divergent thinking inter-correlate 
sufficiently highly to justify the assumption of a general 
factor of divergent thinking and whether any general factor 
of this kind is readily distinguishable from the correspon­
ding factor of convergent thinking.
Three issues emerge from this preliminary discussion; 
the appropriateness of the labelling of divergent thinking 
tests as tests of creativity, doubts about their validity
6.
and reliability, and the relevance o£ divergent thinking to 
the educational process in the classroom. The three issues 
are of course inter-related. The first two are in fact 
closely inter-dependant, and the third provides the practical 
environment in which educational psychology is put into 
practice in a deliberate attempt to recognise and develop 
childrens’ abilities.
Each of these three issues will be looked at more 
closely, beginning in this chapter with the concepts of 
validity and reliability.
1.2 VALIDITY
The validity of a test is broadly defined as the capa­
city of a test to predict some specified behavioural measure, 
or set of measures other than itself (Cattell, 1964). More 
generally, it is expressed in terms of how well a test mea­
sures what it is supposed to measure. Procedures for deter­
mining test validity are therefore concerned with the rela­
tionships between performance on the test and some other 
independently observable facts about the behaviour charac­
teristics under consideration. As the external data can be 
arrived at from a variety of sources, validity is not some 
general pervasive characteristic that a test ’has’. Rather 
it is an index of how well the test is likely to do for a 
specific purpose in a particular situation. This is parti­
cularly important when considering the variety of comments 
made about the validity of divergent thinking tests in 
relation to claims made for them as tests of ’creativity*.
Several types of validity have already been referred to 
indirectly in the criticisms of divergent thinking tests
7.
made above. Thus Butcher refers to both ’predictive vali­
dity’ and ’construct validity’ when talking of ’real crea­
tiveness in later life’ and ’intercorrelations between 
various divergent thinking measures’, respectively.
Nuttall’s remarks on ’empirical validation against creative 
criteria’ were questioning ’concurrent validity’, and 
Guilford’s observation that the tests ’are constructed to 
reflect the sorts of abilities that are significant in 
creative thinking and invention’ makes claims for, though 
do not demonstrate construct validity. A number of other 
descriptions of validity could also be applied to divergent 
tests though there would be considerable overlap with the 
divisions mentioned.
In an attempt to standardise the reporting of reliabi­
lity and validity the American Psychological Association and 
the American Educational Research Association set up a joint 
committee in 1953 to suggest a basic set of concepts for 
future use in evaluating the reliability and validity of 
educational and psychological tests. This led to the formu­
lation of each Association’s ’Technical Recommendations’
(A.P.A., 1954; A.E.R.A., 1955) and subsequently to a com­
bined and revised version, most recently published as 
’Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests’ (A.P.A., 
1974). The ’Standards’ have resulted in the widespread 
classification of validity procedures into four categories 
of content, concurrent, predictive and construct validity. 
(Educational Testing Service, 1961; Anastasi, 1968; 
Cronbach, 1970, 1971.) As both Anastasi and Cronbach point 
out, concurrent and predictive validity are included in a 
single category of criterion-related validity in the first
8.
(1966) and subsequent versions of the ’Standards’, but 
their interpretations of these two aspects vary somewhat 
and will be discussed further later. Meanwhile the three 
categories of concurrent, predictive and construct validity 
will be used as a basis for the investigations in this study.
Some individuals however have found the above catego­
ries, defined as they are at some common denominator of 
meaning, to be too unsophisticated for their purpose.
Cattell (1964), for example, suggests that more basic con­
cepts are needed to match some of the increasingly subtle 
concepts involved in personality and motivation measurement, 
and Cronbach,himself a member of the A.P.A. committee, felt 
it necessary to clarify his views regarding their introduc­
tion of the category of construct validity. (Cronbach and 
Meehl, 1955, 1972.) With certain types of test some of these 
categories will obviously be less important than others, and 
additional measures may be needed to provide a useful basis 
from which to evaluate the tests. There will be occasions 
in this study when some different types of validity measure­
ments will be informative, and these will be introduced 
where appropriate. On the other hand, content validity, 
which is associated with adequate coverage of content and 
objectives in the case of achievement tests is not appropriate 
in evaluating divergent tests.
Although it would be possible to stretch the concept of 
’content validity’ to a consideration of the different 
facets of divergent thinking sampled by any particular test, 
the question of the nature of the variable measured by a 
psychological test is answered by most writers (Brown, 1976) 
in terms of the evidence from studies of construct validity.
9.
Content validity in this study is therefore subsumed under 
the concept of ’construct validity’ to be discussed later.
Often associated with content validity is a concept of 
’face validity’, though Anastasi (1968) warns that this is 
not validity in the technical sense and should not be 
regarded as a substitute for objectively determined validity. 
It is basically a judgement process based on the appearance 
of the test to be measuring what it claimed to measure. 
Garrett (1966) notes that it is nevertheless a useful con­
sideration in the construction of tests where there is no 
easily defined area of content such as for tests and rating 
scales for various hypothesised traits. At first sight 
this appears very relevant to divergent thinking tests par­
ticularly if such judgements included an appraisal of the 
thinking process appearing to underly the questions.
Anastasi (1968) however notes that face validity is not a 
matter concerning technical scrutiny but a superficial 
assessment of the tests appropriateness by the subjects 
themselves, administrators and "other technically untrained 
observers". It therefore is more appropriate to consider 
the psychological appearance of the test with the theoreti­
cal foundations under construct validity.
It is worth noting however that some of the questions 
in divergent tests - ’how many uses can you think of for a 
brick’, ’tell me all the ways in which a cat and a mouse 
are alike’ - may appear silly or inappropriate, even to 
young people, and if so, then face validity is an important 
consideration which would deserve investigation. It is 
also worth noting on the other hand that in certain tests 
the true nature of the items needs to be concealed, e.g. in
10.
tests of dogmatism or personality, and the less obvious the 
face validity of the items the less likely are the subjects 
to misrepresent themselves.
The three remaining categories of concurrent, predic­
tive and construct validity are more relevant to investiga­
tions of divergent thinking tests, and these will now be 
looked at more closely.
1.21 Concurrent Validity and Predictive Validity
These two types of validity have been taken together as 
they are both aspects of what is often termed ’criterion- 
related* validity. In general this indicates the effective­
ness of a test in predicting an individual’s behaviour in 
certain specified situations. For this purpose, performance 
on the test is checked against a ’criterion’, the latter 
being a direct and independent measure of that which the 
test is designed to predict.
Prediction in this broad sense refers to prediction 
from the test to any criterion situation, whether the latter 
is obtained after some significant time interval or ’con­
currently’, i.e. at the same, or nearly the same time. 
Anastasi (1968) however suggests that it is in the former 
more limited sense of prediction over a time interval that 
the term predictive valdity is generally used. Cronbach
(1970) takes a slightly different view. He suggests that 
"logically, predictive and concurrent validation are the 
same, and most writers apply the term ’predictive’ to both." 
If however one wishes to emphasise that no time has elapsed 
between measures, he agrees that the study can be spoken of 
as a ’concurrent’ validation.
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Strictly speaking, and in the sense in which it is 
commonly used in scientific experiments, prediction is no 
doubt as Cronbach suggests a matter of prediction from one 
situation or property to another, not necessarily involving 
a projection into the future. Common usage however appears 
to favour Anastasi’s interpretation. For the sake of clarity 
both terms will be retained in the present study with the 
time element as their distinguishing feature. It will still 
be appropriate to talk of the concurrent validity of a test 
in predicting something other than itself.
Questions of prediction over long periods of time will 
also be discussed, though in this case, as with the concept 
of ’stability’, to be discussed later, it is acknowledged 
that it is the trait rather than the test itself which is 
being investigated. It is valuable for such information to 
be included in evaluations of test reliability and validity, 
though it is possible for misunderstandings to arise if 
they are interpreted strictly as coefficients of validity 
and reliability for the test itself. Cattell (1964) points 
out that some tests, especially of attitudes or motivation, 
are known to have quite a high degree of predictive validity 
or reliability over short periods of time, but to involve 
traits which change markedly with increasing age. To report 
coefficients of long term stability or predictive validity
"as evaluative measurements of such tests would not be a3̂
air measure of their reliability or validity in the more 
restricted sense normally required in test manuals. Cattell 
does not suggest that long-term information is without 
value, but suggests that alternative labels might be more 
appropriate, such as ’dependability’ or ’scientific utility’
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respectively. Such terms are not in general use however 
and having clarified the interpretation of long term stabi­
lity and predictive validity the latter terms will be main­
tained in this study.
Returning to the use of the term 'concurrent validity’ 
it is important to point out that although it is often 
easier to assess than predictive validity it should not be 
interpreted as an inferior form of test validation. It is 
true, as Pilliner (1968), writing on examinations, points 
out, that because of the time-lag and difficulties of 
extending validation procedures over the time required for 
predictive validity "test constructors often substitute 
’concurrent’ procedures". His conclusion that "concurrent 
validation for examinations is scarcely a viable procedure" 
should however be seen only in terms of examinations as 
predictors of future outcomes. A useful discussion of 
validity and reliability as they apply to school examinations 
is given by Thyne (1974). Increasingly the purposes of tests 
and examinations are diagnositic rather than predictive and 
in such cases as Anastasi (1968) points out "concurrent 
validity is the most appropriate type and can be justified 
in its own right". Provided the diagnostic groups have 
distinguishing features that could be revealed in some other 
way, the concurrent validity of the test in predicting this 
can be assessed. Thus, for example, it would be useful to 
have a test which would diagnose children’s mathematical 
difficulties even though the same difficulties could be 
revealed by personal attention from the teacher, given 
sufficient time.
Hudson (1968) justifies the validity of divergent
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thinking tests in a somewhat similar way. He suggests that 
if a testing "differentiates between variables of psycholo­
gical or social interest - if it differentiates arts 
specialists from scientists, let us say - then it interests 
us; if it does not, it does not". He therefore justifies 
their use in terms of "their external validity: their
power to differentiate among variables other than themselves". 
At the stage at which Hudson is writing however his claims 
are still at the exploratory stage of suggesting the useful­
ness of the tests in discriminating between people with 
certain characteristics which only might prove pervasive.
He is thus exploring what will shortly be termed the ’cons­
truct validity’ of the tests rather than their concurrent 
validity. If at a later stage one of his hypotheses, for 
example, that divergent thinking tests can discriminate 
between Arts and Science bias is evaluated by further experi­
ment, then the tests concurrent validity is being examined 
for that specific purpose.
A number of researchers have since examined some of 
Hudson’s findings (e.g. Child, 1968; Mackay and Cameron,
1968) and provided some concurrent validity in relation to 
the characteristics of convergers and divergers. Others 
(e.g. Christie, 1970) have not been so successful and as 
Butcher (1968) and Lewis (1974) point out there is still 
need for some caution in interpreting Hudson’s results. In 
particular, in the English education system Butcher suggests 
that the degree of specialisation might even be the cause 
rather than the effect of the two modes of thinking inves­
tigated by Hudson. It is worth noting however that Hudson 
makes no claim for the validity of divergent tests in
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relation to creative ability. In fact he notes that for 
his purposes such a consideration would be a "technical red 
herring" (Hudson, 1966).
The most common reference to divergent thinking tests 
is, nevertheless, that they are ’creativity’ tests, and so 
common has this nomenclature become, that they are often 
accepted unquestioningly as having validity in predicting 
creative work in real life. Evidence that has been reported 
in support of this claim, and studies that have investigated 
such validity are reviewed later. Putting the question of 
validity in perspective however, it would be unrealistic to 
expect divergent thinking ability to appear as an effective 
single predictor of some creative criterion. Divergent 
thinking tests would still be valuable if they added some­
thing to the predictive value of some battery of tests over 
and above that covered by more conventional tests, such as 
I.Q. tests. In this sense it is their ’incremental’ valid­
ity (Sechrest, 1963) which is important - the extent to 
which they raise the multiple correlation between the pre­
dictors and some criterion (Lewis, 1974). Even if, as 
Cronbach (1970) points out, a criterion can be predicted 
only with validity 0.20, the test may still make an 
appreciable practical contribution, and this is especially 
true if it is part of a battery containing independent tests 
measuring different factors. "Success," he writes, "is 
never unidimensional", and the writer’s personal view is 
that divergent thinking abilities may well provide some of 
the elements needed for creative achievement.
Criteria that have been used for concurrent and predic­
tive validity include ratings of individual’s creative
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activity at work, school, or home, self-ratings of creative 
interests and activities, and academic achievement including 
imaginative story-writing, and various end of course results. 
Any test may, as Anastasi (1968) points out, "be validated 
against as many criteria as there are specific uses for it", 
but it is essential to recognise that validity in one con­
text does not imply validity in another.
The relation between test scores and criterion measures 
can be expressed in a number of ways, including simple des­
criptions of the test scores of individuals who either per­
form ’wel l ’ or ’badly’ on some job, course of study, or 
other criterion. The most common method however is the 
calculation of a ’validity coefficient’ - the correlation 
between test score and criterion measure. The normal 
statistical requirements and limitations need to be applied 
to whatever method is used to calculate the coefficient.
Criteria to be used in the present study
In the present study a number of criterion measures 
will be selected to investigate the validity of divergent 
tests. Although they will not include real creative per­
formance in later life, they will look at prediction in 
terms of a number of concurrent criteria. Long-term stabi­
lity of the concept will also be looked at and this will be 
of relevance to any projection into the future of the con­
current findings.
The criteria will include ratings of the children’s 
creative behaviour by teachers and from self-report inven­
tories of their creative interests. In particular an 
experimental exercise, the ’Board Game’ is to be designed.
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in accord with later theoretical discussion, in an attempt 
to relate divergent thinking abilities to a practical cri­
terion of children’s productive and imaginative thinking.
1.22 Construct Validity
Cronbach and Meehl (1955) observe that this term was 
first introduced by them and others, in the A.P.A.’s Tech­
nical Recommendations (1954) , in order to help formulate 
the type of validity to be expected from tests that attempt 
to measure some attribute or quality which is not ’’opera­
tionally defined’’. The construct validity of a test is 
thus the extent to which the test may be said to measure 
some theoretical trait or construct. The construct itself 
however, being some postulated attribute of people, may be, 
in fact almost invariably is, ’bigger’ than any one specific 
criterion. As Anastasi (1968) notes ’’any data throwing 
light on the nature of the trait under consideration and 
the conditions affecting its development and manifestations 
are grist for this validity mill’’.
Construct validity in fact requires the gradual accumu­
lation of information from a variety of sources. The cons­
truct itself usually arises from psychological theory and a 
number of hypotheses that can eventually be proved or dis­
proved as construct validation proceeds. This is almost 
precisely the way in which Guilford has built up his struc­
ture of intellect theory though as he notes (1967) , even if 
construct validity can be built up for, say, his postulated 
divergent thinking abilities any practical label such as 
’creative’ ability applied to such factors will be a matter 
for validation in relation to definite indices of creative
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performance.
Whereas predictive and concurrent validity are examined 
in relation to a definite question regarding a particular 
empirical criterion, evidence for construct validity is not 
so clear-cut. As knowledge develops we arrive at greater 
understanding of the construct but as psychological theories 
change and develop so the construct also has to be modified 
or discarded. The process of construct validation according 
to Cronbach (1971) , is the same as that by which scientific 
theories are developed, by observation, hypothesis and 
experiment. Reports of the thinking processes of the 
eminent as they engage in creative work (see for example in 
Ghiselin, 1955, and Koestler, 1964) lead one to hypothesise, 
as Guilford has done, that certain types of thinking asso­
ciated with fluency and novelty of ideas are of relevance 
for creative thinking. The utilization of divergent think­
ing tests in an attempt to assess these abilities then 
carries the process of validation further, into the experi­
mental stage. The construct validation of divergent think­
ing tests begins therefore with the question of how we can 
describe the thinking involved in scientific, artistic, or 
any other act of creation, and proceeds through interpreta­
tions of test results in relation to the construct which the 
tests are designed to assess.
The construct, it must be emphasised, is a theoretical 
one. Although there are some objectors to this non- 
operational aspect of validity it is a view which, Cronbach
(1971) suggests, is now generally accepted. Brodbeck (1963) 
however argues that a construct only has scientific status 
when it is equated with one particular measuring operation.
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This behavioural interpretation may be useful in suggesting 
a practical indicator of some construct but it denies the 
existence and usefulness of psychological concepts, such as 
intelligence, anxiety, or self-confidence, which arise from 
a whole set of theoretical and operational associations. To 
divorce practical measurement from psychological theory 
would, Cattell (1964) suggests, leave us "with a purely 
statistical psychometry too drily pointless to grip the 
attention of a psychologist with broad conceptual interests". 
On the other hand he also acknowledges the danger of "spur­
ious theory, too vague and overelaborated to be useful as 
scientific theory".
Cronbach (1971), arguing for the theoretical nature of 
construct validity, notes that behaviour should be taken as 
an indication not a definition of the construct being inves­
tigated, and observes that no list of specific responses-to- 
situations, however lengthy, can define the construct, since 
the construct is intended to apply to situations that will 
arise in the future and cannot be specified now.
Cattell (1964) maintains that the term ’construct vali­
dity’ may have too many empirical associations for its 
theoretical basis to be appreciated, and argues that ’con­
cept validity’ would be a better term in order to maintain 
its theoretical parentage and openness to ideational enrich­
ment. It might result, he suggests, in a better balance 
between the psychological theory and the psychometric prac­
tice. Keeping the warning in mind it is acknowledged that 
in subsequent discussion of construct validity, the construct 
should be seen as a theoretical concept which exists over and 
above its materialisation as a set of relationships evident
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in empirical observation. The theoretical background to the 
concept of divergent thinking will be reviewed in Chapter 3.
Empirical evidence for construct validity of a test can 
come from many sources, from studies of performance of 
different types of groups on the test, from the effects of 
training and teaching on test scores, and from correlations 
with practical criteria and other tests. In fact much of 
the evidence accumulated from predictive and concurrent vali­
dation is relevant to construct validity if it is interpreted 
not in terms of the tests practical ability to predict a cer­
tain definite type of behaviour, but in terms of the psycho­
logical construct postulated as being responsible for such 
outcomes.
Once again it is emphasised that the same test can have 
validity in some, or all, of the categories discussed, each 
referring to a specific way in which the test might be used.
One of the major ways in which construct validity of a 
test is assessed is in relation to its correlations with 
other tests. As Campbell (1960) points out this has two 
aspects. We must show that the test under discussion 
correlates highly with other variables with which it should 
theoretically correlate, and also that it does not correlate 
significantly with variables from which it should differ. 
These contrasting aspects are termed ’convergent validation’ 
and ’discriminant validation’ respectively. They are very 
relevant to the doubts expressed earlier from Butcher (1972) 
regarding the correlations within batteries of various 
divergent thinking measures and between divergent thinking 
and convergent measures such as I.Q.
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A great deal of evidence and debate has focussed on 
these issues, especially since the claims of both Getzels 
and Jackson (1962) and Wallach and Kogan (1966) to have 
established contrasting domains of ’creativity’ and 
’intelligence’. Burt (1962), reviewing the evidence presen­
ted by Getzels and Jackson, acknowledges that there may be 
a group factor of divergent thinking type abilities, but 
concludes that it is unreasonable to infer the existence of 
a separate domain outside the conception of general intelli­
gence. In spite of the more impressive results presented 
by Wallach and Kogan, using a somewhat different battery 
of divergent tests and alternative administrative proced­
ures, many researchers have since supported Burt’s view of 
divergent tests, finding a limited amount of evidence for 
convergent and discriminant validity but also considerable 
overlap with general intelligence measures (e.g. Ward, 1967; 
Cropley, 1968; Vernon, 1972; Hargreaves and Bolton, 1972). 
The debate is far from settled however, conflicting inter­
pretations even being made from the same data (Richards, 
1976; Guilford, 1976) - Richards claiming that the results 
in question ’’support the Wallach-Kogan position of a unitary 
and independent dimensions’’, and Guilford that such a con­
clusion ’’is very unjustified’’. This issue of convergent and 
divergent validity will be returned to and some relevant 
evidence will be presented later in this study.
In studying the construct validity of a test in terms 
of its correlations with other tests, the technique of fac­
tor analysis has played a key role. Essentially factor 
analysis is a statistical procedure for locating the common 
factors required to account for the correlations between a
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number of tests. With a small number of tests and a clear 
pattern of intercorrelations deductions can be made without 
resort to more sophisticated methods, but with, for example, 
20 tests and the resulting 190 intercorrelations relation­
ships between the tests are difficult to establish. After 
factor analysis the intercorrelations between the tests may 
be accounted for in, perhaps, only five or six factors, each 
factor pointing to common abilities present in certain of 
the tests.
The interpretation of such theoretical common abili­
ties, however, is a psychological rather than a statistical 
exercise and it is in the interpretation of the factors 
that construct validity principles emerge. Thus for example 
convergent validity appears if the test or tests under con­
sideration load on a common factor with other tests thought 
to measure the same construct, while discriminant validity 
is suggested if the test does not appear significantly on 
the same factor as tests measuring abilities to which it is 
supposedly unrelated. Although it is unlikely that any test 
would appear in such a ’pure’ a precise manner, as there are 
likely to be a number of minor abilities present in all 
tests, this method of analysis has become of central impor­
tance in modern test construction and validation. Construct 
validity obtained by this means is often referred to as 
’factorial validity’. (Guilford, 1973.)
This is a two-edged compliment however for while it 
points to the important part played by factor analysis in 
test development and validation, it also infers the wisdom 
of underlining the source of such validation. There is a 
good deal of arbitrary judgement involved in choosing methods
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of factor analysis, and the test used, and the technique is 
not without its critics. Factor analysis has been the main 
tool by which Guilford has attempted to validate his 
structure-of-intellect model, in which "each intellectual 
component or factor is a unique ability that is needed to 
do well in a certain class of tasks or tests" (Guilford, 
1959, 1968). While Guilford however claims to have demons­
trated, using factor analysis, the construct validity of 
most of his abilities including those of divergent thinking, 
a number of objections have been raised (e.g. Humphreys, 
1962; Cattell, 1971). Guilford’s theory and some of the 
objections will be looked at more closely later. In general 
it is worth remembering that, as Thorndike and Hagan (1969) 
observe "this internal or ’factorial validity’ still seems 
to need evidence of relationship to life events outside the 
tests themselves if the factor is to have much substance 
and vitality".
Construct validity will be investigated in this study 
both theoretically and experimentally. The theoretical 
basis for the construct validity of divergent thinking tests 
in relation to the wider issue of creative thinking will be 
presented in Chapter 3, and the practical investigation will 
involve a study of divergent performance in relation to a 
range of variables including intelligence and academic per­
formance .
There are also suggestions (Butcher, 1972; Nuttall, 
1972) that divergent thinking is likely to be related to 
personality and motivational factors as well as to cognitive 
ones, and the experimental study of construct validity will
23.
endeavour to include some affective as well as cognitive 
variables.
1.3 RELIABILITY
Test reliability refers to the consistency with which 
individuals score on some test. In general terms it indi­
cates the extent to which individual differences in test 
scores are attributable to some ’true’ differences in 
whatever characteristics are being assessed by the test, 
and the extent to which they are attributable to chance 
errors. More technically, measures of test reliability 
allow one to estimate what proportion of the total variance 
of test scores is due to ’error variance’, and what propor­
tion to whatever characteristic the test is able to measure 
consistently.
Performance on a test can be influenced by a large 
number of factors giving rise to variation in test scores. 
Following Thorndike (1951), these are commonly grouped in 
terms of lasting and temporary characteristics of the indi­
vidual and variations due to the administration and scoring 
of the tests (Brown, 1976). Stanley (1971) suggests that 
although no list of sources of variation can be exhaustive, 
a consideration of such categories can help particular 
investigators to decide which contributions should be 
thought of as true variance in the quality being measured, 
and which as error variance. At the same time he notes that 
it is possible for different investigators to view the func­
tion of a test differently so that ’true variance’ for one 
may be ’error’ for another. Some investigators may, for 
example, treat ’test-taking attitudes’ as a source of error.
24.
whilst others may consider them as characteristics which the 
test is meant to assess.
Although for some researchers their interest in the 
intercorrelations among a battery of tests at a given time 
leads them to adopt a measure of the 'internal* reliability 
or consistency of the tests at that moment in time, it is 
usually the degree to which a test can assess lasting 
characteristics that is of interest. After all, as Cattell 
(1964) states plainly "psychological testing has its very 
raison d'etre in predicting real-life behaviour". For the 
purpose of prediction or the evaluation of some period of 
training therefore, the more meaningful definition of relia­
bility is, as Stanley (1971) observes, "that of consistency 
over a comparable period of time".
No psychological test is perfectly reliable, but one 
must expect a high level of consistency from one performance 
to another or when assessed by different markers, or any 
subsequent claim to validity could only be of a transient 
and coincidental nature. Reliability in these cases is thus 
a prerequisite for validity, and it is frequently stated 
that no test can be valid unless it is reliable (e.g. Wesman, 
1952, 1976). Unless the term 'reliability* has been clearly 
defined however this bare statement can be misleading.
Wesman points out that "there is no such thing as the relia­
bility coefficient for a test", and that it is relative to 
the situation and purpose for which it was calculated. He 
nevertheless includes measures of internal consistency or 
'test homogeneity* within his generic use of the term relia­
bility, though an excessively high level of homogenity can 
reduce the chances of the test being a good predictor of
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external criteria which frequently include a number of abi­
lities. Cattell (1964) points out that "we pay a heavy 
price, in terms of testing inefficiency, for mistaking 
homogeneity for reliability. Confining the term ’reliabi­
lity’ to the agreement of scores ’across occasions’ he 
notes that a high reliability is desirable, but that "an 
optimum rather than a high homogeneity is commonly desired". 
As in the case of his suggestions for a different nomencla­
ture for the various types of validity, Cattell’s proposals 
for a change in the titles of coefficients referring to 
test consistency have not been widely adopted, though his 
warning of the relative nature of different aspects of what 
is commonly termed reliability is a salutory start to this 
discussion of the concept. In particular it underlies the 
limitations in the common practice of reporting the relia­
bility of divergent thinking tests in terms of their inter­
nal consistency rather than their consistency over a period 
of time. This issue and further discussion of the reliabi­
lity of divergent tests will be returned to later, after an 
outline of the more common methods of assessing various 
aspects of reliability.
In the general sense in which it is used, reliability 
can be looked at in various ways, by re-examining with a 
similar test, by repeating the same test on different 
occasions, by examination of how individuals have performed 
on different sections of the test, and by the consistency 
with which different scorers would allocate the same mark.
1.31 Test-retest Reliability
Performance on a test can be influenced by day to day
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fluctuations in a person’s attitude, mood and state of 
health. These can arise from an infinite number of changes 
in his personal circumstances, from having an early night 
to having a row at home. The degree to which test perform­
ance is affected by such random changes in the conditions 
of the subjects over some period of time can be assessed by 
comparing their performances on the same test on two differ­
ent occasions. The coefficient of correlation between the 
scores obtained by the same individuals on the two occasions 
gives the ’test-retest’ reliability coefficient of the test. 
The error variance from this method includes variance due 
to temporal changes and also from random changes that might 
occur in the testing environment, for example from changes 
in the weather, background noise or classroom arrangements.
It also includes a source of error due to memory or practice 
effect introduced by repeating the test.
Examiners can reduce some of the sources of error 
variance by adhering to definite standards of organisation 
and administration that eliminate the more obvious possible 
sources of error such as seating arrangements, equipment, 
instructions, time limits and general rapport with the 
class. With standardised tests such conditions are clearly 
stated from the provision of spare pencils to standard sets 
of instructions. With divergent thinking tests however this 
is far from the case and numerous methods of administration 
are employed. Tests are given on a group basis with time 
limits for each section (e.g. Torrance, 1974), with an 
overall time limit for all sections (Vernon, 1971), with a 
mixture of timed and non-timed sections (Getzels and Jackson, 
1962) , and with no time limit (Cropley and Maslany, 1969).
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Wallach and Kogan (1966) recommend their method of individual 
administration in a game-like atmosphere with no time limits.
It is noticeable that most test reliabilities arising 
from these situations have been internal consistency coeffi­
cients rather than test-retest coefficients. This point 
will be returned to later.
1.32 Alternate-form Reliability
One method of avoiding the problems of memory, and to 
some extent that of practice, which may affect re-test 
performance is to use an alternate or parallel form of the 
test, but maintain a time interval. This introduces other 
sources of variation from the use of different items in the 
test, but this may in fact be an advantage as measurement 
of error from item selection is also an important aspect in 
test construction. The error variance in this case is 
therefore due to personal and environmental fluctuations 
over time, and varying responses to different items in the 
test (internal consistency).
If an alternate form were administered without delay 
following the original test it would neglect to assess 
error due to a change in personal circumstances over an 
interval and be largely a measure of ’internal consistency’. 
Any immediate retesting however may also introduce its own 
errors of boredom and fatigue.
1.33 Internal Consistency
One advantage of an internal consistency measurement 
of reliability is that it can be assessed from a single 
administration of the test. This is not only convenient
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but also valuable when test-retest methods are inappropriate. 
For certain types of test the experience of taking the test 
once would distort the performance on a second occasion, 
and an internal measure of the tests consistency on a single 
occasion can provide valuable information about the test.
It should not be taken as a substitute for reliability over 
time however. It assesses a different aspect of the tests 
consistency namely the consistency or homogeneity of indi­
viduals’ performances over the different subsets or indivi­
dual items of the test. It thus confines itself to inter­
nal errors arising from differing responses to test items.
In the ’split-half’ method two scores are obtained for 
each individual, by dividing up the test into two comparable 
halves, consisting, for example, of the odd and even items 
respectively. These pairs of scores are then correlated 
and an estimate made of the correlation which would have 
been expected from the full-length test. It is known as 
the coefficient of split-half reliability. To take an 
extreme case however, if the test items were originally 
selected in pairs to cover some aspect of the test then an 
odd-even split would in effect be selecting ’matched items’ 
of the test and would give a spuriously high estimate of 
the test’s internal consistency over all the items.
In all cases in which the items are likely in some way 
to be dependent on each other so that, for instance, 
answering one question helps one to answer the next, inter­
nal consistency methods are not appropriate. As Cronbach 
(1970) notes "Non-independence gives spuriously high co­
efficients". This would also be true in the case of a test 
in which a number of questions remained unanswered, (e.g.
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in a speeded test). In this case candidates would perform 
equally well, (i.e. score 0), on a number of items and if 
these were systematically, or randomly, allocated to the 
test ’halves’ they would inflate the correlation between 
the halves.
A method of assessing internal consistency developed 
by Kuder and Richardson (1937) although still inappropriate 
for non-independent items or speeded tests, is preferable 
in many cases to the split-half method. It removes the 
arbitrary nature of the split-half tests where different 
coefficients could be obtained for different choices of 
halves. It is based on the performance of candidates on 
each item in the test in relation to all the other items, 
and in effect gives a reliability coefficient which is the 
mean of all possible split-half coefficients resulting from 
different splittings of a test (Cronbach, 1970).
Both methods are widely used in assessing the reliabi­
lity of objective tests where a very large number of items 
is a common characteristic, and where problems of sampling 
and coverage of content are of great importance.
Their use has been extended to divergent thinking tests 
however and here their application is somewhat artificial. 
Internal consistency is nevertheless the commonest form of 
reliability coefficient quoted and it is almost invariably 
high. Wallach and Kogan (1966), for example, using the 
split-half method, and Cropley and Maslany (1969) using the 
Kuder Richardson formula 20, both reported a large number 
of coefficients in excess of 0.85.
Alternate-form reliabilities with time intervals 
however are often unsatisfactorily low. Wodtke (1963) , for
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example, investigating the test-retest reliabilities of both 
verbal and non-verbal tests with alternate forms from Torr­
ance's Creativity battery obtained reliabilities for the 
sub-test scores ranging from 0.03 to 0.62 for the non-verbal 
tests and from 0.21 to 0.74 for the verbal tests. Totalling 
the scores from each sub-test to give overall scores for 
fluency, etc., the reliabilities were slightly increased, 
and ranged from 0.23 to 0.63 for the non-verbal battery and 
from 0.35 to 0.79 for the verbal battery. Whilst acknowledg­
ing that Torrance has reported higher reliabilities with 
older subjects, Wodtke suggests that his results, obtained 
from over 100 children in both grade 4 and grade 5, do not 
justify the use of the tests with elementary school children, 
other than for research purposes.
The obvious variation in magnitude of reliabilities 
obtained from internal consistency and test-retest methods 
underlines the necessity to establish the source of any 
figures quoted, and to view reliability, not as a single 
entity but in terms of its different applications. As 
Stanley (1971) emphasises "There is no single, universal, 
and absolute reliability coefficient for a test".
1.34 Discussion
Obviously reliability coefficients from different 
methods are not expected to be the same as they are a measure 
of different sources of error. They indicate the amount of 
true variance that can be ascribed to the test in the circum­
stances being investigated. As with validity therefore, 
reliability has to be closely related to the purpose for 
which the test is being used.
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The relationship between reliability and test variance 
can be expressed in general terms as follows. The total 
test variance (0^)^ can be divided up into two components, 
true variance and error variance so that
The reliability coefficient (r^^) is the proportion of total 
variance which is true variance, so that
Alternatively using the equation above
i.e. it is the proportion of the total variance which remains 
after the proportion of error variance has been subtracted.
In modern test theory these principles are developed 
into general theories regarding error variance and the amount 
of true variance which can be attributed to variance specific 
to the test itself or to variance in common with other tests 
(common factor variance). (Harman, 1967; Guilford, 1973.) 
These principles will be returned to when the factor analy­
sis results are interpreted.
To summarize the relationship between sources of error 
variance and the corresponding reliability coefficients, it 
is useful to refer to the results of some hypothetical 
reliability investigation with a certain (c.f. Anastasi, 
1968). Suppose that alternate-form reliability after a 
two-month interval with 100 children gives a reliability 
coefficient of 0.70, split-half reliability is 0.80, and 
inter-scorer reliability, to be discussed later, calculated
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for a random sample of the scripts is 0.92. As any relia­
bility coefficient can be interpreted directly in terms of 
the percentage of score variance attributable to different 
sources, the alternate-form reliability coefficient of 0.70 
shows that 70% of the variance in test scores depends on 
true variance and 30% depends on error variance from sources 
dependent on fluctuations over time and content sampling.
The split-half coefficient of 0.80 estimates error from con­
tent sampling as 20%. The difference between these estimates 
of error, 30% - 20% = 10%, therefore represents the error due 
to time fluctuations alone. The scoring error is 8%. The 
picture of the test as a whole can therefore be represented 
as follows:
True Variance Error Variance







Fig.l. Percentage Distribution of Variance in a
Hypothetical Test
The true variance taking in account all three sources 
of error is therefore 62%, and this represents the variance 
which should remain stable over changes in time, content 
sampling and scorer differences. All three sources of error 
will be considered in the present study.
The writer however doubts the appropriateness of inter­
nal consistency methods alone when applied to divergent 
thinking tests and the alternate-form method will be preferred 
to cover fluctuations over time and test content. Guilford
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(1973) points out that reliability based on internal consis­
tency "tells us nothing about function stability of persons 
or of tests" though he also notes that "it does have meaning 
in connection with factorial descriptions of tests". High 
internal consistency tells us that whatever a test is measu­
ring at a particular time it is doing so consistently 
throughout the test and there is little error variance due 
to the choice of items. If as in factor analysis our 
interest is confined to the relationships between results of 
particular tests at some particular time, this type of 
internal consistency is appropriate. It is rather like 
Hudson's comment in justifying the use of open-ended tests 
"not in terms of their test-retest reliability", but in 
terms of their power to differentiate between other variables. 
As noted earlier whether these differences are pervasive is a 
different question needing concurrent and predictive valida­
tion. In such cases test-retest or alternate-form reliabi­
lity is needed to examine the tests reliability over time, 
for a test which has low reliability due to variable errors 
over some interval must also have low validity. It cannot 
correlate, except by change, more highly with a criterion 
than with itself.
It is suggested that as our use of divergent thinking 
tests extends into predictions and into use as criteria for 
evaluating teaching methods and curricula content, more 
attention should be given to reliability over time. Although 
interest in divergent thinking tests has moved ahead into 
questions of what can be inferred from the results about 
individuals' future performances, reliability has too often 
remained at the stage of internal consistency.
The goals of validity and reliability are often diffi-
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cult to reconcile, for as Guilford (1973) observes, "when 
we seek to make a single test both highly reliable (inter­
nally) and also highly valid, we are often working at cross
purposes......  In aiming for one goal, we may defeat
efforts towards the other". If a test is highly homogeneous 
it would have a high internal reliability but it might 
correlate with little else but itself or very similar tests. 
Its validity might be defended in terms of construct validity 
of the discriminant or convergent type, but it would need a 
very closely related criterion to show appreciable correla­
tion in other forms of validity.
So far a large proportion of the claims made for the 
validity of divergent thinking tests has been made on this 
basis. Wallach and Kogan (1966) for example emphasising 
the internal consistency of their tests and their lack of 
correlation with intelligence measures. While, as noted 
earlier, others have been less successful than Wallach and 
Kogan, a lack of support for a domain of divergent thinking 
or 'creativity* quite distinct from intelligence and other 
measures would not negate the value of such tests, provided 
they have some element of validity in recognising thinking 
abilities that are not commonly measured by more conventional 
tests. As Vernon (1967) suggests, they may, in pointing to a 
new area of abilities, help "overcome the deadening influence 
of assessing the growing generation for conformity".
Partly, the writer suggests, in order to accommodate 
internal consistency methods however some divergent thinking 
tests have been composed of a number of items (e.g. Wallach 
and Kogan, 1966; Ogilvie, 1974), when only one or two items 
would have sufficed. It could be argued, in fact, that the
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latter would be more likely to yield a meaningful measure 
of divergent thinking. Wallach and Kogan themselves argue 
that children should be given plenty of time to come up 
with ideas, for, "if responses of greater stereotypy are 
likely to come early in a sequence even in the case of 
creative persons, then it will not be possible to detect 
these persons if insufficient time is permitted". They 
also argue for a form of administration that is "relatively 
free from the stress of knowing that one’s behaviour is 
under close evaluation". They consequently administer the 
divergent thinking exercises in a game-like atmosphere on 
an individual basis with no time limit. However having 
conducted the "Uses for objects" test by asking for "all 
the different ways you could use a newspaper" they repeat 
the exercise seven more times with the stimulus object being 
a knife, automobile tyre, cork, shoe, button, key and chair. 
In Wallach and Kogan's experiment the atmosphere might have 
been sufficient to maintain children's motivation to really 
think hard throughout all the items, but it is suggested 
that particularly in a written group presentation (e.g. 
Ogilvie, 1974), the number of items is likely to result in 
pupils doing less than justice to their divergent thinking 
ability. Instead they are likely to spread their efforts 
evenly over the items available without entering deeply into 
the type of thinking in which, as Guilford (1959, 1973) des­
cribes divergent thinking, "considerable searching about is 
done". The result will obviously be high internal consis­
tency though, it is suggested, at the expense of validity.
Objections to the interpretation of the results of 
divergent thinking tests as being independent of general
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intelligence can be made on the grounds that such indepen­
dence can often be explained by their low reliability. To 
increase reliability by increasing the number of items, 
however, is likely to be unprofitable in the long run, when 
such tests are subjected to criterion-related validity 
studies. It is also questionable whether the items are of 
sufficient independence to allow the application of statis­
tical measures of internal consistency.
It is noticeable that Torrance (1974) in the Manual for 
his divergent thinking tests does not refer to internal con­
sistency in commenting on their reliability, nor does he use 
multiple items in his individual tests. He claims instead 
some test-retest reliability for his tests, over various 
periods of time, the longest being after a period of almost 
three years. The evidence is varied, though the majority 
of the retest reliabilities quoted were higher than those 
given by Wodtke (see earlier page 29) and lie in the reason­
ably satisfactory region of 0.60 to 0.70. Most of these, 
however, arose from cumulative scores rather than from 
individual tests and the reliabilities would consequently 
be inflated. Torrance’s disappointment at some of the 
results is nevertheless apparent in his remark that the 
motivational aspects of the testing situations may not have 
been maintained and since the latter is indisputably impor­
tant in creative thinking reliability would be affected.
Apart from differences in administrative conditions 
due to chance factors there are also wide differences in 
the actual procedures recommended by different researchers. 
Since Wallach and Kogan’s emphasis on individual and informal 
testing procedures a number of researchers have investigated
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the effects of different methods of administration. Results 
have been conflicting, relaxed conditions, for example, 
appearing to be more favourable in some experiments (e.g. 
Vernon, 1971) and 'mild stress' (Channon, 1974) in others.
Time allowances have been seen as exerting less influence 
than other characteristics of the test situation (Hargreaves, 
1974) and also as the most potent factor (Van Mondfrans et al, 
1971) . Direct comparison of the various studies is difficult 
however as superficially similar testing batteries and types 
of administration are often composed very differently, 
informal procedures, for example, varying from allowing the 
tests to be taken home to answer at leisure to attempts at 
establishing a game-like atmosphere within the classroom.
What does appear from most of the investigations however 
is confirmation of the presence of different motivational 
effects. This underlines the importance of arriving at some 
set of optimal conditions that will allow the pupils to do 
justice to their divergent thinking abilities and yet be 
sufficiently standardised to be replicable by other investi­
gators without undue variation. No direct investigation is 
being made into differing procedures in this study, though 
some relevant observations will be made when appropriate.
In general the tests will be administered under relaxed but 
timed conditions after the experimenter has become well 
acquainted with the children concerned. Details will be 
given later.
On the basis of this discussion the tests in the study 
will be based, in a similar manner to Torrance, on single 
items only; and to cover fluctuations over time and test
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content reliability will be assessed by the alternate-form 
method after an interval of one week. Details of the tests 
and the form of administration will be given later.
1.35 Long-term Stability
Reliability coefficients obtained by a retest or alter- 
nate-form method after an interval of time are sometimes 
referred to as coefficients of ’stability’, as opposed to 
the coefficients of ’consistency’ arrived at by internal 
measures. The term is perhaps better reserved however for 
long term studies of the constancy or stability of some 
ability, over a considerable period of time rather than for 
shorter periods when it is the reliability of the test 
rather than the trait that is then being investigated.
While studies of retest reliability are generally restricted 
to short-range random changes that occur within a few weeks 
of the initial testing, questions of stability can extend 
for some years after the initial testing.
Cronbach (1970) quotes several retest correlations for 
the Stanford-Binet scale. Over about a week the ’retest 
correlation’ for 200 seven-year-old children was 0.91, over 
4 years it was 0.74 and over 11 years, 0.68. Without 
entering into discussion of the possible self-fulfilling 
nature of the children’s education between 7 and 18 a high 
proportion of the test variance at age 7 can still be meas­
ured at age 18, or looked at from the opposite point of 
view a considerable proportion is not stable over time.
If, however, education places some value on fostering 
divergent thinking in the belief that it will be relevant to 
future work, it is important to have some information about
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the stability of the trait. Haddon and Lytton (1971), for 
example, in one of the very few longitudinal studies of 
divergent abilities, suggest that promotion of divergent 
thinking abilities in the primary school still has a signi­
ficant effect on performance in divergent thinking tests 
four years later. Whether children’s divergent thinking 
abilities increase with age or whether education has a con­
forming influence resulting in diminishing levels of diver­
gent ability is also a matter of long-term study.
Some evidence on these issues of long-term stability 
and the development of divergent thinking abilities will be 
presented in this study. This will be produced by following 
up after an interval of five years, a large proportion of 
the 265, 11 year-old children involved in an earlier study 
of the writer (Richards, 1970). The results should have 
considerable implications for the use of divergent thinking 
tests as predictive measures.
1.36 Scorer Reliability
Psychological tests designed for group use are usually 
provided with highly standardised procedures for scoring 
and the scorer has only to follow carefully the instructions 
given. In such tests there is consequently very little 
error variance attributable to scorer differences. In 
scoring divergent thinking tests however a good deal is 
left to the judgement of the scorer and considerable varia­
tions could occur. There are no ’right’ answers to divergent 
tests, testees are encouraged to be unusual and inventive and 
scoring procedures must attempt to credit such responses
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without departing entirely from judging the appropriateness 
of the anwers.
In these circumstances it would not be surprising if 
two independent scorers arrived at somewhat different 
results. Consequently, as Anastasi (1968) points out, with 
this type of test ’’there is as much need for a measure of 
scorer reliability as there is for the more usual reliabi­
lity coefficients” , and ”it is imperative to ascertain 
scorer reliability for all such instruments” . In spite of 
this warning however the caution that one would expect from 
users of such tests has not been very apparent. Even 
details of the scoring procedures are rarely given and 
measures of inter-scorer reliability are rarer still.
Wallach and Kogan (1966) commenting adversely on aspects 
of the Getzels and Jackson study (1962), note that ”we might 
note such issues as the problem of scoring reliability” and 
observe that for certain measures ”no descriptions of scor­
ing methods nor information as to reliability of scoring 
were provided” . Such criticisms could be levelled at a 
large number of studies involving divergent thinking, yet 
the question of scorer reliability is of crucial importance 
for tests where no completely objective method of scoring 
is possible.
Scorer reliability is found by having a sample of 
scripts independently scored by two markers. The two scores 
thus obtained for each script are then correlated and the 
resulting correlation coefficient is a measure of inter­
scorer reliability. The amount of error from this source 
is distinct from that arrived at by retest and internal 
consistency measures and can be represented as shown earlier
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(Fig.l, page 32). The chief reason why inter-scorer relia­
bility is seldom reported is no doubt due to the time and 
effort needed to score divergent thinking tests. For scor­
ing anything more than fluency the procedures are quite 
lengthy and, unlike scoring standardised tests, potential 
scorers also need to be aware of the principles underlying 
the tests.
Vernon (1971) observes that "a preliminary difficulty 
to be overcome in using divergent thinking tests is the com­
plexity and tediousness of scoring, though this is seldom 
referred to in the literature” , and Cronbach (1970) points 
out simply that ’’scoring tests of this sort is difficult” . 
Questioning the relationship some researchers have found 
between age and divergent production, Cronbach also suggests 
that with a subjective element in the scoring procedures, 
scorers may inadvertently be more severe in scoring work of 
older persons. The writer suggests that subjective impres­
sions can also seriously affect one’s assessments of children 
within groups.
Some time will be given in this study to investigate 
this possibility. Details of scoring procedures from other 
studies will be reviewed, and every effort made to establish j 
reliable scoring procedures for present use, and possibly / 
for further investigations by the writer or others. /
Without such procedures any subsequent results regarding the 
reliability and validity of the tests could only be of a 
personal and fortuitous nature.
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1.4 SUMMARY
It has been suggested that many doubts exist about the 
reliability and validity of divergent thinking tests, not 
the least in relation to their label as ’creativity' tests. 
Neither reliability nor validity is an absolute concept 
however and the previous discussion has attempted to clarify 
some of their different aspects, and their application to 
tests of divergent thinking.
The action to be taken in the present study to investi­
gate the issues raised involves investigation of the 
following : -
(a) Scoring procedures and inter-scorer reliability.
(b) Alternate-form reliability over an interval of 
one week.
(c) Long-term stability over an interval of five 
years.
(d) Concurrent validity, including ratings of 
children’s creative interests and behaviour, and 
a practical exercise designed to entail divergent 
thinking.
(e) Construct validity in relation to a range of 
variables both cognitive and affective.
The theoretical basis for construct validity will also 
be discussed (Chapter 3) and practical investigations of 
reliability and validity will be reviewed (Chapter 4).
The next chapter will look more closely at two issues 
remaining outstanding since attention was drawn to them in 
the Introduction. Firstly, the educational relevance of a 
study of creative abilities and what has been disparagingly 
referred to as the ’’cult of creativity” (White, 1968), and
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secondly, the relationship between divergent thinking tests 
and so-called tests of creativity. In order to clarify the 




CREATIV ITY,  DIVERGENT THINKING AND CLASSROOM LEARNING
2.1 CREATIVITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CREATIVE THINKING
ABILITIES IN THE CLASSROOM
A large proportion of the creativity research that has 
been related to children’s thinking and school learning 
acknowledges the early work of Torrance (1959, 1962, 1963) 
in identifying and developing creative abilities in the 
classroom. Much of this research involves Torrance’s diver­
gent thinking tests, (labelled the Torrance Tests of Crea­
tive Thinking, latest version: Torrance, 1974) which he has
adapted from the Guilford material, for use in schools from 
’’kindergarten thru graduate school” .
In addition to his influence in designing divergent 
tests to assess children’s creative thinking abilities, 
Torrance has also played a significant part, in books such 
as Guiding Creative Talent (1962) and Rewarding Creative 
Behaviour (1965) , in influencing approaches to the school 
curriculum to develop such abilities, and he emphasises the 
part education should play in developing these ’’creative 
characteristics” , both for the individual’s personal fulfil­
ment and to satisfy the needs of society for creative initia­
tive. He considers a formal, passive, authoritarian approach 
to learning to be unlikely to stimulate a child’s capacity to 
think creatively. Instead he suggests that ”a child learns 
creatively by questioning, inquiring, searching, manipulat­
ing, experimenting, even by aimless play; in short, by 
always trying to get at the truth” (Torrance, 1963).
Crutchfield (1964) also emphasises the freedom needed
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for children to develop their creative talents, and suggests 
that pressures on a child to conform inhibits his creativity 
and quells his motivation so that he loses his "trust in the 
essential validity of his own processes of thought and 
imagination". Mooney (1967) commenting on ’Creation in the 
Classroom setting’, underlines the importance of communica­
tion between teacher and pupil in a spirit of mutual enquiry, 
and Wallach and Kogan (1966) make a similar plea for class­
room conditions conducive to fostering creativity, and 
advocate a stress-free atmosphere in which the creative child 
"can blossom forth cognitively".
Though such assumptions are likely to be tempered some­
what under the "astringent intellectual scrutiny" which the 
Plowden Report (196 7) recommends that teachers should bring 
to bear on their day to day work, and by warnings of indis­
criminate reaction against values of the traditional school 
curriculum (Dearden, 1968; Peters, 1969), they express a 
philosophy which underlies much of the curriculum development 
that has taken place both in this country and in America in 
the last twenty years. In particular the word ’creativity’ 
has become closely linked to teaching methods that emphasise 
the role of experience and personal discovery in children’s 
learning.
Critics of this link however have suggested that its 
dépendance on a personal ’everyday’ concept of creativity 
is becoming confusing, meaningless and even anti-educational 
(White, 1968), and that mere ’openness’ may in fact lead to 
the child’s level of adjustment being less than adequate to 
meet the demands of the adult world (Shouksmith, 1970). If 
the word ’creative’ is used to describe any activity instigated
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by the child himself, criticisms are understandable, for it 
might well appear that at classroom level "one only need 
speak to be creative" (Dearden, 1968) or that creative 
answers appear to be equated with the ability to write 
(Hudson, 1966).
To be able to think of new ideas and to act for oneself 
however are abilities to be encouraged in children, and 
methods of fostering them in the classroom deserve attention. 
The real danger is that means may be mistaken for ends 
especially if they are given the title of ’creative' activi­
ties. Partly because of the conceptual confusion surround­
ing such a term, Ausubel (1968) suggests that "many other­
wise hardheaded educators have adopted highly unrealistic 
educational objectives regarding the nurturance of creativity, 
and many otherwise well-trained educational and school psy­
chologists have deluded themselves into believing that they 
are able to identify pupils with unusual potentialities for 
creativity".
Accepting the desirability of ’teaching for creativity’ 
is to adopt an attractive principle, but it is a long way 
from knowing how to put it into practice. The questions of 
how to recognise, and how best to foster creative abilities, 
are still far from having any definite answers. One step in 
the right direction however is to attempt to clarify what is 
meant by creativity.
2.11 Defining Creativity
In studies of creativity a rough distinction can be made 
between those orientated to products, persons or processes 
(Brogen and Sprecher, 1964; Wallach, 1970). The first two
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of these perspectives normally focus on adult populations, 
and an extensive literature (e.g. Roe, 1953; Cattell and 
Drevdahl, 1955; MacKinnon, 1962; Taylor C.W. et al^ 1963; 
Taylor D.W., 1963; Cross et a7, 1967) has accumulated 
regarding the occupational achievement and personalities of 
individuals in both the arts and sciences.
Product-centred criteria however have been extremely 
varied in nature, including indices such as salary, number 
of publications or patents, membership of professional 
bodies and ratings by peers or panels of judges, and it is 
not surprising that Golann (1963) finds that they turn out 
to be relatively uncorrelated among themselves. The creative 
person too is revealed as a very complicated person, MacKin­
non (1962) for example finding from his study of creative 
architects that "the successful and effective architect must, 
with the skill of a juggler, combine, reconcile, and exer­
cise the diverse skills of businessman, lawyer, artist, 
engineer, and advertising man, as well as those of author 
and journalist, psychiatrist, educator, and psychologist"I
It is on the third aspect, that of processes that 
research involving divergent thinking tests has concentrated 
in an effort to recognise and foster psychological processes 
that may be more generally related to creative thinking abi­
lities than an emphasis on products or persons.
Taylor (1964) is critical of a process definition of 
creativity preferring to rely on evaluation of the product.
He suggests however that no single definition of creativity 
will suit all workers in the field, and he is no doubt right 
in suggesting that creativity is likely to be a complex 
rather than a unitary concept. While some researchers would
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consequently adopt different labels for various abilities 
thought likely to be of value in creative production, diver­
gent thinking being one of them, Taylor recommends the 
adoption of different definitions of creativity! He 
encourages a blanket use of the word to enable researchers 
to move ahead in their work either by choosing "tentatively 
an existing definition of creativity" or by developing "a 
definition of their own". This ’inspirational’ use of the 
term no doubt helped encourage the early enthusiasm for 
creativity research in such gatherings as Taylor’s ’Univer­
sity of Utah Research Conferences on the Identification of 
Creative Scientific Talent’ which began in 1956, though 
subsequent evaluation of the researches is made almost 
unmanageable by the diversity of definitions. Some of the 
confusion is removed if the particular context of the defi­
nition is made clear, but even this is not always done and 
readers of the research literature consequently tend to 
interpret the terminology in their own way, not necessarily 
in the way the investigators intended.
The definitions of creativity favoured by the organisers 
of the Utah conferences were directed towards the evaluation 
of the degree of creativeness of a product or a performance 
as distinct, Taylor (1964) notes, from estimates of potential 
such as test scores. Taylor recommends two definitions, that 
of Ghiselin (1957), "that the measure of a creative product 
be the extent to which it restructures our universe of 
understanding", and that of Lacklen R.L., who reported at 
the Second Utah Conference (Taylor, 1958) that in scientific 
work at the Space Agency creativity was defined by "the 
extent of the area of science that the contribution underlies".
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Taylor suggests that despite certain differences in emphasis 
the two definitions were considered to be quite compatible, 
and showed the same emphasis on the creative product rather 
than creative process. Whilst recognising that indicators 
of creative potential can be assessed from both products and 
processes he suggests that criteria for the evaluation of 
degree of creativity are much better sought in the product 
rather than in assessment of the process.
With populations of research scientists or in evaluat­
ing the contributions of exceptional individuals Taylor’s 
considerations are no doubt important and a good deal of 
creativity literature is concerned with establishing criteria 
for judging the creative products of talented individuals.
In any absolute sense however, what is creative has to be 
debated in terms of the values, judgements and stage of 
development of a particular culture (Dentier and Mackler,
1962) , and with varying aesthetic and professional points 
of view it is not surprising that the problem of evaluating 
creativity in terms of products has not reached any consen­
sus. Golann (1963) claims that criteria that involve 
evaluating the product have been found to be so inconsistent 
that they are virtually useless, and Shapiro (1968) observes 
that one of the disheartening conclusions emerging from 
approximately fifteen years of intensive research is that 
little progress has been made on achieving acceptable cri­
teria of creativity.
Welsh (1973) is similarly dismayed at the lack of suc­
cess in arriving at an acceptable definition. Despite the 
increasing attention being paid to creativity he suggests 
that ’’it does not seem possible to offer a simple, substantive
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definition of creativity that would win consensus. This is 
borne out by most reviewers of the field. Taylor I.A. (1959) 
analyses over one hundred different definitions, Dudek (1974) 
somewhat belatedly notes that "there are some fifty defini­
tions of creativity", and Dacey and Madeus (1969) more 
realistically point out that the number of definitions of 
creativity are "only slightly fewer than the numerous works 
on the subject".
Any attempt to establish a consensus definition of 
creativity is therefore unlikely to succeed, and it underlines 
the deceptive use of the word in relation to divergent think­
ing test alone. At the same time in order to move nearer 
towards an understanding of creativity in its totality we 
must, as Welsh (1973) suggests, first understand some of the 
bits and pieces of human behaviour related to the subject 
"regardless of the fact that the observed behaviour may 
seem at this time to be far removed from the supernatural 
acts of a creative genius".
Different perspectives within the broad study of crea­
tivity are each likely to be important contributions to this 
understanding, provided investigators refrain from assuming 
that the concept of creativity can be conceptualised fully 
within any particular perspective. It is suggested however 
that investogations of creativity as a process may be more 
profitable than other apparatus, not only in identifying 
and developing those abilities that are considered likely 
to enhance one's potential for creative production, but also 
in developing practical criteria related to such a process. 
Rogers (1954, 1970) defines creativity as a process result­
ing in "emergence in action of a novel relational product,
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growing out of the uniqueness of the individual on the one 
hand, and the materials, events, people or circumstances 
of his life on the other". This allows him to relate the 
concept of creativity to a personal level as Bruner (1960, 
1961) does for 'discovery' and Guilford (1950) for 'creative 
abilities'. Bruner (1960) in the context of discussing 
school learning, makes it clear that the concept of discovery 
should not be restricted to the act of finding out something 
that before was unknown to mankind, but rather should relate 
to the individual, and to all forms of obtaining knowledge 
for oneself by the use of one's mind.
Guilford (1950) discussing creative abilities maintains 
that the general psychological conviction is that "all indi­
viduals possess to some degree all abilities, except for the 
occurrence of pathologies". Whatever, therefore, the compo­
nents of creativity might be this principle of 'continuity 
of abilities' maintains that they are present to some extent 
in all of us. In this way, a study of 'creativity' in terms 
of a process rather than a product can provide a basis for 
investigating and developing creative abilities in all 
individuals not just in those who have distinguished them­
selves in some field. In a similar way, Rogers (1954, 1970) 
sees the creative process as being present, to some degree, 
in most activity so that "the action of the child inventing 
a new game with his playmates, Einstein formulating a
theory of relativity,  ..... all of these are, in terms of
our definition creative".
In order to study creative behaviour, Torrance (1974) 
is also convinced that the definition of creativity should 
be based on that of a process;-
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"a process of becoming sensitive to problems, 
deficiencies, gaps in knowledge, missing elements, 
disharmonies, and so on; identifying the diffi­
culty; searching for solutions, making guesses, 
or formulating hypotheses about the deficiencies; 
testing and retesting these hypotheses and 
possibly modifying and retesting them; and 
finally communicating the results." Torrance (1974).
Torrance sees this definition as describing a natural 
human process that it is in harmony with historic usage and 
equally applicable in scientific, artistic, literary, drama­
tic, and interpersonal creativity. It is in fact such a 
comprehensive definition that it reminds one of Wechsler’s 
(1958, 1974) definition of intelligence as "the aggregate 
or global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, 
to think rationally and to deal effectively with his environ­
ment", and his comments that "it is global because it 
characterises the individual’s behaviour as a whole; it is 
an aggregate because it is composed of elements or abilities 
which, though not entirely independent, are qualitatively 
differentiable". Torrance's definition, on which he has 
based his whole work on creativity, is seen by Ausubel 
(1963) as defining "a generalised constellation of intellec­
tual abilities, personality variables, and problem-solving 
traits", and while he does not deny the existence of such a 
general group of creative abilities he objects to Torrance's 
labelling of the abilities as if they were a highly particu­
larised and substantive capacity.
This objection however is levelled less at Torrance's 
definition than at his operational interpretation of the 
definition in terms of his creativity test. The limitations 
of the latter will be discussed in the next section. For
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the present it is suggested that Torrance’s global definition 
of creativity has much to commend it. Guilford (1950) 
appeals to a similar general concept of creativity in terms 
of ’’those patterns of traits that are characteristic of 
creative persons", and like Ausubel he sees these as includ­
ing a broad category of abilities, applitudes, interests and 
temperamental qualities.
It is important to realise that process definitions of 
creativity are based on a person’s ’potential’ for creative 
performance in real life not on the actual quality of his 
output. Torrance (1974) points out that a high level of the 
abilities in his process definition do not guarantee that 
the possessor will behave in a creative manner, rather, they 
increase his chance of behaving creatively.
Guilford similarly emphasises that creative abilities 
determine whether the individual has the "power to exhibit 
creative behaviour to a noteworthy degree". Whether or not 
the gifted individual actually produces results of a crea­
tive nature depends on other factors including motivation 
and opportunity.
Drevdahl (1956) in an attempt to define the creative 
process also finds himself formulating a generalised defini­
tion of creativity as:-
"the capacity of persons to produce compositions, 
products, or ideas of any sort which are essentially 
new or novel, and previously unknown to the producer.
It can be imaginative activity, or thought synthesis, 
where the product is not a mere summation. It may 
involve the forming of new patterns and combinations 
of information derived from past experience, and the 
transplanting of old relationships to new correlates.
It must be purposeful or goal directed, not mere idle
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fantasy - although it need not have immediate prac­
tical application or be a perfect and complete 
product. It may take the form of an artistic, 
literary or scientific production or may be of a 
procedural or methodological nature."
While this type of generalised definition based on crea­
tivity as a process appears to be one way of incorporating 
all the different aspects of creative ability, its very 
generality means that in practice it verges on the meaning­
less. In principle however it reminds one that creativity 
is not a specific term and that investigations of children’s 
behaviour within the overall field should be related not to 
different, more specific, definitions of ’creativity’ but to 
other more specific and more easily defined variables.
One way of narrowing the field has been to study the 
types of thinking that appear to be involved in the creative 
process. It should be emphasised however that to label any 
one particular type of thinking as creative is likely to 
result, as in attempts to categorise the ’creative product’, 
in a multitude of different thinking abilities claiming to 
justify the title. As Vernon (1973) points out, "to the
psychologist .......  creative thinking is merely one of the
many kinds of thinking which range from autistic fantasy 
and dreaming to logical reasoning". "Indeed," as he adds, 
"to some extent it seems to partake of both extremes".
Many writers however have attempted to specify criteria 
for creative thinking usually associated with novel or 
unusual combinations of ideas. Thurstone (1952) sees crea­
tive thinking in terms of what is novel for an individual 
and argues that it makes no difference how society regards 
the idea. Stein (1967) on the other hand claims that
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thinking can only be called creative if it results in a 
product which is not simply novel to the individual but 
obeys certain external criteria which are relative to the 
society of which the individual is part. This, however, is 
to return to the difficulty of defining the creative pro­
duct, and it is suggested that specific definitions of 
creative thinking are likely to be similarly constricting 
and in the long run confusing. Instead, in parallel to the 
definition of creativity as a general process, it is sugges­
ted that creative thinking should be seen as a multifaceted 
activity. It would then be more appropriate to talk in 
terms of creative thinking abilities and to designate any 
particular ability in some specific way. In general there­
fore creative thinking will be concerned with a process 
resulting in some new thought ̂ insight or material product ; 
the difference between what is new to an individual and 
what is C'^^dged as valuable and original by Society at large 
being only a matter of degree. In this way thinking abili­
ties that have variously been labelled "productive" (Werth- 
euner, 1961), "adventurous" (Bartlett, 1958), "lateral" (De 
Bono, 1967) or "divergent" (Guilford, 1956) can be recog­
nised as being relevant to creative thinking in general.
2.12 Educational Implications
With creativity defined in terms of a process involving 
a variety of creative thinking abilities, it is possible to 
consider means whereby education might foster such abilities, 
and it enables teaching to be more directly related to 
developing children’s creative thinking not simply as a 
vague ideal but with particular thinking skills in mind.
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Torrance (1972) maintains that improvements in creative 
thinking skills are most predictable when direct teaching 
is involved, and Bruner (1961) emphasises the part that 
"inductive teaching" can play in helping pupils to be 
exploratory and constructive in their thinking. Even Burt 
(1962) , while critical of any concept of creativity con­
fined to divergent abilities, welcomes the attention that 
schools might give to individuals whose special abilities 
are of a productive rather than a merely reproductive type.
Wallach and Kogan (1966) after emphasising the import­
ance of divergent abilities nevertheless acknowledge that 
there are both divergent and convergent aspects of creative 
thinking and that both should be developed in the classroom. 
They suggest that more attention should be given to problem 
solving and personal exploration as each provides opportuni­
ties for fostering associative and inferential modes of 
thinking.
More specifically de Bono (1973) has created materials 
specially designed for "teaching thinking directly". In 
the past, he suggests, education has emphasised thinking 
skills concerned with the development and utilization of 
ideas rather than with the making of new ideas, and he 
emphasises the need to develop what he terms "lateral think­
ing" and "the more creative aspects of mind" (de Bono, 1969),
In America Wootton (1965) describing the work of the 
School Mathematics Study Group notes that many of the exer­
cises were designed to be of a discovery type to extend the 
treatment in the text and also "promote original thinking 
and creativity on the part of the student", and similar 
beliefs in the value of exploratory material to encourage
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children’s thinking processes are apparent in a number of 
British projects. The Nuffield Primary Mathematics Project 
aims to foster in children ’’a critical, logical, but also 
creative turn of mind" Nuffield Foundation (1964a), and the 
director (Matthews, 1969) notes that the central message of 
the project was to "let the children think". A further 
Nuffield Project (1964b) was designed to "encourage children 
to think freely and courageously about science", and Kerr 
(1966) suggests that the central purpose of the Nuffield 
science courses was "to stimulate critical and imaginative 
thinking".
It is noteworthy that the above suggestions for encoura­
ging creativity do so, not in the trivial sense of any spon­
taneous action of the child, but in terms of those original 
and imaginative aspects of children’s thinking that are 
likely to contribute to the process of creative thinking. 
Although the implementation of some of the suggestions might 
have been due to the mood of the times and the "wave of 
romantic enthusiasm for the spontaneous" that Butcher (1972) 
maintains characterises some of the interest in creativity, 
the aims mentioned are firmly based in the realm of child­
ren’s creative thinking abilities, and show a considerable 
overlap with the views of Guilford (1958) relating divergent 
thinking skills to "creative thinking and invention".
Not all the aims are easy to translate into definite 
teaching objectives however, and although they clearly inter­
pret creativity in terms of creative thinking abilities they 
could look more closely at the skills involved so that the 
teaching could be more specifically directed towards those 
ends.
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Shouksmith (1970) supports the view that creative 
thinking abilities can be encouraged and developed, but also 
suggests that educationalists in general have taken an 
altogether too simple view of creativity, and that to 
encourage children to express themselves openly is not 
enough. He considers instead that children should be edu­
cated in the use of appropriate strategies to meet a wide 
range of problem situations. This view is in accord with 
Guilford’s (1952) suggestions that like most behaviour 
creative activity probably represents to some extent many 
learned skills, and that appropriate teaching methods and 
techniques will help promote such abilities including those 
of divergent thinking (Guilford, 1967).
Torrance (1972) reviewing attempts at improving child­
ren’s creative abilities by using specific teaching programmes 
reports that improvement was shown on over 90% of the criteria 
used. As the latter were largely divergent thinking tests the 
effectiveness of the teaching methods in improving other 
thinking abilities should be questioned, but looked at in 
terms of divergent abilities alone the improvements are con­
sistent with Guilford’s view that such abilities can be 
enhanced by appropriate teaching. Based on a similar view 
held by the writer, further support for this finding is 
reported by Franklin and Richards (1977) as the result of 
teaching procedures designed specifically to foster child­
ren’s divergent thinking abilities. The latter avoids the 
issue of whether divergent thinking tests justify their 
common title of ’creativity tests’, but this question is now 
considered in the next section.
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2.2 DIVERGENT THINKING TESTS - NOT ’CREATIVITY’ TESTS
Since Guilford’s (1950) re-emphasis of the term ’crea­
tivity’ many psychologists have adopted the word to describe 
divergent thinking tests in much the same way as educational­
ists have been tempted to equate ’creativity’ with ’freedom 
of expression’ in the classroom. To suggest, Brown (1976), 
that in order for a behaviour to be indicative of creativity, 
or a test classed as a measure of creativity, responses must 
be produced rather than just selected from among available 
responses; is to adopt a narrow and limited interpretation 
of both creativity and divergent thinking.
Even writers who accept a wide interpretation of crea­
tivity in terms of the process definition suggested in the 
last section argue for the retention of the word creative 
to label divergent thinking aspects of creative ability.
Even if, as Wallach and Kogan (1966) suggest their diver­
gent thinking measure, based on the production of fluent 
and novel associates related to some stimulus, can be shown 
to be ’’strikingly independent of the conventional realm of 
general intelligence, while at the same time being a unitary 
and pervasive dimension of individual differences in its own 
right’’, it seems highly undesirable for such a dimension to 
be labelled ’creativity’. They do not themselves deny the 
value of other abilities, particularly general intelligence, 
in achieving real-life creative performance, but their 
limited use of the term ’creativity’ with its exclusion of 
abilities like intelligence may well be anti-educational if 
it were to be taken by teachers and others to be more than 
just a label for one type of psychological ability - no 
matter how important those particular abilities might be.
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It is therefore of some concern to the writer that the 
tests have been widely used and described as criteria of 
creativity in evaluations of curricula and teaching approa­
ches. This is particularly common in America but also not 
unusual in this country, Ogilvie (1974) and Starr and 
Nicholl (1975), for example, both accept the term creativity 
as describing an activity based on divergent thinking. 
Torrance (1972) reviewed 142 studies of programmes designed 
to "teach children to think creatively", 103 of which used 
performance on his divergent thinking battery, described as 
'Tests of Creative Thinking' as criteria. The latter 
ranged from evaluations of children's creativity due to 
'creative versus non creative school climate' (Raina, 1971), 
'multimedia sensory exercises' (Abbott, 1972) and 'music 
improvisation' (Vaughan and Myers, 1971), to teaching 
approaches based on programmes of 'creative expression' 
(Schaefer, 1970) and 'creative problem solving' (Olkin, 
1967). Notwithstanding this diversity, Torrance's tests 
were often the sole criterion of creativity used.
It appears that the 'bandwaggon' of creativity research 
remarked on by Hudson (1966) is now running markedly out of 
control. It is certainly running away with much of the 
validity that Torrance might claim for his tests if they 
were more precisely defined in terms of divergent thinking. 
While he notes that "I strongly favour and have used more 
'real life’ criteria" Torrance (1972), he nevertheless 
defends the validity of his tests as tests of creativity, 
in the belief that "the word describes the behaviour inves­
tigated more adequately than any other word I know".
Torrance describes the creative behaviour being
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investigated in terms of his process definition given in 
the last section (page 52) but while his definition can be 
justified as a global definition of creativity his claim 
that the behaviour is adequately assessed by his divergent 
thinking measures is asking a great deal more than appears 
realistic. He modifies his claim somewhat by mentioning 
that it is people's potential for creative behaviour that 
is assessed, but even so the abilities assessed by his tests 
would seem to sample only some of the creative thinking 
abilities that could be suggested.
Even though Guilford (1965) notes that he believes his 
divergent thinking category "to contain some of the most 
directly relevant intellectual abilities for creative 
thinking and creative production", it must be emphasised 
that he does not equate divergent thinking with creativity. 
His structure of intellect model, to be discussed later, 
contains a wide range of other intellectual abilities 
including those covered by the conventional type of I.Q. 
test, and though critical of a conception of creative talent 
accounted for solely in terms of high intelligence or I.Q., - 
a concept he suggests is largely responsible for the lack of 
progress in the understanding of creative people - he empha­
sises that creativity is likely to be a matter involving the 
entire personality "including intelligence".
Torrance on the other hand, whilst accepting that crea­
tive abilities and tendencies are likely to be related to a 
'constellation of general abilities', sees these abilities 
largely in terms of divergent production. He notes that his 
tests involve different kinds of thinking that incorporate 
many features from models of the creative process but also
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that "An attempt is made, however, to assess the products 
that result from the administration of these test activities 
in terms of Guilford’s divergent thinking factors (fluency, 
flexibility, originality, and elaboration)" (Torrance, 1966).
It is in this step from his general definition of creativity 
to the specific abilities covered by his tests that Torrance’s 
theoretical arguments become separated from his practical 
assessments. Notwithstanding this he labels the tests, in 
association with his process definition of creativity as 
tests of ’Creative Thinking’.
Taking Torrance’s test in conjunction with the wide use 
of other batteries of divergent thinking tests designed or 
adapted for their own use by other researchers, including 
Getzels and Jackson (1962) and Wallach and Kogan (1966) but 
also labelled as ’creativity’ tests, a very large proportion 
of ’creativity’ research needs to be put in perspective as 
being largely an investigation of divergent thinking abilities.
As Torrance (1966) observes in commenting on the devel­
opment of his tests, they probably represent the first time 
that a battery of such tests has ever been made available 
for general research use, at least with children. Their wide 
classroom use however is another source of concern, for 
teachers are likely to be less aware and less critical than 
researchers of their limited validity in relation to real- 
life creative performance or the whole spectrum of creative 
thinking abilities.
Getzels and Jackson (1962) justify their use of the 
’creativity’ label by noting that the tests require the 
pupils to ’diverge’ in their responses so that they measure 
"the ability to deal inventively with the verbal or numerical
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symbols or with object-space relations” . But as Burt (1962) 
points out creativity should imply ’’useful creative activi­
ties” , and in order to deal rationally as well as inventively 
with material supplied he suggests general intelligence is an 
essential constituent. Most investigators would agree with 
this assessment, but the labelling of divergent activities 
as ’creativity’ is still not always avoided.
Cropley (1967) writing on ’creativity’, notes that 
’’virtually all the research cited in this book, whether the 
authors reported the results as concerning divergent think­
ing or creativity, employed tests of this latter kind in 
order to identify highly creative children” .
While pointint out the ’’doubtful validity” of this 
practice he nevertheless suggests that although the ’’concept 
of creativity is a difficult one to employ with precision 
because of its impreciseness, the term is coming to be 
accepted by many psychologists and educators as referring 
to an intellective mode characterised by thinking of the 
divergent kind” . He therefore argues for an ’objective’ 
use of the term creativity in a way which will allow it and 
the term divergent thinking ”to be used almost interchange­
ably” . He points out that, personally, he would prefer to 
use the notion of divergent thinking exclusively, in order 
to avoid any possibility of confusion between the everyday 
conception of what ’creativity’ means and a strict psycho­
metric meaning of the term as a shorthand for referring to 
the fact that certain tests (of divergent thinking) go 
together. He concludes, however, somewhat contradictingly, 
that ’’the term ’creativity’ is a very meaningful one, and 
is by now so well established in the literature and so
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widely used that strict insistence on the exclusive use of 
'divergent thinking' would involve restating the findings 
of almost all research in the area; and would be unneces­
sarily pedantic in the present context". He suggests that 
if the reader remembers that there is no evidence that a 
Michaelangelo or Einstein would have done well on these 
tests, it is legitimate to refer to them generically as 
'creativity tests'.
Most researchers would agree with Cropley's general 
assessment of the 'creativity' label as being synonymous 
with that of 'divergent' in the context of research based 
on divergent thinking tests, but there are many, including 
the writer, who would not wish to perpetrate the problem by 
continuing to apply the 'creativity' description to diver­
gent tests. Cropley's answer, to remind readers that 'crea­
tivity' is 'what divergent thinking tests measure' is almost 
a parallel with the traditional operational definition of 
intelligence and seems to be walking into the same trap.
If one continues to use the label 'creativity' to describe 
certain tests it is irresponsible to assume that the man in 
the street will interpret the label in a strict psychometric 
sense. If psychologists and educators continue to use the 
label it is feasible to suppose that a large proportion of 
people will assume that such a trait exists. If on the other 
hand, being more sceptical, they were to scrutinise the label 
more closely, they might indeed be critical of a 'cult of 
creativity' and their disillusionment might understandably 
alienate them from results which, expressed more accurately 
might have valid and important implications.
Thankfully the label 'creativity' to describe divergent
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thinking tests is being applied less frequently, particularly 
in this country. Vernon (1971) for example, in an investiga­
tion of divergent thinking tests refers to them consistently 
as such, only mentioning the "area of divergent thinking" as 
that of "so-called 'creativity'". Haddon and Lytton (1968) 
pointing out that there is no clear evidence for the assump­
tion that high scorers on tests of 'divergent thinking' will 
be particularly fertile in creative original production in 
their own life situation also chose to "avoid undue claims" 
by using the term 'divergent thinking', rather than 'creati­
vity' throughout. This is the point of view also taken in 
this study.
While, however, it is considered unwarranted to apply 
the comprehensive label of 'creativity' to divergent think­
ing tests it is suggested that they are likely, as Burt 
(1962) observed "to elicit supplementary activities that 
are rarely tapped by the usual brands of intelligence test". 
It is also suggested that divergent thinking abilities are 
likely to be components of value in creative activity, and 
their concurrent validity in this respect will be investiga­
ted later. Their construct validity in relation to a pro­
cess of creative thinking will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
Although it will be impossible to avoid using the term 
'creativity' when referring to other researches they will be 
interpreted in terms of divergent thinking whenever possible. 
The use of the word 'divergent' instead of 'creative' to 
describe the thinking implicit in divergent tests does not 
remove the necessity to provide evidence regarding its 
relationship to other variables, including practical
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performance, but it removes the intrinsic assumption implicit 
in the label 'creativity’ that a divergent mode of thinking 
is necessarily directly related to creative work in an 
aesthetic or professional sense.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CREATIVE THINKING
It has been maintained in the last chapter that the 
distinctive feature of divergent thinking tests, that sub­
jects produce a large number of different and unusual res­
ponses to some stimulus situation, is not sufficient to 
warrant the tests being labelled as measuring creativity. 
There is however a great deal of theoretical.and anecdotal 
evidence built up over centuries that gives credence to the 
belief that such an ability is an ingredient in the thinking 
processes which have been described as characteristic of 
those creative individuals whose creativity is beyond doubt, 
and in the thinking processes which others postulate are 
essential for cognitive excellence.
It is in this sense that the writer suggests that diver­
gent thinking tests are of relevance for creative activity.
They will not provide a sufficient criterion for predicting 
real-life creative eminence, but they may well provide a 
means of assessing some of the necessary ingredients.
The construct validity, or as Cattell (1964) would pre­
fer, the 'concept' validity of divergent thinking tests
depends a great deal on the theoretical evidence that can be 
built up or 'constructed' to substantiate the concept. A 
certain amount of evidence has already been presented to give 
plausibility to a divergent aspect of creative thinking and 
to sustain the discussion up to this point. It is now inten­
ded to look more closely at some of the relevant background 
and theoretical approaches to divergent factors in the study 
of creative thinking abilities.
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3.1 DIVERGENT THINKING AND GUILFORD'S STRUCTURE-OF-INTELLECT
THEORY
In his 1950 Address, Guilford attempted to explain crea­
tivity in terms of a "factorial conception of personality" in 
which all individuals possess patterns of primary abilities 
which govern their capacity for creative thinking. While he 
notes that creative production in everyday life is undoubtedly 
dependent upon primary traits other than abilities, such as 
motivational and temperamental variables, he restricts his 
analysis to cognitive factors. Having noted that any list 
of creative thinking abilities would include reasoning fac­
tors he emphasises his hypotheses of "other possible thinking 
factors that are more obviously creative in character".
These, he suggests, would include sensitivity to problems, 
ideational fluency, ideational novelty, synthesizing ability, 
analysing ability, reorganising or redefining ability, span 
of ideational structure, and evaluating ability. In addition 
he suggested appropriate tests which, largely novel at the 
time, have now become very familiar, such as suggesting 
improvements to a common article, naming as many objects as 
possible with a given property, or giving consequences to 
some hypothetical occurrence such as ’no need to eat’.
Although there are thousands of observable traits 
Guilford suggests that many are interrelated and that by 
intercorrelation procedures it should be possible to deter­
mine the threads of consistency that run through the various 
categories and reduce the number of variables. He therefore 
proposed that a fruitful approach to the domain of creativity 
would be through a complete application of factor analysis, 
beginning with hypotheses and tests concerning the primary
oy,
abilities and their properties.
Guilford’s explorations bore fruit in the form of his 
structure of intellect model (Guilford, 1956) which was then 
developed into the well-established three dimensional form 
shown below (Guilford, 1959, 1968).
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Fig.1. Guilford’s Structure of Intellect Model
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Each intellectual component or "cell" (or ’factor') in the 
model represents a unique ability that is needed to do well 
in a certain class of tasks or tests. Guilford (1959, 1968) 
maintains that each ability is sufficiently distinct to be 
detected by factor analysis, but that they also resemble 
each other in certain ways which give rise to three classifi­
cations, according to the type of ’operation’ performed, the 
kind of material or ’content’ involved, and the type of 
’product’ produced.
(i) Operations
There are five kinds of intellectual ’operations’, cog­
nition, memory, convergent thinking, divergent thinking, and 
evaluation. Cognition means discovery or rediscovery or 
recognition. Memory means retention of what is cognized.
Two kinds of productive-thinking operations generate new 
information from known information and remembered informa­
tion. In divergent-thinking operations we think in different 
directions, sometimes searching, sometimes seeking variety.
In convergent thinking the information leads to one right 
answer or to a recognized best or conventional answer. In 
evaluation we reach decisions as to goodness, correctness, 
suitability, or adequacy of what we know.
(ii) Content
The four kinds of content are described as figurai, 
symbolic and semantic, and behavioural. Figurai content is 
concrete material such as is perceived through the senses. 
Symbolic content is composed of letters, digits, and other 
conventional signs, usually organized in general systems, 
such as the alphabet or the number system. Semantic content 
is formed of verbal meanings or ideas. The fourth category
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of behavioural content is largely theoretical but is included 
to cover the possible development of the concept of ’social 
intelligence’ and its social or behavioural content such as 
thoughts, feelings, and perceptions of others.
(iii) Products
When a certain operation is applied to a certain kind 
of content six types of product may result: units, classes,
relations, systems, transformations and implications. Con­
vergent production of symbolic relations, for example, would 
result from an analogies test item that called for completion 
of the following:-
pots, stop bard, drab rats
Each cell in the 5 x 4 x 6  model can be designated by 
its position relative to the three ’axes’ of operation, con­
tent and product respectively, and represents an unique com­
bination of these properties. The divergent thinking category 
constitutes one layer of twenty-four different cells. This 
category is our chief concern and is now looked at more 
closely.
3.11 The Category of Divergent Thinking
Guilford (1970) defines divergent thinking as "genera­
tion of information from given information, where the emphasis 
is upon variety and quantity of output from the same source; 
a search for logical alternatives"» His interpretation of 
’logical’ in this context is in the weak sense of ’relevant’ 
alternatives, and divergent thinking is contrasted with the 
accompanying definition of convergent thinking as the "genera­
tion of information from given information, where the needed
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information is fully determined by the given information; a 
search for logical imperatives".
In divergent thinking one's search for ideas is manifest 
in the form of fluency in the production of information, 
novelty, flexibility and elaboration, (Guilford, 1965, 1968.) 
According to Guilford's original (1950) hypotheses the more 
creative individual would think with greater fluency, with 
more flexibility and with greater originality than his less 
creative peers. The quality of elaboration was added later 
(Berger, Guilford and Christensen, 1957) as factorial inves­
tigations revealed that in tests calling for a variety of 
answers the degree of extra detail supplied with the respon­
ses constituted a distinguishable ability.
The unique feature of divergent production is that a 
variety of ideas are produced. Tests of this ability thus 
require the subject to think of a number of answers in reply 
to some initial stimulus. He might, for example, be required 
to name all the things he can think of that are round, or 
give a list of titles for a picture or story. His answers 
are then assessed in terms of criteria such as the number of 
ideas he can think of, their variety, and their originality.
While fluency is assessed in terms of the total number 
of appropriate ideas a subject can think of, usually in a 
given time, flexibility is concerned with how well he changes 
the direction of his thinking in some way. It can be a 
change in the meaning, interpretation, or use of something, 
a change in understanding of the task, a change of strategy 
in doing the task, or a change in one's interpretation of the 
goal. "How often," Guilford (1970) asks, "do we keep trying 
to solve the wrong problem?" Solving a problem may very well
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depend upon revisions in one’s conception of the problem, 
and changing one’s conception is a matter of intellectual 
flexibility. A parallel with the Gestalt conceptions of 
’restructuring’ and ’functional fixedness’ will appear later.
Originality in the context of divergent tasks is inter­
preted by Guilford (1962) as the production of ’unusual, far­
fetched, remote, or clever responses’. It is ’originality’ 
within the context of the person’s own development rather 
than in an absolute sense of being previously unknown to 
mankind that Guilford (1965) maintains is important for 
assessing creative abilities. Neither of these criteria are 
possible to apply in practice however, as we cannot be sure 
whether an idea has existed before or is new to the person 
concerned. Empirically therefore, Guilford resorts to the 
concept of originality as statistical infrequency within a 
population which is culturally relatively homogeneous.
Although Guilford (1958, 1968) emphasises that it is in 
the divergent thinking category in his structure of intellect 
model that we find the abilities most significant for crea­
tive thinking and invention, he also points out that creati­
vity is not a single variable, but "is many things and takes 
many forms". Each of the categories in his SI model contain 
abilities which he claims are relevant to creative production, 
including the twenty-four factors in the divergent thinking 
category itself. Twenty-three of the latter he has confirmed 
by factor analysis, though this is very different from demon­
strating any practical usefulness for this number of factors, - 
which even Guilford himself notes are only more or less 
independent (Guilford, 1970).
The divergent thinking abilities assessed by the tests
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to be used in the present study are located in Guilford’s 
theoretical model as follows;
Circles Test (Guilford, 1967; Guilford and Hoepfner, 1966;
Torrance, 1962, 1974)
’Draw on the circles provided to make them into as many dif­
ferent objects as possible’.
This test involves divergent production of figurai material. 
Guilford (1967) notes that when scored for fluency it pro­
vides a good measure of divergent figurai units (DFU), though 
he gives no information on the factor composition of the 
flexibility and originality scores for this specific test. 
Flexibility scores seem however to imply a fairly obvious 
loading for divergent production of figurai classes (DFC), 
though the originality score could imply the production of 
both systems and transformations. The former is concerned 
with a ’reorganisation of parts into new wholes’, while the 
second ’reinterprets lines or elements in a different way’. 
Discussing an alternative figurai test (Making Objects), 
which involves using predetermined parts to make different 
objects, Guilford (1967) notes that what were thought in 
principle would be transformations turned out in practice to 
be systems. The distinction, he suggests, depends on whether 
the elements are extracted from one figure and then reinter­
preted, or whether they are originally seen to exist as 
separate entities. In the Circles Test this distinction is 
not easy to make for the originality score could arise from 
either activity. Guilford’s answer would be that the origi­
nality score is not unidimensional enough for this test to be 
used as a specific measure of the cell for Divergent Produc­
tion of figurai transformations in his model. It is this
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procedure of being able to dispense with tests which do not 
fit exactly into one’s theoretical model which indicates 
some of the arbitrary nature of the factor analyst’s approach. 
Consequences Test (Guilford, 1950, 1951, 1967;
Torrance, 1962, 1974)
’What changes would occur if we had no need to eat?’
Guilford (1967) reports that this test is concerned with 
divergent production of semantic material, but that it is 
again not entirely unidimensional. It gives rise to DMU 
(divergent production of semantic units) if scored simply for 
number of responses, but this score also has secondary load­
ings on the cognition factor for semantic implications. When 
scored for unusual consequences it provides a measure of 
divergent production of semantic transformations for which 
Guilford reserves the word originality.
Uses Test (Guilford, 1950, 1951, 1967; Torrance, 1962, 1974) 
’How many uses can you think of for a newspaper?’
This test, involving divergent production of semantic mate­
rial, gives rise to units when scored for fluency, to 
classes when scored for flexibility, and to transformations 
when scored for remote responses. In order to justify the 
’originality’ label Guilford maintains that it should be 
clear that there is a shift of meaning to something novel, 
unusual or clever. The flexibility score, described by 
Guilford as ’’adaptive flexibility With semantic material’’, 
has some overlap with scoring for transformations, though 
Guilford claims it is still a good measure of divergent pro­
duction of semantic classes (DMC). It is likely that an 
originality score would reflect both a shift of meaning to 
determine the unusual use and a shift of classes, and would
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not be a distinct measure of DMT. Guilford (1959, 1973) 
acknowledges that there is a possibility that "what we have 
called originality is actually a case of adaptive flexibility 
when dealing with verbally meaningful material". In this 
test the quality of output, or more accurately, the quantity 
of high-quality responses is therefore likely to be an indi­
cation of both originality and flexibility in production.
3.12 Discussion
The details of how test scores are interpreted in Guil­
ford’s model have been necessary to illustrate the precision 
of the model and Guilford’s suggestion that "the major imp­
lication for the assessment of intelligence is that to know 
an individual’s intellectual resources thoroughly we shall 
need a surprisingly large number of scores". (Guilford, 1959, 
1968.) It has also been the writer’s contention, expressed 
in the last chapter, that investigations of creativity should 
acknowledge a variety of intellectual abilities including 
specific rather than general skills involved in creative 
thinking. Guilford’s model however, while being a major con­
tribution to any systematic analysis of intellectual abili­
ties, takes this position to something of an extreme. In the 
selection of ’high-aptitude personnel’, the area in which 
Guilford’s research originated, a multiple-score approach to 
the measurement of abilities may be useful for selecting 
people with special skills for very specific tasks, but for 
general use the 120 different intellectual factors are likely 
to be too highly specific.
Guilford’s theory of the intellect however has been the 
stimulus and the foundation for a large proportion of the
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research into creative abilities with the focus on his cate­
gory of divergent thinking. Although different researchers, 
such as Wallach and Kogan (1966) and Torrance (1974) base 
their measures of divergent thinking on modifications of 
Guilford’s principles an understanding of Guilford’s theory 
is essential if subsequent modifications are to be seen in 
perspective.
One of the paradoxical ways in which Guilford’s theory 
and test construction has been developed is remarked on by 
Butcher (1972). Whereas Guilford has been the main antago­
nist of an unitary concept of general intelligence or general 
convergent abilities, and has gone to the opposite extreme 
in fragmenting abilities. Butcher points out that some wri­
ters "have, on rather weak evidence derived from the use of 
Guilford’s test, postulated a trait of general creativity or 
general divergent thinking" (original emphasis). Some of 
the paradox is explained by the very impracticality of 
assessing the individual abilities covered by Guilford’s 
theory.
Investigators who have followed Torrance (1962, 1974), 
commonly adopt only the three divergent scores of fluency, 
flexibility and originality, summing the scores for fluency 
etc., from each of the sub-tests in their divergent test 
batteries. Others, including the writer (Richards and Bolton, 
1971; Nuttall, 1972) have suggested that these abilities are 
more task specific, especially between verbal and figurai 
tests, and.maintain individual scores for each test. At the 
other extreme it is not uncommon to find users obtaining a 
single composite divergent thinking or ’creativity’ score. 
Commenting on this practice, Torrance (1974) observes that
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while the latter does appear to give quite a stable index of 
a person’s ’creative energy’ he recommends users to base 
their interpretations on the separate scores for fluency, 
flexibility, originality and, in some cases, elaboration.
It is otherwise possible for individuals who obtain high 
scores for fluency by producing a high number of obvious and 
trivial responses, to be placed in the same category as 
those who give a smaller number of responses but gain a 
similar overall score due to better flexibility or origina­
lity.
The relationship between fluency, flexibility and origi­
nality scores will be looked at empirically later in this 
study, and the relationship between convergent and divergent 
scores should cast some further light on the question of 
whether the categories overlap or are relatively distinct.
McNemar (1964) argues that provided there is not a dras­
tic curtailment of range a general factor is almost invari­
ably present in tests of cognitive abilities. Though not as 
productive as Guilford’s paper fourteen years earlier,
McNemar’s (1964) Presidential Address to the American Psycho­
logical Association was a timely influence in calling for a 
better balance in the way creative abilities should be 
viewed. Highly critical of some of the ’’half-blind logic’’ 
that he suggested characterises some ’creativity’ research, 
particularly that of Getzels and Jackson (1962), he suggested 
that the concept of general intelligence "still has a right­
ful place in the ... practical affairs of man". Guilford’s 
structure of intellect with 120 different factors may very 
well, be suggests, "lead the British, and some of the rest 
of us, to regard our fractionization and fragmentation of
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ability, into more and more factors of less and less impor­
tance, as indicative of ’scatterbrainedness'".
Burt (1962), Vernon (1964) and Eysenck (1967), though 
less stringent in their criticisms than McNemar, make simi­
lar objections to Guilford’s multiple-factor theory and 
favour a hierarchical organisation of abilities. Eysenck 
points to the fact that utilizing appropriate testing batte­
ries, there is a possibility of infinite sub-division inher­
ent in factor analytical approaches to studies of the 
intellect, and that evidence is lacking that further and 
further sub-factors add anything either to the experimental 
analysis of intellectual functioning or the practical aim of 
forecasting success in intellectual pursuits. What is 
worse, he suggests, is the fact that models such as Guil­
ford’s fail to reproduce the essentially hierarchical nature 
of the data, positive correlations being present among all 
the relevant tests. Positive correlations among cognitive 
tests on the other hand can be partly explained by the written 
format and time limits of most tests, implying some common 
variance due to test-taking skills.
Cronbach (1970) in a more favourable review of Guilford’s 
theory accepts that while the elements in Guilford’s "fine- 
grain analysis" are not likely to be practically useful in 
themselves some hierarchical reassembly into groups of abi­
lities may serve as coherent predictors. To determine which 
regroupings can account for enough variance to be useful 
will, Cronbach suggests, need a whole generation of valida­
tion studies, and the divergent thinking category deserves 
particular attention.
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Having established the framework within which Guilford's 
divergent thinking abilities have been postulated, the re­
mainder of this chapter will consider some of the other 
theories that may provide support for believing that these 
abilities, involving the fluent, varied and unusual produc­
tion of ideas have relevance for creative activity. A large 
number of these stem from considerations of creative think­
ing as a problem solving ability.
3.2 CREATIVE THINKING AND PROBLEM SOLVING
To the psychologist, Vernon (1973) suggests, creative 
thinking is merely one of the many kinds of thinking which 
range from autistic fantasy on one hand to logical reasoning 
on the other. Indeed as he mentions it seems to some extent 
to partake of both extremes. Vinacke (1952) for example 
more specifically suggests that "Creative activity can best 
be understood if it is defined as a combination of problem 
solving and imagination".
The early history of the concern with thinking processes 
that are involved in creativity (e.g. Wallas, 1926; Patrick, 
1938) tended to make use of concepts drawn mainly from the 
study of problem solving. Wallach (1970) however is doubt­
ful whether the use of models drawn from general problem 
solving can succeed in describing thinking processes that 
differ from the more mundane ones. Most problem solving 
skills he suggests have been effectively described within 
the concept of general intelligence and the abilities so 
described demonstrated, in the sense that individuals can be 
reliably ordered in terms of their overall competence at 
coping with the problems offered them by their environment.
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In widening the scope of problem solving to include 
"problems offered them by their environment" Wallach’s obser­
vation becomes questionable. As Guilford (1958, 1968) argues, 
the environment would seem to contain far more problem solv­
ing activity than of a purely logical reasoning type. In 
arguing for thinking abilities over and above those involved 
in logical reasoning however Wallach is drawing a parallel 
with Guilford’s convergent reasoning ability and divergent 
abilities, though he conceives of the latter as outside 
rather than within a broad concept of intelligence.
With regard to the creative process however there is 
little separating the views of Wallach and Guilford that 
some ’extra ability’ is needed to elevate ’routine’ problem 
solving to the realm of creative activity. Gutman (1967) 
sums up this relationship by suggesting that while creative 
activity is more than problem solving, the latter is certain­
ly a part of it.
How great a part, and to what extent it involves think­
ing abilities other than formal reasoning, however, depends 
on one’s interpretation of problem solving. To some writers 
the activity of problem solving is used to define what is 
meant by thinking. "Thinking may be provisionally defined 
as what occurs in experience when an organism, human or ani­
mal, meets, recognises and solves a problem" (Humphrey, 1951). 
Dewey (1910, 1933) also defines thinking as what happens when 
we solve a problem though he also formulated five stages in 
problem solving which distinguishes the thinking involved 
from a more commonplace definition of thinking as "any course 
or train of ideas" (Drever, 1952).
Dewey’s analysis of problem solving consisted of five 
stages :
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1. Recognition of a problem: Occurring in some dis­
turbance of perplexity, doubt, confusion or recog­
nition of a need.
2. Analysis of the problem: A period of searching,
enquiring, and assembling of material bearing on 
the problem.
3. Suggestion of possible solutions: Hypotheses for
solution are made.
4. Testing of the consequences: The possible solutions
are elaborated and tested.
5. Judgement of the selected solution: The solutions
resulting from Stage 4 are evaluated by overt or 
imaginative action.
By ’imagination’ in Stage 5, Dewey means a mental pro­
cess of evaluation as opposed to an overtly demonstrable one. 
He deliberately dismisses the more ’day-dreaming’ aspects of 
imagination as unworthy of the name of ’thought’. Similarly 
Morse and Wingo (1962) state that ’’by thinking we do not mean 
the stream of consciousness, nor do we mean ... day dreaming 
and woolgathering ... We mean the deliberate application of 
reflection to the solution of a problem’’.
This interpretation of problem solving could be inter­
preted largely in terms of convergent thinking abilities 
though it is possible in Dewey’s first two stages to imagine 
a mental activity in which as in divergent thinking ’’consi­
derable searching about is done’’ (Guilford, 1959 , 1973). 
Dewey’s stages are in fact reflected in those stages of crea­
tive thinking proposed by Wallas (1926) and Rossman (1931). 
While Rossman like Dewey includes the solution stage or the 
’’birth of the new invention’’ as occurring after predominantly
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conscious stages o£ logical reasoning, Wallas includes an 
'incubation’ stage in a pattern of ’preparation’, ’incuba­
tion’, ’illumination’ and ’verification’.
It is in the ’incubation’ stage with its associations 
of unconscious thought and freely flowing imagination that 
some writers see the distinction between the steps involved 
in problem solving and those in creative production.
Whether one conceives of creative thinking as problem 
solving plus imagination or whether one incorporates an 
’insightful’ stage into one’s concept of problem solving and 
equates problem solving with creative thinking, both inter­
pretations point to some activity which is over and above 
that of logical reasoning. A large number of psychological 
theories have attempted to illuminate the nature of this 
’extra something’. Guilford with a multifactorial view of 
intellect emphasises the role of divergent abilities. Ges­
talt psychology emphasises that creative thinking entails the 
restructuring of a problem situation so as to see the elements 
in a new light and achieve ’insight’. Association theories 
emphasise the productive combination of freely flowing ideas. 
Psychoanalytical approaches underline the importance of un­
conscious conflicts that can either prevent the release of 
unconscious associations and block the creative process, or 
else spur it on. Cognitive psychologists emphasise the role 
of ’direction’ and ’cognitive style’ in productive thinking.
These differing approaches do not yield independent 
theories of creative thinking, on the contrary an idealistic 
picture of an individual engaging in creative activity would 
draw on something from each of them. It is convenient however
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to highlight some of these contributions as they relate to 
divergent thinking abilities.
3.3 UNCONSCIOUS DRIVES AND MOTIVES IN CREATIVE THINKING
Without being drawn into a discussion of creative think­
ing from an entirely psychoanalytical standpoint, there is a 
good deal of evidence to support the orthodox Freudian belief 
(1949) that the energy generated by the unconscious is the 
motivating force of both the creative person and the neuro­
tic. Vernon (197 3) notes that there is an underlying theme 
in the history of genius that gives some credence to Dryden’s 
line that ’Great wits are sure to madness near allied’, 
Kretschmer (1931) for example being convinced of a psychopa- 
thetic element associated with a high degree of talent.
Behrens (1974) relating a large number of instances of crea­
tive invention from a variety of fields, illustrates the act 
of genius in going beyond the information given and establish­
ing new closures and acts of imagination in forming new con­
nections and associations. While Leonardo da Vinci, however, 
in his genius could relate his imagining of battles and 
miniature landscapes in the stains of rain-soaked walls to 
the reality of his art, the imaginings of others, in Rosarch’s 
inkblots for example, are often taken as an index of disorder.
Divergent thinking tests do not have quite the same 
scope as Rorschach as a projective technique but they do 
assess the subject’s ability to produce ideas with only a 
minimum of restraint. It is also possible, as Hudson (1966, 
1968) shows, to analyse the responses to divergent tests in 
a clinical fashion in terms of characteristics of the sub­
jects such as humour, violence, hostility and authoritarianism.
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and groups identified by the more conventional measures of 
fluency and flexibility tend to have common factors in terms 
of such characteristics, Behrens (1974) points out a number 
of links between the creative production of ideas which are 
’ordered* and recognised as creative, and those which remain 
’disordered'. In the notes of William Blake two maxims 
appear, ’’Wise men see outlines and therefore they draw 
them’’, and also ’’Mad men see outlines and therefore they 
draw them’’. Shakespeare in A Midsummer Night ̂ s Dream writes 
that ’’The lunatic, the lover, and the poet. Are of imagina­
tion all compact", all give names and habitations to "the 
forms of things unknown". Blake, Ezra Pound, and Shakes­
peare, Behrens suggests were men of uncommon genius mixed 
with a touch of madness, while on the other end of the scale, 
we find the idiot savant - overwhelmed by madness, confused 
by a touch of genius. Both lunatic and genius deny estab­
lished groupings of ideas but the schizophrenic cannot break 
out of his reordering of the world which is a compulsive 
revelation, inadequate for social survival. The grouping and 
association 'errors’ of the schizophrenic are consequently 
referred to as ’disorders of association’ while those of the 
genius are recognised as being creatively ordered.
Modern developments of the classical Freudian theory, 
however, are less prone to couple creativity with the neuro­
tic elements of the unconscious and some in fact emphasise 
that the ego of a creative person must be well-balanced, 
flexible and secure if he is to realise his full potential 
(Anderson, 1959).
Storr (1972), outlines some of the ways in which various 
types of ’psychopathology’ can provide the motive power which
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’activates the creater’, but suggests that the creative per­
son may well be the person who is more adept than most at 
utilising the inner tensions and psychopathogies that we all 
have, and to do so may mean that the creative are less like­
ly to suffer from mental illness than others. Mental ill­
ness itself, he suggests, almost certainly interferes with 
creativity.
Kneller (1966) also emphasises adjustment and flexibi­
lity rather than disorder in the creative individual. He 
suggests that it is in the half-way stage, the ’preconscious’, 
between unconscious influences, linked to repressed conflicts 
and impulses on one hand, and the conscious, which is con­
ventional and reality orientated on the other, that one's 
level of creative thinking is determined; and it depends on 
the degree to which one can operate flexibly in the precon­
scious; assailed as it is by the opposing forces of reality 
and the unconscious.
Kubie (1965) puts even more emphasis on the concept of 
flexibility. "The measure of health," he suggests, "is flexi­
bility, the freedom to learn through experience, the freedom 
to change with changing internal and external circumstances, 
to be influenced by reasonable argument or by the appeal to 
emotions and especially the freedom to cease when sated."
This concept of ’flexibility’ as a personality variable 
extends beyond Guilford’s cognitive interpretation of flexi­
bility (page 72) though it also incorporates the latter.
Both aspects will reoccur later in discussing the Gestalt 
uses of the term.
There are likely to be unconscious factors influencing 
people with apparently similar intellectual abilities to
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reach different levels of creation, but like Kubie psychoana­
lysts are developing theories that incorporate specific 
thinking abilities and interaction with the environment.
White (1961) suggests that there is a drive of an intellec­
tual nature, ’competence motivation’ which stimulates crea­
tive exploration and experiment, and Rogers (1954) puts 
forward a similar drive for ’self-actualisation’.
Rogers also claims that creativity is a sign of optimal 
adjustment, not maladjustment and emerges when one’s persona­
lity is uninhibited by neurotic tendencies. This links with 
the general view that as children grow older in an educa­
tional system which does not recognise their autonomy they 
become more inhibited and anxious and less likely to produce 
creative work. In order to allay anxieties they adopt a 
conventional, conformist pattern of behaviour. This is then 
viewed as being a repressive influence on creativity (Mous- 
takas, 1966).
A low score for originality on a divergent test provides 
some measure of an individual’s conformity (though the ratio 
of originality score to fluency score might be a better 
index), and it is tempting to assume that high scores conse­
quently reveal a productive and valuable ability for ’origi­
nality’. Without practical validation however it is appro­
priate to point out that other interpretations are possible. 
Ausubel (1968) for example suggests that high scores on 
divergent tests have less to do with creativity than mere 
glibness, uninhibited self-expression and deficiency of 
self-criticism.
Hudson (1966) while suggesting that convergers and di­
vergers have different personality associations is careful
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not to label one as more creative than the other. Eysenck 
(1967) commends a similar view in preference to associating 
creative production with one particular mode of thinking.
He suggests that the divergent superiority of Hudson’s arts 
specialists might well be explained in terms of their verbal 
fluency. Though not as sweepingly critical as Ausubel, he 
does suggest that divergent production is very likely a 
function of personality particularly extraversion.
Developing out of psychoanalytical formulations of the 
creative personality, and particularly associating the desire 
for self-actualisation with emotional health, Golann (1962) 
designed a questionnaire measure of creative motivation based 
on an interpretation of the ’creativity motive’ in terms of a 
person’s ’’desire to maximise the experiencing of one’s own 
perceptual, cognitive and expressive potentials” . Golann’s 
use of this measure in connection with the concept of flexi­
bility will be discussed later.
Whether or not divergent thinking tests reflect this 
’creativity motive’ or mere extraversion will be subjected 
to investigation in the experimental section of this study.
It is perhaps salutory at this stage to be reminded of 
Rossman’s (1931) argument regarding creative production that 
’’the assumption that the subconscious is responsible for the 
final condition is no answer to the problem” . In a search 
for mechanisms that can operate between conscious and uncon­
scious stages however the associationist tradition has been 
reawakened as one answer to the creative thinker’s need for 
”a ready flow of ideas” and ’’the freedom to generate exten­
sive ideational possibilities” (Wallach and Wing, 1969).
This is the subject of the next section.
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3.4 ASSOCIATION AND CREATIVE PRODUCTION
The principle of association refers to a mechanical 
process by means of which ideas or feelings are connected 
to one another in the mind. (Shouksmith, 1970.) The first 
to formulate the principle explicitly was Aristotle (Vinacke, 
1952) and the laws of association maintain that the associa­
tion of ideas or thought processes are dependent on the 
ideas occurring contiguously, being similar to or contrasting 
with one another. Shouksmith (1970) follows the development 
of the theory by Hobbes and Locke in the seventeenth century 
through J.S. Mill to Bain, Stout and William James, and con­
cludes that the liking for this kind of approach is still 
prevalent in psychology today.
Studies of creative individuals have given some support 
to the role of association with the experiences of Poincare 
(1968, 1906) in particular being widely quoted (Hadamard, 
1949; Chiselin, 1955; McKellar, 1957).
Poincaré, explaining his discovery of Fuchsian functions 
relates how after many unsuccessful attempts at proving their 
existence he retired to bed one night but could not sleep - 
"Ideas rose in crowds; I felt them collide until pairs 
interlocked, so to speak, making a stable combination. By 
the next morning I had established the existence of a class 
of Fuchsian functions.”
Chiselin (1955) reveals similar instances in his quota­
tions of accounts of the creative thinking of a variety of 
eminent men. Einstein talks of "combinatory play” or 
"associative play” seeming "to be the essential feature in 
productive thought” , Mozart of "ideas flowing abundantly", 
Dryden of "a confused Mass of Thoughts tumbling over one
90.
another in the Dark” , and Housman of "springs of ideas” .
Wallas (1926) and Hadamard (1949) interpret such evid­
ence as stressing the importance of the preconscious sorting 
of ideas in the ’incubation’ stage. For Hadamard invention 
takes place in building up numerous combinations in what 
Francis Galton termed the ’ante-chamber of consciousness' 
and choosing those which are useful. Rugg (1963) in a simi­
lar way emphasises both ’pre-logical’ and ’pre-conscious’ 
stages in creative thinking and suggests that "the creative 
flash of insight takes place in the transliminal, across- 
the-threshold border between the unconscious and the cons­
cious states” .
The study of mental ’images’ as elements completely 
independent from conscious ideas has been largely discredi­
ted by behaviourist approaches, though the role of imagina­
tion and association of ideas as ’not entirely conscious’ 
activities are retained by a number of psychologists in an 
attempt to focus attention on those internal activities of 
creative thinking that contrast with more concrete or 
reasoning activities. Thompson (1959), for example, consi­
ders creative thinking as a process involving a ’switching of 
gears’ as ideas flow between an ’imaginative’ and a ’realis­
tic’ pole.
McKellar (1957) also approaches the subject through a 
continuum of ideas flowing from logical reasoning on one 
hand through creative imagination, dreams and related exper­
iences to the hallucinations of psychosis on the other. He 
suggests that the formation of creative ideas is then not a 
matter of mere chance but due to a selection from those among 
which a solution could reasonably be expected. This gives
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some weight to Guilford’s (1950) hypothesis that being able 
to generate a large number of ideas (ideational fluency) is 
one relevant stage in creative thinking.
Drawing on, but also adding to the principle of asso­
ciation, Koestler (1964) argues that creative thinking takes 
place in relation to some problem when the thinker is able 
to bring together hitherto separate and habitually incompa­
tible ideas in order to solve the problem. He suggests that 
the association between previously unrelated ideas, the 
’Eureka Act’, almost always occurs as a flash of insight and 
is typically the result of both unconscious and conscious 
thinking. Ideas which are not commonly associated come 
together in a process which he terms ’bisociation’. As a 
typical example he relates, within his framework, the story 
of Archimedes bringing together the commonplace associations 
involved in taking a bath with the problem of finding the 
volume of the King’s crown.
It is via the conscious visualisation or verbalisation 
of previously unconscious ideas that Koestler suggests the 
final solution is reached. If this is the case then as 
Osborn (1957) and Guilford (1959, 1973) both claim the more 
ideas that are expressed verbally the more likely it is that 
some valuable ideas will emerge. Osborn uses this principle 
as the basis of his ’brainstorming’ technique and Guilford 
in his divergent measure of ideational fluency. Few real- 
life problems have unique solutions and in the search for
solutions the greater the number of possibilities that are
suggested the greater the chance of arriving at a suitable
solution. Whether by calling for a free and uncritical flow
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of associations one is more likely to arrive at insightful 
solutions than by a directed and controlled approach however 
is debatable.
Firmly in an associationist tradition Mednick (1962) 
maintains that creative thinking takes place in forming ideas 
"into new combinations which either meet specified require­
ments or are in some way useful". . This "associative theory 
of creative thinking" (Mednick, 1962) is the theory adopted 
by Wallach and Kogan (1966) as the basis for their investi­
gation of creative thinking.
In order to make an assessment of creative thinking in 
accordance with his theory, Mednick introduced his ’Remote 
Associates Test’, in which subjects are asked to provide one 
word which would form an associative bridge between three 
other words. For example, given ’mouse’, ’blue’ and ’cottage’ 
the subject would need to find the word ’cheese’. Wallach and 
Kogan on the other hand suggest that this confirms more to 
Guilford’s conception of convergent thinking than to his 
general definition of divergent thinking, and they presented 
their subjects with tasks which asked them to generate as 
many ideas as possible to meet a certain requirement. They 
gave their subjects five types of task;
Instances: e.g. ’Name all the round things you can think o f ’
Alternate Uses: e.g. ’Tell me all the different ways you
could use a newspaper’
Similarities: e.g. ’Tell me all the ways in which a potato
and a carrot are alike’
Line Meanings: j ’Tell me all the things you think this '
Pattern Meanings: ) drawing could b e ’
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Each of these procedures were scored for fluency and 
originality, only unique responses qualifying for inclusion 
in the latter. Wallach and Kogan point out that their pro­
cedures derive from the work of Guilford but also underline 
their differences in allowing the subjects unlimited time, 
giving the procedures verbally to individual children and 
emphasising the game-like nature of the tasks.
The tasks, they suggest, should carry certain realistic 
constraints, but they also observe that the associative pro­
cess as it appears in the introspections of highly creative 
individuals seems to possess "some degree of functional 
autonomy from the observer, rather than being entirely under 
his control. ... Critical faculties, censors, are to some 
extent stilled when generation of cognitive elements is to 
be encouraged". To achieve a balance between these opposing 
principles they conveyed some constraints in the wording of 
the task, but endeavoured to make the testing atmosphere as 
'evaluation-free' as possible.
Based on this conception of creative thinking Wallach 
and Kogan gave their procedures to 151 children, 'middle 
class', aged between 10 and 11 years, and concluded that the 
results demonstrated a dimension of individual differences 
which on the one hand possessed generality and pervasiveness 
and on the other hand was also quite independent of the tra­
ditional notion of general intelligence. This dimension, 
based on the ability to generate unique and plentiful asso­
ciates, they felt justified in labelling as 'creativity', and 
they proceeded to find a number of behavioural measures asso­
ciated with their measure.
Getzels and Jackson (1962) though unable to demonstrate
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as distinct a dimension of 'creativity’ as Wallach and Kogan 
made similar claims for the importance of recognising crea­
tive (divergent) abilities as distinct from intelligence.
They rejected however the "associationist theory ... as an 
explanation of these phenomena". Illustrating their objec­
tion in terms of the Alternate Uses test they acknowledge 
that a child can only use those connections that are part of 
his repertoire but maintain that the laws of associationism 
(e.g. frequency, vividness, recency) can not explain why some 
children give predominantly common uses for a brick while 
others give uncommon ones.
In their efforts to find a more acceptable explanation 
Getzels and Jackson also reject the operations of tradition­
al logic and go as far as to suggest that adherence to rules 
of the latter "help us to understand the laak^ not the pre­
sence, of novelty and originality in the behaviour of our 
children" (original emphasis). Quoting Hadamard (1949) in 
support they note that invention often appears to be charac­
terised by "sudden, unlogical, non-experiential, and as it 
were spontaneous solutions" and that both logic and associa­
tionism seem to be relegated to secondary roles behind the 
primacy of "unconscious or fringe-conscious mechanisms". 
Referring to Wertheimer (1949, 1961) they suggest the possi­
bility of an explanation of creative thinking in terms of 
the Gestalt approach. A good deal of Getzels and Jackson's 
arguments against a theory of creative thinking in either 
logical or associationist terms are in fact a reflection of 
Wertheimer's own arguments. Wertheimer sees the creative 
thinking process as more under the control of the individual 
than is credited by purely associationist theories and
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emphasises the dynamic relationship between the individual 
and the stimulus situation. This typical Gestalt approach 
is now considered further.
3.5 GESTALT APPROACHES TO CREATIVE THINKING
Most commentators on creativity (e.g. Getzels and Jack­
son, 1962; Kneller, 1966; Shouksmith, 1970; Vernon, 1973) 
acknowledge the influence of the Gestalt school in understan­
ding the creative process; and its emphasis on flexibility 
and the need to view objects and ideas in new ways is of 
obvious relevance to measures of divergent thinking.
The work of Maier (1930, 1931, 1945), Duncker (1945), 
and Wertheimer (1949, 1961), is of importance in any attempt 
at explaining creative thinking and is of particular rele­
vance to the design and interpretation of the practical cri­
terion to be used in the present study. Gestalt psycholo­
gists, as Wertheimer (1949, 1961) points out, are concerned 
with the question of what occurs when thinking really works 
productively, and what is really going on in such a process - 
"when one has just had a creative idea, however modest the 
issue, when one has begun really to grasp an issue, when one 
has enjoyed a clean productive process of thought".
Maier (1930, 1931) investigating the process of thinking 
in problem solving pointed out several characteristics of his 
subjects which have since been widely investigated in terms 
of 'mental set' or 'rigidity'(e.g. Luchins, 1942; Kellmer 
Pringle and McKenzie, 1966), or as response bias on 'direc­
tion' in thinking (e.g. Bruner, Goodnow and Austin, 1956; 
Berlyne, 1965). Maier described a number of experiments in 
which unsuccessful subjects exhibited 'functional fixedness'.
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lack of ’direction’ or ’rigidity of set*.
In one experiment subjects were required to join two 
strings hanging from the ceiling which were too far apart 
to take hold of simultaneously. One solution was to convert 
one of the strings into a pendulum using an otherwise super­
fluous pair of pliers. As Maier (1931, 1968) notes "Presen­
ting the subject with pliers is of.no benefit so long as the 
pliers are seen as pliers. They become useful, however, 
when they are seen as a weight." 'Functional fixedness' is 
said to occur when the use of an object in one way inhibits 
a solution of a problem requiring its use in a different way.
Though at first sight some of the reasoning might have 
appeared as 'trial and error', Maier maintains that on closer 
observation and discussion successful solutions were seen to 
depend on changes in organisation and meaning so as to 
achieve a new 'gestalt'. Duncker (1965) and Luchins (1942) 
both confirmed and extended Maier's findings, especially in 
the effects of initial 'set' and the way in which past 
experience can give rise to 'interfering habits'. Duncker 
suggests that the key to achieving a solution lies in the 
subject's flexibility in restructuring and reformulating 
the original problem.
Wertheimer (1949, 1961) discussing children's attempts 
at solving certain problems notes that "sometimes one gets 
surprisingly fine reactions, which are also evident in the 
remarks of the subject; sometimes one encounters utter help­
lessness, surprisingly stupid or blind responses even in 
intelligent subjects". In productive thinking Wertheimer 
suggests "items do not remain rigidly identical; and as a 
matter of fact, precisely their change, their improvement is
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required. ... Blindness to such a change in meaning often 
impedes productive processes."
This suggestion is adopted as the basis of one of the 
experimental criteria, the ’Board Game’, to be devised in 
this study. In order to solve the problem presented the 
children will have to utilize objects in new ways and appre­
ciate their relatedness to the overall structure - the good 
gestalt. Wertheimer refers to ’fine, genuine solutions’ in 
which the subject shows a grasp of the overall problem and 
the ability to manipulate its constituent parts in different 
ways, as A-responses. Blind, foolish and unsuccessful 
attempts are classified as B-responses. An extended classi­
fication of this type will be used to describe children’s 
attempts at the ’Board Game’.
The psychological issue is basically what decides, in 
the mind of the pupil, between A and B responses and how 
does he find the A-solution? Wertheimer offers a number of 
suggestions :
(i) Productive processes are inhibited by blind habits, 
school drill, bias or special interests.
(ii) Thinking depends on realising the structural fea­
tures of a situation and the ability to reorganise, 
regroup and suggest structural improvements.
(iii) The dynamic requirements of a situation require
thinking not in terms of isolated piecemeal ideas 
but in relation to ’whole-characteristics’.
(iv) Thought processes are not arbitrary but develop 
constructively in spite of deviations and diffi­
culties .
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(v) Productive procedures call for not merely ’piece­
meal factual truth’ but also for ’structural truth’, 
(vi) Productive thinking depends on structural insight, 
structural mastery and meaningful learning. It 
needs to ’deal with gaps and trouble-regions’ by 
finding inner structural relations and arranging 
them accordingly, by dynamically segregating and 
regrouping parts of the whole, and overall, by 
looking for structural rather than piecemeal truth.
Like Duncker, Wertheimer therefore emphasises that what 
matters in thinking is how one applies what one has learned 
from past experience, whether blindly, in a piecemeal way, 
or in accordance with the structural requirements of the 
situation. It is the connection of ideas not simply by 
chance association but with respect to their inner related­
ness, their structural features and reasonable requirements, 
that Wertheimer sees creative thinking taking place. It is 
not just the quantity of ideas that is important but the need 
to distinguish between "sensible thought and senseless com­
binations" .
One can only speculate on how Wertheimer would have 
regarded divergent thinking tests. To see the ’problem’ in 
a way which is not dictated by blind associations, blind 
habits and blind experiences is an essential ingredient in 
Wertheimer’s productive thinking and it can be suggested that 
the diverger is precisely the sort of person who views the 
problems of divergent thinking tests in such a way, interpre­
ting objects and ideas in unusual ways, yet recognising the 
’reasonable requirements’ of the situation.
It is interesting on the other hand to note that
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Wertheimer also calls for an honest attitude and a sincere 
evaluation of one’s thinking to avoid the "danger of 
dilettantism, of cheap plausibility". This point is appro­
priate to scoring divergent tests, especially in judging 
whether a response, which one may suspect of being less than 
serious, deserves credit for originality.
A more fundamental point however is that the problems 
envisaged by Wertheimer involve some hard analytical think­
ing in "trying to penetrate, to realise and to trace out the 
main relations between form and task", and divergent tasks 
are likely to be too trivial to demand this component.
It is suggested however that in providing an initial 
stimulus situation and the requirement that subjects pro­
vide possible ’solutions’ to fit some goal such as being 
’consequences’ or ’uses’ or recognisable shapes, divergent 
tests do require sensible as well as unusual combinations 
and have some of the ingredients of a problem solving situa­
tion. It is precisely because of their emphasis on the ’di­
vergent’ rather than the analytical process that divergent 
tests lack justification as ’creativity’ tests in Wertheimer’s 
’productive’ use of the term. They nevertheless incorporate 
an opportunity for the subject to utilize a number of the 
free and flexible aspects of thinking that the Gestaltists 
have signified are important for creative production.
It will be interesting to discover later whether the 
children’s performance on divergent thinking tests has some 
power in predicting their performance on the practical 
experiment designed in line with the Gestalt conception of a 
problem situation.
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3.6 STYLES OF THINKING
According to the Gestalt interpretation, whether o n e ’s 
thinking is open, flexible and potentially creative, or 
whether it is a matter of blind habit, is largely a matter 
of previous experience. Gestalt psychology however gives us 
only general indications of what sort of experience is desir­
able to arrive at a good gestalt, and ’’more attention needs 
to be given to the forms of action on the environment through 
which disturbing patterns can be replaced by satisfying ones’’ 
(Berlyne, 1972).
Cognitive psychologists such as Berlyne (1965, 1972), 
Bruner (1956), and Gagné (1964, 1970) have attempted to find 
’mediating processes’ to explain the links between learning 
and thinking and the way in which cognitive styles can direct 
behaviour. Vinacke (1952) notes that a person’s thinking is 
influenced by his adjustment and motivation and is open to 
forces which can direct its process ’in keeping with inner 
needs’. Gagné (1964) discussing behaviour akin to problem 
solving suggests that after the stimulus is received the 
individual forms concepts relating to the task in accord with 
past experience, determines a course or courses of action, 
makes decisions about possible alternatives and verifies the 
final result. What directs the approach he suggests is a 
combination of intellectual and attitudinal factors.
Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956) in their 'Study of 
Thinking’ claim that from observations of the way in which 
people approach problems it is apparent that there are 
’’regularities in decision making’’. In utilising one of these 
particular ’styles of thinking’ Bruner et al conclude that 
individuals may be concerned with one or other of the
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following objectives:
(i) to maximise information gained for ’each decision’
(ii) to keep the cognitive strain imposed by the task 
at a minimum
(iii) to regulate the ’risk’ consequent on decision 
making.
Two of the strategies investigated by Bruner were termed 
’focussing’ and ’scanning’ and it is tempting to draw some 
parallels with ’convergers’ and ’divergerS’. The focusser 
tends to look systematically at the information provided and 
move on to the next stage logically with minimum risk of 
being incorrect. The scanner on the other hand tends to 
jump to conclusions and follow his initial ideas until they 
achieve success or end in failure. The danger in the latter 
strategy is that frequent failure can result in withdrawal 
and disorder, though at the same time the willingness to take 
risks and to follow one’s spontaneous ideas without excessive 
evaluation may result in new and unexpected solutions. The 
caution of the focusser may be safer, especially within an 
education system that puts a premium on the correct and the 
conventional, but it may lack the spark of originality.
Bruner et al also emphasise that past experience appears 
to be a major factor influencing the way people make their 
decisions. It can, they suggest, provide a basis for making 
good decisions but it may also be restrictive and make a 
person too rigid in his or her approach to problem solving 
and discovery. A person may, they suggest, be predisposed 
to flexible, open, productive thinking or be limited to the 
reproductive utilization of a restricted set of concepts.
Getzels and Jackson come to a similar conclusion about
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the responses of subjects to their divergent tests. For 
some, they suggested, the dependence on recent and frequent 
concrete experiences and of fixed and well-worn logical 
paths "seems to lead to hackneyed and pedestrian responses" 
while at the same time some children gave "responses that 
are new, vital, and, in the limited sense in which we are 
using the term, creative". The result of Getzels and Jack­
son’s study might have been less widely criticised had they, 
like Hudson (1966), labelled these contrasting styles ’con­
vergers’ and ’divergers’ respectively. Instead they labelled 
the children in the top 20% on divergent thinking measures 
but below the top 20% in I.Q., as a ’High Creative’ group, 
and children in the top 20% on I.Q. but below the top 20% on 
divergent thinking as a ’High Intelligence’ group. They 
compared these groups on school achievement, aspects of 
behaviour and attitudes, and how they were regarded by 
teachers and parents. The results indicated two different 
modes of thinking and their subsequent plea for the proper 
recognition of children with abilities other than convention­
al intelligence gave impetus to the creativity movement.
One has to remind oneself however that each of the two groups 
contained only about 5% of the total sample, that pupils in 
the top 20% on both I.Q. and divergent thinking were exclu­
ded, and that the whole experiment was conducted with a 
population of gifted children with a mean I.Q. of 132.
As in the case of Bruner’s ’focussers’ and ’scanners’, 
contrasting types of cognitive activity can be illuminating 
but the labels should not be taken as identifying two dis­
tinct groups. This applies to other related research such 
as Witkin’s (1965) work on field-dependence and independence.
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Kagan’s (1966) reflection/impulsivity dimensions, Pask’s 
(1969) distinction between ’holists’ and ’serialists’,
Satherly and Brimer’s (1971) investigation of ’analytic’ 
and ’synthetic’ styles, and Luchins’ (1942) discussion of 
rigidity and flexibility. Perhaps of all the contrasted 
styles of thinking, with the possible exception of conver­
gers and divergers, the latter has received the most atten­
tion from psychologists.
Luchins (1951) maintained that the rigidity/flexibility 
dimension should be regarded as a cognitive style dependent 
on a person’s perception of the field or structure of a 
problem, rather than as a general personality trait or some 
"essence of the organism" operating independently of the 
field conditions. Other experimenters, however, have utili­
zed the concept of rigidity well beyond the cognitive field 
to explain social relationships, attitudes and prejudices.
Frenkel-Brunswick (1950) reported findings which related 
rigidity, or as she termed it ’intolerance of ambiguity’ to 
a person’s dislike of conflicting situations. Rigid indivi­
duals were reluctant to change set, were unable to learn 
from changing stimuli and suffered from premature closure.
These variables appeared in cognitive, perceptual and social 
areas and indicate that rigidity is a pervasive part of 
one’s personality structure.
Rigidity is explained by Fisher (1950) as a defence 
mechanism whereby individuals can avoid the stresses caused 
by "cognitive dissonance" (Festinger, 1957). Faced with 
conflicting ideas, some individuals therefore tend to cling 
to their preconceptions and to what they have learned from 
authority rather than face up to "cognitive conflict" (Berlyne,
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1965). Leach (1964) suggests that some people appear to be 
more flexible than others not just in their treatment of new 
ideas but in their whole approach to life.
Gallagher (1964) maintains that implications for child­
ren’s creative expression are obvious. ’’Two distinctly dif­
ferent patterns or strategies ... begin in childhood and 
extend to all aspects of life. One of these patterns is 
characterised by freedom and striving for expression, the 
other by caution, and concern for the opinions of others.’*
This suggests that not only are the flexible thinkers recep­
tive of new ideas but they are also more likely to produce 
them, and divergent thinking tests provide one means of 
investigating this ability.
Torrance (1974) notes that the flexibility score is 
intended to represent a person’s ability ’’to produce a 
variety of kinds of ideas, to shift from one approach to 
another, or to use a variety of strategies’’, and the origi­
nality score reflects some of the same properties with an 
emphasis on the number of responses which are ’’away from the 
obvious, commonplace, banal or established’’.
Although a low flexibility score appears to be directly 
related to a subject’s tendency to stick to a narrow range 
of responses and a rigid pattern of thinking, high flexibi­
lity scores may be more valuable if used in conjunction with 
a criterion of ’quality’ of response. Without the latter 
high flexibility might characterise a person who jumps from 
one approach to another so frequently that he is unable to 
concentrate on one line of thinking long enough to make it 
profitable or original. Details of scoring divergent think­
ing tests for originality are given later, but it is appropriate
105.
to point out that the score is devised so that it also reflects 
the subject’s change of category of response. A subject giving 
a response which is unique to himself would gain maximum ori­
ginality marks for that response, but he would not gain addi­
tional marks for originality if he repeated the same type of 
idea. Originality marks for divergent tests therefore reflect 
flexibility as well as novelty. This substantiates the ear­
lier discussion of the tests in relation to Guilford's S. of 
I . model (page 76) .
Torrance (1974) claims that high originality scorers on 
divergent tests are those who are able to delay immediate 
gratification or reduction of tension, in order to get away 
from the obvious, low quality response. Producing the easy 
’conforming’ response can therefore be interpreted as a mark 
of the individual who prefers to avoid any cognitive stress.
Stenhouse (1973) also suggests that the diverger will 
make unusual as opposed to commonplace responses because of a 
’’withholding of the standard response’’. This ’’negativistic- 
seeming sceptical capacity for doubting the authorities and 
not accepting the standard techniques’’ Stenhouse terms a 
’postponement’ or P-factor. He maintains that education does 
a great deal to inhibit this factor, producing ’learnedness’ 
rather than ’critical flexibility of intelligence’.
Barron (1953) found that people scoring highly on a 
rigidity scale tended to prefer the simple to the complex on 
the Barron-Welsh scale of artistic preference. Barron 
suggests reasons for this relationship in terms of an under­
lying variable of originality which he maintains demands the 
fullest possible utilization of stimuli from the environment. 
This however, he suggests, is not possible for the rigid
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individual, who selects out and utilizes stimuli in accord­
ance with his defensive needs. Golann (1962) taking this 
study further argued that subjects high on "creativity moti­
vation" would prefer stimuli and situations which allow for 
idiosyncratic ways of dealing with them. Using a revised 
form of the B-W scale with groups of 11 and 13 years of age 
he found that children who preferred the ambiguous and com­
plex shapes also showed a preference on his creative motiva­
tion scale for the activities that allowed more self-expression 
and utilization of creative capacity, in contrast to low B-W 
scorers who preferred more routine activities. High scorers 
for example showed greater preference than the low scorers 
for activities such as 'drawing pictures', as opposed to 
'colouring in a colouring book', and 'figuring out how to do 
something yourself as opposed to 'have the teacher tell you 
how to do something'. The complete questionnaire (Golann,
1961) is reproduced in the Appendix and will be used later 
as one of the criteria in assessing the concurrent validity 
of divergent thinking.
It is suggested that the higher children's divergent 
thinking ability, particularly in terms of flexibility and 
originality, the greater will be their creativity motivation.
This chapter began with a discussion of the concept and 
measurement of divergent thinking, as established within 
Guilford's theory of the structure of intellect, and has so 
far been concerned with theories of creative thinking which 
provide it with some theoretical support. Guilford's model, 
however, did not arise independently of other attempts at 
conceptualising and measuring intellectual abilities and it
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owes a great deal to earlier developments in the field of 
mental measurement. To conclude this chapter some further 
evidence for the construct of divergent thinking will be 
looked at within the tradition of psychometric measurement.
3.7 PSYCHOMETRIC APPROACHES TO CREATIVE THINKING
The origins of creative production have been attributed 
to sources that vary from ’divine inspiration’ to ’devilish 
influence, depending on the use to which the creative talents 
were p u t ’. (Anastasi, 1968). The Greeks spoke of a m a n ’s 
'daemon' (without its connotation of evil) which was supposed 
to furnish the inspiration for his creative work, and the 
essence of such views was that creative work of the highest 
order arises from a process which is absent in the ordinary 
man. Any study of the creative process with a view to 
encouraging its development in the rest of the population 
would consequently, on this basis, be doomed to failure.
Galton's (1869) early work was the beginning of a scien­
tific study of creative ability. He remarked on a range of 
individual differences and began a quantitative approach to 
the measurement of his subjects' characteristics, including 
the "fluency and freedom of their associations". Galton's 
attempts at measuring psychomotor and intellectual abilities 
were disseminated by his contact with Cattell, who according 
to Guilford (1967) , was the first person to use the term 
'mental test' in psychological literature (Cattell, 1890). 
With the further developments of Binet in France and Terman 
in the U.S.A., studies of intellectual functioning, including 
what Galton termed 'creative power' began to take place 
within a quantifiable framework of individual differences.
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Spearman, for example, in 'The Creative Mind' called 
for investigations of creativity not in terms of some innate 
power of genius, but in terms of a continuum of intellectual 
abilities in which some people would show quantitative 
superiority.
The development of divergent thinking tests has been 
within this tradition of psychological measurement in an 
attempt to assess and understand cognitive aspects of creati­
vity, though for the first half of this century their origins 
are largely buried by the development of intelligence tests, 
and by the belief that the 'general intellectual ability' 
measured by the latter would be of most significance in fore­
casting future talent and creative achievement.
In general terms measured intelligence has in fact been 
a surprisingly effective predictor of future achievement. 
Reviewing such evidence, particularly Terman's 'Genetic 
Studies of Genius' (Terman, 1925; Terman and Oden, 1947,
1959) , Butcher (1968) suggests that the evidence demonstrates 
overwhelmingly, the value of general intelligence, measured 
by conventional tests, as the most important psychological 
variable that can at present be assessed to predict future 
achievement. In spite of a conviction that other variables 
such as personality and motivation are of importance he ack­
nowledges (Cattell and Butcher, 1968) that they are so elusive 
that even in combination their practical predictive efficiency 
is lower than that of general intelligence.
From another point of view however he notes that the 
individuals who are the statistical exceptions require 
detailed study and as Goldberg (1965) points out elsewhere, 
that Terman's work also demonstrates the rarity and
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unpredictability of creative and original talent. Although 
it produced plenty of indication of superior educational and 
vocational attainment and social adjustment it has not 
yielded any Darwin, Einstein, Picasso or Henry Ford. Guil­
ford (1950) and Getzels and Jackson (1962) both referring to 
Terman's studies suggest that had he used criteria of intel­
lectual abilities more specifically related to creative 
aspects, he might have had more success in selecting a more 
truly 'gifted' sample. As pointed out by the original 
researchers however, (Terman and Oden, 1947) the occurrence 
of individuals with supremely gifted talents is extremely 
rare and the chances of finding them within any sample of 
1000 people is very remote.
When the content and form of administration of intelli­
gence tests are scrutinised however one must have certain 
doubts about their coverage of creative abilities. Not only 
have the abilities covered become increasingly tied to logi­
cal reasoning, but the format, demanding simply ticks or 
deletions, prevents the individual from expressing any obser­
vations other than those prescribed by the tester.
In fairness to some of the early test developers their 
attempts at measuring individual differences ranged over a 
variety of abilities and it is in the earlier activities of 
this century that we find some of the antecedents of divergent 
tests. Binet and Henri (1896) proposed that ten areas of 
intellectual functioning be explored: memory, imagery, ima­
gination, attention, comprehension, suggestibility, aesthetic 
appreciation, moral sentiment, muscular force and force of 
will and motor skill, and judgement of visual space. For 
each of these categories they suggested a number of different
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tests. Their view of intellectual ability was far from a 
unitary one.
Even when asked to produce a scale for differentiating 
between different learning abilities within a school situa­
tion, Binet’s first scale was designed so that the tester 
could decide how far a child was advanced or retarded intel­
lectually on 30 aspects of mental ability. These covered 
both psychomotor and cognitive abilities, the latter includ­
ing tests of comprehension and memory, and three tests which 
using Guilford’s terminology could be classified as divergent 
thinking. These asked the subject to construct sentences 
containing three given words, make up their own endings for 
sentences, and give rhyming words in response to a given 
word. Under demands for a scale to meet administrative 
requirements Binet modified and reduced his battery of tests 
and finally in obvious contradiction to his belief in the 
complex nature of human intelligence allowed his tests to 
yield a single score in relation to each child.
Contemporary with Binet's work in France, Terman in 
America was also investigating the relationship between a 
variety of mental tests and children’s school performance, 
the latter already beginning to dictate the content of the 
tests. In one of his early investigations however (Terman, 
1906), he chose a battery of tests which would satisfy many 
advocates of a multi-dimensional view of intelligence. It 
included what he claimed were measures of inventive and 
creative imagination, logical processes, mathematical ability, 
mastery of language, insight (interpretation of fables), 
learning ability, memory abilities, and motor ability. In 
order to investigate the power of the tests to discriminate
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between children's abilities he chose two groups of children 
whom local teachers rated to be the most and least able res­
pectively. Using teacher ratings to help validate new scales 
is a reasonable practice, [see for example Entwistle (1968)], 
but Terman chose only 14 children for his investigation, the 
7 brightest and the 7 least able. With these extreme groups 
it is hardly surprising that most of Terman's tests discri­
minated between them. The tests of motor ability showed a 
slight negative relationship however and more significantly 
(for this survey though not for Terman at the time) the mea­
sure of creative and inventive imagination was only slightly 
higher for the 'bright' group. With hindsight it is easy to 
suggest that the small relationship between the test of crea­
tive imagination and the criterion should have worried Terman 
more than it apparently did. It is interesting to speculate 
on how the testing movement might have developed had Terman 
been less ready to dismiss the creative measure from his 
battery. Terman might then have been more reluctant to con­
clude that the similar relationships of the other mental 
tests suggested that intellectual abilities develop along 
similar lines and that consequently the measurement of a 
single intelligence trait was feasible. At the time however 
the temptation to utilize the apparent success of the majo­
rity of the tests would have been difficult to resist, 
though Kamin (1976) suggests in an historical/political 
review of the testing movement that the reasons for adopting 
the I.Q. concept were not altogether scientific. As far as 
divergent and inventive abilities are concerned Terman's 
results helped preclude them from most of the early 'intelli­
gence' tests including Terman's modification of Binet's tests
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into the standardised Stanford-Binet Scales, and they have 
been so precluded until recently (Warburton, 1970).
These examples of the work of Binet and Terman illus­
trate two important features. Firstly the initial inclusion 
in testing batteries of measures of creative ability, and 
secondly the gradual omission of such measures as attempts 
to validate and utilize the tests became increasingly tied 
to the school situation. Furthermore the administrative 
convenience of using a single score instead of a collection 
of subscores, and its effectiveness in predicting and dis­
criminating between children’s school achievement, laid a 
foundation for a narrow interpretation of intelligence in 
terms of a single general ability largely tied to convergent 
reasoning ability.
As tests of 'general intelligence' began to dominate 
the mental measurements scene, investigations of thinking 
more directly related to creative expression and invention 
tended to take place in terms of specific or group factors 









Fig.2. Model of the Hierarchical Group-factor theory of Human 
Abilities (From Vernon, 1961)
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Vernon’s familiar hierarchical model of intellectual 
abilities (Fig.2) developed from Burt (1940) illustrates an 
alternative theory to that of Guilford. Spearman’s ’g ’ fac­
tor of general ability is the most prominent component, in 
that it accounts for the greatest proportion of difference 
in abilities, though Vernon also notes that abilities are 
too varied to be adequately described in terms of a monoli­
thic general intelligence as conceived by Spearman. After 
the ’g ’ factor the abilities fall into two major groups, 
verbal-educational (v:ed) and spatial-perceptual-practical 
(k:m). These in turn can be broken down into minor group 
factors typically including scientific, technical, linguis­
tic, physical, musical, or other more specialised abilities.
At the bottom of the hierarchy are the specific factors 
which underlie some particular task but imply nothing about 
ability at anything else. Vernon (1964) suggests that diver­
gent thinking abilities comprise specific or group factors 
and that their presence does not conflict with the hierar­
chical model and the importance of general ability.
Specific factors unrelated to other abilities occur at 
the bottom of Vernon’s hierarchy and although for most 
general educational and vocational prediction Vernon consi­
ders specific abilities to be less influential than abilities 
higher in the ’tree’, he acknowledges that in more homogeneous 
populations they would be of more relevance in matters of 
selection and prediction. In the same way Vernon (1969) 
notes that while there is some divergence of views between 
British and American factor psychologists regarding theories 
of the intellect, the American interpretation of intellectual 
factors as separate primary abilities is a legitimate model
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when dealing with highly selected or homogeneous groups, 
where the underlying 'g' factor does not discriminate marked­
ly between individuals.
While McNemar (1964) sees the debate going on for some 
time as to whether a scheme involving primary abilities plus 
a de-emphasised ’g ’ is preferable to one involving an empha­
sised *g* plus group factors, Wiseman (1967) suggests that 
the end-results are largely a matter of emphasis rather than 
fundamental difference. The essential difference depends on 
whether in factor analysing a battery of intellectual tests 
one extracts factors that are distinct or correlated. The 
British (and Guilford) with a very different emphasis on the 
initial battery of tests) adopt the former method, the Ameri­
cans, following Thurstone largely adopt the latter. The end 
result is either a major general factor followed by group 
and specific factors or a number of correlated factors of 
roughly equal weight with an underlying general ability. 
Thurstone originally suggested seven such factors, spatial 
abilities, perceptual speed, numerical ability, verbal 
meaning, memory, verbal fluency, and inductive reasoning.
The number and types of factors extracted however depends 
on the initial testing battery, and divergent abilities for 
example, can appear as factors only if they are included in 
the initial hypotheses and tests of the intellectual abili­
ties to be investigated. Their inclusion depends initially 
on their theoretical justification, and finally on their 
practical, predictive validity.
To some extent the justification for divergent abilities 
is still at the former stage though they have also gained 
support as questions have been raised about the predictive
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value of I.Q. alone. MacKinnon (1962) for example reports 
that studies of eminent men and women showed that, given a 
minimum level of I.Q. of about 120, there was no relation 
between I.Q. and outstandingly original work. Similarly Roe 
(1953) from a study of high level research scientists con­
cluded that "It is then, not essential to have this ability 
(intelligence) at the highest level in order to become an 
eminent scientist". Hudson (1966) makes similar conclusions 
regarding the achievement of able schoolboys.
As in the theoretical discussion earlier there is a 
definite indication that creative ability is composed of 
something in addition to reasoning and the type of convergent 
ability measured by the conventional I.Q. test. Some of this 
’extra something’ is no doubt due to personality and motiva­
tional factors, though it is also likely that explanations of 
creative ability will be enhanced by a broad conception of 
intellectual ability including divergent factors.
The researches of Getzels and Jackson (1962) and Wallach 
and Kogan (1966) brought to the fore the limitations of the 
traditional I.Q. test and the potential of divergent thinking 
measures. Both researches claimed to have elicited two dis­
tinct types of intellectual ability, the ’intelligent’ and 
the ’creative’, and though the latter is an unacceptable 
label for their ’divergent’ dimensions, they were able to 
demonstrate that the common type of intelligence test fails 
to sample all or at least a sufficiently broad range of known 
cognitive abilities (Getzels and Jackson, 1962).
Burt (1962) gives some positive support for the latter 
conclusion, and notes that "there can be no doubt whatever 
that these new tests have succeeded in eliciting supplementary
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activities that are rarely tapped by the usual brands of 
intelligence test". Defending the general ability concept 
of intellect however he points out that the conventional 
intelligence test should not be regarded as an adequate mea­
sure of the general ability factor. He suggests, in fact, 
that "the ’common type of intelligence test’ provides a 
very inadequate measure of that factor", and emphasises, 
somewhat belatedly, that within the general ability theory 
there are ’constituent subfactors’, which include a group of 
factors for ’productive’ rather than ’reproductive’ imagina­
tion.
Some early testers did in fact draw attention to these 
factors, though their practical effect in the development of 
intellectual tests was negligible.
Hargreaves (1927) gave 151 children tests of imagination, 
including ’unfinished pictures’, ’ink-blots’, and story com­
pletion. Marking them for ’fluency’ he found correlations 
between all the tests and concluded that "imagination tests, 
marked for that aspect called ’fluency’ had some group fac­
tors distinct from ’g ’. Spielman and Gaw (1926) arrived at 
a similar conclusion with tests of ’creative imagination’, 
and although the tests correlated with great intelligence 
they suggested that there was also a specific factor of ima­
gination to some extent independent of intelligence. Karve 
(1929) more forcibly claimed to have "proved the existence 
of a ’fluency’ factor, independent of intelligence, in tests 
of imagination and association". The latter comprised tests 
of Controlled Association (write down things made of leather), 
Free Association, Nouns (give as many as possible beginning 
with P.T. ... etc.). Unfinished Stories, Ink-Blots, Picture
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Completion and Prediction (what might happen if it became 
unnecessary for people to eat and drink?). These would serve 
well as a modern test of divergent thinking, yet their exis­
tence, and the researcher’s conclusions, were largely ignored 
in practical attempts at assessing intellectual abilities.
It is very likely true as Burt (1962) points out that 
these abilities can be incorporated within a hierarchical 
model of the intellect, but it is also true that such abili­
ties were relegated to an insignificant position alongside 
those cognitive processes assessed by the conventional I.Q. 
test, and labelled ’general intellectual ability’. Burt 
suggests that even for predicting scholastic achievement "few 
educational psychologists would imagine that a single I.Q. 
based on a ’common type of intelligence test’ would yield all 
the relevant information required", but unfortunately educa­
tional psychologists, including Burt, have not always commu­
nicated to the community at large the importance of the 
motivational and special abilities that Burt (1962) maintains 
should have "considerable weight".
Whatever position divergent abilities finally take up 
in various theories of the intellect and batteries of intel­
lectual tests, they can be welcomed for the fresh air, which, 
as Hudson mentions in connection with Getzels and Jackson’s 
research, they let in upon a world of musty, even foetid, 
expertise. As Heim (1970) has observed the study of abilities 
appeared to be stagnating with tests being constructed within 
too narrow a frame of reference. Even if, as Burt claims, the 
results of divergent thinking studies do not contradict the 
general ability theory, they have revived interest in factors 
which have remained well hidden in the conventional approa­
ches to intelligence testing.
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3.8 CONCLUSIONS
The theoretical evidence of this chapter has been presen­
ted to indicate the associations between divergent thinking 
and a long line of theoretical approaches to creative think­
ing. It lends some support to the view expressed in the last 
chapter that creative thinking is a broad rather than a uni­
tary trait, but also that divergent thinking, with an empha­
sis on fluent, imaginative, open and flexible thinking is 
likely to be of an important element in the process of crea­
tivity in its broad sense. It has provided grounds for 
believing that creative ability is unlikely to be encapsuled 
within the conventional view of intelligence as assessed by 
the traditional type of convergent I.Q. test, though it has 
also emphasised that creative thinking, especially as con­
ceived by Guilford in his Structure of Intellect, is not 
tied exclusively to a divergent category. It is significant 
that divergent thinking items have now been included in the 
British Intelligence Scale (Warburton, 1970), one of the 
subtests including scores for fluency and quality of ideas.
In endeavouring to provide some theoretical associations 
for the concept of divergent thinking the emphasis in this 
review has naturally concentrated on the cognitive aspects 
of ability. On a number of occasions however I have added 
the rider that real life creative production depends not only 
on cognitive factors, but also on temperamental and motiva­
tional dispositions for creative expression. It is also 
likely that performance on divergent thinking tests themselves 
will also reflect the latter qualities, and Golann's (1962) 
scale of ’creativity motivation’ will be used as one criterion 
in the present study. Heim (1970) suggests that the study of
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abilities has often distinguished too sharply between the 
cognitive and affective factors, and Eysenck (1967) maintains 
that personality variables such as extraversion-introversion 
and stability-neuroticism should always be included in experi­
mental studies of intellectual functioning, because of their 
value in mediating predictions and their interaction poten­
tial in all types of learning and performance tasks. Some 
attention will be given to these personality dimensions in 
the final part of this study in exploring the relationship 
between divergent, convergent, and attitudinal factors in 
children’s thinking.
It has been suggested that the concept of problem solv­
ing seen as the exercise of one’s thinking in order to 
obtain some goal has contributed a great deal to the theory 
of creative thinking. As Wertheimer points out problem 
solving is not confined to the schoolroom; problem situa­
tions occur throughout life and for a satisfactory outcome, 
they depend on the thinker getting away from a one-sided 
inflexible view (recentering), and appreciating changes in 
meaning of the constituent ideas in accordance with different 
relationships to the whole structure. In one’s ’’willingness 
to face issues, to deal with them frankly, honestly, and 
sincerely’’, Wertheimer sees problem solving as a ’’philosophy 
of life’’. Education, he maintains, should therefore concen­
trate not on developing blind, mechanical habits, norms or 
opinions, but on encouraging children to get to the merit 
of a situation themselves without depending on the opinions 
of others, fashion or authority.
While the theoretical evidence does not justify equating 
divergent with creative thinking, it does give some support
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to the view that divergent thinking tests are at least point­
ing in the right direction, and provides some construct 
validity on which to base the claim that such divergent 
measures as fluency, flexibility and originality of ideas 
are of relevance for creative thinking.
The unavoidable issue however is to evaluate their suc­
cess in demonstrating this hypothesis of relevance. Before 
proceeding with the practical contribution of the present 
study the empirical evidence as arrived at by other investi­
gations of their validity and reliability will be reviewed.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REVIEW OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE VA LID ITY  AND 
R E L IA B IL IT Y  OF DIVERGENT THINKING TESTS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
There are a large number of reviews of ’creativity’ 
research of varying depth and range covering studies up to 
the beginning of the 1970’s, such as those of Wallach, 1970; 
Richards, 1970; Freeman, Butcher and Christie, 1971;
Butcher, 1972; Gilchrist, 1972; and Nuttall, 1972. That 
of Wallach (1970) is a particularly comprehensive review of 
studies with populations of school children, but with a pre­
dictable point of view based on that of Wallach and Kogan
(1966).
Whatever their views however, reviewers are consistent 
in underlining the lack of empirical evidence, referred to 
earlier in this study, regarding the validity of divergent 
tests in relation to criteria of creativity. Butcher (1972) 
for example suggests that far too much has been taken for 
granted regarding their validity, though he nevertheless 
accepts that ’’some connection is plausible’’ and points to 
Desing’s (1970) study of reliability and validity for a little 
recent positive evidence.
It is encouraging to observe however that as Vernon (1972) 
points out, signs of some useful validity are beginning to 
emerge, and like this study a number of researches are being 
undertaken to examine the problems of validity and reliability 
directly. This review will concentrate on recent studies of 
this type, referring to earlier studies where appropriate.
To begin, an appraisal will be made of the evidence of
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Torrance (1974) in comparison with the views of other resear­
chers, followed by a more general review, and concluding with 
a detailed look at the three validation studies of Bennett 
(1973), Dewing (1970) and Vernon (1972). Throughout the 
chapter parallels will be drawn with the present study. In 
spite of the ceiling placed on their validity by the relia­
bility of divergent tests however, many of the investigations 
to be reviewed still ignore the latter. Further evidence 
regarding reliability will therefore be drawn from wider 
sources when discussing the evidence for scorer reliability, 
test-retest reliability and long-term stability, in the 
experimental part of this study.
4.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE VALIDITY OF DIVERGENT THINKING
TESTS BASED ON THE CLAIMS OF TORRANCE (1974)
Torrance (1966, 1974) in presenting his divergent tests 
for commercial use has endeavoured to present information on 
reliability and validity for the information of potential 
users. Though slender in comparison with the number of stu­
dies that have used his tests as criteria of ’creativity’ 
without regard for their validity, there are some studies 
which provide much needed evidence in these respects.
The greatest number of studies presented by Torrance are 
in relation to aonstruot validity, the divergent tests usually 
being used on an exploratory basis and revealing interesting 
relationships with other variables. Most of the researches 
were conducted by comparing high and low scorers on Torran­
ce ’s tests, the resulting groups being referred to as the 
’High Creative’ and ’Low Creative’ respectively. Without 
adopting this prejudicial nomenclature there is a clear
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indication from most of the studies, as in Hudson's investi­
gations (1966, 1968) in this country, that highly divergent 
children do tend to exhibit unconventional characteristics 
both in their responses and in associated personality vari­
ables and activities. Most of the studies involving children, 
however, tended to be with small, selected groups, usually of 
high I.Q. The divergent tests were, consequently, often 
being used as an introspective technique with relatively 
homogeneous groups in terms of intelligence. In these cir­
cumstances they appeared to provide a convenient method of 
discriminating between children in much the same way as the 
Rorschach Ink Blots. Weisberg and Springer (1961), for exam­
ple, finding that the high divergers also showed a tendency 
towards unconventional treatment of the blots.
The half-dozen studies in this context reported by 
Torrance lend some support to the theoretical evidence reviewed 
in the last chapter, highly divergent children being found to 
be less rigid in their attitudes (Fleming and Weintraub, 1962), 
and able to resist premature closure (Long and Henderson,
1964). On the other hand while two of the studies found evid­
ence of greater humour and playfulness in the young diverger 
(Torrance, 1962b; Lieberman, 1965), Long et al (1965) found 
the highly original children on figurai divergent thinking to 
be unhappy, lower in self-esteem and alienated from authority.
In studies with older children or young adults groups of 
highly divergent individuals were again differentiated from 
lower scorers in a variety of ways. They tended to see them­
selves as more adventurous, curious and independent and less 
constrained by authority and others' opinions, than their 
non-divergent peers (Dauw, 1965), but they also experienced
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more intense and prolonged stress due to the disparaging views 
of others, disagreement with parents, and general frustration 
of their craving for independence (Torrance and Dauw, 1965).
In general the evidence suggests that performance on the 
tests is related to behaviour characteristics associated with 
creative thinking, but if it were not for the weight of theo­
retical backing such as that provided in the last chapter, 
many of the studies quoted could be dismissed on the grounds 
of the very limited number of subjects involved, the question­
able significance of some of the relationships, the extreme 
nature of groups selected, and Torrance’s lack of evaluation 
when reporting the results. It is too easy, for example, to 
seize on, and generalise from, the fact that in one study of 
a sample of 26 junior high school students, a correlation of 
0.52 was found between ’Unusual Questions’ and Torrance’s 
Creative Motivation Inventory.
Baird (1972) commenting on Torrance’s tests, suggests 
that in spite of the limited evidence the results seem to be 
consistent with theories of creative behaviour, though he 
points to the need for evidence in relation to predictive 
validity. A very similar assessment is made by Holland (1972) 
and he concludes that despite gross statistical deficiencies 
and weak designs in many of the experiments using Torrance’s 
tests, most of the evidence seems generally consistent with 
the literature of creative behaviour, though lack of external 
predictive validity is a serious deficiency.
In the latest edition of his tests, Torrance (1974), 
there are some signs of an increase in predictive studies^ 
particularly of a long-term nature. Torrance distinguishes
125.
three types of predictive studies, concurrent, short-range 
(one week to nine months) and long-range.
In the QonouTvent studies with school children, Torran­
ce's criteria consist only of peer nominations of creative 
behaviour, teacher nominations, and educational achievement. 
Elsewhere however (Torrance, 1962, 1967), he draws attention 
to the potential of checklists of creative interests and 
leisure activities as possible criteria, and it is surprising 
that no studies using the latter as criteria are reported. 
Vernon (1964) suggests that research into the home, leisure 
and educational backgrounds of creative individuals may well 
yield better measures of creative talent than divergent tests, 
and some studies involving their use as concurrent criteria 
will be reviewed later.
Two measures of children's interests and activities will 
be used in the present study as concurrent criteria. These 
comprise a 'Creative Leisure Interests Checklist' (Torrance, 
1962; Dewing, 1970), and an 'Interests' questionnaire 
(Barker Lunn, 1970) which includes two groups of creative 
interests, one 'imaginative' and one 'logical/analytic'.
Teacher ratings of the children's creative behaviour are also 
obtained on a scale constructed by the writer from Torrance
(1967) .
Defending the use of teacher ratings as criteria of 
creative talent (with more conviction than that of peer rat­
ings) , Torrance (1974) suggests that teachers must be in a 
favourable position to assess children's creative potentiali­
ties, and points to a number of studies giving support to 
this view, (Yamamoto, 1962; Nelson, 1963). The ratings in 
Nelson's study, when the teachers gave opinions in a structured
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manner on scales of behavioural characteristics, are more con­
vincing than those obtained by Yamamoto from general ratings 
of fluency, flexibility and originality. It has been sugges­
ted however (Getzels and Jackson, 1962; Hasan and Butcher, 
1966; Cropley, 1967) that teachers find divergent children 
less desirable than convergent children as pupils, and it is 
possible that, in giving subjective ratings of creative abi­
lity, teachers may not do justice to divergent pupils.
Wallach and Kogan (1966) go so far as to suggest that teach­
ers' ratings are "next to worthless" in creativity research. 
Research findings by Biggs, Fitzgerald and Atkinson (1971) 
suggest otherwise, however, and lend support to Torrance's 
view.
Biggs et al found that both convergent and divergent 
children received favourable ratings in terms of classroom 
behaviour, and concluded that teachers were evaluating diver­
gent children realistically and positively. Although the 
mean I.Q. in Bigg's sample (108.7 for girls and 104.9 for 
boys) is higher than in the present study, it is similar in 
mean age (11.3 years) and background (primary school), and 
the teacher ratings in this study will be utilized in the 
belief that they too will be realistic.
As well as the use of teacher ratings as a criterion of 
creative activity, teacher ratings of the children's persona­
lity and desirability in class are also utilized on an explo­
ratory basis in the construct validity investigation.
Studies attempting to validate divergent tests against 
educational criteria are equivocal both in Torrance's review 
and in researches using other batteries of divergent tests.
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Hasan and Butcher (1966) for example, found correlations of 
0.62 and 0.76 between divergent ability and English and 
Mathematics attainment respectively, while the writer (Rich­
ards and Bolton, 1971) found that divergent abilities played 
only a minor role in mathematics achievement, even in tests 
designed to assess modern approaches to the subject; and 
Bennett (1973) reports that, although five divergent thinking 
measures correlated significantly with conventional English, 
only one loaded with English on a conventional attainment 
factor.
The use of educational or academic criteria is complica­
ted by the important role played by intelligence in such 
achievement, and experiments conducted in groups already 
selected on the basis of high I.Q. have led to some spurious 
conclusions about the relative importance of divergent think- 
abilities and I.Q. [See for example McNemar’s (1964) comments 
on Getzels and Jackson’s investigation (1962).] When I.Q. is 
allowed for, in more representative samples the effect of 
partialling out I.Q, normally has the effect of reducing the 
correlations between divergent thinking and academic attain­
ment (Cronbach, 1968; Vernon, 1972), though Bish (1964) 
reports on the opposite effect.
The effect of divergent ability on educational attainment 
is an important area of study but a highly complex one, and 
with differing types of achievement, teaching approaches and 
ways of learning, Torrance’s use of educational attainment as 
a criterion is not a very satisfactory way of validating 
divergent tests.
Nine studies, dating from 1961 to 1970, noted as being
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the major investigations into the short-range predictive vali­
dity of the Torrance tests are summarised by Torrance (1974). 
Divergent thinking predicted such creative behaviour of ele­
mentary school children as the production of creative ideas 
about science toys, humour and fantasy, originality in imagi­
native stories, differential responses to varied curriculum 
tasks and, in high school students, creative science questions. 
In the four studies with adult populations, the tests predic­
ted more provocative/divergent as opposed to factual/reproduc­
tive questions from six teachers selected as ’high creative’ 
than from six convergent teachers (two studies), teaching 
success in inner-city schools, and superior performance in 
productive thinking and creative applications in a Mental 
Health Course.
The same general criticisms made earlier with regard to 
the construct validity studies also apply to the above, though 
as before the overall picture provides some evidence for the 
predictive validity of the tests.
Results of long-term validity studies reported by Tor­
rance are also encouraging though some negative results, and 
criticisms of Torrance’s studies, have been presented by other 
researchers (Kogan and Pankove, 1974; Crockenberg, 1972).
Of the five long-range prediction studies reported by 
Torrance (1974) , three were by Torrance and his associates 
and two by other investigators. In that of Witt (1971) Tor­
rance’s tests and W i t t ’s ’Favourite Group Games Test’ were 
used to select sixteen black, disadvantaged children from 
second, third and fourth grades of a ghetto school. After 
six years, of the twelve who continued with an out-of-school
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programme designed to provide opportunity for the development 
of creativity, ten had revealed superior creative talent in 
the arts and three in science. It provides some support for 
the efficacy of Torrance’s tests in the initial selection 
procedure but the result is as much an evaluation of the out- 
of-school programme as it is of Torrance’s tests.
Cropley (1972) located 111 students from a sample tested 
five years earlier on six of Torrance’s tests. A composite 
divergent measure was derived from the test results and com­
pared with data concerning the out-of-school achievements in 
art, drama, literature and music of the follow-up sample. 
Significant correlations of 0.52 for boys and 0.42 for girls 
were found between the criteria and the divergent test pre­
dictor. Similar levels of association between predictors and 
criterion variables are reported in Torrance’s own studies 
(Torrance, Tan and Allman, 1970; Torrance, 1969; Torrance, 
1971) but in all these the degree of prediction due to diver­
gent abilities over and above that available from intelligence 
alone is not determined. Wallach (1970, 1972), however, main­
tains that the predictive value of Torrance’s tests is due 
largely to their substantial correlations with intelligence.
The earliest of Torrance’s prediction studies (Torrance 
et al^ 1970) obtained follow-up data after a period of eight 
years from 114 of an initial sample of 325 student teachers. 
The students’ responses to a questionnaire designed to yield 
information on 69 different creative teaching behaviours 
formed a creative teaching index and correlated significantly 
(r = 0.57) with the original divergent thinking score. Com­
pared with follow-up studies of conventional teacher assess­
ment at college and teaching performance some years later.
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(e.g. Wiseman and Start, 1965) the predictive validity of 
Torrance's tests are quite impressive. One would be happier 
however if the assessments of the teachers' behaviour had 
been deduced from opinions other than their own.
The two remaining long-term studies reported by Torrance 
(1969, 1971) involve two groups of children from the same 
school seven and twelve years after their initial testing in 
1959. The first investigation involved 65 subjects, and data, 
by mailed questionnaire, was received back from 46 of them.
The questionnaire asked for information regarding creative 
achievements, aspirations, and the quality and nature of 
creative achievements in art, music, literature, science, 
drama, business and politics. Three measures were constructed 
from the data; (1) quantity of creative achievements, (2) 
quality of highest creative achievement and (3) creativeness 
of future aspirations. These were correlated against the 
composite divergent thinking measure obtained in 1959, and the 
resulting validity coefficients were 0.50, 0.46, and 0.51 res­
pectively. The following correlations were obtained for the 








Fluency 0.44 0.39 0.34












divergent 0.50 0.46 0.51
Intelligence 0.22 0.37 0.32
(for 44 d.f. values of r > 0.29 are significant, p < 0.05)
Table 1 Predictive Validity Coefficients 
(from Torrance, 1969)
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It is noticeable that the divergent scores, except for 
the elaboration score, are better predictors than the intel­
ligence score, although there is considerable overlap. It 
must be noted however that the sample was well above average 
in intelligence (I.Q. 118) and without this curtailment of 
range the intelligence effects would no doubt be much greater.
The results of the 12-year follow-up study reported by 
Torrance (1971) are very similar to the 7-year findings, the 
data being gathered in an identical manner, and the correla­
tion between the creativity predictors and the criterion 
variables being 0.51. The study was conducted with a larger 
population however, of over 200 subjects, and the resulting 
validity coefficient is even more significant (p < 0.001).
The greater numbers were only achieved, however, by bringing 
together the whole high-school population of 392 subjects, 
with ages ranging from 13 to 19 years. Until such time as 
this age difference becomes insignificant with regard to 
future achievement and creative aspiration there is likely to 
be some age factor in any correlation between divergent think­
ing performance at school and future creative achievements. 
This is not allowed for in Torrance’s validity coefficient.
As Vernon (1972) points out it is the amount of predic­
tion over and above that which can be forecast by intelli­
gence that is crucial in evaluating divergent tests and Tor­
rance’s evidence and that of Cropley (1972) leaves this in 
considerable doubt. Assuming only a moderate correlation 
between the divergent tests and intelligence the validity 
coefficients are high enough to give some positive evidence 
of predictive validity, but more specific information is nee­
ded before any definite conclusions can be made. The effect
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of intelligence will be looked at closely when validity coef­
ficients are presented later in this study.
4.3 FURTHER STUDIES OF THE VALIDITY OF DIVERGENT TESTS
A study of the predictive effect of divergent thinking 
and intelligence on creative activities and accomplishments 
over a two-year period and a seven-year period is reported by 
Kogan and Pankove (1974) and this study arrives at a very 
different conclusion to those of Torrance (1969, 1971). As a 
criterion Kogan and Pankove adopted a biographical inventory 
of extracurricular activities and accomplishments devised by 
Wallach and Wing (1969). The latter study provided some con­
current validity for divergent tests in relation to the acti­
vities assessed by the inventory, though the experimenters 
accepted that the interaction between intellective and diver­
gent measures was not established. Kogan and Pankove endea­
voured to both extend the validation and ascertain the effect 
of intelligence. The latter was in fact a combined measure 
of I.Q. and the power index from the Differential Aptitude 
Tests.
The testing procedures using the Wallach and Kogan (1966) 
tests of divergent thinking took place in two different 
schools at 5th grade (10-11 year-olds), 10th grade, and 
finally at graduation (12th grade). The predictive validity 
of the divergent tests (scored for fluency only) and the 
intellective measures given at both 5th and 10th grades were 
examined by the degree to which they predicted performance 
on the activities inventory at the time of graduation. 
Utilizing a stepwise multiple regression analysis the experi­
menters found "absolutely no indication in the data of the
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present study that divergent thinking assessed in the later 
years of elementary school is prognostic of nonacademic 
attainment during the high school years". In one school 
divergent thinking measures obtained at the 10th grade showed 
a slight predictive effect, significant at the 10% level. 
Intellective measures were more successful even though the 
criterion was specifically related to accomplishments in 
extra-curricular activities such as leadership, art, litera­
ture, music, science and dramatic arts. In one school the 
5th grade intellective measure accounted for about 45% of the 
variance in such activities and in the other the 10th grade 
measure was highly significant (p < 0.01). The complete 
absence of prediction for the 5th grade intellective measure 
in the larger school however complicated the result consider­
ably.
The results certainly question the predictive validity 
of the divergent measure, though the researchers' criticism 
of Torrance's studies, and their own claims, are rather out 
of proportion to the limited weight of their own study. Out 
of a total 5th grade population of 46 children in the smaller 
school only 22 were available for testing at graduation. In 
the larger school only 46 out of 116 children completed the 
final testing. In the latter the researchers note that "it 
was not possible to obtain the cooperation of all of the 
graduating seniors", and of the 69 who were sent questionn­
aires (with the offer of $2 compensation for the return of 
the questionnaire), the 46 who returned them comprised the 
final sample.
Although both schools were designated as predominantly 
middle class a considerable proportion of the attrition was 
due to dropping out of school prior to graduation. Those 46
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students remaining and the larger school sample were acknow­
ledged by the experimenters to have a significantly greater 
level of intellective aptitude than those who were excluded 
(t = 3.40, p < 0.01).
The other factor which needs to be recognised when com­
paring this study with others is the use of fluency only as 
â  measure of divergent thinking. The experimenters note that 
in a previous study correlations between fluency and origina­
lity (uniqueness) had ranged from 0.46 to 0.97 with a median 
correlation of 0.72, and they considered that this made one 
of the scores redundant. The degree of overlap, however, 
could have been revealed more clearly had they included the 
originality measure in the regression analysis. Whether or 
not it is valuable to use more than a fluency score is still 
a matter of debate, but when a number of researchers point to 
the independent effect of uniqueness on judgements of ’crea­
tivity’ (e.g. Cattell and Butcher, 1968; Hammaker, Shafto 
and Trabasso, 1975), an important predictive study such as 
that of Kogan and Pankove might have included both indices. 
Wallach and Wing (1969) including both indices in their study 
found more association between fluency and extra curricular 
creative activities, than between uniqueness and the latter, 
but this in itself is not a case for dropping the uniqueness 
index. Wallach and Wing note that although their index of 
non-academic accomplishments might not have given sufficient 
credit for depth of performance, and though they endeavoured 
to avoid crediting sheer dilettantism, they accept that ’’as 
soon as we are talking about level of accomplishment within 
a given non-academic domain, intelligence becomes more impor­
tant and sheer fluency of ideas less important’’. A similar
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observation could be made regarding the importance of quality 
of ideas in the divergent test.
Milgram and Milgram (1976) using "a self-report question­
naire of creative activities" owing a good deal to that of 
Wallach and Wing (1969) found that such creative activity was 
related to divergent thinking but not to intelligence or 
school grades. The magnitude of the relationship was not 
high however and once again the sample was of above average 
intelligence. No details of the actual I.Q. is given, but 
the sample was composed of senior high school pupils about to 
graduate in a "school of high academic standards".
An interesting additional finding was that different 
scoring procedures designed to credit separately the quality 
and quantity of creative performances were highly correlated. 
The procedures were applied to exactly the same data however 
and some common variance is to be expected from this source.
The magnitude of the correlation however was such that the 
researchers concluded that engaging in a wide variety of 
creative activities is a necessary condition for unusual and 
excellent creative attainments. The researchers suggest, 
somewhat tenuously, that this finding extends to a practical 
situation the suggestions of Mednick (1962) and Guilford (1950) 
(as noted in the last chapter), that the production of a large 
number of ideas is likely to increase the chance of producing 
original ones.
Though they can provide some evidence of concurrent and 
predictive validity it can also be argued that measures of 
creative interests and extra-curricula activities present 
inadequate criteria of real creative achievement. A recent
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study (Lang and Ryba, 1976) returns to the creative person as 
defined by undergraduate specialisation in musical or artis­
tic studies, as opposed to study in ’general arts’, in order 
to investigate creative thinking abilities. One of the crea­
tive thinking parameters consisted of Torrance’s (1966) tests 
of creative (divergent) thinking. Inter-scorer reliability 
exceeded 0.90 for the combined divergent score, though scorer 
reliabilities for the individual fluency, flexibility and 
originality scores were not given. The mean age of the stu­
dents was 21.8 years and the range 18 to 25 years.
The Barron-Welsh Art Scale for simplicity/complexity 
was also used, the researchers noting its relationship, des­
cribed in the last chapter, to the cognitive study of perso­
nality and to Frenkel-Brunswick’s ’tolerance of ambiguity’. 
After a complex analysis which involved comparisons of means, 
variance, correlation, factor analysis and discriminant ana­
lysis, the researchers concluded that visual artists were 
superior to the other groups on each of the divergent measu­
res and on the B-W Art Scale, that .a general intersensory 
factor existed amongst creative visual artists, and that cer­
tain perceptual factors were shared by the musical and artis­
tic individuals. The former is of most interest to this 
study, and the researchers suggested that divergent tests 
and the B-W scale are reliable predictors for identifying 
the artistically gifted individual. Combining the date from 
each group, there were strong intercorrelations (0.80, 0.79 
and 0.85) between fluency, flexibility and originality, and 
between each of them and the B-W scale, 0.47, 0.44 and 0.49 
respectively. This gives further construct validity to the 
Golann Creative Motivation Scale (Golann, 1962) which will be
137.
used later in this study. As noted in the last chapter 
Golann’s scale was related to creative ability via its 
relationship to the B-W Art Scale.
As a word of caution, Lang and Ryba conclude their 
report by noting that, despite the mounting enthusiasm for 
creativity much spadework remains to be done towards identi­
fying reliable external criteria, and they suggest that 
investigation of ’intra-intersensory’ functions might reveal 
how a host of different creators:- painters, composers, 
poets, designers and research scientists - are all able to 
perceive ratios, permutations and relationships "so as to 
culminate in the birth of an imaginative Gestalt".
Adopting a similar design to that of Lang and Ryba (1976), 
Zegas (1976) hypothesised that undergraduates "choosing major 
study in ’creative’ fields (art, music, English) would per­
form differently on a group of divergent production tests, 
with each subject doing best on the DP tests whose content 
area most closely related to his field of study". More speci­
fically, giving divergent tests to a total of 106 undergradu­
ates, to cover figurai, symbolic and semantic areas of Guil­
ford’s Structure-of-Intellect model, he suggested that they 
would reflect the different creative abilities of the art, 
music and English majors respectively. A study of the levels 
of performance of three ’creative’ groups in comparison with 
a ‘general’ group supported the hypothesis. There were no 
sex differences in performance on the tests, though the art 
majors were all female.
Speed, however, was a major variable in the testing pro­
cedures. Ten short divergent tests were given in forty-four
138
minutes, each containing two items. Subjects were asked, for 
example, to sketch objects from circles in two minutes and 
similarly from squares in another two minutes. Little infor­
mation on scoring was provided apart from the statement that 
’’Papers were scored basically on quantity” . It is difficult 
therefore to generalise from Zegas’ results though they give 
some concurrent validity to the fluency aspect of divergent 
tests given under timed conditions in its ability to differ­
entiate not only between ’creative’ and general groups but 
also between different types of creative group in terms of 
the separate ’content’ categories in Guilford’s S. of 1. 
model.
Split-half reliabilities are given by Zegas for each 
ability within each of the groups of students tested. These 
are typically high, between 0.82 and 0.93 for total divergent 
scores in the three content areas, semantic, symbolic, and 
figurai; and between 0.91 and 0.96 for the overall scores.
It has been suggested earlier in this study that diver­
gent thinking ability may aid children’s performance on a 
problem-solving task designed to incorporate flexible and 
productive aspects of thinking, particularly as suggested by 
the Gestalt school, and this will be subject to investigation 
later. Some practical evidence giving some construct vali­
dity to this hypothesis is revealed in a study by Goor and 
Sommerfeld [1976) into the problem-solving processes of crea­
tive (divergent) and non-creative students.
From an initial pool of 227 university students the 26 
highest and 26 lowest scoring subjects were ’selected’ on 
the basis of two divergent tests. Plot Titles and Consequences.
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The tests were scored for originality or ’divergent semantic 
transformations’ by crediting ’clever’ titles and ’remote’ 
consequences. The researchers note that they adopted the 
tests and scoring procedures from Guilford (1967). Apart 
from providing examples of ’remote’ and ’clever’ responses 
however, Guilford (1967) does not specify criteria for evalua­
ting the latter, and Cropley’s (1967) suggestion, that a more 
objective method based on statistical infrequency would be 
preferable to a subjective assessment, appears to be more 
widely accepted.
With some doubts about the scoring procedures the inves­
tigation nevertheless presents some interesting evidence.
The two extreme groups were referred to as ’High creative’ 
and ’Low creative’ respectively, though here they are inter­
preted simply as ’high divergent’ and ’low divergent’ groups. 
Both groups were asked to ’talk aloud’ as they attempted • 
three problem solving tasks and taped records were kept for 
the whole experimental period of thirty minutes.
The transcripts were analysed at three second intervals 
and the type of response at each interval was categorised 
into one of seven response categories from ’surveying new 
information’, to ’silence’. A Markoff chain analysis showed 
that different overall patterns of response were statistically 
differentiable between the high and low divergent groups.
When these patterns were looked at more closely three of the 
response categories differentiated significantly (y^ test) 
across all three tasks. The diverger scored more highly on 
’’generating new information or hypotheses” , ’’developing or 
working on a hypothesis” , and less highly on ’’silence” .
Other differences were also found but tended to be specific.
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The results give support to the hypothesis that the 
patterns of thinking of the high and low divergent subjects 
show discernible differences when faced with a problem solv­
ing task; and provide some construct validity for the point 
of view presented by the writer in the last chapter. It is 
disconcerting however to find the subjects high on divergent 
performance being referred to consistently as the ’high crea­
tive’ subjects and vice versa. We learn for example that the 
’’low creative subject” had significantly higher periods of 
’’silence” than the high creative. One does not have to enu­
merate the ways in which this can be construed in order to 
appreciate the dangers. There is no evidence that the high 
divergent group were any better at solving the problems than 
the low group. The experimenters hoped in fact that no-one 
would find a sufficiently plausible solution to make them 
abandon the task, as this automatically precluded such sub­
jects from their analysis. A total of 12 subjects were in 
fact thus excluded. As it happened six were in the high di­
vergent group and six in the low group. Apart from the fact 
that all the subjects were university freshmen, no details 
of their intellectual ability was provided.
The tasks themselves are familiar to those interested in 
puzzles or problem-solving; building four equal and equila­
teral triangles with six matches; the ’cancer’ problem from 
Duncker (1945); and the ’pebbles’ problem from De Bono’s 
’Use of Lateral Thinking’ (1967). Only the former has an 
unique solution. If the subjects remained silent for about 
10 seconds the task administrator had a list of ’’verbal 
promptings” to be used. Presumably these were used to encour­
age subjects who quickly proffered ’low level’ solutions to
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the last two tasks to ’think again’.
In contrast to Goor and Sommerfeld’s study, the expéri­
mental task designed for the present research will be used 
to assess the quality of the subjects’ solutions, but it is 
encouraging to find some empirical evidence to add to the 
construct validity for believing that divergent abilities 
will be a factor in different approaches to the task.
Though not a major area of investigation in this study 
it was noted in the last chapter that different approaches 
to creative tasks are also likely to arise from personality 
variables.
Torrance and Khatena (1970) have developed a personality 
scale ’What Kind of Person Are You?’ incorporating character­
istics which are though to distinguish creative from non- 
creative persons. Halpin and Halpin (1973), and Halpin, Hal- 
pin and Torrance (1974) report on its use with undergraduates 
in exploring the relationship between Torrance’s ’creative 
thinking abilities’ and other variables.
In the latter study the personality inventory was signi­
ficantly correlated with four out of the seven scores from 
the Torrance tests for males but with only two of the scores 
for females. While the experimenters note that this data is 
not impressive if the inventory is interpreted as a measure 
of criterion related validity, they suggest that it does 
suggest that the constructs which underline the Torrance 
tests are significantly related to the. constructs of the 
creative personality as measured by the ’What Kind of Person?’ 
test,
The study by Halpin and Halpin (1973) also fails to
142.
report any convincing relationship between Torrance’s tests 
and the personality inventory, performance on both appearing 
to be affected by the motivation of the subjects. Ward,
Kogan and Pankove (1970) on the other hand find that, while 
motivating conditions may alter the level at which groups 
perform, individual differences in performance derive from 
differences in capacity rather than motivation for divergent 
production.
Turning to more established measures of personality vari­
ables, it was suggested in the last chapter that the diverger 
may exhibit characteristics of the extravert (Eysenck, 1967), 
and divergers have also been found to be more neurotic than 
convergers (Hudson, 1968). The latter finding, however, was 
somewhat blurred by the fact that a minority of neurotic 
items in the Personality Inventory positively discriminated 
in the direction of the converger. The results of Smithers 
and Child (1974) investigating extraversion, neuroticism and 
divergent thinking in a sample of 306 university undergradu­
ates do not support either view. Identifying the students as 
divergers (n = 51), convergers (n = 53) and all rounders 
(n - 202), according to their differential performance on 
divergent thinking tests (’Uses’ and ’Consequences’, scored 
for fluency) and the AH5 test of intelligence, Smithers and 
Child found no differences in the level of extraversion or 
neuroticism between the three groups. While this finding 
was with university students, Hudson’s subjects were 15 years 
of age. Some evidence at the other end of the scale with 
11-year-olds will be provided by the present study.
143.
4.4 STUDIES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVERGENT THINKING
AND INTELLIGENCE
The impetus given to creativity research by the studies 
of Getzels and Jackson (1962) and Wallach and Kogan (1966) 
has been acknowledged throughout this study. Most writers 
would agree with the important educational implications of 
their findings, particularly regarding the development of 
abilities other than those covered by the conventional I.Q. 
test, but their suggestions that creativity, expressed in 
terms of divergent ability, is a quite distinct and indepen­
dent entity from intelligence has not been confirmed in var­
ious replications and follow-up studies (Marsh, 1964; Thorn­
dike, 1966; Hasan and Butcher, 1966; Ward, 1967; Fee,
1968). At the same time, as in the last two studies mentioned, 
factor-analytic techniques have demonstrated the presence of 
some distinct divergent ability loading on factors orthogonal 
to that of conventional I.Q., though the fact that the diver­
gent variance extends to a number of factors is a clear indi­
cation that ’creativity', even in terms of divergent abili­
ties, is not unidimensional (Fee, 1968).
The presence of some distinct ’divergent’ variance is 
crucial to any study of the validity of divergent thinking 
tests and it is not surprising that the extent of this dis­
tinction, both as a study in its own right and in wider stu­
dies, continues to be investigated (Anastasi and Shaefer,
1971; Guilford, 1971; Starr and Nicholl, 1975; Guilford, 
1975; Richards, R.L., 1976).
In a study of nearly one thousand 15-year-old pupils, 
Anastasi and Schaefer (1971) compared the responses to the 
Alternate Uses and Consequences Tests with I.Q. and school
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grades. They found that divergent tests correlated only as 
highly with each other as with I.Q., and separate analysis 
for boys and girls yielded closely similar results. The deg­
ree of overlap, they point out, could very likely be modified 
by a different choice of I.Q. and divergent measures, but 
they claim that the results indicate that neither dimension 
exists as a distinct entity. They suggest rather that each 
dimension includes identifiable traits that, organised in a 
pattern of relationships, cuts across both domains. This 
emphasis on divergent thinking as a many-faceted concept is 
supported by Guilford (1971, 1975, 1976).
Richards R.L. (1976) makes a comparison of selected Guil­
ford and Wallach and Kogan tests, with three general ability 
measures. Contrary to Wallach and Kogan’s recommendations 
however, their tests were administered in a timed format, of 
five minutes per item, together with the Guilford tests. The 
Wallach and Kogan tests were scored for fluency and unique­
ness, and the three Guilford tests yielded three scores for 
fluency, two for flexibility and one for originality. Inter­
nal consistency reliabilities were reported for each of the 
13 scores. These ranged from a low of 0.45, to 0.81, the 
lowest coefficients arising from the uniqueness score on the 
Wallach and Kogan tests. Ten of the coefficients exceeded 
0 .66, but even so these are lowpr than commonly reported for 
internal consistency measures, and Richards used a correction 
for attenuation to help clarify their relationship with intel­
ligence. As a result she observed that ’’Results were similar 
for both Guilford and Wallach-Kogan tests with the Guilford 
tests showing a slightly higher average relation to general 
intelligence” (Richards, 1976). There was some slight evidence
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for convergent and discriminant validity of the divergent 
measures, the divergent tests correlating more highly between 
themselves than with I.Q., but having acknowledged the zero- 
order correlations, of the order of 0.25 to 0.35, between the 
divergent measures and intelligence, Richards made the sur­
prising conclusion that the "results argue for a relatively 
simple description of the creative thinking domain, supporting 
the Wallach-Kogan position of a unitary and independent 
dimension".
In a reply Guilford (1976) points out the considerable 
common variance implicit in the relationship between the 
divergent and intelligence measures, and reiterates his belief 
in a multi-variate view of both the divergent and convergent 
dimensions in his Structure-of-Intellect model. He concedes 
that there may be second-order or third-order factors common 
to all his divergent production abilities, but when the 
first-order correlations are of limited size he suggests that 
thé influence of any common underlying ability would be 
severely restricted.
The discriminant validity of divergent measures in rela­
tion to I*.Q. and its convergent validity in relation to other 
divergent tests is often better discussed in terms of the 
tests factorial validity (e.g. Cropley and Maslany, 1969). 
Investigating the reliability and factorial validity of the 
Wallach and Kogan battery of divergent tests, Cropley and 
Maslany (1969) arrived at results which, though conducted 
with a highly selected sample in terms of I.Q. (university 
students), and allowing unlimited time (which varied from 1 
hour 15 minutes in the case of one student to 6 hours 30 
minutes for another), nevertheless indicated a considerable
146.
overlap between the ’creativity' and ’intelligence’ domains. 
The restriction of range and the informal conditions (the 
students were allowed to smoke, drink coffee and move around 
the room during the administration), were likely to reduce 
the I.Q. effects, and the divergent tests did correlate much 
more strongly between themselves than with I.Q. Cropley’s 
conclusion, that the results suggest that divergent tests 
measure a stable and internally consistent intellective mode, 
albeit substantially related to general intelligence, is 
quite compatible, however, with that of Anastasi and Schaefer 
(1971) , and would also be a more balanced interpretation of 
the results of Richards R.L. (1976).
Factorial studies, however, do not always clarify rela­
tionships between tests though they might raise questions 
for further study. A study by Plass, Michael and Michael 
(1974), provides such an example. A factor analysis was per­
formed on the 30 separate measures obtainable from the seven 
tests in Torrance’s ’creativity’ battery. Conveniently seven 
factors were extracted and the researchers conclude that "from 
the factor matrix presented ... it is apparent that each of 
the seven rotated factors described each task rather than the 
hypothesised psychological process for which it was scored".
Their interpretation of the factor matrix however is 
open to some question. The percentage of variance attribut­
able to each factor is omitted, and while the task specific 
element is evident, the first factor had substantial loadings 
from several of the verbal tests. The result of this inves­
tigation is a good illustration of the arbitrary nature of 
the factor analysis technique. Had composite fluency, flexi­
bility, originality and elaboration scores been included to
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balance the scores arrived at from the same task (nine scores 
from the same Ask and Guess task), a different pattern would 
no doubt have arisen.
4.5 EVIDENCE FOR THE TEST-RETEST RELIABILITY OF DIVERGENT
THINKING TESTS
The reliability information provided by Cropley and Mas­
lany (1969) relies on an internal consistency (K.R. 20) mea­
surement and applies to the scoring of originality, defined 
as statistical infrequency. The exact details of Cropley’s 
recommendations for scoring will be discussed later. The 
K.R. coefficients were 0.67, 0.82, 0.86, 0.87 and 0.85 for 
the five divergent sub-tests, for the full sample (134 male,
73 female). Although the writer has suggested earlier that 
internal consistency methods are not the most appropriate for 
assessing the reliability of divergent tests, Cropley is one 
of the few investigators who have looked closely at this 
aspect of divergent tests.
The varied and often unsatisfactory evidence for test- 
retest reliability has already been outlined in Chapter 1, 
and little evidence has been presented to aleviate the con­
cern expressed (Cronbach, 1970; Lewis, 1974). Torrance (1974) 
notes that few test-retest studies of his latest battery of 
tests have been made. That of Hagender (1967) however reports 
coefficients which show some improvement over those discussed 
earlier from Wodtke (1963) , and these will be given in more 
detail later, in comparison with those obtained from the pre­
sent study. Hagender’s results were obtained with a sample 
of only 28 children after a period of ’’from one to two weeks’’, 
but the verbal test results, in the region 0.79 to 0.87, 
would be acceptable for most psychological tests. The
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coefficients for the figurai tests ranging from 0.50 to 0.71 
were not as satisfactory.
Earlier studies quoted by Torrance (1974) generally have 
somewhat lower verbal test reliabilities than those given by 
Hagender, though figurai results have been higher. Yamamoto 
(1962) for example obtaining reliabilities for the Circles 
Test of 0.76, 0.63 and 0.79 for fluency, flexibility and ori­
ginality respectively.
The longest time interval between testings reported by 
Torrance (1974) is that of Dalbec (1966) who, with 43 college 
students, obtained long-term reliabilities of 0.59, 0.35 and 
0.73 for fluency, flexibility and originality, after an 
interval of three years. Cropley and Clapson (1971) have 
also reported on long-term test-retest reliabilities.
Out of a group of 320 twelve-year-olds who had taken a 
variety of tests in 1964, Cropley and Clapson located 110 who 
were still at school five years later, and investigated the 
stability of their performance on two divergent tests, ’Con­
sequences’ and ’Circles’. The mean I.Q. for the final sample 
was 119, the population, as Cropley remarks, resembling that 
of an English Grammar School. Making some correction for the 
restriction of range, which he also assumed, on the basis of 
reduced variance, had occurred in the divergent responses, 
Cropley found reliability coefficients for the whole sample 
of 0.45 for the Consequences Test, and 0.44 for the Circles 
Test. Those reported for the boys separately were somewhat 
higher, 0.58 and 0.48 respectively, while those for the girls 
were 0.33 and 0.40. Although significant, Cropley remarks 
that these are rather low, but within the range of test-retest 
reliabilities commonly reported for subscales of other well
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accepted mental tests, including those of the WISC.
Haddon and Lytton (1971), retesting a sample of English 
15 to 16-year-olds, four years after their initial testing, 
reported test-retest reliabilities of 0.50, 0.55 and 0.62 for 
composite non-verbal, verbal and total divergent scores res­
pectively. This investigation will be looked at more closely 
later when considering the long-term stability of the tests 
in the present investigation.
Evidence regarding scorer reliability and further details 
of test-retest reliability and long-term stability will be 
incorporated in the later chapters devoted to investigating 
these aspects of reliability.
This chapter will now be concluded with a review of three 
studies specifically designed to investigate the validity and, 
in the case of Dewing (1970), the reliability of divergent 
thinking tests and consequently of particular relevance to 
this study.
4.6 STUDIES OF VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY BY BENNETT (1973).
DEWING (1970). AND VERNON (1972)
Bennett (1971) , suggesting that there was an unsatisfac­
tory link between divergent thinking and creativity in one 
book on the subject, (Lytton, 1971), underlined the pressing 
need for some validation studies. This was followed up 
(Bennett, 197 3) by a report on one such investigation. 300 
ten-year-old children were drawn from eight British primary 
schools resulting in a sample with slightly above average 
V.R.Q. (104.8) and standard deviation (17.0). Divergent abi­
lities were assessed from five pairs of semantic divergent 
thinking tests, taken from Guilford and Hoepfner (1966).
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Each of the five abilities tested was provided by a composite 
score from each pair of tests. No details of the tests are 
given however, and neither from subsequent mention of the 
tests, nor from the reference provided, can one deduce pre­
cisely which tests were used. Parallel tests were presumably 
of the nature of ’Uses for a brick’ and ’Uses for a newspaper’.
In accord with Guilford’s scoring procedure each test 
was scored for one ability only. Three of the tests gave 
fluency scores, one an originality score and one a flexibility 
score. These were analysed separately, and an overall diver­
gent score was also computed by standardising and averaging 
the five separate ability scores.
The correlations among the divergent tests ranged from
0.36 to 0.74 but they also had significant correlations with 
V.R.Q. ranging from 0.26 to 0.50. The overall score for sem­
antic divergence correlated 0.54 with verbal reasoning for 
boys and 0.58 for girls. These are similar to the values 
obtained by Haddon and Lytton (1968), but the latter also 
included the results of figurai as well as verbal tests in 
their composite score.
Although the intercorrelations of individual divergent 
tests are greater than their correlations with verbal reason­
ing the latter are substantial enough to indicate a good 
degree of overlap. Analysing the scores in categories,
Bennett remarks that only 3% of the sample combined low diver­
gence with high convergence and vice versa. In contrast 18% 
gained high scores on both ability measures - a category 
ignored by Getzels and Jackson (1962). Apart from the expres- 
sional fluency score however a factor analysis showed some 
evidence of discriminant validity between divergent and
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convergent measures. This was reported for both sexes com­
bined, separate factor analyses have been found to be "almost 
identical".
Having reviled in his introduction the "dearth of objec­
tive criteria" on which to base validity studies, Bennett’s 
attempts to provide such criteria are disappointing. He uti­
lizes only an ’imaginative story’. Two teachers "gave impres­
sion marks for the use of imagination, good ideas and so on, 
ensuring that poor spelling and grammar were not penalised". 
Mark/re-mark and inter-marker correlations both exceeded 0.70. 
The latter is not a very high level, though impressionistic 
marking, with no particular guidelines, could not be expected 
to give a much higher result.
Some evidence of a relationship between the divergent 
measures and the imaginative story appeared on the third fac­
tor (accounting for 17.7% of the variance) of a varimax rota­
tion, and an analysis of mean scores indicated that, given a 
certain level of V.R.Q., children with high divergence had a 
better performance on the story than those with a low diver­
gent score. Bennett noted that this gave "evidence for con­
struct validity". This, however, blurs the specific concur­
rent validity evidence from the ’objective criterion’ with 
that of the general relationship between convergent and diver­
gent measures. Overall the results are not very convincing, 
Bennett himself concluding somewhat ambiguously that "the 
evidence concerning the construct validity of semantic diver­
gent abilities is encouraging, but it does not provide any 
justification for treating such abilities as synonymous with 
creativity".
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Dewing (1970) directed her study more specifically 
towards criteria of creative performance. As well as an 
imaginative story, she incorporated peer ratings and teacher 
ratings of in-school creativity, Torrance’s Creative Leisure 
Interests Checklist, and the Golann Creative Motivation Scale.
Selecting children in the top stream from ten different 
schools in Perth in Western Australia, Dewing’s sample consis­
ted of 394 children aged 11 to 12 years, with a mean I.Q. of 
113.9 (s.d. 10.5). Two pairs of divergent tests were used. 
Alternate Uses for bricks and ’tin cans’, and the Circles 
Test with its parallel form as ’Squares’. Fluency and origi­
nality scores were obtained for each, standardised and added 
to form a total ’creativity’ score. No indication is given 
of the correlation between the verbal and non-verbal pairs of 
tests and the results might have been more illuminative had 
they been kept separate. . Each test was given a time limit of 
12 minutes ’’by which time a pilot study had shown that response 
production by most students had ceased’’.
The measures of creative performance were intercorrelated 
within each school, with the exception of teacher ratings
which were made for only those children rated as being in the
most creative 20%. Most of the intercorrelations were posi­
tively correlated as one might have expected, but they in no
way provided a unidimensional measure of creativity. Some of 
the intercorrelations were in fact negative. This occurred 
particularly, in six out of ten cases, between the Torrance 
checklist and peer ratings and gives some weight to the doubts 
expressed by Wallach and Kogan (1966) about the value of peer 
ratings for creativity.
Dewing did not attempt to compare divergent performance
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with any total creativity index however, but selected the 
top 20% of the children on the total divergent thinking score 
and compared their creativity performance with a matched 
group from the remaining 80%. 61 children in the high diver­
gent group were in the top 20% on at least one creative per­
formance measure as compared with 31 from the control group. 
The result, further categorised into High, Medium and Low 
Performance, gave a highly significant result = 28.476,
d.f. = 2., P < 0.001). A moderate degree of validity in this 
indicated, creative thinking ability (divergent thinking) 
being significantly related to creative performance as judged 
by the various measures.
Dewing did not however include any "mediating variables" 
Eysenck (1967) , such as attitude or personality, which might 
have accounted for some of the difference in performance.
It must be remembered that the control group was selected 
from a population which had been truncated by the removal of 
those in the top 20% on divergent measures. As Hasan and 
Butcher (1966) found in replicating Getzels and Jackson’s 
study it is not always possible to find a complete distribu­
tion of other abilities, such as I.Q., within the remaining 
group. Like Bennett (1973), Dewing found no marked sex dif­
ferences with regard to either divergent thinking or creative 
performance.
Before reporting the validity results Dewing gave 
details of the reliability of the divergent thinking measures. 
Test-retest reliabilities over a six-week interval were repor­
ted separately for the Uses and Circles Tests and for origi­
nality and fluency. With ten samples ranging from n = 31 to 
n = 56 the average reliability coefficients for the Uses Test
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were 0.52 for fluency and 0.39 for originality, with corres­
ponding values of 0.69 and 0.54 for the Circles Test.
No comment was made on the way in which these results
might affect the validity conclusions. The evidence itself, 
however, particularly for the Uses Test is not very encoura­
ging.
Vernon (1972) reports on an investigation into the vali­
dity of divergent thinking tests in relation to a large num­
ber of variables. This major study involved nearly 400
children of median age 13y 11m in rather a wide range of ages 
from 12y 4m to 17y Om; and about 10 hours of test procedures 
covering over 100 test variables.
To investigate concurrent validity Vernon selected ten 
variables and summed their scores to form a "scholastic and 
daily-life criterion of creativity". These consisted of
(i) Essay writing, scored for 'conceptual maturity’ and 
’imagination and creativity’.
(ii) The rating for imagination and originality on 
McClelland’s Need for Achievement Test.
(iii) The rating for creativity on Witkin’s "Drawing of 
a Man and Woman" Test.
(iv) Sociometric score for choice of 3 persons to work
with on a creative project (disguised peer rating), 
(v) Ratings by two teachers for curiosity.
(vi) Scores for answers to a questionnaire on leisure­
time activities, giving scores for ’artistic- 
creative’ and ’scientific-creative’ activities.
In an interesting comparison Vernon reported the following 
validity coefficients (Table 2) between the criteria and each
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divergent thinking test, firstly by direct correlation and 
secondly with the effect of general verbal ability held con­
stant :
r with Creativity 
Criterion
Ditto, V.R.Q. held 
constant
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Circles .10 .25 .06 .16
Patterns .24 .47 .09 • 36
Uses .32 .38 .20 .28
Improvements .32 .45 .19 .28
Similarities .30 .35 .24 .28
Topics .27 .37 .19 .29
Consequences .39 .48 .25 .28
Multiple Vocabulary .46 .53 .17 .21
Rorschach Inkblots . 32 .34 .18 .28
Total D.T. Battery .51 .63 .29 .42
Table 2 Validity Coefficients of Divergent 
■Thinking Tests from Vernon (19 72)
The normal ’first order’ correlations are quite substan­
tial for all tests except Circles, and the validities for the 
total battery of 0.51 for boys and 0.63 for girls are, Vernon 
suggests, high enough to indicate that "such a battery would 
be of real diagnostic value to secondary school teachers and 
counsellors". However much of the prediction is attributable 
to verbal ability, the residual coefficients dropping to 0.29 
for boys and 0.42 for girls. In terms of variance, for boys, 
verbal ability predicts 22.8 per cent of the criterion and 
divergent thinking adds 8.1 per cent, and for the girls the 
corresponding figures are 23.8 per cent and 17.9 per cent 
respectively.
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Commenting on this research elsewhere (Vernon et at 
1977), Vernon is more critical of the findings than in 1972, 
noting that when verbal intelligence was held constant "it 
became more doubtful if the tests are worth the trouble".
He also notes that these figures represent confurrent vali­
dity and that for longer-term predictions, the superiority 
of the intelligence tests to available divergent thinking 
tests might well be greater. The long-term stability enquiry 
in this study will provide some relevant evidence on this 
question.
Cronbach (1968) in a re-analysis of the Wallach and Kogan 
data suggests that when convergent ability is held constant 
divergent ability adds very little to the prediction of cog­
nitive output. Vernon’s (1972) result indicates that this is 
not altogether true, and advocates of the potential of diver­
gent thinking tests for indicating some ’extra’ ability over 
and above verbal reasoning can be encouraged. It has been 
pointed out consistently throughout this study that while
I.Q. can be regarded as necessary for most creative produc­
tion, other abilities including divergent thinking could 
prove to be an important additional ability. The appearance 
of a significant amount of residual variance in Vernon’s 
study, after the extraction of that due to I.Q., gives some 
real concurrent validity.
In contrast to the studies of Bennett (1973) and Dewing
(1970) with children of 10 to 12 years of age in which little 
or no sex differences in divergent thinking were found, Ver­
non (1972) suggests that there are marked differences between 
the sexes. Bennett’s study, however, contained entirely cog­
nitive variables whereas Vernon’s study contained a large
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number of measures of personality and interest. The residual 
correlations of divergent thinking with the various scores 
for the ’imaginative story’ in Vernon's study were generally 
significant for both boys and girls, giving support to 
Bennett’s conclusion that divergent thinking is a signifi­
cant ability in both sexes in performance on that criterion.
Looking more closely at Vernon's non-cognitive variables 
residual divergent thinking in girls was associated with high 
teacher ratings for conscientiousness, curiosity, sociability, 
independence and adjustment, suggesting that teachers are 
impressed by the divergent thinking girl. For boys the corres­
ponding correlations were generally positive but non-signifi­
cant. Neither of these results gives support to Getzels and 
Jackson’s finding of a negative relation between ’creativity’ 
and ’likeability’, but they are in accord with those of Biggs 
et al (1971). Divergent thinking in girls was strongly asso­
ciated with artistic talent and literary creativity, and 
parallel correlations for boys were just significant. The 
reverse is true for scientific leisure activities.
A "Personality and Attitudes Questionnaire" was construc­
ted by Vernon to measure a number of traits associated with 
creativity and independence, and yielded eleven different 
measures including self-concept, need for achievement, inde­
pendence, and conventionality.
Conventional, rather than unconventional girls, tended 
to do better on divergent tasks, and positive self-concept 
was an advantage particularly for boys. Independence was a 
significant factor in divergent performance, positively for 
girls and negatively for boys. Rather surprisingly, those 
boys showing acceptance of school and adults tended to do
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better than those who were more rebellious.
On the whole, as Vernon concludes, personality patterns 
were more obscure than those for interests. Both ’interests’ 
and personality variables are to be included in the present 
study on an exploratory basis and will provide a comparison 
with Vernon’s results.
A number of points of caution however might be sounded. 
Vernon points out that little stress should be laid on border­
line coefficients obtained from about 100 criteria, but con­
cludes that it is reasonable to take note of correlations in
related clusters and those that are well above the borderline. 
When 5 or 6 significant correlations are to be expected at 
the 0.05 level however it is tempting to invent associations 
for them.
It is also worth noting that Vernon for the most part 
follows Wallach and Kogan rather than Torrance in giving mul­
tiple options within divergent tests. Thus subjects have to 
give ’Meanings’ for eight patters in 13 minutes, ’Uses’ for 
five objects in 18 minutes, ’Similarities’ between six differ­
ent pairs of objects in 12 minutes, and ’Consequences’ for 
four items in 15 minutes. With this emphasis the divergent 
thinking score must depend a great deal on verbal ability, 
even though it is assessed by scoring for originality (number
of responses given by less than 5% of the subjects). Verbal
and non-verbal scores are added together to form an overall 
score, though elsewhere, Vernon (1971), in suggesting suitable 
tests for a battery of tests to operate over a wide age range 
(from 11 years to college student or adult), maintains that 
"tests involving non-verbal (drawing) responses, such as Cir­
cles and Incomplete Drawings have been conspicuously poor".
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The data in Vernon’s study was also used to compare per­
formance in formal and permissive testing conditions and half 
the classes took the divergent tests under conventional con­
ditions and half in a relaxed setting. This comparison is 
reported elsewhere (Vernon, 1971) and a number of differences 
between performances under the two conditions were reported.
In spite of this Vernon (1972) notes that the ’’factorial 
structure of the battery was generally similar under the two 
conditions’’ and the data was combined for the 1972 analysis. 
While this is unlikely to result in strong overall relation­
ships which were not present in both conditions of testing it 
may result in some blurring of relationships present under 
more precise conditions.
4.7 SUMMARY
Overall the evidence in this chapter suggests that diver­
gent thinking skills bear some relationship to creative accom­
plishments though this relationship is not great enough to 
justify the identification of creative potential simply in 
terms of divergent thinking. Even if low however, the rela­
tionships with creative criteria are generally positive and 
persist, to some extent, after the effects of general intelli­
gence is controlled. Whether the residual effect of divergent 
tests is sufficient to warrant their continued development has 
been questioned, though the variety of scoring procedures, 
testing batteries, methods of administration and creative 
criteria makes it difficult to generalise.
The creative criteria often consist of self-report inven­
tories which are consequently not independent of the indivi­
dual’s performance on the divergent tests. Some doubts have
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been raised about the validity of teacher ratings of creative 
behaviour, though this is partly aleviated if the teacher has 
to complete a structured list of creative characteristics 
rather than simply supply an overall judgement. The utiliza­
tion of practical criteria has often stopped at an imaginative 
story, and the use of problem-solving exercises in one study 
provided evidence of construct, rather than criterion-related 
validity. Personality characteristics are also likely to 
affect relationships between divergent thinking and other vari­
ables though their mediating effect is not widely reported.
There is obviously a great deal of research still to be 
done before the value of divergent thinking tests is establi­
shed. The investigation which follows aims to provide some 
further evidence, and the experimental procedures are descri­
bed in the next chapter.
The reliability of divergent tests will then be investi­
gated, scoring procedures, inter-scorer reliability, test- 
retest reliability, and long-term stability, each being 
reported on in a separate chapter.
Subsequently the concurrent validity of divergent think­
ing tests will be looked at in relation to children’s creative 
interests, teacher ratings of their creative behaviour, crea­
tive motivation, and an experimental task, the ’Board Game’, 
designed to involve flexible and imaginative aspects of child­
ren’s thinking. Finally construct validity will be explored 
with the aid of both cognitive and affective variables includ­
ing intelligence, academic performance, attitudes, self- 
concept and personality dimensions.
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CHAPTER F IVE  
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The practical investigations in this study fall into 
two parts, one involving a follow-up study, after approxi­
mately five years, of 173 pupils previously tested in 1969 
and located in the North East of England, and the other 
based on a population of 176 ’local’ 11-year-old school 
children. The main investigation, including scorer reliabi­
lity, test-retest reliability and validity will be conducted 
with the latter group, the results from the 15-year-olds 
being used to investigate long-term stability.
Details of the background and procedures adopted with 
the 15-year-old sample will be given separately in Chapter 9 
when long-term stability is investigated. The same diver­
gent tests, with slight variations, are used in both investi­
gations. The scoring procedures used with the 15-year-old 
population are identical to those adopted when they were ini­
tially tested in 1969 (Richards, 1970), and are similar to 
those used with the main 11-year-old sample. When giving 
details of the latter in the next chapter, variations in the 
15-year-old marking will be noted.
5.2 THE MAIN 11-YEAR-OLD SAMPLE
The decision to carry out this investigation with chil­
dren of 11 years of age was made on the basis of a number of 
factors. The writer had some previous experience of diver­
gent thinking research with children of this age, and a good 
deal of other relevant research has been based on the studies
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of Wallach and Kogan (1966) and Getzels and Jackson (1962) 
with children of a similar age. Children of this age 
generally possess sufficient verbal skills to deal with the 
written and spoken framework of the instructions and testing 
procedures, and yet they have not reached the stage of 
adolescent development which would make the population less 
cohesive both psychologically and educationally.
The last year at primary school frequently sees the end 
of a stage in which educational activities are relatively 
consistent for all children. Research conducted during this 
year, however, has an opportunity to involve children, of a 
wide range of ability, in common activities, and for the 
researcher to get to know children and teachers in a way 
which would not be possible in a large secondary school.
In contrast to the view of Wallach and Kogan (1966) 
that a sample of children from "professional and managerial 
backgrounds" is likely to be "the one most relevant socio­
cultural group for which to establish generalisations", the 
writer wished to choose a group more representative of the 
population as a whole. This too is conveniently found in 
most primary schools in this country.
In order to achieve a reasonably large sample, children 
were chosen from two schools, one with three 11-year-old 
classes and the other with two. The larger school was situa­
ted on the outskirts of a city in the South West of England, 
and the other on the outskirts of a small town about 8 miles 
away.
Both were within walking distance of open countryside 
and the town centre, and children in either have the opportu­
nity to participate in a wide range of creative activities
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and interests, both in and out of school. The catchment area 
of both schools included council and private houses though 
there was a greater proportion of private houses in that of 
the larger school. Unlike a previous study of the writer, 
however, (Richards, 1970) no comparison of the schools is 
being made and no attempt was made to arrive at a matched 
pair of schools.
There was no marked contrast in the schools however, and 
of the five class-teachers four were senior members of staff. 
The teaching methods in each were predominantly formal. In 
the larger school two of the teachers were men, and the third 
was a young woman with about five years teaching experience. 
In the other, one teacher was male and the other female. It 
is accepted that there are bound to be wide differences in 
the children’s classroom experience and home background, but 
the total sample is deliberately heterogeneous in order to 
arrive at measures of divergent thinking, as well as intelli­
gence, over as representative a sample as possible.
176 children comprising the whole ’fourth year junior’ 
population in the two schools took some part in the testing, 
complete records finally being available for 161 of them.
Details of the age and I.Q. of the final sample for boys 
and girls separately, and for the whole sample are given in 
Table 3.
I. Q. Age
mean s . d. mean s.d.
Boys (n = 77) 97.39 13.81 lly 4.25m 3.68m
Girls (n = 84) 97.55 14.20 lly 4.54m 3.12m
All (n = 161) 97.47 13.97 lly 4.40m 3.41m
Table 3 Details of the Main 11-year-old Sample
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5.3 TESTING MATERIAL
As indicated at the end of the last chapter the testing 
materials fall into four main groups, the divergent thinking 
tests themselves, criteria of creative interests and beha­
viour, convergent tests including I.Q. and school attainment, 
and a number of scales of attitude and personality. Each of 
these will now be looked at in more detail.
5.31 Divergent Thinking Tests
These have already been discussed (Chapter 3) in rela­
tion to Guilford’s Structure of Intellect Model but are des­
cribed here in terms of their general use and presentation.
5.311 Circles Test (Torrance 1962, 1974; Guilford and
Hoepfner, 1966; Guilford, 1967)
Described by Guilford and Hoepfner (1966), as a test in 
which figurai details are added to several replications of 
the same basic design to produce a variety of recognisable 
objects, this test has been extensively developed by Torrance 
(1962, 1964) for use with school children. It is well suited 
to group presentation and to children who are slow in their 
verbal development. It also has a convenient alternate form 
’Squares’, (Torrance, 1962) which can be presented and 
scored (with its own frequency distribution of unusual res­
ponses) in exactly the same way as ’Circles’. With approp­
riate substitution of the word ’squares’, the following com­
ments on the Circles Test apply equally well to the Squares 
Test, and separate details of the latter will not be given. 
Both tests are reproduced in the Appendix.
The subjects were presented with a page containing
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tennis ball
forty-eight empty circles and asked to make as many different 
objects as they could. They were told to add lines inside 
the circle, outside the circle, or both inside and outside, 
and that they may label the object if they didn’t think it 
would be recognised.
e.g
The ’test’ was labelled ’Circles Game’ and attracted a 
good deal of enthusiasm. From previous experience the time 
limit of 10 minutes given by Torrance (1974) appeared to be 
too short and it was felt that a more reliable measurement, 
particularly of flexibility and originality, would be obtained 
if the time was extended. Fifteen minutes was therefore 
allowed and even at the end of this time many of the children 
wished to continue.
The test is scored for fluency, flexibility and origina­
lity and the procedures used are discussed in detail in the 
next chapter.
5.312 Uses Test (Guilford, 1950, 1951, 1967;
Torrance, 1962, 1974)
Since Guilford (1950) suggested this test as a measure 
of ideational fluency or flexibility, it has been widely used 
in a variety of forms, from that of Wallach and Kogan (1966) 
in which subjects were asked to give uses for eight different 
objects, to the more established form of Torrance (1974) 
asking for uses for only one object in ten minutes.
With the 15-year-old population the writer has used the 
form adopted previously (Richards, 1970), with three stimulus
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objects and a total time limit of fifteen minutes. This was 
incorporated with the Circles and Consequences tests into a 
testing booklet and is given in the Appendix. In pilot work 
prior to the main 11-year-old investigation, however, many 
children were able to continue thinking of uses for a single 
object beyond the five minutes allocated, and it was felt 
that the use of several objects may give insufficient oppor­
tunity for less obvious responses to emerge. The format 
suggested by Torrance, namely one object and a time limit of 
10 minutes, has therefore been adopted for the main 11-year- 
old population.
The children were presented with a sheet of lined paper 
and asked to write their name and the heading 'Uses for 
Objects'. As an example, they were asked verbally to suggest 
uses for a bucket, and the writer wrote on the blackboard 
five uses, making sure to include, 'to carry water', 'to sit 
on', and 'to make a helmet’. They were reminded of this 
when taking the alternate form. They were then asked to 
write down as many different uses as they could think of for 
a newspaper, or, in the alternate form, for a spoon. It was 
made clear that they could write down anything they could 
think of, no matter how unusual. The responses were scored 
for fluency and originality and full details of the scoring 
procedures are given in Chapter 6.
5.313 Consequences Test (Guilford, 1950, 1951, 1967;
Torrance, 1962, 1974)
This test, originated by Guilford as a test of fluency 
of inferences, is put into a less formal context as a 'Just 
Suppose’ activity by Torrance (1962), "to elicit a higher
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degree of spontaneity and to be more effective with children". 
A similar format is adopted here, though the time limit of 
five minutes allowed by Torrance is increased to ten minutes.
The test was introduced by an example. "I want you to 
imagine that the following thing suddenly happened, and to
think of what other things would happen because of it. Just
suppose that we only had one arm. What things would happen 
as a result?". The writer then listed five responses on the 
blackboard including the following:
(i) we couldn't use a bow and arrow
(ii) couldn't thread a needle
(iii) only need one glove.
The children were then asked to write down as many dif­
ferent things that might happen 'if we had no hair on our 
heads', and for the alternate form 'if we did not need to 
eat '.
With the 15-year-old group both items were included in 
the same time limit of 10 minutes, but once again, in order 
to give time for more 'searching about to be done', only one 
item was included in the test for the main 11-year-old sample. 
In the interests of simplicity, the second item was also 
reduced from the more comprehensive situation of 'no need to 
eat or drink' to just 'no need to eat'.
The responses were scored for fluency and originality as 
described in Chapter 6.
5.314 Representative Nature of the Tests 
The divergent thinking tests therefore comprise two ver­
bal and one figurai test and provide a group of test which 
should enable a comparison to be made with other researches.
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and previous work of the writer (Richards, 1970). All three 
tests have figured prominently in previous researches, 
stemming from Guilford's early development of materials for 
use in his factor analytical studies of creative thinking 
Guilford et al, 1951) , and from their development in a form 
more suitable for children, in Torrance's batteries of crea­
tive thinking tests both in his outline version of the 
Minnesota Tests of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1962) and in 
the latest issue of the 'Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking' 
(Torrance, 1974). In addition to their wide use within 
Torrance's testing battery numerous other studies have used 
their own version of one or more of these tests. Vernon
(1971), for example, includes all three amongst the seven 
tests in his study of the effects of administration and scor­
ing on tests of divergent thinking. Hudson (1966) refers to 
the Uses test as almost the conventional divergent thinking 
test, and considers it "perhaps the most convenient and ver­
satile of open-ended tests". He employs it as one of the 
two tests he uses to distinguish convergers and divergers. 
Dewing (1970) selects the Uses test and the Consequences test 
as the two tests on which to base her study of the reliabi­
lity and validity of selected tests of creative thinking, and 
Debney (1969) in a study of the relationships between 13 
creativity tests found the same tests to be among those most 
clearly related to an internal validity criterion - high and 
low groups defined by the battery of tests as a whole.
The Uses test is one of the tests employed in the major 
investigations by both Wallach and Kogan (1966) and Getzels 
and Jackson (1962); and Hasan and Butcher (1966) add the 
Circles test to the divergent battery in their partial
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replication of Getzels and Jackson's study. Versons of the 
Uses test and the Circles test are also included in studies 
by Haddon and Lytton (1968, 1971) and Lytton and Cotton (1969) 
into the effects of different teaching approaches on the 
development of divergent thinking abilities, though in these 
studies the Circles test showed some different patterns of 
results from those of the other tests. Child (1968) on the 
other hand found that in factor analysing a large battery of 
tests, including seven of divergent thinking, a divergent 
factor of ideational fluency was formed by the three tests 
chosen here, namely Uses, Consequences and Circles.
Inconsistencies in the results of studies using the Cir­
cles test are noted by Vernon (1971) and consequently, though 
he recommends the inclusion of both Uses and Consequences 
tests in forming a divergent battery, he does not advice the 
inclusion of test with non-verbal responses such as Circles. 
Evidence presented by the writer (Richards, 1970) would tend 
to support Vernon's assessment of the performance of the 
Circles test, as it showed some definite factorial separation 
of the Circles test from other tests including verbal tests 
and figurai tests with verbal responses. The exclusion of 
tests with non-verbal responses however, while it might make 
the divergent tests more homogeneous and be advisable if a 
summed score was required, would limit the scope of any inves­
tigation into tests of divergent thinking.
The three tests having been selected it was encouraging 
to find all three recommended by Hargreaves and Bolton (1972) 
in their investigation into the problem of selecting creati­
vity tests for use in research.
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5.32 Criteria of Creative Interests and Behaviour
5.321 Teacher Ratings of Creative Behaviour:
'Indicators of Creative Behaviour Rating Scale'
The testing took place in June/July towards the end of 
the children's school year, and they were well known by their 
class teacher who had taken them for that year. It was felt 
that the class teacher would therefore be able to give valu­
able judgements about the extent to which the children had 
exhibited creative characteristics during that year.
In suggesting non-test ways of identifying creative beha­
viour Torrance (1967) reports on a number of descriptions of 
creative children made by parents, teachers, counsellors and 
administrators. In one investigation eighty-seven members of 
a creative thinking seminar group each contributed a list of 
five behaviours which they felt were the best indicators of 
creative talent. The most frequent types of behaviour sug­
gested were compiled by Torrance into thirteen categories, 
from "curiosity, inquisitiveness, investigativeness, penetra­
ting questioning, etc.", given by 66% of the participants; 
to "daydreamer, pre-occupied, etc.", given by 10%.
From the descriptions given, the writer has drawn up a 
list of ten characteristics to use as a basis for the teach­
er's ratings in this study. Teachers were presented with 
this list together with a recording sheet giving the names of 
the children in their class, and were asked to rate each 
child on each of the characteristics, entering 2, 1 or 0 if 
the child had, during the year, shown the characteristic 'to 
a great extent', 'sometimes', or 'very weldom or not at all', 
respectively. The total score for each child, with a possible 
range from 0 to 20, is used as the index of creative behaviour.
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The rating scale as presented to the teachers is repro­
duced in the Appendix.
5.322 Creative Leisure Activities Checklist:
'Things you have done in your spare time*
This is a checklist of 95 creative activities practiced 
by children in their spare time. They are specifically asked 
to include only the things they have done for themselves, not 
things they have been given or told to do. Originally compi­
led by Torrance (1962) and reported on in a validity study 
by Dewing (1970), it "includes activities related to language 
arts, science, social studies, art, and other fields" 
(Torrance, 1962). Of the original 100 items the writer has 
retained 95, with slight change of vocabulary, to suit Brit­
ish school children. A copy of the checklist is included in 
the Appendix. One mark is awarded for each item ticked. In 
attempting to assess children's interests and activities 
there is always a problem, as Evans (1965) points out, of 
differentiating between the level at which an interest may 
function and the simple choice of interest. The present in­
ventory is of the latter type and will be interpreted as 
such when the results are presented. Limitations in the use 
of this type of assessment will also be considered.
5.323 Interests
Following discussions about their interests with groups 
of 9 to 11-year-old British school children. Barker Lunn 
(1970) constructed a 30-item 'Interests' questionnaire speci­
fically including items judged to have "creative content".
The scale was subjected to a considerable amount of study
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including factor analysis and two consistent sub-scales "both 
concerned with creative interests, one imaginative and the 
other logical" were established. The former consists of 
seven of the items and the latter, four.
The remaining nineteen items give general information 
about the activities children "like doing either in or out of 
school". As such they might appear to give a further index 
of leisure activities that might be related to divergent 
thinking ability. A large number of these items however inc­
lude games and ’passive activities' such as playing football, 
cricket, playing marbles, climbing trees, watching T.V. and 
going to the cinema, and are not relevant to the thinking 
abilities being investigated. Seven of the items however, 
drawing, collecting stamps, writing a daily diary, doing 
crossword puzzles, sewing, gardening and dancing are similar 
to items on Torrance's checklist, and were felt worth includ­
ing in an overall 'creative interests' measure, which will 
also provide some comparison with the Creative Leisure Acti­
vities Checklist described above.
The children are asked to indicate their feelings about 
the interests by marking each activity in the following way:
Like very much = 2 
Quite like = 1
Never tried it or don't like it = 0.
Their score for each of the two sub-scales, and the total 
score for all the interests except those designated as sport­
ing/passive were recorded, and will be used as criteria for 
the investigation of concurrent validity.
A copy of the scale is given in the Appendix. Items 
forming the total and sub-scale scores are lettered accordingly.
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the 'imaginative' interests are marked 'I', the 'logical/ 
analytical' interests are marked 'L ' and the 'general' active 
interests are marked 'G'.
5.324 Creative Motivation Scale:
'Things I would like to do most'
This scale, amended from Golann (1962) and Dewing (1970), 
requires the children to choose one preferred activity from 
pairs of creative and nonrcreative items judged to be equally 
socially desirable.
The amendments are chiefly those of language, found after 
a pilot study to be inappropriate. Thus 'Dress the windows in 
a bookshop' (Q.6) is changed to 'Arrange a display in a book­
shop window'; 'penmanship' (Q.8) becomes 'handwriting', 
'store' (Q.18) becomes 'shop'; and 'the great books' (Q.20) 
becomes 'famous books'. The choice in question 17 is changed 
from 'Do a neat careful report' or 'Do an original report', 
to 'Write an account of a visit' or 'Write a story'.
The scale is reproduced with scoring key in the Appendix. 
The more 'creative' activity is denoted by the appropriate 
letter on the right hand side of the questionnaire. One mark 
is awarded for each creative activity chosen.
5.325 'The Board Game'
5.32 51 Introduction
This is an experimental task designed by the writer to 
involve productive and imaginative thinking for a 'good' solu­
tion. It incorporates several 'Gestalt' principles and it is 
hypothesised that children's divergent thinking abilities 
will be a positive factor in effecting a solution.
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As a result of previous research into children’s mathe­
matical ability and the effects of different teaching approa­
ches, the writer had felt that written test materials were 
unlikely to do full justice to the type of thinking ability 
fostered by some of the newer approaches to mathematics 
teaching. Although there was some slight evidence that such 
methods might have positive effects on the productive and 
original aspects of children's thinking, it was suggested 
that "further studies in practical open-ended situations or 
exploring the type of problem described by Wertheimer (1961) 
are necessary to substantiate this hypothesis" (Richards and 
Bolton, 1971) . A similar consideration applies to evaluat­
ing the validity of divergent thinking abilities. Finding a 
suitable practical exercise however was not easy. Even the 
problems designed to exercise thinking skills, by researches 
such as Wertheimer (1949, 1961) and Bartlett (1958), are pre­
dominantly in a symbolic format and involve a considerable 
amount of logical reasoning. The 'lateral thinking' exerci­
ses of De Bono (1967, 1971), and certain other problems with 
a practical flavour such as matchstick problems, pentominoe 
puzzles, or arrangements of counters, were tried out in a 
pilot study but they did not sustain the motivation of the 
children.
Too often there is an unique solution to such problems 
and attempts have to end with 'all or nothing'. If they 
don't 'see' the solution quickly, many children lose interest, 
especially if they view the problem as some sort of 'mathema­
tical' puzzle which they 'know' they can't do I Faced, for 
example, with making four equilateral triangles out of six 
matches they frequently declared the problem 'impossible'.
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On the other hand many of the problems had been met with 
previously and the solutions - such as building six matches 
into a regular tetrahedron, were often already known. This 
made it difficult to judge whether the solution was a perso­
nal achievement or not.
As a result it was felt necessary to get away from a 
’puzzle’ framework into a practical exercise with more scope 
for experiment. As discussed in Chapter 3 the early Gestalt 
approach to the study of problem solving (Maier, 1930, 1931; 
Duncker, 1945) utilized a number of more practical problems 
and these, together with the type of productive thinking 
described by Wertheimer (1949, 1961) led the writer to design 
a practical experiment to be referred to as the ’Board Game’.
There is no unique solution, but for a successful out­
come the solver needs, as in Duncker's (1945) problems, to be 
willing to experiment, to look at things in new ways, and to 
be able to change direction in his thinking. He has to arrive 
at a "combination and organisation of elements" which meets 
the required condition (Maier, 1931) ; and to achieve this he 
has to think of unusual uses for objects rather than see their 
function as ’fixed’ by their habitual use.
5.3252 Description and Administration
As a prerequisite the subject is assumed to understand 
the nature of an electric circuit and to know that all metals 
conduct electricity. This formed the subject of classwork 
done prior to the Board Game, and will be described under 
’Organisation’ later in this chapter. Having had this exper­
ience the subjects were individually presented with the Board 
Game, set up exactly as shown in the photograph (Figure 4).
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Fig.4 . Initial Position of the Board Game
Fig.5. An g-solution to the Board Game
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A good ’a ’ solution is also shown in the adjacent photograph 
(Figure 5), and will be useful for reference during the 
following description. Photographs of all the main types of 
response to the problem are included in the Appendix.
The board itself, which measures 33cm x 23cm, carries 
a plastic tower surmounted by a bulb in a bulb-holder, a 
fence and a battery holder. The problem is to light the bulb 
at the top of the tower with the battery placed at the other 
end of the board. Anything on the table can be used to com­
plete the circuit.
Each child was introduced to the game individually and 
informally, though the same information was given and the 
same procedure carried out each time. The introduction pro­
ceeded as follows:
"Do you remember the lesson we had on electricity?"
"What did we find out about all metal objects?"
("They all conduct electricity")
"Here is a bulb on top of this tower, and here is a battery."
(Handing over the battery.)
"Show me how to light up the bulb; you can use this piece of 
wire to complete the circuit."
(An extra piece of wire was needed to join one terminal 
of the battery to one at the bulb. The other terminals
can be connected directly with wire protruding from the
bulb-holder.)
"Good"
"Now I'm going to put the battery down at this end in the 
holder"
"I want you to make a circuit to light the bulb again, with
the battery at this end of the board."
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"You can use anything you like on the desk/table,"
"Just a quick flash on the bulb and you've done it."
"Would you like to try?"
"You can use anything you like."
The materials available to the children can be seen in 
Figure 4. Some of the objects would conduct electricity, 
others would not. Non-conducting materials could be used 
for support, however, or in any other way that was thought 
to be useful. The objects which conducted electricity were 
as follows:
paper clip bulldog clip
coil of wire two 2p pieces
(crocodile clip at each end)
clip on the pen top
coil of wire
(crocodile clip at one end only) wire on the fence 
round tin with lid wire attached to bulb holder
two screws screwdriver
Other objects provided were:
coloured pencil roll of sellotape
ruler drinking straw
3 blocks of polystyrene piece of string
3 blocks of wood
5.3253 Development and Assessment of Performance 
A number of pilot studies were conducted with the appa­
ratus, the above description being that of the final product.
It was found that most children began by uncoiling the wires, 
found that they were far too short to be sufficient on their 
own, and gradually introduced other objects into the circuit. 
Some of the most intelligent children failed to complete the 
circuit, while others solved the problem in less than 10
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minutes. Allowing up to about 35 minutes per pupil, about a 
half of those studied succeeded in lighting up the bulb in 
one way or another.
In order to arrive at an 'elegant* solution it is neces­
sary to modify some objects, and to incorporate into the cir­
cuit others that might not at first sight appear to be useful. 
Unbending the paper clip helps, so does using the screws 
which appear loosely built into the board, and a more advan­
tageous position can be found for the battery whilst still 
keeping it in the holder. While some children carried out 
these operations without apparent inhibition, others had to 
be reassured, and others said later that either they "just 
didn't think", or "didn't think they could do that". Whenever 
asked for permission to modify the board or the objects the 
experimenter consistently adopted the response of "You can do 
anything you like".
The coins, penclip, screwdriver and bulldog clip can all 
be useful in building the circuit through the tin, especially 
if opened, and the wire strand on the fence are of major 
importance. Solutions can be obtained without using all of 
the objects, in fact the best solutions often use the least 
number of bits and pieces.
The difference in height between the bulb and the board 
means that blocks of wood or polystyrene can be useful in 
building up the circuit to the right height. Some children 
managed to reach the tower but could not bridge the final gap 
from board-level up to the bulb. Others lifted the fence, 
with its horizontal wire, out of the sockets in the board and 
made it slope gradually up to the bulb.
A study of the responses of each child during the pilot
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study encouraged the writer to believe that the most success­
ful solutions needed more than logical reasoning, and that 
the Board Game was a feasible practical exercise to involve 
aspects of creative thinking as discussed in Chapter 3. It 
is suggested, therefore, that the most successful solver will 
be the person who is able to generate a large number of ideas, 
is flexible enough to put them into operation, and at the 
same time is able to view the different elements in relation 
to the problem as a whole. These qualities are also reflec­
ted in divergent thinking performance and it will be hypo­
thesised later that divergent thinking will be a significant 
factor in children’s performance on this task.
Children’s responses are similar in a number of ways to 
those observed by Wertheimer (1949, 1961). In presenting his 
productive thinking tasks he found ’fine, sensible and origi­
nal processes’ which he termed a-responses, and also ’blind, 
slavish and unsuccessful’ attempts which he termed 3-responses. 
In the same way here, some children approached the task in a 
piecemeal fashion, joining up anything that came to hand, 
laboriously following the obvious method that they first 
thought of. They often continued in this way for up to thirty- 
five minutes before they gave up or the experimenter intervened 
to help them to a solution. All of the children, in fact, were 
helped to achieve some sort of success. This was done, 
however, not by using the experimental material, but by 
adding two lengths of wire to the circuit or by placing the 
battery nearer the bulb.
The successful solvers usually adopted more flexible 
approaches and appeared to have a deeper structural view of 
the situation involving changes in the functional meaning and
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grouping of the items. While some children therefore managed 
to achieve a good ’gestalt’, others remained blind to context, 
unable to appreciate the overall structure of the problem.
The 3-responses, Wertheimer suggests are typical of the 
child who rejects the problem with the comment that ’’We 
haven’t done this before’’ or ’’We haven’t learned how to do 
this’’. All the children in the present investigation, however, 
had achieved some success in the electricity lesson, and all 
made some token attempt. Some of the children, nevertheless, 
were reluctant to commit themselves practically, prefering to 
’think about the problem’ and rarely went beyond the stage of 
utilizing the obvious pieces of wire with their attached 
crocodile clips. Their reluctance to take risks is a charac­
teristic which may also be reflected in their divergent 
thinking performance.
A scheme for assessing the quality of the children’s 
performance was built up on the basis of Wertheimer’s a and 
3-responses but with an extension to six different categories. 
They do not define completely distinct types of solution, but 
they reflect the different types of performance that could 
reasonably be distinguished.
5.3254 Categories of Performance
The following descriptions of children’s responses are 
used to classify their performance: 
a-responses
Solves quickly, modifying objects if necessary, and 
building up with a fine overview of the problem. Sees the 
relationship between overall structure and individual proper­
ties of the objects. Time: less than 10 minutes.
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g 1-responses
Solves the problem after quite a lot of experiment, but 
prepared to change direction of approach, and final solution 
uses the objects efficiently with modifications (similar to 
an a-solution). Time: approximately 10 to 15 minutes.
g2-responses
Solves the problem, but in a fairly laborious, straight­
forward way, using just about all the articles in a linear 
fashion. Some modifications. Time: approximately 15 to 25
minutes. 
g/j-responses
Final solution is unstable and laborious but eventually 
gives a successful outcome possibly with help in holding 
together. If the circuit is technically complete but fails 
to conduct properly because of its instability, slight help 
can be given to hold together. This help can be given at any 
time after 20 minutes if the pupil indicates that the circuit 
is complete but w o n ’t light the bulb, and that he is glad to 
accept help rather than try to modify the circuit further. 
Time: approximately 20 to 35 minutes.
j 1-responses
Works for a long period of time, tries quite a lot of 
objects, links them up inefficiently, can’t jump the final 
gap. Gives up. Doesn’t see the whole problem, but views it 
only in terms of joining things together and hoping they will 
reach. Time: approximately 20 to 35 minutes.
j 2-responses
Spends time unconstructively, possibly thinking but 
without much construction. Seemingly unable to grasp the 
situation of the problem as a whole though understanding the
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elements of an electric circuit. "Can’t see how to do it." 
Gives up sooner or later without much practical result.
Time: approximately 10 to 2 5 minutes.
A photograph of a final solution or attempt in each of 
these categories is given in the Appendix.
In order to arrive at these categories details of each 
child’s responses were recorded on a prepared recording sheet. 
Notes were made on articles used and whether or not they were 
modified, and on the method of approach. Certain actions 
such as changing the position of the battery, or changing 
round articles to improve the solution, called for specific 
comment, and other comments were made, with a note of the 
time, at regular intervals. A drawing of the final solution 
or attempted solution was also made. A copy of the record- 
sheet ’Responses to the Board Game’ is given in the Appendix.
In some of the subsequent analysis a numerical score is 
adopted for each of these categories, from 5 for an a-solution 
to 0 for a j 2-solution. Further details of the arrangements 
for administering the Board Game in the present study, and of 
the preliminary lesson on electricity, are given later in 
this chapter under ’Organisation’.
5.33 Convergent Thinking
5.331 Intelligence (V.R.Q.)
Two parallel forms of the Moray House Verbal Reasoning 
Tests had been given to the children in both schools in com­
pleting the County’s personal record procedure for Junior 
Schools, and the results were made available to the writer 
for confidential research purposes. The tests are standardised
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to a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15.
In the interests of the factor analysis to follow, a 
balance needs to be kept between different groups of tests 
and both I.Q. scores are therefore included in that analysis. 
For all other purposes the I.Q. is taken as the result of 
the first testing. Although a more reliable measure would 
be obtained by averaging the two scores, this would in turn 
affect the reliability and validity of the divergent thinking 
tests when the effects of intelligence are controlled.
5.332 Academic Performance in English and Mathematics 
Overall ratings of the children’s attainment in school 
work were obtained from class teachers for English and Mathe­
matics. Each teacher had already compiled school end-of-year 
grades for these subjects, again for record purposes, but 
were also asked to allocate a rating for each child on a 
common scale presented by the writer: unlike the creativity
ratings, these were not therefore basically subjective, but 
were based on the children’s work in classwork and tests 
throughout the year.
The grades suggested were:
A B C D E
Very good good average weak very weak
A prepared class list with columns for the appropriate 
grade was given to each teacher, accompanied by an introduc­
tory sheet, ’Children’s School Work and Personality’ is given 
in the Appendix. It also outlines the request for ratings 
of certain aspects of the children’s personality.
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5.34 Personality and Attitudes
5.341 Junior Eysenck Personality Inventory
Details of this scale, designed to measure the two major 
personality variables of neuroticism or emotionality, and 
extraversion/introversion in children are given in the test 
Manual (Eysenck S.B.C., 1973). It is designed for children 
from 7 to 16 years of age, though some of the least able of 
the 11-year-old children in the present study required assis­
tance in reading some of the items.
In addition to the Neuroticism scale ’N' (24 items) and 
the Extraversion scale ’E ’ (24 items), the test also provides 
a Lie scale 'L' (12 items). The latter measures the extent
to which subjects ’fake’ responses for one reason or another. 
Although the term ’Lie scale’ has a somewhat unfavourable 
flavour, it is often associated with the subject’s attempt to 
present himself in a good light (Michaelis and Eysenck H.J.,
1971), and can provide a measure of test-taking attitudes or 
’’conformity to social pressures’’ (Eysenck S. , Nias and 
Eysenck H.J., 1971). It could provide interesting information 
in the exploratory section of this study and all three measu­
res, E, N and L are retained in the analysis.
5.342 Self Concept: ’What I am Like’
A ’Self-Appraisal Scale’ designed by Davidson and Green­
berg (1967) for use with children aged 10 to 11, was chosen 
to assess the children’s self-concept. The introduction to 
the scale was slightly amended by the writer from the American 
presentation, and the scale was entitled ’What I am like’.
The test consists of 24 items each giving a concise des­
cription of what children are like from ’neat’, ’a big help at
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home’, ’nice looking’ and ’polite’, to ’lazy’, ’careless’, 
’nervous’ and ’sad’. Subjects are asked to tick opposite 
each item to show whether they think they are that way, ’most 
of the time’, ’about half the time’ or ’hardly ever’. These 
categories are scored 3, 2, 1 respectively for favourable 
items, and in the reverse order for unfavourable ones. The 
total score is a measure of the children’s self-concept.
A copy of the scale is given in the Appendix.
No problems appeared in administering or marking, though 
the ’I THINK I A M : - ’ format led one slightly dreamy boy to 
respond ’Robert Smith’I
5.343 Teacher Ratings of Children’s Personality and 
PIeasurability
When responding to the request for grades on children’s 
attainment in English and Mathematics, teachers were also 
asked to rate the children in their class on two questions of 
personality, ’shy?’ and ’lively?’, and also to what extent 
they were ’a pleasure to have in class’. They were given a 
recording sheet with the children’s names already inserted, 
and asked to use the following grades
A B C D E
Very often quite often sometimes seldom not at all
A copy of the introductory sheet ’Children’s School Work 
and Personality’ is given in the Appendix.
5.344 Attitudes to School and School Work 
Noting that no suitable measures of pupil’s attitudes 
were available for use in her large-scale research study into
187.
the effects of streaming and non-streaming in Junior Schools, 
Barker Lunn (1969) constructed a set of ’Primary Children’s 
Attitude Scales’ for use with children aged 9 to 11 years. 
These provide a useful set of resources for other research 
workers, a considerable amount of evidence for their reliabi­
lity and validity having been accumulated in an analysis with 
over 2000 pupils.
A specimen set and ’Manual of Instructions’ was supplied 
by the N.F.E.R. for use by the writer. Of the ten possible 
scales incorporated in the 64-item questionnaire, six were 
scored for this investigation. The following summary will 
enable these scales to be scored, and a copy of the question­
naire is included in the Appendix, but anyone envisaging 
using the materials should apply to the N.F.E.R. for the com­
plete manual.
The original cover sheet, with the N.F.E.R. heading, 
was amended into a less formal cover sheet for present use, 
under the title ’What I think about School’. All the instruc­
tions and guidelines were preserved however, including the 
note regarding confidentiality between researcher and pupils, 
and in presenting the material, these were read aloud to the 
class while they followed the wording in their own booklet.
The following scales are included in this study:
(i) Attitude to School and Intent in School Work
It is possible to score these two aspects separately 
though they intercorrelate highly and the writer has adopted 
Barker Lunn’s (1969) suggestion that there is a case for com­
bining them. The scale therefore includes both general atti­
tudes, such as ’School is fun’ and ’I would leave school 
tomorrow if I could’, and statements directed towards school
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work such as 'I enjoy most school w o r k ’ and ’we spend too
much time doing arithmetric’.
There are 12 items altogether 18, 25, 41, 48, 56, 60, 8, 
12, 23, 31, 47, 64, the first six emphasising general attitu­
des to school and the others school work.
The scores to be allocated to each item are noted on 
the specimen questionnaire in the Appendix. Half marks are 
awarded for ’contrived items’ which demand two items being 
endorsed positively before credit is given. Any odd half 
marks are consequently rounded down» Total scores can range 
from 0 to 12, and high scores, as on all scales, represent 
positive attitudes.
(ii) Importance of doing well
Items on this scale stress the child’s attitude towards
achievement, such as ’I work and try very hard in school’ and 
’Doing well at school is most important to m e ’. There are 
five items in all, 11, 43, 44, 52 and 63, and each is scored
2 , 1 or 0.
(iii) Conforming versus non-conforming
This scale covers these two opposing types of behaviour, 
with items such as ’I dislike children who are noisy in class’ 
and ’It ’s nice to fool about in class’. There are five items
3, 6, 22, 33 and 35, and scores range from 0 to 5. Half 
marks are rounded down.
(iv) Relationship with Teacher
These items emphasise the extent to which the child 
thinks the teacher shows concern for him, rather than his
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liking for the teacher. Items include ’Teacher is interested 
in m e ’ and ’Teacher thinks I ’m a trouble-maker’. There are 
six items 4, 24, 36, 49, 51, 54, scored in the way indicated. 
Negative half marks are added algebraically and odd halves 
are again rounded down. If there are two marks of ’- J ’ 
however the total algebraic score is increased by one, (or 
alternatively the negative marks are ignored). This is 
necessary to prevent the scoring for a pair of contrived 
items affecting the swing of other single items.
(v) Anxiety in the Classroom Situation
Items on this scale refer to fears and worries in the 
classroom, for example, ’I would feel afraid if I got my work 
wrong’ and ’Children who can’t do their school work feel 
ashamed’. The relevant items are 20, 27, 28, 32, 38, 58, 61 
and possible scores range from 0 to 6. The scoring is slight­
ly different from the other scales, some items being credited 
with ticks instead of marks. One mark is awarded for each of 
the following: if both items 27 and 28 are ticked at least
once, if both items 27 and 38 are ticked twice, if both items 
38 and 61 are ticked at least once.
(vi) Academic Self-image
This scale reflects children’s image of themselves, not 
in general terms as in the Self-Concept (S.A.S.) scale, but 
in terms of school work. Thus items include ’I ’m useless at 
school work’, ’I ’m very good at sums’, and ’I find a lot of 
school work is difficult to understand’. There are nine items, 
5, 7, 14, 17, 30, 42, 45, 50, 57, and the total score can 




Although it might have been possible to have carried out 
the pencil and paper tests during a number of visits to each 
school, the time needed to look at each pupil’s individual 
performance on the Board Game made a more permanent attachment 
necessary. The writer also wished to keep the testing 
sessions as informal as possible and consequently needed to 
avoid cramming too many tests into one session. These con­
siderations are particularly important in attempting to pro­
vide the right atmosphere and gain children’s cooperation for 
tests of divergent thinking, intents and attitudes.
The actual testing time was therefore spread over five 
weeks, during which time the writer and an assistant were 
continually involved in either group testing or carrying out 
the Board Game experiment. The assistant was a recently 
qualified student of the writer’s who had just gained his 
Postgraduate Certificate in Education. He had been involved 
in some of the pilot work developing the Board Game, and 
after a short introductory period was able to supervise its 
administration and assessment in cooperation with the writer. 
The arrangements for this will be returned to later.
The testing materials, apart from the Board Game were 
given in a group format to each class in their normal class­
room. Arrangements had to be made with each teacher, on a 
day to day basis, to avoid interruptions due to such activi­
ties as swimming, end-of-year plays and musical rehearsals.
The order in which the tests were given however, and the 
length of each session were maintained across all the classes. 
It was not possible within the school timetables to keep the
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classes exactly in phase, sometimes a class would have a day 
without any tests, and occasionally would have one session in 
the morning and another in the afternoon. At no time was 
more than one session given in a morning or an afternoon.
The lack of phase had the advantage of making it difficult 
for children to realise that a definite pattern existed across 
the classes, and would have reduced the effects of communica­
tion between classes. The latter no doubt took place, but 
apart from performance on the Board Game, passing references 
were considered unlikely to alter children’s general level 
and pattern of responses.
To help avoid any meaningful communication about the 
Board Game, it was kept in a separate part of the school and 
packed away between sessions. While children may have desc­
ribed its general nature and appearance to others their exact 
performance would have been difficult to describe. To comp­
licate this further the children, on finishing the Game, were 
congratulated on their effort and asked not to tell anyone 
else how to do it, ”as I want to see how they do” . The con­
gratulations, and the suggestion that they had found a clever 
method, were given to all the children even for the most un­
likely solutions. In this way it was felt that any subsequent 
hints to other children, who had not even seen the Game, would 
not be particularly helpful.
5.42 Testing Sessions
The tests were given in eight different sessions, the 
retesting with alternate forms of the divergent tests taking 
place one week (± 1 day) after the original testing. Apart 
from the divergent thinking tests, there were no time limits,
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though a rough indication of the time taken is given in the
following list of the eight sessions:
1. ’What I Think About School (20 mins.)
Interests (5 mins.)
2. Circles Test (15 mins.)
3. ’Things You Have Done in Your Spare Time (15 mins.)
Uses Test (10 mins.)
4. ’Things I Would Like to do M o s t ’ (10 mins.)
Consequences Test (10 mins.)
5. Junior Eysenck Personality Inventory (15 mins.)
Self-Concept (5 mins.)
6 . Squares (15 mins.)
7. Uses Test (10 mins.)
8 . Consequences Test (10 mins.)
5.43 Preparatory Lesson and the Board Game 
Before embarking on the testing sessions the writer spent 
half a morning with each class, giving a lesson on a simple 
electric circuit and things that conduct electricity.
The lesson took the form of a class experiment each pair 
of children being given a ’k i t ’, as shown in Figure 6, made 
up as follows:
Cycle lamp battery 
Bulb
Two wires with crocodile clips 
Plastic tube Perspex Nail
Metal clamp Copper Wire Hacksaw blade
Piece of rubber Screw Cardboard







Plastic covered wire 
Wool.
Fig.6 . Basic Kit for the Electricity Lesson
Using the battery, bulb and wires, the children were 
shown how to complete a simple circuit, and how to incorpor­
ate an object into the circuit. They tested the objects 
given and any others they had at hand and listed them as 
’Conductors’ and ’Non-conductors’. Their findings were dis­
cussed and finally written down by each pupil. The main 
conclusion, that all metals conduct electricity was stressed, 
though also that some objects, such as the metal plate, will 
not conduct if covered with paint or dirt. It was also noted 
that electricity can be conducted through water and other 
substances, such as the carbon lead in ordinary (not coloured)
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pencils. A typical ’report’ on the experiment by one of the 
children is reproduced in the Appendix.
Having completed this lesson the children were in a posi­
tion to attempt the Board Game, and each school allowed the 
children to be drawn out of their normal lessons to partici­
pate in the experiment. The schools also provided some space 
for the experiment to be conducted in isolation from the other 
activities. In one school this was a handicraft room not 
being used a great deal at that stage of the year, and in the 
other an unused cloakroom.
Four sets of the Board Game were set up well away from 
each other on double desks or tables, and the writer, with 
the help of his assistant, found it possible to supervise 
four children at a time, each child individually working on 
his own apparatus. A record sheet was completed for each 
pupil, two being filled in by the writer and two by his 
assistant. It was possible for the experimenters to move 
freely about the room however, and to communicate to each 
other if any special features needed discussion. The final 
solutions were left standing until all four pupils had fini­
shed and were then discussed by the experimenters in conjunc­
tion with the record sheets. Each solution was finally placed 
in one of the performance categories outlined earlier in this 
chapter.
Each of the testing sessions on the Board Game was con­
ducted in this way, the apparatus being set up in a standard 
format as shown in Figure 4, and any damaged articles replaced. 
On average, each session took about 40 minutes, and testing 
took place whenever time was available between the group test­
ing sessions.
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CHAPTER S IX  
THE SCORING OF DIVERGENT THINKING TESTS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
It has to be appreciated that in comparison with the 
automatic scoring procedures that can be applied to standar­
dised tests whose questions demand specific correct answers, 
the scoring of tests of divergent thinking will usually in­
volve tedious and often complex procedures. The more encour­
agement the tests give for a subject to think divergently and 
depart from the usual, the more difficult it is to score his 
responses reliably whilst at the same time crediting what 
Getzels and Jackson (1962) term the "richness and uniqueness" 
of a subject’s response.
The researcher is thus faced with the problem of devis­
ing a marking procedure that will maintain a balance between 
objective and subjective assessments and at the same time 
preserve reliability and validity. What is more the proced­
ures need to be realistic in terms of the time and effort 
they involve. As Vernon (1971) observes the problem of scor­
ing is a preliminary difficulty that must be overcome in 
using divergent thinking tests though, as he says, this is 
seldom referred to in the literature.
Most attempts at devising scoring procedures for diver­
gent thinking tests have been based on the creative thinking 
abilities of fluency, flexibility and originality hypothesised 
by Guilford (1950), and subsequently formulated into his 
Structure-of-Intellect model (Guilford, 1956). Although, as 
noted in Chapter 3, Guilford’s model of the intellect is not 
without its critics (e.g. Eysenck, 1967; Vernon, 1964), his
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conceptualization of the divergent production abilities within 
his Structure-of-Intellect, together with tasks designed to 
assess them, has provided a springboard for other attempts at 
devising materials for measuring divergent thinking. The most 
thorough attempt to establish a battery of such tests is 
found in the work of Torrance (e.g. 1962, 1965, 1972) culmi­
nating in the latest versions of the Torrance Tests of Crea­
tive Thinking, with accompanying Norms-Technical manual. 
Directions manuals and Scoring guides (Torrance, 1974). As 
noted earlier Torrance’s materials have been used in a very 
large number of studies and they provide the most comprehen­
sive set of procedures available for the administration and 
scoring of the tests used in the present study. Although a 
number of criticisms of his materials will be made, the value 
of Torrance’s work in developing instruments and procedures 
for use in investigating divergent thinking abilities must be 
acknowledged.
Goldman (1967) points out that the divergent thinking 
tests used in Guilford’s early studies were designed to assess 
only one specific factor in his Structure-of-Intellect model, 
and were consequently scored for that factor only, whereas 
Torrance, in his development of the tests has incorporated 
several factors into one test. Although a number of researchers 
(e.g. Hudson, 1966; Wallach, 1970; Hargreaves and Bolton,
1972) consider that the time and effort required to calculate 
anything more than fluency scores do not justify the small 
amount of extra information gained, a single test scored 
according to Torrance may yield scores for fluency, flexibi­
lity, originality and elaboration. Few independent experimen­
ters however, are likely to score a single test for all these
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abilities, and it would be inappropriate to do so, as indica­
ted below, under certain instructions for administering the 
tests.
Although he gives a guide to scoring both his verbal and 
figurai tests for elaboration, Torrance (1974) notes that 
some difficulties have been experienced in obtaining inter­
scorer reliability of a high order with the verbal tests, and 
cautions potential users that "Until more data are obtained 
concerning the Verbal Elaboration Score, most users may pre­
fer not to use this score".
In administering the figurai tests the elaboration abi­
lity is encouraged by an instruction to the pupils to keep 
adding to any idea they think of. In particular, in the Cir­
cles Test, Torrance encourages pupils to make as many differ­
ent objects as they can and to put as many ideas into each 
one as they can. The latter part of this instruction was not 
included in administering the tests in the present study and 
no elaboration score was extracted. Scoring methods will 
however be scrutinised in relation to the three abilities of 
fluency, flexibility and originality.
In spite of the work of Torrance, it is typical of the 
lack of uniformity in scoring methods for divergent thinking 
tests that even these three abilities are frequently scored 
in different ways. It is not difficult to establish from most 
researches the nominal abilities for which the tests are 
scored but frequently scant attention is given to the precise 
scoring procedures used. This makes replication of experi­
ments difficult and adds to the confusion that, as Yamamoto 
(1965) observes, has been characteristic of experimental 
approaches to creativity.
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6.2 THE REPORTING OF SCORING PROCEDURES IN DIVERGENT
THINKING RESEARCH
The following illustrations reveal some of the lack of 
detail and are typical of the way the scoring procedures are 
treated in many reports of research involving tests of diver­
gent thinking.
Ogilvie (1974), in an investigation of creativity and 
curriculum structure, notes that his tests owe much to Guil­
ford's and Wallach and Kogan's conceptions with regard to 
both type and task administration, and that they include mea­
sures of complexity, associative fluency, and originality. 
When information about the tests is given however no further 
information on scoring is provided beyond the comment that 
"complexity and originality scores can be constructed".
In Hasan and Butcher's (1966) replication with Scottish 
children of Getzels and Jackson's study, it can be assumed 
that the scoring procedures used with the tests, which were 
common to both experiments, were as outlined by Getzels and 
Jackson. A number of other tests were used however, with no 
scoring details except a note that the creativity score was 
the aggregate of "scores obtained from ten tests of creativi­
ty". The inclusion of the Circles Test alone could have 
resulted in a further four scores, for fluency, flexibility, 
originality and elaboration, or it might have simply been 
scored for fluency. In the reference that Hasan and Butcher 
give for the Circles Test, (Torrance, 1962), Torrance himself 
describes two versions of the test, the first of which did 
not involve a score for elaboration. The nature of the crea­
tivity score would be clearer if at least the nominal diver­
gent thinking abilities included in the score had been stated.
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It was noted by Biggs, Fitzgerald and Atkinson (1971) 
that their divergent thinking measure was flexibility, and 
that this was obtained from three versions of the Uses test, 
uses for a brick, a wooden box, and a tree respectively.
They state that this was assessed "using category scoring" 
but there is no standard procedure for forming such categor­
ies. This problem will be returned to later.
The omission of scoring details is quite often acknow­
ledged by some writers but tempered by a note that the pro­
cedures are modifications of those used by other writers, 
particularly Guilford and Torrance. The modifications are 
seldom made explicit however, and as will be seen more 
specifically later can involve some very significant changes. 
Debney (1969) , studying the interrelationships of thirteen 
creativity tests, including Consequences and Uses, gives 
some general indication of the scoring procedures but not in 
sufficient detail for the procedures to be repeated. The 
Consequences Test was marked for "low grade - direct responses" 
and "high grade - remote consequences", but although it was 
noted that one mark was given for a response in the former 
category and three marks for the latter, how exactly to judge 
whether a response is ’direct' or 'remote' is not clear. The 
Uses Test was scored for originality according to Guilford's 
suggestion that a weight be assigned to each response in 
direct proportion to the infrequency of occurrence in the 
population. It is unlikely that the scoring procedure would 
have implemented this suggestion literally to credit every 
response in this way, but no details are given of any other 
interpretation.
Hargreaves and Bolton (1972) note that they followed the
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scoring procedures given in the manuals for the Minnesota 
Tests of Creative Thinking (Yamamoto, 1965b), and give some 
guidelines for the scoring of fluency, flexibility, origina­
lity and elaboration. These however were adapted and modi­
fied for flexibility and originality and the scoring for 
neither of these could be duplicated from the information 
given.
Lovell and Shields (1968), in a study of the gifted 
child, note that details of the divergent thinking tests 
used in their study and the procedures used in scoring may be 
obtained from the authors. This is also, of course, a possi­
bility with other studies, and some details are in fact pub­
lished with research reports, especially if published in 
book form (e.g. Getzels and Jackson, 1962; Wallach and 
Kogan, 1966; Hudson, 1968). A closer look at the details 
however does not reveal a consistent scoring procedure.
In the Lovell and Shield’s study for example, the diver­
gent thinking score for the Uses Test was the sum of the 
marks for uncommon responses and for the number of different 
uses. One mark was awarded for each uncommon response- i.e. 
not given by more than one-fifth of the population, and one 
mark for each different response. Other studies adopt various 
other criteria for uncommonness, and the interpretation of the 
word ’different’ also varies considerably between studies. 
’Different' is sometimes weakly interpreted as 'not identical', 
whereas Lovell and Shields apply it more strongly so that the 
use of a brick 'to build walls' is not credited as being 
different from 'to build houses'. A considerable amount of 
judgement is needed to apply the latter interpretation and 
the resulting score would seem to involve both fluency and 
flexibility.
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When scrutinised, details of scoring procedures unfortu­
nately show a serious lack of consistency between researchers, 
even though most procedures attempt to credit some or all of 
the abilities of fluency, flexibility and originality.
The following discussion will review some of the proced­
ures in general use, and will recommend a precise convention 
and practical details for use in the present study. A final 
summary of the detailed scoring procedures for each test will 
be given at the end of the chapter. Each of the abilities of 
fluency, flexibility and originality will be looked at sepa­
rately.
6.3 REVIEW AND PRACTICAL PROCEDURES FOR SCORING FOR FLUENCY.
FLEXIBILITY AND ORIGINALITY
6.31 Fluency
Fluency in relation to tests of divergent thinking is 
the ability of an individual to produce a large number of res­
ponses relevant to some stimulus, verbal or figurai. "It is 
a matter" Guilford (1967b) claims, "of the facility with 
which an individual retrieves items of information from his 
personal information in storage". This is more than a memory 
ability as it emphasises the ability to retrieve the informa­
tion and see associations in new situations. In scoring 
responses for fluency he emphasises that "sheer quantity is 
the important consideration; quality need not be considered 
so long as responses are appropriate" (Guilford, 1959, 1973)
The question of how to judge ’appropriateness', or 'rele­
vance' as it is more frequently termed, will be discussed 
later, in the meanwhile fluency will be defined as the total 
number of relevant responses to an item. This is the simplest
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of divergent thinking test scores to calculate and although 
an element of subjective judgement is involved in assessing 
the relevancy of some responses the procedure can be almost 
as routine as for a standardised test. Interscorer reliabi­
lities as high as r = 1.00 have been reported for five of 
the Minnesota Tests including the Uses Test and the Circles 
Test (Yamamoto, 1962).
Unfortunately the definition of fluency is sometimes 
worded as the "total number of different relevant responses" 
(Torrance, 1962), and the presence of the word ’different' 
has confused the issue and resulted in some real discrepan­
cies between similar sounding measures of divergent thinking.
It is evident from his Scoring Guide (Torrance, 1974) 
that Torrance intends the word 'different' to be interpreted 
as 'not identical' and he notes in the instructions for scor­
ing the Circles Test, that "Fluency is simply the number of 
responses minus the number of duplications and irrelevant 
responses". This is made clear in a scoring example for his 
test of Unusual Uses (for a tin can) in which he gives credit 
for five similar uses of a tin, as a container for food, pen­
cils, little toys, water and parts of things. Other experi­
menters assess 'difference' much more structly. Getzels and 
Jackson (1962), for example, observe in an appendix that in 
scoring their 'Uses of a brick' test, "use them to build 
houses; use them to build fireplaces; use them to build 
walls; heat them and use them as bed warmers", would be credi­
ted as only two different uses - for building and as a bed 
warmer. In summarising their creativity measures in the main 
text they note that a subject's score "depended on the number 
and originality of the uses he mentioned", but the details of
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the tests given in the appendix make it clear that they inter­
preted the word different in terms of 'different category of 
response' not simply as 'not identical'.
Getzels and Jackson comment that they originally used 
unnecessarily elaborate scoring procedures, but that a simp­
lified system produced extremely similar results. In the 
Word Association Test for example they originally rated each 
script "according to the total number of meanings suggested; 
the number of different meanings, and the relative uniqueness 
of each meaning" (original emphasis). This procedure they 
modified to simply scoring the number of different meanings. 
They observe that Guilford (1954) used the Uses Test to assess 
'ideational fluency' or 'semantic spontaneous flexibility' 
depending on whether it was scored for the number of responses 
or the number of classes into which the responses may be 
placed, and they note that it was included in their creativity 
battery "because it apparently measures the subject's ability 
to shift frames of reference, to use the environment in an 
original manner". After scrutiny it is clear that in contrast 
to Torrance's interpretation, Getzels and Jackson's scoring 
for number of different responses is, in fact, a flexibility 
rating.
It is suggested that such a lack of consistency in speci­
fying and interpreting scoring procedures has been one of the 
reasons for the conflicting results that have occurred in 
research into divergent thinking. Although fluency and flexi­
bility scores for the same test are often highly correlated 
no consistent patterns are likely to emerge between studies 
if an identical instruction to score for 'number of different 
responses' is interpreted by some researchers according to
204
the examples given by Torrance and by others in the alterna­
tive manner used by Getzels and Jackson.
The publication of 'Creativity and Intelligence' by 
Getzels and Jackson (1962) though occasioning some detailed 
criticism, also sparked off an increase of research into 
divergent thinking often based on their procedures. The pro­
cedures referred to earlier from Lovell and Shields (1968) 
for example, were adapted from Getzels and Jackson and retained 
a strong emphasis on the need for responses to be different.
Hudson (1966) follows Getzels and Jackson's example of 
distinguishing between two types of child, the 'High I.Q.' 
and the 'High Creative', terming them 'convergers' and 'diver­
gers' respectively. He bases the distinction on the results 
of two tests. Uses of Objects and Meanings of Words which he 
notes are almost identical to those used by Getzels and 
Jackson. The scoring procedures, however, were confined to 
quantity scoring for 'the total number of responses'. On the 
other hand, there is also an indication that the responses 
had to be different, for Hudson notes that "Nor is it clear 
whether 'as a container of liquids' and 'as a container for 
beer' should count as two uses for a barrel or only one". On 
balance, however, one would guess that the result is more 
akin to the fluency score of Torrance than that of Getzels 
and Jackson. This is borne out by the further details of 
his scoring procedures given by Hudson (1968). It is also 
the interpretation used by Child and Smithers (1971, 1973) 
who, in their investigations of convergence and divergence, 
note that their samples were identified in a similar manner 
to Hudson (1966, 1968) using "fluency scores".
Apart from considerations of relevance and duplication
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of responses it is likely that when specifying a score as 
being for fluency, experimenters mean it to be obtained by 
counting the total number of responses and this is the pro­
cedure adopted here. It is worth noting however that, as 
Wallach and Kogan (1966) point out, fluency as conceived by 
Guilford carried speed implications that their untimed tests 
tried to avoid. They still retained a score for ’total num­
ber of responses’ however and although they refrained from 
describing it as fluency it provides an identical score if 
fluency is defined as suggested above.
Even in interpreting fluency in terms of total number of 
responses however, some assessment has to be made for the 
relevance of the responses.
6.311 Relevance of Responses
In any test the responses have to be related to the 
requirements of the task set, and divergent thinking tests 
are no exception. Before being credited therefore, responses 
have to be assessed for relevance. The requirements of a 
divergent test are however deliberately chosen so as not to 
constrain the subject, and to do him justice the scorer must 
not adopt a narrow view of the requirements.
It is widely suggested that teachers and others tend to 
favour the conformist answer and children’s conventional 
abilities, and there is a temptation to dismiss answers that 
at first sight appear to be fanciful or stupid, or more 
generally, in opposition to the views of the scorer. Wallach 
and Kogan (1966) observe that responses in their study were 
excluded only if they "could not conceivably fit into the 
stimulus requirements" and they note that responses that
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might be considered bizarre or inappropriate were extremely 
rare. It is possible however that having to give their res­
ponses orally, face to face with the experimenter could 
inhibit the children in this respect.
Torrance (1974) cautions scorers that "any minimal res­
ponse which can be reasonably interpreted and/or identified 
should be scored and given a point for fluency" and urges 
them not to give way too readily to their subjective standards 
for completeness. Such a caution would be well taken by a 
scorer who was not in sympathy with the spirit of divergent 
thinking assessment, though as Hudson (1968) observes "Our 
capacity to code (score) in ways that support our own hypo­
theses is well known", and some scorers could take Torrance’s 
suggestion as a licence for ’inventive’ scoring that would 
credit the imagination of the scorer rather than the candi­
date. Though the subjective element in scoring divergent 
tests cannot be avoided, it is important that scorers be 
aware of the part it plays, and attempt to subject their 
instinctive judgements to some form of evaluation. If more 
than one scorer is involved it is essential that doubtful 
responses are discussed and a common decision arrived at.
This applies equally to judgements relating to the scoring 
of flexibility and originality.
Garwood (1964) suggests that any response which is ’fea­
sible’ should be credited and in practice few responses are 
so absurd that they have to be deleted. In accord with a 
further suggestion of Torrance (1974) however, fantastic or 
impossible responses beyond all possible reality have to be 
categorised as irrelevant. As a guiding principle a response 
should be credited if it shows a recognisable relationship to
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the requirements of the test.
There can however be no rigid rule for judging the rele­
vance, appropriateness or feasibility of a response and 
inevitably some subjective judgements have to be made. 
Torrance for example allows ’throw them away’ as a use for a 
tin can, but the writer would not.
In the Circles Test subjects occasionally draw objects 
within the circle with no apparent relationship to the circle 
itself. Unless these clearly involve another circle in their 
construction, when the benefit of the doubt might be given to 
the subject, such responses should be considered irrelevant 
to the requirements of the test.
It is important to realise that many divergent thinking 
tests, especially those used by Guilford to identify some of 
the factors in his Structure-of-Intellect model, have been 
administered and scored in a variety of ways in order to 
emphasise different aspects of divergent thinking. The Uses 
Test is the most obvious example. Guilford (1967) even des­
cribes the test differently as ’Uses for a brick’ or ’Unusual 
u se s ’ depending on the emphasis he wishes to convey. When he 
wishes to call for varied class responses he notes elsewhere 
that ’’the emphasis upon unusual uses virtually forces the 
examinee to go from one class of uses to another’’ (Guilford, 
1967b). It would seem more appropriate on the other hand to 
suggest that the word ’unusual’ emphasises originality rather 
than flexibility.
Following the adaptation of the tests for school use 
however the instructions have been more in the form of a 
general request to subjects to ’give as many different and 
unusual uses as possible for an object’. This gives an
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invitation for the subject to be fluent (number of responses), 
flexible (different responses) and original (unusual respon­
ses) , and the scoring for each of these abilities is conducted 
independently, without considerations of difference or unusual­
ness being applied to the judgement of fluency.
To encourage pupils to avoid the normal uses of an object 
the Uses Test may still be referred to as ’Unusual Uses’ 
(Torrance, 1974) or ’Alternate Us e s ’ (Wallach and Kogan, 1966), 
but there is little to indicate that the labels ’unusual’ or 
’alternate’ in the title are taken as a specific requirement 
of the task when fluency is scored. Torrance however does 
attempt to utilize it in his scoring instructions though the 
net result is hardly worth the effort and he himself appears 
largely, in practice, to ignore it. He explains that in 
allocating marks for fluency the ’usual’ uses of the object 
should be excluded. For example when the object is a tin can, 
he defines an acceptable use as ’’any relevant use other than 
the ’usual u s e ’ as a container for preserving food and other 
products. Other container responses detailed uses after the 
can has been emptied of its original contents are counted’’ 
(Torrance, 1974). He notes that this rather a lenient defi­
nition of unusualness and credits such replies as ’container 
(unspecified)’, ’food container’ and ’liquid container’ in 
his list of responses. It appears therefore that the unusual­
ness criterion is only minimally applied to the scoring for 
fluency, and, although it might appear in the name of the 
test, it seems preferable to judge the relevance of a response 
in terms of the general requirements of the test rather than 
attempt to apply an additional criterion, especially when it 
is later related to the scoring for originality.
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Finally it needs to be noted that responses from pupils 
who misunderstood the requirements of the test have to be 
deemed irrelevant and deleted. In the present study none of 
the subjects completely misunderstood the requirements of the 
figurai tests and the few responses judged to be irrelevant 
only minimally affected any individual’s score. In the ver­
bal tests however the misunderstanding of the directions by 
four candidates resulted in their total departure from the 
requirements of the test.
In one case ’Uses for a newspaper’ resulted in a football 
article for a newspaper; and in the others, ’Consequences of 
having no hair’ resulted in a story about a boy who had no 
hair, a list of other missing attributes such as ’no arms’ or 
’only one eye’, and one unintelligible passage full of non 
sequiturs. In such cases the whole answer must be deemed 
irrelevant. Any estimation of the subject’s score from his 
attempt would be invalid, though if necessary a statistical 
estimate could be made if sufficient information had been 
obtained from other similar tests. In this study the children 
concerned were omitted from the overall results.
This raises the question of the difference between very 
low scorers and those who were judged as misunderstanding the 
task rather than having a score of zero. In three of the 
cases mentioned the children were clearly on the wrong track 
and produced fairly competent answers for the parallel ver­
sion of the test. The fourth case was more ambiguous as the 
pupil concerned had difficulty in writing intelligibly though 
her second attempt was more clearly related to the task. She 
also found reading difficult however and as some of the other 
materials had been presented in verbal form her answers to
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the questions were unlikely to be reliable. As a result, all 
four children were omitted from the overall analysis. Low 
scorers on the other hand were usually characterised by a 
short but sensible list of responses even if they exhibited 
limited ability to write clearly. The obvious presence of a 
verbal ability in answering the tests will be borne in mind 
when the results are interpreted.
It is important that the exclusion of certain subjects 
does not lead to a bias in the sample however, and such omis­
sions need some justification. The ability of a subject to 
understand and follow directions may, for example, be related 
to his general ability and this could be a variable under 
discussion. This is in fact the case in the present study 
and the four children omitted had below average I.Q.’s. Even 
without these four children however a very wide range of abi­
lity is covered as the statistics of the sample will show 
later. With the comparatively large number of children invol­
ved therefore their omission was considered legitimate.
6.32 Flexibility
Guilford (1950) argued that flexible thinking is an 
attribute of creative thinkers shown by their ability to 
desert old ways of thinking and strike out in new directions. 
As discussed in Chapter 3 this view reflected earlier attempts 
to relate rigidity, the counterpart of flexibility, to app­
roaches to problem solving and soon received some confirma­
tion in a factorial study of thinking abilities (Guilford, 
Wilson and Christensen, 1952).
In the latter, flexibility was assessed using tests of 
divergent thinking by counting the number of different cate-
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gories into which the subjects’ responses fell. This is still 
the method of scoring adopted though there is considerable 
variation in the way in which the categories are formed.
The principle of the procedure, however, is fairly 
straightforward. For example, if the Uses Test asks for a 
list of uses for a brick, a subject who says bricks could be 
used for building a house, a barn, a school, a stove, a wall, 
a floor, and a chimney would receive seven marks for fluency 
but only one for flexibility - all the responses falling into 
the single category of ’building’. Another subject who says 
bricks could be used to build a house, throw at the cat, make 
a doorstop, make bookends, make a red powder, make a tombstone 
for a dead bird, and scratch a message, would receive seven 
fluency marks but also seven flexibility marks, one for each 
of the seven different categories of response.
Although Guilford (1959) in a similar example notes that 
responses of the type given by the first subject would earn 
"a very low score for spontaneous flexibility, because all 
these uses fall into the same class", he brings some slight 
confusion to the scoring procedure by noting elsewhere (Guil­
ford, 1967) that a flexibility score is calculated "by count­
ing the number of different categories of use, or, alterna­
tively, the number of times that the examinee shifts category 
of use’’.
The latter may seem to be more exactly in line with the 
concept of flexibility though it is open to various inter­
pretations which could affect its reliability and validity. 
Some scorers might credit a shift from one category to 
another even if it resulted in a return to an earlier catego­
ry, though clearly this would give a very narrow concept of
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flexibility if the subject were to oscillate frequently bet­
ween two categories. If shifts were only credited when the 
subject moved into a new category, then his score would sim­
ply be one less than if scored by counting each different 
category of response as shown above. This would give a zero 
score for a subject who remained in one category only and 
strictly speaking this would be an appropriate score for his 
flexibility in such a case. In practice, however, the method 
of ’counting each different category of response’ is most 
commonly used, and both Torrance (1974) and Cropley (1967) 
recommend this procedure when giving details of their scoring 
procedures.
It is clearly important for experimenters to specify 
their method of scoring if valid comparisons are to be made 
between studies, and it is suggested that in the interests of 
consistency ’number of categories into which responses fall’ 
should be adopted as the standard procedure for counting 
flexibility categories. Special note should then be made 
when researchers point out that their flexibility scores were 
found ’’by calculating the number of shifts amongst predeter­
mined response categories’’ (e.g. Hargreaves and Bolton, 1972).
This variation in scoring for flexibility is, however, a 
less widespread problem than that of defining the response 
categories. The above recommendation for flexibility scoring, 
whilst clear in principle leaves open the question of how 
exactly the categories are constructed. Guilford leaves their 
construction to the scorer, and although this ensures that the 
categories are directly related to the population tested, it 
leaves open a range of options. These can vary from the con­
struction of very general categories to others more specifi-
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cally defined in terms of the predominant features of the 
responses.
Torrance (1966, 1974) in an effort to standardise the 
procedure has produced a list of categories derived from an 
analysis and classification of the responses of a sample of 
500 subjects from kindergarten children to college students. 
When marking a script, the category of each response is 
determined from this list and entered on the scoring sheet, 
the flexibility score then being the total number of differ­
ent categories. In cases where responses cannot be classi­
fied into any of the categories listed, Torrance allows new 
categories to be created but notes that this should rarely 
be necessary since these categories cover over 99 per cent of 
the responses given by the 500 subjects.
It is not surprising that most responses can be fitted 
into the categories as the latter are of a very general 
nature. As a result they are not mutually exclusive and a 
considerable amount of subjectivity arises in placing a res­
ponse as will be shown later. What is more, the general 
nature of the categories means that they are only loosely 
related to the psychological processes that are likely to be 
involved in flexible thinking, and the ways in which indivi­
duals attempt the test. In particular from the experiences 
of the present study it appears that children of 11 years of 
age may approach the test in different ways to the 15-year- 
olds. In marking scripts it seems easier to recognise the 
association between consecutive responses in the answers of 
the younger children, even when they move into a new category. 
A lollipop, a balloon and a table-tennis bat, might, for 
example, follow each other in replies to the Circles Test,
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involving changes of category but little actual change of 
appearance in the children’s drawings. Whether or not it 
is true that this is more likely to occur with younger chil­
dren is a question which deserves further study.
It is unlikely that any general, predetermined, set of 
response categories could cater for such an ’associative’ 
approach to studying children’s flexible thinking, but some 
indication of the changes in direction of a subject’s think­
ing can be arrived at from a set of response categories. 
Torrance’s very general categories however, though possibly 
increasing reliability may be sacrificing validity. His 
latest scoring guide (1974) is in fact more general than the 
1966 version, and although he observes that recent validity 
studies give confidence to the changes in scoring procedures, 
there are some aspects of the earlier guide which seem prefer­
able. Some details will be considered shortly.
As noted earlier (page 196) there are some doubts about 
the value of scoring all three abilities, fluency, flexibility 
and originality on any one test of divergent thinking. As a 
result many researchers (e.g. Dewing, 1970; Vernon, 1971) 
have omitted flexibility from their investigations. As Guil­
ford (1950) notes however - ’’Although there have been disap­
pointments in the attempt to establish a common factor of 
this type, the concept of flexibility and of its probable 
opposite, rigidity, will not be downed” . It was suggested in 
Chapter 3 that it is still an appealing concept in relation 
to problem solving, and the writer has shown some connection 
between flexibility and mathematical problems, particularly 
when flexibility is derived from figurai tests (Richards, 
1970). Flexibility scores still correlated highly with other
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scores from the same test, but this was less marked in the 
Circles Test than the Uses Test. In the former the coeffi­
cients of correlation between flexibility and the other two 
scores were 0.86 and 0.79, with fluency and originality res­
pectively, while the corresponding coefficients for the Uses 
Test were 0.95 and 0.84. With a correlation as high as 0.95 
in the Uses Test there is little variance which might distin­
guish the flexibility score from that of fluency, and conse­
quently a flexibility score is included in the present study 
in the figurai test only.
The procedures for forming the flexibility categories 
have yet to be established however, and these will now be 
looked at more closely. The practical details needed to make 
the procedures clear will be related to the Circles Test, 
although the general nature of the problems discussed is 
shared with other divergent thinking tests when flexibility 
is scored.
6.321 Practical Details of Flexibility Scoring
Although the rationale for divergent thinking abilities 
stems largely from Guilford’s work, the establishment of the 
Minnesota Test of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1962; Yamam­
oto, 19659 and their subsequent commercial development by 
Torrance (1966, 1974) has meant that many scorers adopt the 
flexibility categories as listed by Torrance, and others use 
’adapted versions’. Some of the drawbacks to Torrance’s 
scheme have already been mentioned however, and as more will 
become apparent when the details are looked at more closely, 
new categories will be constructed for use in the present 
study. However, as most of the attempts to establish scoring
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procedures for divergent thinking tests has been done in rela­
tion to the Minnesota tests it would be fair to say that any 
new version is likely in many ways to be an adaptation of one 
of the Torrance versions. Whilst acknowledging this, there 
are a number of inconsistencies and limitations in the Torr­
ance material that need to be clarified and amended.
In the Scoring Guide for Figurai Tests, Booklet B, 
Torrance (1974) gives the responses of a college student to 
the Circles Test. Two of the responses are faces, a sleepy 
face labelled ’I sleepy’, and a toothy face labelled ’I use 
Crest’. Unlike the 1966 version there is no specific ’Faces’ 
category and the two responses are separated into categories 
of ’Body or body p a r t ’ and ’Human beings’ respectively. The 
justification for this separation is not clear from the scor­
ing procedures. Other faces and human figures appear in 
Torrance’s list of uncommon responses and these too are 
allocated to different categories, for example, a King’s face 
is allocated to ’Royalty’, a devil to ’Supernatural creatures’ 
and a giant to ’Human beings’. There is a considerable amount 
of arbitrary judgement evident in some of the allocations.
Variations on a face are in fact common amongst respon­
ses to the Circles Test and if scored as Torrance demonstra­
tes, could result in a subject who produced nothing but faces 
still getting a high mark for flexibility, and, as will be 
seen later, for originality. It is not uncommon for a sub­
ject to draw several faces before changing category. Some 
have small variations in features such as spectacles, eye 
patches, a hat or a moustache, others carry labels to dis­
tinguish them as a pirate, clown, school girl, princess, red 
Indian or sad man, while others are characters as Hitler,
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Edward Heath, Robin Hood or Kojak. To credit these with dif­
ferent flexibility categories would be appropriate for a 
'faces’ test, but when the responses are judged in relation 
to a circle it seems more appropriate to place all such res­
ponses in a ’Faces’ category.
Applying this principle in general means that a response 
should be placed in a new category only if the scorer can 
recognise a definite shift of direction in the subject’s 
thinking in relation to the requirements of the test.
Although some subjective judgement still needs to be applied, 
it can be more closely related to the concept of flexibility 
than is possible when asked to fit responses into general 
categories such as those of Torrance.
It might appear that the resulting score for flexibility 
would be lower than if based on Torrance’s procedures, since 
responses having the same basic theme, such as faces, are not 
put in a different category even if they contain variations 
on a theme. On the other hand there is no suggestion in the 
above principle that 99% of the responses should fit into the 
more specific categories compiled in the present study, and 
as a result the score is likely to be higher by this method.
A list of the categories is given in the Appendix.
Credit for flexibility is also given when the scorer finds a
response not covered by the categories listed, and often, if 
a number of similar responses are found, he can form a new 
category. Such a category need not have a collective name 
imposed on it if this would be a constricting influence. 
Instead it would be defined by the typical responses listed. 
Pool, pond, puddle, and swimming pool, would, for example, be
likely to belong to a single category. By contrast, in
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Torrance's guide 'swimming pool’ is placed in a ’Recreation’ 
category and the other responses are not listed.
Torrance’s scorers, however, are encouraged to fit the 
responses into some category, though Torrance (1974) notes 
that ”A response which truly (original emphasis) does not 
seem to fit into a listed category may be indicated by an ’X ’ 
and given extra credit". ’Pond’ could however be put in the 
Geography category (which already includes ’lake’) and 
’puddle’ and ’p o o l ’ in the ’Weather and Seasons’ category.
In the writer’s view this would be likely to have less vali­
dity than the alternative suggested above.
Torrance (1974) observes that "in rare instances a res­
ponse may not fall into any of the listed categories" and 
that the categories could never be exhaustive. In attempting 
to be as comprehensive as possible however, the categories 
seem to be only loosely related to the thinking process that 
should be reflected by the score for flexibility. As Torrance 
remarks "the important thing is that the testee be given 
credit for each different type of idea produced", but this 
seems hardly possible when he included in one (’Recreation’) 
category, responses as diverse as, exercise bars, movie screen, 
roller coaster, swimming pool, swing, slide, skin diver, stage 
and strong man. Any subject giving these nine responses would 
appear to justify a high score for flexibility.
The introduction of very general flexibility categories 
for the Circles Test is one of the changes that appear in the 
1974 versions of Torrance’s scoring guides. In the 1966 
guide for example, Torrance included categories of balls, 
blots, blemishes/spots, pastries/cake, hoops and optical in­
struments, but in 1974 these are absorbed into more general
219.
categories such as Sports, Food, Games and Science. How to 
score the responses of blots and blemishes/spots, is no longer 
clear in the 1974 guide. The earlier version though perhaps 
less comprehensive, is more precisely related to the actual 
type of response and the ways in which the pupils answer the 
test.
The procedure followed in the present study is more akin 
to this version and earlier suggestions by Torrance (Torrance, 
1962). It places an emphasis on the thinking of each indi­
vidual and although a number of categories are similar to 
those given by Torrance there is not the same attempt to 
force 99% of the responses into these categories. Instead it 
is suggested that if the defining characteristic of a response 
is not obviously similar to that of a listed category, the 
response should be awarded a mark for flexibility. The cate­
gories suggested are therefore much less comprehensive than 
those suggested by Torrance (1974) but it is felt that they 
should have more validity.
6.33 Originality
The scoring of divergent thinking tests for originality 
is normally based on Guilford's suggestion that it can be 
tested "in terms of the frequency of uncommon, yet acceptable, 
responses to an item" (Guilford, 1950). Although in some 
exercises, such as imaginative stories, originality is asses­
sed by less statistical methods it is a practice which, as 
Cropley (1967) suggests, can be "both more objective and also 
more reliable than others".
There is considerable variation however in the way in 
which this principle of statistical infrequency is applied.
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both in the level of uncommonness at which credit is given, 
and in the relative weights given to different levels.
Wallach and Kogan (1966) credit only unique responses - 
defining uniqueness literally as "of which there is but one" 
in the sample tested, and at the other extreme Getzels and 
Jackson (1962) award one mark for any response that is given 
by less than 20% of the sample.
Both procedures have been used by other researchers. 
Garwood (1964), relating personality factors to creativity 
in young scientists, includes an uniqueness score for respon­
ses to the Uses Test in her creativity criterion. Whereas 
Lovell and Shields (1968) in their creativity measure include 
a score for uncommon responses identical to that of Getzels 
and Jackson. With such a wide variation it is unlikely that 
the resulting creativity scores are comparable and inconsis­
tencies are bound to arise from researches that use such 
differing criteria for scoring for the same nominal ability.
Each of these extremes also has its own disadvantages. 
Scores awarded on the basis of Wallach and Kogan's method 
tend to be low and therefore rather unreliable; while Getzels 
and Jackson's procedure gives no more credit to unique respon­
ses than to those that are given by one fifth of the popula­
tion.
It is not however a straightforward case of one extreme 
or the other, for many experimenters use some intermediate 
scoring method which credits uncommon responses differentially. 
What is more, it is not unusual to find different criterion 
levels being used within a single battery of tests. Torrance 
(1974) for example varies both the marks awarded and the level 
of uncommonness credited. He allocates marks as follows:
(i) for the ’Asking’ Questions test;
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Frequency of a 
response in the 
population tested
<2% 2 to 4.99% >5%
Originality mark 2 1 0
(ii) for the Picture Construction test:








Mark 5 4 3 2 1 0
(iii) for the Circles test:
Frequency <2% 2 - 4% 5 - 9% >10%
Originality
Mark 3 2 1 0
Torrance does not justify his use of different levels of fre­
quency and their corresponding originality marks, though it 
is possible that these are related to differing patterns in 
the distributions of responses for different tests. On most 
of his verbal tests the marks are the same as that for the 
Asking Questions test though the frequency percentages credi­
ted are not stated explicitly. In an earlier publication 
Torrance (1962) after giving weights for different frequencies 
notes that "More simply, an originality score may also be 
determined by counting the number of responses not in the zero 
category". This alternative is not suggested in the scoring 
guides for the later versions of his tests.
Haddon and Lytton (1968) , using five tests from Torran­
c e ’s battery, reflect some of the uncertainty in the 1962
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versions of the scoring procedures, and vary their scoring 
from giving one point to any uncommon response (Circles Test) 
to a scale of 1 to 4 marks for degrees of unusualness up to 
a cut-off point of about 5% (in the Uses and Common Problems 
Tests) .
A cut-off point of 5% is favoured by a number of resear­
chers. Dewing (1970) adopts a 5% cut-off point, and the same 
weightings as Torrance for the Asking Questions test, and is 
also consistent in applying the same criterion for both of 
the tests she uses. This is particularly important when a 
total creativity score is to be calculated. Barker Lunn (1970) 
also adopts this procedure for assessing originality and for 
each of the divergent thinking tests used in her study.
Cropley (1967) recommends awarding points for originality 
up to a maximum of 4 for a unique response, with a cut-off 
point at 15%. He suggests the following mark allocation:






Mark 4 3 2 1 0
Vernon (1971) adopts the 15% cut-off point as suggested 
by Cropley but with the following simplified weighting cate­
gories :
Frequency of response 
in the sample tested 
(n = 100)
<5 6 to 14 >15
Originality Mark 2 1 0
He also suggests constructing the list of uncommon responses 
from a random sample rather than the total population of
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scripts. This procedure reduces some of the labour involved 
in listing and weighting every response, and will be returned 
to later.
Cropley (1967) notes that his originality categories, 
expressed in percentages, are apparently uneven, the one 
point category covering a range from 7 to 15 per cent, the 
next only from 3 to 6 per cent and so on. He explains this 
by noting that the percentage limits for each category corres­
pond to equal standard-score distances along the x-axis of a 
normal curve - "Thus, the distance between 7 and 15 per cent 
is about 0.44 standard deviations; as is the distance from 
3 per cent to 6 per cent and so on". It is not made clear 
why equal standard deviation intervals were considered prefer­
able to equal percentage intervals, though the effect is to 
add more weight to the ’original’ end of the scale than equal 
percentage intervals over the same range would have done.
This is achieved in the present study by increasing the 
weighting of unique responses from an otherwise linear scale 
of marks based on equal percentage intervals.
Some confusion could arise from the way in which Cropley 
presents his intervals. In ending intervals at 2% and 6% and 
beginning the next intervals at 3% and 7% respectively, he 
loses the two 1% transition intervals and it is not immediately 
clear in which intervals intermediate scores should be placed. 
This could cause some difficulty in trying to apply the scheme 
to a sample whose size was not 100. What mark, for example, 
should be given to a response given by 7 out of 120 subjects,
i.e. by 6.7% of the population? It could be taken as 7% ’to 
the nearest whole number’ and awarded 1 mark, or alternatively 
as occurring in less than 7% of the responses be given 2 marks.
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Calculating the end points of Cropley’s intervals in 
terms of standard deviation units of the normal curve helps 
to clarify the intervals intended:-
Percentage frequency 
contained in tail of 
the normal curve
1 2 3 6 7 15
Deviate in standard 
score units 2.33 2.05 1.88 1.55 1.48 1.04
The sizes of the intervals from 1 to 3%, 3 to 7%, and 7 
to 15% are 0.45, 0.40 and 0.44 s.d. units respectively and 
clearly these are the intended intervals. (The interval from 
0 to 1% is indeterminate.) The actual end points, however, 
are still nominally in two categories. A clearer procedure 
would be to note the cut-off points for each interval and 
whether or not it is included in the interval. Torrance does 
this for two of the distributions given earlier by noting 
that the intervals end at 1.99% etc. though he also gives an 
indefinite version for the Circles Test.
Many researchers begin their distribution with the award 
of maximum originality marks for responses given by less than 
1% of the population, though when the size of the population 
tested is less than 100, no responses can occur in this cate­
gory. When this happens it is suggested that the first cate­
gory should be that of an unique response whatever its per­
centage frequency.
6.331 Use of a Sample of Scripts for Listing Uncommon 
Responses
Instead of forming the list of uncommon responses for 
the whole population of scripts, Vernon (1971) suggests that
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basing the procedure on a random sample of 100 scripts would 
be less time consuming and still adequately reliable. A 
similar system has also been used by other experimenters 
including the writer . (Richards, 1970). The scoring guides 
produced by Torrance (1974) include lists of uncommon respon­
ses based on the same sample of 500 subjects of all ages from 
kindergarten to college, which he used for establishing flexi­
bility categories. The representativeness of the sample, 
however, is even more questionable for originality than it 
was for flexibility. Responses which are original for a 
group of 7-year-olds may well be commonplace for a group of 
college students and it is also unlikely that his distribu­
tion would be suitable for populations outside the U.S.A.
As Cropley (1967) argues, originality distributions should be 
compiled for each group of subjects tested, such as year- 
group or school class. This is the practice followed in the 
present study, with a sample of the group being tested.
The size of the sample necessary depends on the composi­
tion of the group, the more homogeneous it is the smaller the 
sample need be. Whatever the sample size however the list of 
responses can never be guaranteed to be exhaustive. In ob­
serving this in her study. Barker Lunn (1970) goes on to note 
immediately that "A certain amount of discretion had to be 
employed in interpreting responses, and where queries arose 
these were discussed by markers and members of the research 
team". This is an observation often made on the scoring of 
divergent thinking tests in general, but should not be taken 
as specific advice on what to do with responses not appearing 
in the originality list. A more reliable procedure is to 
score any new responses as original even if they are repeated
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in the scripts not comprising the distribution sample. The 
writer has found this a reasonable procedure for verbal tests, 
only a limited number of new responses actually occurring.
In the Circles Test with many more responses however, the use 
of a sample is likely to be less exhaustive and the procedure 
consequently less valid. Vernon (1971) acknowledging that 
complications such as this are bound to arise in any sampling 
procedure where the frequency of occurrence of responses in 
the sample is unlikely to be identical to that in the whole 
population, nevertheless estimates that "the resulting error 
probably has little effect on total test scores". In the 
present study a sample of scripts will be used for scoring 
the verbal tests, but in the interests of validity the whole 
population will be used to draw up the frequency distribution 
for the Circles Test.
The basis of the sampling procedure outlined by Vernon 
is that the sample should be a random one taken directly from 
the population being tested. This is not the case when using 
a 'standard’ list of uncommon responses such as those compi­
led by Torrance, and the problem of how to deal with respon­
ses not on the list is then a rather different one.
Torrance (1974) suggests that although most new responses 
will justify the maximum originality mark the scorer should 
exercise his judgement of the "creative strength" of any new 
response. Torrance’s guidance on how to assess creative 
strength is based on the scorer acquiring experience and 
familiarity with the appropriate originality lists in the 
scoring guide. In this way he believes the scorer should 
gain a feeling for the difference between non-scoring and 
scoring responses. The former, ’obvious’ responses are he
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says, characterised by requiring little intellectual energy, 
while in contrast the scoring responses require more intel­
lectual energy to be "beyond what is learned, practical, 
habitual and away from the obvious and commonplace".
It is true that familiarity with a large number of scripts 
does give one a feeling for the clearness and originality of 
responses and that in a non-standardised test some discretion 
has to be applied. In the interests of interscorer reliabi­
lity however the scoring procedures should attempt to keep 
this aspect to a minimum. Vernon (1971) expresses the view 
that it is reasonable to allow the scorer to use some subjec­
tive evaluations of the value, cleverness or originality of 
unusual responses, provided they are recorded and applied 
consistently. The latter is particularly difficult if more 
than one scorer is involved in the marking. Ideally the whole 
scoring, including the construction of the frequency distribu­
tion should be done by one person. This principle has been 
adhered to in this study, all the marking except for certain 
routine tasks carried out under his close supervision, being 
done by the writer.
6.332 Summary
The preceding discussion of the scoring for originality 
has attempted to illustrate some of the differing interpreta­
tions of the criterion of uncommonness, and some of the accom­
panying problems including the use of a 'standard' scoring 
guide for awarding originality marks, and a sampling method 
for determining one's own frequency distribution. As a 
result the writer has arrived at the following principles for 
the marking to be used in the present study:
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1 . To reject the use of a ’standard' list of uncommon res­
ponses from a scoring manual such as that of Torrance 
(1974).
2 . To construct frequency distributions of uncommon res­
ponses for each test used and for each of the two year 
groups tested.
3. To adopt a scale for awarding originality marks by 
weighting the responses in similar way to that given by 
Cropley (1967) but based on the percentage intervals as 
shown:
Frequency *f<l% l%<f<5% 5%<f<10% 10%<f<15% f>15%
Originality
Mark 5 3 2 1 0
* or f = 1 (unique) if n <100
(This allocation is applied to all the tests apart from those 
which had to be scored according to earlier procedures for 
the sake of direct comparison.)
4. To use a sample of scripts to form the frequency distri­
butions for the verbal tests, and the whole population for 
the figurai tests.
6.333 Practical Details of Originality Scoring 
A number of practical details have now to be considered 
if the above principles are to be put into practice reliably. 
The level of interscorer reliability places its own limits on 
the degree of reliability and validity that can be 
in relation to other variables, and scorer reliabilities will 
be calculated for each of the tests used in this study.
Practical problems in scoring for originality become
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apparent as soon as one begins to construct one’s own list of 
uncommon responses, or attempts to understand the principles 
involved in the examples and frequency distributions prepared 
by other scorers. It is essential, as Torrance (1974) notes, 
for prospective scorers to gain familiarity with the construc­
tion of the originality lists if they are to apply the same
criteria to any new responses that occur. In scrutinising
his procedures however, a number of practical issues emerge 
that need resolving before similar procedures can be estab­
lished for use in the present study.
As an example, Torrance, for the Circles Test, gives
originality marks to such responses as a king’s face, a toothy 
face; a billiard ball, a golf ball, a tennis ball, a basket 
ball; Venus, Pluto and Mars. In the present study these will 
be collectively recorded as ’faces’, ’balls’ and ’planets’ 
respectively, and given originality marks according to the 
frequency of the group rather than that of an individual res­
ponse, unless the latter possesses some special defining 
characteristic that identifies it in different relation to 
the requirements of the test than other members of the group. 
This principle, similar to that adopted for judging flexibi­
lity, can also be applied within flexibility categories and 
is adopted for the scoring of all the tests used.
In the Circles Test it means that most of the small 
variations to ’faces’ referred to earlier such as moustaches, 
spectacles or eye patches; or the addition of different 
labels such as pirate, king, clown or princess are not likely 
to qualify for originality; nor are the labels ’golf’, 
’billiard’, or ’basket’ if used to describe a ball. In a simi­
lar way no more credit is given for the specification of a
230.
circle as ’M a r s ’ than for the general description of the cir­
cle as ’a planet’. The defining property of these examples 
in relation to the circle is basically that of a ’face’,
’ball’ and ’planet’ respectively, and it seems unreasonable 
that in Torrance’s lists ’M a r s ’ should receive maximum origi­
nality marks when ’a planet’ as a common response, receives 
none. On the other hand if the circle itself formed the rings 
of Saturn, or a diver’s helmet, or a ball and chain, then the 
response would qualify for separate originality marks.
In the verbal tests some general responses are quickly 
established, and once again any slight variations or specific 
examples are not credited separately from the general response. 
An extension to a commonplace answer, however, can be a defi­
nite source of originality in the verbal tests in a way which 
is not possible in the figurai tests. The ability to make an 
original verbal response often appears to be more intellectu­
ally demanding than making an uncommon figurai response, 
though the latter may encourage a more unconstrained imagina­
tive ability. This question will be discussed when the inter­
relationships between the tests are looked at later. The 
following examples illustrate the details in applying the 
principle for awarding originality marks for the verbal tests.
In the Consequences Test, for example, a common theme 
when responding to the consequences of having no hair is ’no 
need for articles to make it look tidy’. This is often 
expressed in terms of ’’no need for brushes, combs, etc.’’ (sic). 
The use of ’etcetera’ reinforces the writer’s view that a 
mention of specific items does not add to the quality of res­
ponse, and should not form separate items in tabulating the 
uncommon replies. The specific mention of brushes, combs.
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rollers, curlers or hairgrips are consequently all included 
in terms of the above general theme. A similar example 
occurs when subjects note that grooming accessories such as 
hair cream, hair spray or shampoo would not be necessary.
’Hair restorer’ however has a different relationship to 
’having no hair’ than the other applications and it could be 
argued that it deserves separate credit.
As a consequence of ’no need to eat’ a common category 
of response is ’no need to keep animals for food’ and this is 
scored as a collective response to include specific responses 
such as ’no need to keep cows, sheep or pigs’. ’No need to 
keep vegetables’ is a similar example, though an extension of 
the idea to the response ’only flowers would be grown in gar­
dens’ is judged to be worthy of separate credit.
In the Uses Test a common response to being asked for 
uses of a spoon is ’to eat wi t h ’ and this is taken to include 
specific responses as ’to eat food’, ’to eat pudding’ or ’as 
a desert spoon’. ’To dig wi t h ’ is another quite common theme 
though it is less specific in relation to using a spoon than 
’to eat with’. The addition of more specific information such 
as ’to make sandcastles’ or ’to plant things with’ can conse­
quently result in ideas that deserve separate credit for ori­
ginality even though they are in the same general category of 
’digging wi t h ’.
In responding to Uses for a newspaper, the suggestions 
that it be used ’to carry vegetables’, ’carry potatoes’ or 
’carry things’ do not seem to differ sufficiently to deserve 
separate credit for originality though to ’carry water’ is 
rather different. Similarly to use a newspaper ’round the rim 
of a bin to keep it airtight’ is judged as being a very differ-
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ent response to ’use as a bin liner’.
In tabulating responses for originality some subjective 
element is inevitably present though the principle discussed 
above is not usually difficult to apply. Cropley (1967) 
claims that tabulating the frequency of every response in an 
objective way of scoring for originality, but this seems an 
over-optimistic statement in view of the practical problems 
discussed above. Although it is theoretically possible to 
tabulate every single response, giving separate credit for 
every different statement including those that appear to be 
different ways of saying the same thing, such a method would 
distort and invalidate the notion of originality on which the 
scoring is based. Even if some judgements can be avoided by 
using predetermined lists such as those of Torrance, judge­
ments of new responses have to be made and it is suggested 
that the above procedures are likely to be more valid than an 
attempt to apply those implicit in Torrance’s lists.
One further problem needs to be clarified before the 
procedures can be put into operation. In the Circles Test, 
for example, Torrance lists both Venus and Mars as deserving 
maximum marks for originality but gives no indication of a 
different procedure when a subject gives both responses. It 
is difficult to justify the award of two lots of originality 
marks one for each of such responses. It is also difficult 
to apply a rigid rule as the degree of similarity varies 
enormously. Although it seems reasonable to credit for ori­
ginality only one of two responses as similar as Venus and 
Mars, it is more difficult to judge the award of marks to 
less similar responses.
If the responses are in different flexibility categories
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it usually follows that they should have individual credit 
for originality. It is when they are in the same category 
but yet show some variation that judgements are most diffi­
cult to make. For example, in the Circles Test, the writer 
credits one pupil in the present study with originality marks 
for both ’volcano’ and ’moon crater’, though it could be 
argued otherwise. It is not necessarily an all or nothing 
situation and it is possible to allocate reduced marks to 
the second of two such responses, depending on their degree 
of similarity, but this introduces another source of unrelia­
bility and a more standard procedure is recommended in this 
study. If two similar responses are given, both individually 
deserving credit for originality, the higher scoring response 
only should be scored. When more than two related but not 
identical responses are given it is suggested as a general 
guide that credit for originality should not be given for 
more than TWO of them. If, for example, bomb, mine, hand 
grenade, and torpedo are all given by one pupil it is sugges­
ted that only the two best responses be awarded credit. In 
this study these responses would qualify for originality marks 
of 2, 3, 3 and 5 respectively, but if given together would 
therefore be awarded a total of eight marks.
In assessing the originality of responses to the Conse­
quences Test (for no need to eat) it is common to find a res­
ponse such as ’no need to clean teeth’ being developed into 
additional responses such as ’no need for toothbrush’ or ’no 
need for toothpaste’. A similar guideline to the above can 
be applied whereby extensions on the same theme are ^iven 
separate credit for originality. It is suggested that the 
main idea plus one extension, i.e. a total of TWO only are
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credited. In this study the originality marks for these res­
ponses would then total three, one mark for ’no need to clean 
teeth’ and two marks for ’no need for toothpaste’. Similarly 
’no need for farms, no need for a tractor, no need for a 
trailer’ would be marked for the theme and one extension. In
this case ’no need for farms’ which is a common response 
would score nought and ’no need for a tractor’ two, giving a
total score of two.
Similar considerations are applied to the scoring of the 
Uses Test. For example two responses observing that a news­
paper could be used ’as a lining for drawers’ and ’as a lining 
for a d o g ’s basket’ are sufficiently different to receive 
separate credit even if given by the same person, though the 
addition of ’as a lining for an animal’s cage’ or ’as a lining 
for cupboards’ would not appear to justify further originality 
marks for the same person.
6.4 A NOTE ON THE TIME INVOLVED IN DIVERGENT TESTS
It must be pointed out that the scoring procedures adop­
ted in this study though using a sample of scripts to form 
the frequency distributions for originality in the verbal 
tests, are still enormously time-consuming. For a study of 
this type however it is essential to base the scoring methods 
on the most established of previous procedures, with enough 
detail to create a firm basis from which any modifications 
can then be recommended.
Few researchers acknowledge the time that is involved in 
scoring for anything more than fluency, though Vernon (1971) 
gives some details which put the task in perspective. Commen­
ting on the marking, with three fellow scorers, of the scripts
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of about 400 pupils, each of whom spent 140 minutes on diver­
gent thinking tests, he notes that "All four of us were large­
ly engaged in this for almost six months".
Although it is not clear how exactly to interpret the 
word ’largely’ some estimates might make the information more 
enlightening. If the scorers each spent three days per week 
marking it means that about 300 scorer-days were needed to 
mark just over 900 testee-hours of work. This puts the time 
needed at about one-third of a day or, say, two hours, for 
each hour of candidate’s work.
Some further details can be provided from this study, 
basing the time taken on those periods when nothing else but 
scoring took place. In practice it is difficult to find long 
periods of time to devote exclusively to scoring, though an 
interruption for any length of time is bound to affect the 
efficiency and distort the subjective element of the marking.
It is thus recommended that any one section of the marking be 
done in as continuous a period as possible. In any one day, 
however, it is difficult to maintain one’s efficiency after 
about six or seven hours of marking.
Scoring for originality is the most time-consuming ele­
ment in the procedures as frequency distributions have to be 
drawn up not only for each test but also for each item in the 
test. Separate distributions were also drawn up for each age 
group tested in this study as proposed earlier. As a result 
the Uses Test alone necessitated five separate originality 
distributions, two for the 1 1 -year-old population and three 
for the 15-year-olds.
Using a sample of scripts reduces some of the work, though 
even so the construction and organisation of a single distribu­
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tion usually took the writer between 10 and 15 hours for a 
sample of 42 scripts in the verbal tests. For larger samples, 
particularly the whole populations of 165 and 139 in the case 
of the Circles Test the time taken was much greater.
For the Circles and Squares Tests it was found conven­
ient to translate each completed script into a line of sym­
bols. This releases the scorer from the need to go through 
the original scripts for a second time and means that deci­
sions about the identity of a response have only to be made 
once. This eliminates the chance that on a second reading an 
obscure response could be given a different interpretation. 
Some common objects are quickly recognised, and these can 
simply be recorded as a tick or a figure *1'. Responses in 
the same flexibility category as previous ones are enclosed 
in brackets. Objects that might attract originality marks 
are listed by name. The latter are also enclosed in brackets 
if in the same category as previous responses. The frequency 
distribution of uncommon responses is then drawn up from 
these representations of the candidates scripts and origina­
lity marks allocated to each response according to its fre­
quency. Finally the subject’s score is obtained by counting 
the number of responses, for fluency; the number of unbrack­
eted responses, for flexibility; and the weightings of each 
named response, for originality. This procedure for the Cir­
cles Test with 165 subjects, itself took a total of 10 days.
In all, the scoring of the divergent tests, excluding 
the time spent on tests scored during previous work, needed 
about 320 hours or approximately 53 days of marking time.
Over 300 pupils were involved, and in total 287 testee-hours 
of work was marked. Thus just over one hour of scoring time
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was spent for each hour of testee time - as compared to the 
estimate of about two hours in Vernon’s study.
In the latter no flexibility scores were calculated, 
though frequency lists had to be tabulated for 30 different 
items. In the present study fewer (12) frequency distribu­
tions had to be constructed, six for each of the populations 
tested, namely 2 for Circles, 1 for Squares, 5 for Uses and 
4 for Consequences. (One complete frequency distribution for 
each test is included for reference in the Appendix.) Vernon 
also used a larger sample of scripts to draw up his distribu­
tions though it is unlikely that his total number of responses 
was greater for any item, as he allowed much less time per 
item than that available in the present study.
Notwithstanding the differences it is evident that when 
originality lists have to be compiled, the scoring of diver­
gent thinking tests takes an enormous amount of time. Cropley 
(1967) arguing for the use of an originality score in spite 
of the two perusals of scripts which are then necessary, notes 
that "the method is time-consuming but, unfortunately, when 
one is dealing with an essentially non-mechanical process 
like creative thinking, mechanical methods of scoring are of 
little use". Hargreaves and Bolton (1972) come to a different 
conclusion however and suggest that the effort needed to score 
for anything more than fluency does not justify the small 
amount of extra information gained, and that "to calculate 
fluency scores only would render divergent tests much more 
amenable to automated scoring and eventually result in their 
more widespread use". They are certainly correct in their 
latter observation, though it is by no means clear what the 
cost would be to the validity of divergent thinking tests.
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What is clear, however, is that there is a great need for 
some simple scoring procedures if they can be shown to be 
valid. Considerable attention has already been given to 
clarifying the scoring procedures used in this study and the 
patterns of their inter-relationships and their relationships 
with other measures will be investigated later. The writer 
should then be in a position to make some recommendations on 
the above question.
Although often tedious as well as time-consuming it is 
right to acknowledge that there are also times when scoring 
divergent tests can be stimulating and amusing. The respon­
ses are often clever and humorous, and the consistency with 
which certain subjects produce such responses is encouraging 
subjective evidence of the validity of a divergent dimension.
How consistent is any such trait and to what extent the qua­
lity of a subject's response is related to his fluency, are 
further questions to be investigated later.
6.5 SYNOPSIS OF SCORING DETAILS FOR THE DIVERGENT THINKING TESTS
6.51 Circles Test
(i) Fluency
One mark was awarded for each relevant response.
(ii) Flexibility
One mark was awarded for each different category of 
response. A list of categories was constructed from 
an analysis and classification of the responses of 
all the subjects in the present study. The list of 
categories is included in the Appendix.
(iii) Originality
Marks were awarded to a response in relation to its
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frequency of occurrence in the responses of the sam­
ple tested. Responses given by more than 15% of the 
sample were regarded as common and given no credit. 
Separate frequency distributions were drawn up for 
each of the two populations tested. The complete 
distribution for the 1 1 -year-old population is given 
in the Appendix.
The following scales were adopted for awarding ori­
ginality marks :
(1) 11-year-olds n = 165
Frequency 






2-8 9-16 17-24 >25
Originality
Mark 5 3 2 1 0
(2) 15-year-olds n = 139
Frequency 






2-3 4-6 7-10 >11
Originality
Mark 6 3 2 1 0
NOTE:
(i) The allocation of originality marks is based on dif­
ferent frequencies in these two samples. As discussed earlier, 
the writer now favours that used with the 1 1-year-old sample 
and this has been used consistently in all the creativity 
tests used with that sample. The allocation for the 15-year-
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olds was dictated by the need to compare the results with 
those of a previous study.
(ii) In each of the above cases the frequency distribu­
tion was drawn up using all the data available, that is using 
the responses of the whole sample, the numbers being 165 and 
139 for the 11-year-old and 15-year-old samples respectively.
(iii) The frequency distributions reproduced for refer­
ence in the Appendix are those arrived at with the main 11- 
year-old population, using the present recommended procedures.
6.52 Squares Test
This is an alternate form of the Circles Test used for 
assessing test-retest reliability with the 1 1-year-old popula­
tion. It was scored in exactly the same way as the Circles 
Test. The flexibility categories showed a very substantial 
overlap with those drawn up for the Circles Test and a joint 
set of categories was formed as given in the Appendix.
The frequency distribution for originality was based on 
the whole sample of 65 scripts used in the reliability assess­
ment and is also included in the Appendix.
The originality marks were allocated as shown:
11-year-old sample n = 65
Frequency 






2,3 4,5,6 7,8,9 >10
Originality




One mark was awarded for each relevant response.
(ii) Originality
Marks were awarded for uncommon responses on the 
basis of statistical infrequency. To allocate the 
appropriate mark separate frequency distributions 
were drawn up for each item in the tests, and on a 
random sample of the population tested. With the 
1 1 -year-old population only single items were used, 
’a newspaper’ in the initial testing and ’a spoon’ 
in the retesting. In the 15-year-old population 
three items, newspaper, spoon, and string were inc­
luded in the same test and the subject’s marks on 
each item were added to give his total score on the 
test.
Originality marks were awarded as shown below, and 
a complete frequency distribution for Uses of a 
newspaper, based on the recommended 1 1 -year-old fre­
quencies is given for reference in the Appendix.
(1) 1 1 -year-olds (25% sample) n = 42
Frequency 






2 3,4 5,6 >7
Originality
Mark 5 3 2 1 0
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(2) 15-year-olds [38% sample - as in original study) n = 55
Frequency 






2 3-5 6-11 >12
Originality
Mark 5 3 2 1 0
6.54 Consequences Test
(i) Fluency
One mark was awarded for each relevant response.
(ii) Originality
As in the other tests the originality marks were 
awarded for uncommon responses in relation to their 
statistical infrequency. Separate distributions 
were drawn up for each item, two for the 1 1 -year-old 
population and two for the 15-year-olds. In the 
case of the 15-year-old sample both items were inclu­
ded as one test and the subject’s marks on each item 
were added to give his total score. The frequency 
distribution for Consequences of having no hair, 
arrived at with the 1 1 -year-old sample is reproduced 
for reference in the Appendix.
The originality marks were allocated as shown below.
(1) 11-year-olds (25% sample) n = 42 
(As for the Uses Test, (1) above.)
(2) 15-year-olds (28.5% sample) n = 40
Frequency of a ( percentage 
response in the < cut-off point 
population tested ( number range
3% 2 0% 2 0%
1 (unique) 2-8 9
Originality Mark 2 1 0
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6.55 Selection of the Distribution Sample for Assessing 
Uncommon Responses
Whenever a sample of scripts was used to construct the 
frequency distribution of uncommon responses, the scripts 
were chosen in a stratified random manner from the total popu­
lation. The random selection was stratified to the extent 
that it took place within each class and for boys and girls 
separately, so that each school class and each sex contribu­
ted the same proportion of pupils to the sample as it did to 
the whole population. Within these constraints the pupils 
were selected using a table of random numbers (Yamane, 1967).
6.56 Examples of Common and Uncommon Responses to Each of 
the Divergent Thinking Tests
(Selected from the 11-year-old population.)
Circles Test
Examples of common responses were: faces, wheels, fruits,
tennis racquets, and roadsigns. Uncommon responses included: 
a g rm, a corn plaster, a link in a chain, a trout hatchery 
and a finger-print.
Squares Test
Examples of common responses were: books, boxes, radios,
pictures and windows. Uncommon responses included: a bale of
hay, a drain cover, a piano, a playground,a sausage on 
tomorrow’s world.
Consequences
(i) No need to eat
Examples of common responses were: no need for cutlery.
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no foodshops, wouldn’t get fat, we would have money, no need 
to grow vegetables. Uncommon responses included: in space
there would be no problem about food floating about, there 
would be more space to build houses, no harvest, no custard 
pies to throw at clowns, Fanny Craddock would be out of a job.
(ii) No hair
Examples of common responses were: no need for combs/
hairbrushes, we would all look like Kojak, our head would get 
cold, barbers would be out of a job, everyone would buy a wig. 
Uncommon responses included: it would be easier for artists
to paint people, the R.A.F. wouldn’t be known as the ’Bryl- 
cream boys’, lollipops would be in demand (an oblique reference 
to Kojak), toys would not have read hair, wouldn’t have the 
trouble of saying ’’Your hair looks nice” , Indians wouldn’t 
have names like ’Flowing hair’ or ’Tuffty hair’.
Uses
(i) Newspaper
Examples of common responses were: to read, cover table
when painting, sit on, use as a blanket, make paper boats/ 
aeroplanes, make papier mache. Uncommon responses included: 
make a tent, hold roses to keep thorns off, growing mustard 
and cress, holding to be seen at night on the road, hiding 
nasty sights like dead bodies.
(ii) Spoon
Examples of common responses were: to eat with, dig
with, take medicine from, egg and spoon race, flick things, 
play the spoons. Uncommon responses included: a candlestick,
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a paddle for a boat, bolt a door, for a collection of old 




INTERSCORER R E L IA B IL IT Y
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Whenever scorers can use a certain amount of their own 
judgement in scoring tests, it is important to know the 
extent of the agreement between different scorers. This is 
usually reported in terms of the coefficient of correlation 
between the scores awarded to the same sets of scripts by two 
independent scorers. Although such a coefficient of inter­
scorer reliability does not, of itself, indicate that a test 
is reliable, it is a necessary part of any overall picture 
of a test’s reliability.
Reports of interscorer reliability for tests of divergent 
thinking suggest that high levels of reliability can be 
achieved by independent scorers provided they are familiar 
with and understand the criteria for scoring. Anastasi (1968), 
reviewing the tests used by Guilford and Torrance in their 
investigations of divergent thinking, suggests that "With a 
reasonable amount of practice in following the instructions 
and studying the examples in the manuals, such tests can 
probably be scored with satisfactory consistency, although 
the scoring process is quite laborious and time consuming".
She points out that although scorer reliability is not repor­
ted by Guilford in the manuals, other investigators who have 
employed the tests in research have obtained coefficients of 
around 0.90. Reports of interscorer reliability are not com­
mon however, most researchers choosing to assume that the 
reliabilities are high, usually as a result of claims made by 
Torrance in his early publications and the latest issue of 
his tests (Torrance, 1962, 1974).
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An emphasis on the need for scorers to study the scoring 
guides thoroughly, however, is noted by Torrance. In attempt­
ing to widen the scope of his tests for use in research and 
by the educational community at large, he acknowledges that 
some concern was felt about "whether reliable scoring could 
be achieved by classroom teachers by studying the scoring 
guides". Presenting the results of an experiment in which 
classroom teachers untrained in the use of the Torrance Tests 
of Creative Thinking scored a sample of 25 test booklets, 
completed by children at the grade level at which they were 
teaching, Torrance notes that when compared to the results 
obtained by a trained scorer, mean interscorer reliabilities 
of 0.96 for fluency, 0.94 for flexibility and 0.88 for origi­
nality were obtained on the figurai tests. Mean reliabili­
ties for the verbal tests were 0.99 for fluency, 0.97 for 
flexibility and 0.94 for originality. A comparison of the 
individual scores however is more illuminating than the ave­
rages. For the verbal tests only one out of 15 coefficients 
of reliability was below 0.90, though for the figurai tests, 
with a different number of teachers, nineteen out of 28 
coefficients exceeded 0.90, eight lay between 0.80 and 0.89, 
and one equalled 0.66. Five of the seven reliability coeffi­
cients for originality were below 0.90. Torrance points out 
that low interscorer reliabilities appeared to result most 
often from failure of the scorers to scan adequately the ori­
ginality weights listed in the scoring guide.
In the above experiment the teachers had been asked to 
follow the scoring guides as carefully as possible but no 
specific training was given. Scorer reliability can be inc­
reased, Torrance suggests, by employing training in which
248.
scoring rationales are discussed, practice is given in scor­
ing a set of four or five booklets, and the resulting scores 
discussed with an experienced scorer. He claims that this 
procedure generally results in almost no differences in mean 
scores between markers, and coefficients of reliability in 
excess of 0.90. If differences in means are significant at 
the 0.10 level or less, or if there are intercorrelations of 
less than 0.90 between composite scores for any of the abili­
ties tested, he recommends that further training should be 
provided, though this, he says, is rarely necessary. In his 
own research he notes that scorers are excluded if they cannot 
maintain reliability coefficients of above 0.90 or if their 
mean scores show significant differences from those of an 
experienced scorer.
Comparing the scores awarded by an experienced scorer 
with those given by a scorer undergoing training, Torrance 
quotes the following reliabilities (Table 4), for a sample of 
100 verbal and 100 figurai booklets. He does not however 
give any details of the sample, and this is an important 
omission as the age of the subjects is likely to affect the 
type and quality of their answers and present different prob­
lems to the scorer.
Verbal booklet Figurai booklet




0.99 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.86 0.92
(There were no significant differences in mean scores n = 100)
Table 4 Interscorer reliabilities between an 
experienced and an inexperienced scorer for 
the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1974)
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The only coefficient not reaching Torrance’s self imposed 
level of 0.90 is that for originality on the figurai booklet, 
and he notes that the tendency for originality to have lower 
scorer reliability than the other scoring categories is some­
thing to which special attention might be given in the train­
ing procedures. Notwithstanding this, the level of scorer 
reliability is consistently high and justifies, for Torrance, 
the inclusion of the above measures in his scoring procedures. 
Scoring for elaboration on his verbal tests is already exclu­
ded by Torrance, since earlier information suggested that 
scorer reliability for elaboration is not high enough for the 
procedure to be recommended.
In general the high levels of interscorer reliability 
cited by Torrance are very encouraging, though it needs to be 
noted that the coefficients for each ability are calculated 
between scores for the booklets as a whole, that is between 
the composite scores of seven activities in the case of the 
verbal booklet and three for the figurai booklet. The use 
of composite scores has the effect of smoothing out individual 
test differences and increasing the overall reliability coeffi­
cient. This is a valid procedure for reporting information 
regarding the interscorer reliability of a testing battery 
designed to yield composite scores, though the coefficients 
are likely to be exaggerated estimates of the scorer reliabi­
lities of individual tests. In view of the widespread use of 
the individual sub-tests, details of their separate inter­
scorer reliabilities may be more widely applicable. In the 
present study interscorer reliabilities will be reported sepa­
rately for each of the divergent thinking tests.
Yamamoto (1962) reports such reliabilities for a number
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of the sub-tests of Torrance’s Minnesota battery including 
Unusual Uses and Circles. They were calculated from 64 sets 
of scripts marked by two independent scorers and resulted in 
the following coefficients: Circles Test - Fluency 1.00,
Flexibility 0.91, Originality 0.98; Uses Test (toy dog) - 
Fluency 1.00, Flexibility 0.84, Originality 0.92; Uses Test 
(tin cans) - Fluency 1.00, Flexibility 0.87, Originality 0.98.
The scripts, however, were obtained from a sample of 
school teachers and would not have given the same problems of 
legibility and relevance that arise from the scripts of young 
children. The reliability coefficients and therefore higher 
than might be expected from a population of school children.
In a further study, involving 5th grade children of 10 
and 11 years of age, however, Yamamoto (1965c) gives inter­
scorer reliabilities ranging from 0.97 to 0.99 for a number 
of independent scorers on samples of 64 and 76 scripts. The 
reliabilities in this case are not strictly comparable with 
the above, being obtained for a single index of ’creativity’ 
obtained from summing scores for fluency, flexibility, origi­
nality, adequacy, and elaboration from five of Torrance’s 
tests.
Torrance’s tests were also used by Treffinger, Speedie 
and Bruner (1974) in another investigation of 5th grade 
children’s creativity, and the authors report that ’’acceptably 
high levels of interscorer reliability (all greater than 0.90) 
were obtained’’. The tests were marked by trained scorers and 
yielded six scores consisting of verbal and figurai measures 
of fluency, flexibility and originality. Each score was con­
tributed to by a number of sub-tests.
Coefficients of interscorer reliability are not reported
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by Wallach and Kogan (1966) for the tests in their study of 
children’s thinking, but they note that in judging uniqueness 
there was usually 98 or 99 per cent agreement on the respon­
ses to each item. Disagreement between scorers on only 1 or 
2 responses in every 100 is indicative of a very high level 
of consistency in their judgements of the acceptability of 
unique items.
Interscorer reliabilities for each of the tests used in 
the present study were computed by Wodtke (1963) in an inves­
tigation of the reliability and validity of the Torrance 
tests. On the basis of the scoring manual provided by Yama­
moto (1962) , the scores of two independent markers on a sam­
ple of 66 fourth and fifth grade pupils were compared. 
Although the I.Q. of the sample is not specified, Wodtke 
describes it as an "unrestricted sample of elementary school 
pupils". The tests, age range, and ability in Wodtke’s 
experiment are therefore all similar to those in the present 
study. One of the scorers was inexperienced and one had some 
previous experience. Wodtke found reliability coefficients 
for the individual tests ranging from 0.82 to 0.99. Details 





Fluency 0.99 0.98 0.98
Flexibility 0.85 0.96 0.96
Originality 0.98 - 0.99
Table 5 Coefficients of Interscorer Reliability 
between two independent scorers for sub-tests of the 
Torrance Creativity Battery (Wodtke, 1963)
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These compare favourably with the composite coefficients 
reported earlier from Torrance. In general the evidence 
suggests that a high level of scorer reliability, reflecting 
a good degree of objectivity and agreement, can be achieved 
on divergent thinking tests by relatively inexperienced 
scorers. This has been achieved by employing scoring proced­
ures for fluency, flexibility and originality. Divergent 
thinking tests which are not amenable to such procedures 
however have had to adopt less reliable forms of scoring.
One of these, ’Imaginative Stories’ (Torrance, 1962), 
though still frequently used as a measure or criterion of 
divergent ability has now been omitted from Torrance’s batt­
ery. With detailed procedures for scoring this test, Yama­
moto (1961) could only report interscorer reliabilities of 
0.79, 0.80, and 0.76 for a number of independent scorers; 
and for the same test Goldman and Clarke (1967) and Torrance 
(1962) report scorer reliabilities as low as 0.72 and 0.78 
respectively. These are higher than have been reported for 
the marking of English compositions in the G.C.E. examination 
(Schools Council, 1966), but not as high as experimental mark­
ing procedures reported, in the same publication, based on a 
system of multiple marking recommended by Wiseman (1949, 1956).
When used as criteria of creative thinking, imaginative 
stories would be more reliable if similar multiple marking 
methods were adopted, but with the labour involved and the 
experience needed, multiple marking is not feasible for a 
basic divergent thinking test. Scorer reliabilities in the 
region of 0.75 would consequently indicate too large a source 
of error, arising from scoring alone, to justify their use as 
psychological tests. If this degree of scoring error is
253.
found in the procedures established for the present study, it 
will limit seriously the likelihood of finding relationships 
between the test results and other measures.
This possibility is now to be investigated.
7.2 SCORER RELIABILITY IN THE PRESENT STUDY
Details of the scoring procedures used in this study have 
already been given in the last chapter. They are an attempt 
to provide a system of scoring which would validly reflect the 
qualities of divergent thinking being investigated and it has 
been argued that they should be more valid than some of those 
adopted by other investigators. The first consideration 
however is whether the procedures can maintain the high level 
of scorer reliability reported for other scoring procedures, 
particularly those of Torrance.
The investigation of scorer reliability was conducted 
within a stratified random sample consisting of the scripts 
of 42 pupils chosen from the total population of 11-year-olds 
(main sample).
7.21 Selection of the Sample
A sample of 42 pupils had already been drawn from the 
total population to form the frequency distributions of un­
common responses for the Uses and Consequences Tests, and, 
at first, this was also considered as a possible sample for 
investigating scorer reliability. The marking procedure for 
originality involves two distinct stages however, the drawing 
up of the frequency distribution and the scoring of the 
scripts. Scorer errors and differences of opinion can occur 
at both stages, though the second stage is less likely to
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cause difficulty if the scripts have already been scrutinised 
in order to draw up the frequency distribution. When only a 
sample is used to draw up the distribution however, new 
scripts that have not been used for this purpose can be an 
additional source of disagreement between scorers. If, there­
fore, the sample chosen to assess interscorer reliability was 
identical with the distribution sample, it would reduce the 
possible sources of error and exaggerate the subsequent relia­
bility rating. It was decided, therefore, that a new sample 
would have to be constructed and that this sample should con­
tain only the same proportion of scripts contributing to the 
distribution as would the complete population. With this con­
dition added to the ’stratified’ sampling requirement that 
each school class and sex should be represented by the same 
proportion in the sample as in the whole population, the pup­
ils were randomly chosen using tables of random numbers.
7.22 Procedure
The scripts of each pupil in the sample for each of the 
three tests Uses, Consequences and Circles were marked by two 
independent scorers, the writer (scorer 1) and an university 
student (scorer 2). The whole of the scoring procedure, inc­
luding the drawing up of the frequency distribution on a 
separate sample, was carried out independently by the two 
scorers. The procedures adopted were identical to those used 
in marking the whole population of scripts, except for the 
use of a sample of scripts to draw up the frequency distribu­
tion for Circles. Rather than ask the second scorer to draw 
up a frequency distribution for the whole population, the 
writer carried out the same procedures as the second scorer
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by marking the sample of scripts on the basis of a new fre­
quency distribution constructed from the distribution sample. 
If anything the use of a sample of scripts for constructing 
the frequency distribution is likely to be slightly less 
reliable than using the whole sample so that the procedure 
adopted will not give an overestimate of the scoring reliabi­
lity for the Circles Test.
Before embarking on the scoring the second marker was 
prepared for the task in discussion with the writer. The 
background to divergent thinking tests was discussed, the 
procedures explained, and a set of scored scripts from a pre­
vious study were analysed with their accompanying frequency 
distributions. Both scorers had access to the writer’s list 
of flexibility categories for use with the Circles Test, as 
shown in the Appendix, but the principle explained earlier, 
of awarding new categories to responses which could not readi­
ly be related to the suggested list was adhered to.
7.23 Results and Discussion
Means, standard deviations and coefficients of inter­
scorer reliability for the two scorers are given in Table 6 .
The high coefficients of interscorer reliability more 
than confirm Anastasi’s conclusion that with sufficient pre­
paration such tests can probably be scored with satisfactory 
consistency, and all are greater than the arbitrary level of 
0.90 suggested by Torrance.
The lowest coefficient, 0.91, is for the scoring of ori­
ginality on the Uses Test and though less than the 0.98 values 
reported for the same test by both Wodtke (1963) and Yamamoto 
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reported by Yamamoto (1962). It is higher than many of the 
scorer reliabilities for originality reported by Torrance 
(1974) , though it supports his observation that the scoring 
for originality usually causes the most problems. In Torran­
c e ’s experiments however the poorest of his originality relia­
bilities were in scoring the figurai tests. By contrast the 
Circles Test in the present study had a very high level of 
scorer reliability on all three of the abilities, fluency, 
flexibility and originality
As expected the scorers showed greatest agreement in 
scoring for fluency, reliability coefficients of 0.99 being 
achieved for each test. Even for fluency however the scoring 
is not as objective as some previous researchers have sugges­
ted by reporting coefficients of 1.00 (Yamamoto, 1962). This 
is also indicated by some slight differences in mean scores 
which reflect a tendency of the writer to be more generous 
than the second scorer in awarding credit to doubtful respon­
ses. This tendency is discussed later.
Scoring for flexibility in the present study was con­
fined to the Circles Test, but the coefficient of 0.96 is 
greater than the 0.91 reported for the Circles Test by Yama­
moto, and identical to the 0.96 reported for the same test by 
Wodtke. It lends weight to the arguments of the writer that 
a method of scoring based on previously recognised categories 
but also encouraging the award of separate credit to doubtful 
responses, can be scored consistently. In particular the 
present scoring method stresses that the scorer should not 
feel constrained to place 99% of the responses in the given 
categories as Torrance recommends. In spite of the differen­
ces between the two methods however, they yield very similar
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scorer reliabilities, Torrance, in the experiments reviewed 
earlier, reporting coefficients between 0.94 and 0.98.
This suggests that the error involved in the writer's 
greater reliance on the scorer to judge when to form new cate­
gories, is no greater than that involved in placing responses 
into Torrance's exhaustive list of categories; the latter, 
as illustrated earlier, often being too wide to be precise.
Thé writer's claim to greater validity is not, therefore, 
hampered by a reduction in scorer reliability.
There is also no appreciable difference between the 
scorers in terms of the mean scores for each test, on any of 
the abilities tested. The largest difference is between the 
originality scores for the Uses Test, but although this is 
another indication of the problems of scoring for originality, 
the difference is far from statistically significant. The 
't ' value of the difference is 0.52, corresponding to a pro­
bability that differences as large as or larger than that 
recorded would occur by chance over 60% of the time.
Although when averaged over the whole sample there are 
no significant scorer differences, a scrutiny of the raw 
scores of individual pupils (given in the Appendix) can still 
reveal some quite wide variations between the scorers. A 
number of reasons become apparent after a re-examination of 
the scripts.
One or two random mistakes appeared in the totalling of 
marks and in the allocation of originality weights, but the 
major discrepancies between the scorers were more systematic 
and deserve further comment. They arose from two sources, 
firstly a slightly different interpretation of the principle 
suggested by the writer for deciding when to award marks for
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originality to responses that are nevertheless related in some 
way; and secondly a different degree of tolerance and appre­
ciation of responses that at first sight might appear silly or 
irrelevant.
In general the principles of the scoring procedures sug­
gested by the writer were well grasped by the second scorer, 
though the latter had a tendency to award credit for origina­
lity to individual responses when the writer tended to group 
certain responses together. For example, in allocating ori­
ginality marks for Uses of a newspaper, the writer established 
three categories of response within the general area of use 
'for lining things'. These were 'lining for a bin, bucket etc', 
'lining for drawers, cupboards etc', and 'lining the floor of 
a cage as slip tray to help cleaning'. In addition there was 
a category of 'he-dding to keep dog, cat etc. warm' . The second 
scorer gave more individual credit for responses such as lining 
for 'bin', 'bag', 'box', 'drawer', 'bucket', 'dog basket', and - 
'animal cage', as well as 'lining in general'. In the Circles 
Test responses showing the head of a 'pin', 'nail' or 'drawing 
pin' were grouped together by the writer but 'drawing pin' was 
given separate credit by the second scorer.
It is clear from these examples that no hard and fast 
rule is possible, though in subsequent discussion between the 
scorers closer agreement could usually be reached, both in 
the scoring of individual responses and on the principles 
underlying the scoring procedures. The latter is one area 
that could profitably be included in the "special attention" 
which Torrance (1974) notes "might be given to training in 
scoring for originality".
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The second area of disagreement is a less technical one 
but reveals an important difference between the scorers, 
which, had it been greater, could have called into question 
the validity of the measures. It showed up in the extent to
which the scorers gave credit for responses that at first
sight appeared to be somewhat implausible or even facetious, 
and implied some variation in their basic views of the prin­
ciples underlying the tests. In particular it showed in a 
different appreciation of the principles for scoring relevant 
responses discussed earlier. Although these principles, inc­
luding the need for scores to be in sympathy with the ethos 
of testing divergent thinking, were discussed with the second 
scorer some difference of interpretation was revealed by a 
scrutiny of the marked scripts.
Superficially it might be suggested that the writer sim­
ply adopted a ’lenient' approach and the second scorer a more 
'demanding' one, but the issue is more closely related to the 
nature of responses to divergent thinking tests than this
implies. As argued in discussing the scoring procedures, it
is essential to consider all responses seriously no matter 
how implausible they appear initially.
Some bias between the scorers appeared when their evalua­
tion of responses was discussed in this light. For example, 
responses such as the following for 'Uses of a newspaper', 
involved some different interpretations: to make socks, for
bandages, for milking a cow, draw a line, for patterns, hide 
dead bodies, a funnel, cigarette holder, and grow mustard and 
cress. In fact neither scorer could fathom the relevance of 
'milking a cow', but the writer was more prone to give credit 
for the other responses, seeing some practical relevance in
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each of them. 'To make socks' for example was taken to refer 
to the type of practical use of a newspaper to keep feet warm 
inside Wellington boots, though the second scorer was some­
what sceptical of this interpretation. The difference of 
opinion illustrates the sort of dilemma that faces the scorer 
in having to make a judgement on the basis of such a small 
amount of information. As Wallach and Kogan (1966) point out, 
one of the advantages of an oral format is that it allows the 
scorer to ask pupils to elaborate on ambiguous or doubtful 
ideas, but this is not easy when the tests are set in a 
written form.
When evaluating written responses it is also more tempt­
ing for a scorer to interpret an obscure response as a face­
tious one if it is mis-spelt or badly written, than if presen­
ted as part of a lucid and neatly written statement. To use 
a newspaper to 'mack a skirt' is, for example, a less attrac­
tive response than one which states 'for making imitation 
grass skirts'. Although the responses are essentially alike 
it could be argued that the extra detail conveyed in the 
second deserves extra credit for originality. The better 
presentation inevitably creates a favourable impression on 
the scorer and may well influence his judgement of the quality 
of the basic idea. It has to be recognised that in a written 
form, divergent thinking tests are likely to measure a cer­
tain amount of general verbal ability.
Regan (1976) has also found that divergent thinking abi­
lity, when measured by verbal tests, is partly a reflection 
of the subjects' social class, though this is not so marked 
in the case of figurai tests. Whether or not this is indepen­
dent of the effect of intelligence was not determined in
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Regan’s study, though there was also a strong relationship 
between the divergent thinking tests and the verbal measure 
of I.Q. The latter cannot be completely avoided with written 
divergent tests, but in order to help emphasise their diver­
gent nature it is essential for scorers to appreciate the 
value of ideas implicit in responses which are linguistically 
vague, inaccurate, or unrelated to their own social environ­
ment .
As noted earlier, Torrance (1974) goes as far as to cau­
tion scorers to score "any minimal response which can be rea­
sonably interpreted or identified", and although, on the 
other hand, the writer would warn scorers of the danger of 
using their own imagination to interpret a response, the evi­
dence of the present study reinforces the view that scorers 
should think twice before dismissing responses that are dif­
ficult to interpret.
Many responses become clear if given some extra attention, 
particularly if the scorer has had some experience of the 
problems, and common patterns, of children’s handwriting and 
mis-spelling. For example, one girl, as ’Consequences of no 
need to eat’ gave what appeared to be the following responses: 
"no more feed complates, no more farm or farmers, no more 
growing grops, no lauch Breaks needed, no need for eliets, 
animals would be wondering over the place, no more fannin, 
noone being posisioned". With appropriate insertions of the 
words, crops, lunch, diets, wandering, famine and poisoned, 
the responses take on a much more intelligible and competent 
flavour, though ’feed complates’ is still a mystery!
The writer also found it reasonable to credit responses 
to ’Uses for a newspaper’ such as ’lould spearks’, 'to us as
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cortins’, 'to put shoes on when you ploish them', and 'to put 
potoes peals in'; though he could not interpret 'to make 
Joatare'. For the Circles Test somewhat unintelligible 
objects labelled 'spird', 'plat', 'tadle', 'spy roll' and 
'vunel' could also be interpreted on second thoughts, as 
could the response of 'no prasits' as a consequence of 'having 
no hair'.
It is argued that this 'interpretation' of responses is 
a valid procedure largely because of the degree of obviousness 
that the 'correct' interpretation conveys. This should how­
ever be apparent to others as well as the scorer, lest the 
latter become too disposed to take liberties in interpreting 
others responses. In the opinion of the second scorer there 
was a tendency for the writer to err in this direction at 
times, though generally agreement could be reached between 
the scorers in subsequent discussion. This supports the views 
of a number of researchers, (Wallach and Kogan, 1966; Barker 
Lunn, 1970; Vernon, 1971) that when a large amount of mate­
rial has to be scored, satisfactory consistency can be 
achieved by a number of different scorers if doubtful items 
are resolved by discussion.
7.3 CONCLUSION
Prior to this study the writer was somewhat sceptical of 
the generally high levels of scorer reliability reviewed ear­
lier, and concerned at the limited number of first hand 
reports of scorer reliabilities. Vernon (1971) in his study 
involving the scoring of over 900 pupil-hours of divergent 
test material points out that he omitted "the common practice 
of having each test scored by two persons", partly because of
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costs in time and money, and also because of the quite high 
interscorer reliabilities that have been reported. It is 
likely that this combination of reasons influences many 
researchers to rely on earlier evidence, though with the 
variety of scoring procedures and the inevitable degree of 
subjectivity noted earlier, it is surprising that there have 
not been more investigations of scorer reliability. It is 
also surprising in view of Vernon’s (1971) comments that 
"There are still serious problems in deciding when responses 
are different or unusual", and "It is difficult ... to avoid 
some subjective evaluations".
It appears however that some of the writer’s doubts 
were unfounded and that in spite of the subjective judgements 
involved, Vernon was correct in concluding that in his view 
such judgements are reasonable provided they are applied con­
sistently and openly. The present evidence indicates that 
although making subjective judgements may weigh heavily in 
the mind of scorers, it does not influence the final scores 
as much as might be expected. The results support Hudson’s 
(1966) suggestion that "Where errors or inconsistencies occur, 
these are rarely on a scale to threaten the value of the work 
as a whole".
On the other hand the variations in the scores awarded 
to certain individuals in the present study suggests that if 
information on particular pupils is required their scripts 
should be assessed in consultation with a second scorer when­
ever difficulties of interpretation arise.
In general the overall agreement between the scorers is 
very encouraging, especially considering the inexperience of 
the second scorer. The results show clearly that, although
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the scoring procedures may not be as objective as suggested 
by Cropley (1967) , they are more than sufficient to allow the 




TEST-RETEST R E L IA B IL IT Y  OF TESTS OF DIVERGENT THINKING
8.1 INTRODUCTION
It was suggested in Chapter 1 that internal consistency 
methods are likely to give inflated measures of the reliabi­
lity of divergent tests, and although administratively more 
convenient they should be replaced by test-retest correlations. 
It was also noted that while internal consistency methods are 
almost invariably high, test-retest correlations have often 
been unsatisfactorily low. The latter are now to be investi­
gated for the three divergent tests used in this study.
Alternate forms of each of the tests were administered 
to the main population of 1 1 -year-olds, about one week (± 1 
day) after the initial testing.








Consequences Test (No need to eat)
The re-test analysis was carried out on a stratified ran­
dom sample consisting of the scripts of 65 pupils chosen from 
the whole population (n = 165) . In view of the time involved 
in marking divergent tests this sample was considered large 
enough to give weight to the generality of the results. To 
have tested only this group however would have been to introduce
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considerable variations from the first testing and would also 
have been administratively less convenient. The whole popula­
tion consequently took part in the re-testing, identical pro­
cedures being adopted, as already described in Chapter 5.
This sample was an extension of that constructed for 
assessing interscorer reliability. The latter (n = 42) was 
enlarged by choosing further pupils using random numbers, 
within the same constraints as for the former same. Thus 
each school class and sex contributed the same proportion of 
pupils to the sample as it did to the whole population, and 
the sample also contained the same proportion (one quarter) 
of scripts from the distribution sample (for originality) as 
did the whole population. Of the four pupils eventually 
omitted from the analysis for the reasons given earlier (page 
209) two were members of the sample and the final number was 
therefore reduced to 63 subjects. This reduction was allowed 
to stand, rather than interfere with the procedures already 
adopted for selecting and marking the sample by introducing, 
and marking in isolation, two additional subjects.
Scoring procedures were exactly the same as for the ori­
ginal sample. This meant that in the case of the Squares 
Test the frequency distribution to allocate marks for origina­
lity was drawn up for all 63 members of the sample and the 
same percentage of responses credited as for the Circles Test. 
In scoring the two verbal tests the initial scoring procedure 
entailed using a frequency distribution for allocating origi­
nality marks which was based on a sample of scripts from the 
whole sample. Exactly the same sample was used for the scor­
ing of originality in the retest.
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8.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The test-retest reliability coefficients are presented 
in Table 7.
Fluency Flexibility Originality
Circles Test 0.82 0.70 0.76
Uses Test 0.53 - 0.50
Consequences Test 0.75 - 0.60
Table 7 Test-retest (alternate form) reliabilities (n = 65) 
(Interval between testings = 1 week)
These reliability coefficients can be evaluated in three 
ways, in terms of their improvement over chance in measuring 
divergent abilities, by comparing their values with those of 
other tests of the same type found in previous studies, and in 
terms of the proportion of total score variance which can be 
attributed to variation in true scores. Each of these ways 
will be discussed for the obtained coefficients.
8.21 Level of Reliability
There is no absolute level at which a reliability coeffi­
cient becomes acceptable and any test having significant 
reliability coefficients can provide some improvement over 
pure chance speculation. In the above table for 61 degrees 
of freedom, the values of the correlation coefficient are all 
significant (p < 0.01 for r > 0.33). It is however the size 
of the coefficient rather than its significance which is 
likely to influence decisions about the use of divergent tests. 
The reliabilities of 0.82, 0.70 and 0.76 for Circles and 0.75 
and 0.60 for Consequences would be acceptable for many psy­
chological tests particularly if used as sub-tests in an overall
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battery formed of similar tests. Reliability coefficients 
for sub-tests of the W.I.S.C., even by the split-half method 
are as low as 0.71 (Wechsler, 1949). The coefficients of 
0.53 and 0.50 for the Uses Test however suggest that the 
test is of limited value where individuals are concerned.
Even so, they are not unlike sub-test reliabilities for 
personality scales. Test-retest correlations, after one month, 
for the Extraversion and Neuroticism scales of the Junior 
Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck, S., 1973) range from
0.53 to 0.86 for children of 10, 11 and 12 years of age, and 
similar reliabilities are obtained by Eysenck and Eysenck 
(1973) for the new 'P.Q.' Personality Questionnaire. For 
the latter longer term reliabilities fall a good deal lower, 
down to 0.34, especially for younger children, yet the authors 
conclude that the reliabilities are not so low as to make it 
inadvisable to test young children for group comparison and 
for experimental purposes. They suggest however that as a 
general policy "correlations between personality and achieve­
ment, say, require to be corrected for attenuation before the 
’true' correlations can be properly estimated". The use of 
the correction for attenuation will be discussed later.
Thorndike and Hagan (1969) provide a useful illustration 
of the accuracy of prediction resulting from tests with vary­
ing reliabilities. Supposing that two individuals ’A ’ and 
’B ’ appear at the 75th and 50th percentile respectively after 
one testing, the chance that A will still surpass B if they 
were retested can be calculated from the forecasting efficiency 
of the test. With a reliability of 0.5 there is only a 2:1 
chance that the order will remain as before, and even a relia­
bility of 0.8 gives only a 4:1 chance. For individual assess-
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ment reliability coefficients consequently need to be very 
substantial.
For group prediction however comparatively low reliabi­
lities show a marked improvement over chance. If the scores 
obtained by ’A ’ and ’B ’ were averages of a group of 25 people 
rather than individual scores the chance of a reversal for a 
test with reliability 0.5 is only 1 in 20 and for a reliabi­
lity of 0.70 it is only 1 in 1000.
From the reliabilities in Table 7 it can be suggested
that divergent thinking tests can play a consistent role in
making decisions about groups though their use in identifying 
individuals is more doubtful particularly if just one test 
such as 'Uses' is adopted. Reliability is very like to inc­
rease however if the individual test scores were summed to 
form a composite divergent score. Whether the factorial 
structure of the correlations between divergent tests and 
their relationship with other variables makes them suitable 
for use in a composite score will be investigated later.
8.22 Comparison with other Studies
In spite of the comparatively low reliability of the 
Uses Test, the reliabilities are, overall, quite encouraging 
when compared with some previous researches. It should be 
recognised however that the range of ability in the present 
study maximises the chance of attaining high reliabilities.
In Dewing's (1970) study, already reviewed, the children 
were considerably above average in I.Q., and a year older 
than the children in this study, but her use of the Circles 
and Uses Tests provides a direct comparison. The reliabili­
ties obtained by Dewing for each of the school populations
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range 0.55 to 0.85 mean 0.69 




range 0.24 to 0.73 mean 0.52 
range 0.06 to 0.67 mean 0.39
Table 8 Test-retest Reliabilities (6 -week interval)
(from Dewing, 1970)
Considering that reliabilities are reduced when the range 
of ability is diminished and when the time between testings is 
lengthened. Dewing's mean reliabilities are quite consistent 
with those obtained in this study. The wide range of values, 
however, particularly for originality in the Uses Test, is 
somewhat disconcerting. More reliance could be placed on low 
and consistent reliabilities than highly fluctuating ones 
with only a very moderate mean value. Like those in this 
study Dewing's reliabilities are higher for the Circles Test, 
and for fluency as compared to originality. This is a common 
pattern in other studies. Yamamoto (1962) obtained reliabi­
lities of 0.76, 0.63 and 0.79 for the Circles Test (fluency, 
flexibility and originality respectively), and 0.75, 0.60 and
0.64 for the same abilities on the Uses Test, though the popu­
lation was considerably older, student teachers, and smaller, 
n = 22, than that in this study. Torrance (1974) reports 
similar values though usually for composite batteries of tests 
rather than for individual tests, and most frequently for high 
school or college students. Elsewhere however Torrance reports 
on a test-retest study with 118 5th grade children of similar 
age to those in this study and with an identical one-week
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interval (Torrance and Aliotti, 1969). Summing the scores 
for each ability, such as fluency, across the verbal and 
figurai sub-tests the figurai reliabilities ranged from 0.71 
to 0.85, and the verbal reliabilities from 0.84 to 0.93. The 
former are very similar to those reported here though the
latter even allowing for the effect of summing across tests
are considerably higher. The trend for high figurai than 
verbal reliabilities is also reversed.
In a smaller study with a similar time interval and 5th 
grade children, Hagender (1967) obtained the following relia­
bilities :
Verbal fluency (0.87) Figurai fluency (0.50)
Verbal flexibility (0.84) Figurai flexibility (0.63)
Verbal originality (0.79) Figurai originality (0.60)
The magnitude of the correlations is not unlike those obtained 
here, but once again there is a reversal between verbal and 
figurai values, the verbal tests having similar reliabilities 
to the writer’s figurai test and vice versa. Each coefficient 
however is once again for a composite score across all the 
tests in Torrance's battery rather than for a single test.
Much lower reliabilities were obtained by Wodtke (1963) 
both for individual tests and for his combined battery based 
on Torrance's tests though the interval is one of 6 months. 
Wodtke's values, based on groups of between 100 and 150 chil­
dren in both the 4th and 5th grades, range, as noted in Chap­
ter 1, from 0.03 to 0.62 for the non-verbal sub-tests and 
from 0.21 to 0.74 for the verbal tests. Reliability coeffi­
cients obtained by Wodtke for the tests investigated here 




(n = 105 
to 1 2 0)
(Grade 5 
children) 
(n = 132 
to 147)
Fluency 0.60 0.61








Table 9 Test-retest Reliabilities - over 6 months
(from Wodtke, 1963)
Although the overall level is considerably lower, the 
pattern of Wodtke's results for these three tests is similar 
to the writer’s. The Uses Test is the least reliable and the 
Circles Test, overall, the highest.
Wodtke considered that the higher reliabilities for the 
Circles Test may have resulted from the fact that identical 
forms of the test were used, there being no alternate form 
published by Torrance at that time. Even with the alternate 
form 'Squares’ used in this study, the Circles Test is clearly 
the most reliable of the three tests used, and alternative 
explanations to that of Wodtke can be offered.
The most obvious explanation is that the variation is 
caused by different abilities being demanded by the tests, 
though the question of interest and motivation also needs to 
be considered. Children obviously enjoyed doing the Circles 
Test (and its alternative form) and frequently asked the writer 
to allow them to continue after the fifteen minutes allowed.
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This applied right across the ability range, and the contin­
ued enthusiasm for the alternative form indicates that moti­
vation can be sustained when retesting with this test. The 
writer feared in fact that the children's enjoyment of the 
test might mean that the responses could be so easily made 
that the test would fail to differentiate between individuals. 
The high correlation between 'Circles' and 'Squares' however 
suggests the opposite, some individuals consistently perform­
ing at a more fluent, flexible and original level than others.
The enthusiasm for the Consequences Test was less marked, 
though the procedure of giving each test separately and insert­
ing it as another 'enjoyable activity' into the normal lessons, 
given by the class teacher, meant that the children appeared 
to react positively to each of the tests.
In dealing with 'implications' however the Consequences 
Test might demand more of the children's reasoning ability 
than the other two tests, and considering the range of ability 
in this study its consistency might owe something to its rela­
tionship with intelligence.
The Uses Test appeared to be somewhere between the other 
two tests in its level of popularity and this also appears to 
be true of its level of difficulty. As noted earlier it is 
the most common of all divergent tests, and in view of this 
its reliability is disappointing. With similar evidence from 
other studies, this may have to be regarded as realistic in 
the present stage of development of divergent tests.
The reliabilities for the Circles and Consequences Tests 
however are not unlike those reported for established tests. 
Though retest reliabilities for I.Q. tests are generally in 
the 0.80's and 0.90's (Anastasi, 1968) retest correlations
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for the sub-scales are often lower; Derner, Aborn and Canter 
(1950) for example reported reliabilities for the Wechster- 
Bellavue sub-tests as low as 0.64. For personality scales 
the reliabilities are markedly lower. For the extraversion 
and neuroticism dimensions of the Junior Eysenck Personality 
Inventory test-retest reliabilities calculated for separate 
age groups range from 0.51 to 0.91, the overall reliabilities 
for E and N being 0.6o and 0.75 for boys and 0.67 and 0.74 
for girls respectively (Eysenck, 1973). In comparison, the 
reliabilities of 0.82, 0.70 and 0.76 for the Circles Test and
0.75 and 0.60 for the Consequences Test are quite encouraging, 
and though not particularly high in absolute terms, suggest 
that the tests deserve investigation in relation to other 
variables. The statistical limitations on any such relation­
ship will be looked at later in this chapter.
8.23 Levels of Performance from Test to Retest
Although alternate forms are not identical to the initial 
tests, a comparison of level of performance from one testing 
to another can still indicate consistency of performance, and 
may cast further light on any difference in overall motivation 
from one session to another. Means and standard deviations of 
each test and its alternative form are given in the following 
table (Table 10).
There appears to be little indication of any reduction 
in motivation for the retesting. For both the Uses and Conse­
quences Tests mean scores for fluency are increased and for 
the Circles Test they are almost identical on the two occa­
sions. This information, however, should be interpreted in 
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retest performance and the amount of dispersion of the scores 
indicated by the standard deviation.
The standard deviation for fluency is greater for each 
of the alternate forms of the tests, very significantly so 
for the Consequences Test and nearing significance for the 
Uses Test. Children who are most fluent at the Consequences 
Test on the first occasion consequently tend to do even better 
at the second attempt while the reverse is true for those who 
do not score well in the initial testing. To some extent this
is also true for the Uses Test. This finding is consistent
with the writer’s suggestion that the Consequences Test makes 
more demands on children's thinking than the other tests and
is likely to receive less effort from some of the pupils on
retesting. Whether or not this implies a greater degree of 
correlation with intelligence will be investigated later when 
the factor structure of the tests will be looked at in rela­
tion to other variables.
In the case of the Circles Test the standard deviation is 
not significantly different and for flexibility it is slightly 
reduced, as in the mean score. The originality score however 
is much increased together with the degree of variation. This 
is also true for the Consequences Test. In this case the 
conclusion made for the fluency performance on the Consequences 
Test is not applicable as the significant increase in variation 
is accompanied by an increase in mean score. This pattern, 
together with the correlation between first and second testings 
suggests that divergent thinking behaves like most abilities 
in showing an overall increase after practice, but also a pre­
servation of relative ranking. This is a typical finding when
I.Q.'s are retested over a short interval, as illustrated by
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Mean s , d. Mean s , d. Mean s.d.
1st occasion 101.46 12.77 101.62 12.61 104.14 11.67
2nd occasion 105.34 14.32 103.97 14.36 107.46 12.62
’t ’ value of 
difference 2.04** 1.04 1.85*
’F ’ ratio of 
variances 1.26 1.30 1.17
* * 
*
Significant at 5% (2-tail test) 
Significant at 10% (2-tail test)
Table 11 Test-retest performance for alternate forms of 
• the Moray House U.R.Q. test (interval two months)
On retesting there is a significant increase in I.Q. in two out 
of three of the groups and, though not statistically signifi­
cant, the standard deviation is also enlarged in all three 
cases. The pattern of originality scores for the divergent 
tests is very like this though it is slightly complicated by 
the significant increase in variance. While some increase in 
variation to accompany the increase in mean score is to be 
expected it may also be due in part to variation in motiva­
tion, particularly in the case of the fluency score for the 
Consequences Test.
In the case of convergent tests retesting can be compli­
cated by memory or practice effects, though with the pressures 
on pupils to face up to a ’test’, motivation is generally 
assumed to remain reasonably uniform. The open-ended nature 
of divergent tests however relies a great deal on the indivi­
dual’s motivation, and there are some suggestions in the
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present evidence that the initial testing experience may have 
differentially affected the children’s approach to the second 
testing. This possibility deserves further study. Some rele­
vant evidence may arise from the final part of this study when 
divergent thinking performance will be looked at in relation 
to other variables including measures of attitude and persona­
lity.
Apart from the slight evidence that divergent ability 
depends on affective as well as cognitive factors the overall 
pattern of reliability coefficients, means and standard devia­
tions are not unlike those that would be expected from most 
cognitive variables.
8.24 Reliability Coefficients and Distribution of Variance
The level of reliability however varies between tests 
and for each test places a limit on any possible relationship 
with other variables or validity criteria. This aspect will 
be clarified by looking at the amount of error variance and 
’true’ variance in the test scores, and will have to be borne 
in mind when appraising correlations obtained with divergent 
measures later in this study.
As outlined in Chapter 1, reliability coefficients can 
be interpreted directly in terms of the percentage of variance 
attributable to true scores and that due to error; the sour­
ces of the latter depending on the method used to determine 
reliability.
Combining the results from the assessment of alternate- 
form reliability and scorer reliability, an estimation of 
error variance in divergent thinking scores can be made to 
cover errors over time, content and scoring. This is illus­
trated in the following diagram for the best and worst results 
obtained.
280.
(i) Circles Test r.. = 0.82. Scorer reliability r = 0.99ZZ S 1S 2
True variance = 81 Error variance = 19%
■ ■ ■ ■ ■  J L
81%
Fluctuations over 







(ii) Uses Test r^^ = 0.50. Scorer reliability r^ = 0.91
True variance Error variance
Fluctuations over time Scoring
41% and Content sampling variation
50% 9%
(Not to scale)
Fig.7. Percentage distribution of variance for the 
Circles Test (fluency) and the Uses Test (originality)
The greatest amount of error variance in the present tests 
is therefore 59% and the least 19%. Unfortunately an inconsis­
tent test cannot be a good predictor as the error portion of 
the test score will not correlate with any criterion. Conse­
quently, the greater the error variance the lower any validity 
coefficient is likely to be. Theoretically a test cannot 
correlate with any outside variable more highly than it would 
with a ’true' measure of itself. The theoretical correlation 
of a test with ’true’ scores, free from chance errors, known 
as the test’s index of reliability, is the square root of the 
reliability coefficient, i.e. equals / r ^  (Cronbach, 1970). 
Correlations of the test with any other variable or criterion 
measure (r^^) , must therefore be less than or equal to /r ^ , 
that is,
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Taking a coefficient of reliability based on the amount 
of true variance illustrated above, the highest possible 
correlation of the Circles Test with any other measure is 
/0.80 = 0.89, and for the Uses Test /0.42 = 0.65. While 
chance association of errors could inflate these theoretical 
maxima it is extremely unlikely provided the initial reliabi­
lity estimates are realistic.
Adopting the test-retest method with alternate-forms over 
an interval of time provides the most rigorous method for 
assessing reliability and with the addition of error variance 
due to scorer variation, it is possible that the above results 
may overestimate the error term. In scoring divergent tests 
some error in scoring is likely to appear even with the same 
scorer, and this is already included in the test-retest assess­
ment. On the other hand the scoring procedures laid down for 
the present study resulted in a high level of agreement bet­
ween scorers, while an inexperienced scorer can find some 
difficulty in applying Torrance's scoring guide reliably.
(See for example Regan, 1976.)
Whatever modifications could be made to the reliability 
estimates calculated above, they nevertheless fall well 
within the range of reported test-retest reliabilities and 
contrast markedly with those reliability estimates arrived 
at from internal consistency methods which, as noted in Chap­
ter 1, are typically in excess of 0.85 (Wallach and Kogan,
1966; Cropley and Maslany, 1969; Zegas, 1976). Wallach and 
Kogan’s split-half reliability for the fluency score for 'Uses’ 
for example is 0.93 suggesting a limit of /O.93 = 0.96 for 
correlations with other variables.
In the latter case failure to find a relationship of any
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magnitude with say, intelligence can then be interpreted as 
compelling evidence for discriminant validity. On the other 
hand if this internal measure of reliability is spuriously 
high, as it seems to be, then as Cronbach (1970) points out, 
how correlations of divergent tests with other variables can 
be attributed to their low reliabilities.
It would be difficult to fully justify this suggestion 
for the Circles Test or even the Consequences Test, but it is 
a realistic assessment of the Uses Test.
While discriminant validity demonstrated for tests of 
divergent thinking may, therefore, be partly a statistical 
artifact, the same may be true for any lack of convergent or 
criterion related validity. The true variance associated 
with the Uses Test is not sufficient for a very high level of 
correlation to appear with any other variable and what does 
appear may therefore be given less attention than it really 
deserves. It is rather like a type I error in testing a null 
hypothesis, one may be overlooking an important relationship 
by demanding too high a level of significance.
Having established the reliability of the divergent tests 
used here, it will be possible to make an allowance for the 
known proportion of error variance, and to estimate the cor­
relation with other variables which would be likely to arise 
if the tests were perfectly reliable. This correction for 
the reduction or attenuation of correlation coefficients due 
to unreliability in test scores will be applied later in this 




The test-retest (alternate form) reliability coefficients 
reported in Table 7 have been looked at in three main ways.
It has been suggested that the size of the coefficients, which 
varied from 0.82 for the Circles Test (fluency) to 0.50 for 
the Uses Test (originality) are sufficient to indicate that 
divergent thinking tests can play a consistent role in making 
decisions about groups of children, though their use in iden­
tifying individuals is more doubtful. Unfortunately the test 
most often used to differentiate between convergers and diver­
gers, the Uses Test, has the lowest reliability and results 
using this test should be treated with some caution.
Although internal consistency estimates of reliability 
are frequently in the region of 0.90 the present test-retest 
coefficients are considerably lower, though in accord with 
those reported by other studies of test-retest reliability.
The writer suggests that the latter method gives a more 
realistic estimate of the reliability of divergent tests.
In general the pattern of correlations, means and stan­
dard deviations wasssimilar to that which would be expected 
of most cognitive variables, though an increase in variabi­
lity on some measures suggests that test-retest reliability 
for divergent tests may be complicated by the introduction of 
motivational effects, not only in prefering certain tests, 
such as Circles, but in the way different children react to a 
retest situation.
Reliability has finally been looked at in terms of the 
percentage of variance attributable to ’true’ scores and that 
due to errors. Correlations with other variables can only be 
done to the amount of non-error variance possessed by a test
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and this needs to be recognised when correlations of diver­




LONG-TERM STABIL ITY  OF DIVERGENT THINKING
9.1 BACKGROUND
In July 1969, in a previous study (Richards, 1970), 
several divergent thinking tests were given to 265 11-year- 
old children from three Primary Schools in the North of 
England.
Two of these schools were on the outskirts of a large 
city, and the third in the suburbs of a nearby town. The 
latter had placed special emphasis on mathematics teaching 
for over four years and was the ’experimental’ school for the 
purpose of that study, while the former two schools, similar 
in most other respects were used for comparison.
Apart from the special attention given to mathematics in 
the one school, the children as a group formed a very repre­
sentative sample of the whole population of the area. Exclu­
ding the children from the experimental school, the remaining 
sample is even more typical, and these 173 children form a 
natural group of reasonable size for a follow-up study. Even 
with the reduction in numbers to be expected over a period of 
five years, the final sample should be large enough to be 
amenable to statistical analysis and to give some weight to 
the generality of the results. Details of the age, I.Q. and 
social class of the children as initially found in their two 
schools are given in Table 12.
The problem in any educational study and in long term 
studies in particular is that results are influenced by an 
infinite number of variables having a differential effect on 
the individuals being studied. Most of these variables are
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School A School B
Number of pupils 102 71
Mean age (s.d. in parenthesis) lly 3.8m lly 3.6m
(at 1st July 1969) (3. 3m) (3. 6m)




Registrar-General’s I/II 12 17
Classification III 65 64
IV/V 23 19
Table 12 Details of Initial Sample (1969) n = 173
beyond the control or even the knowledge of the researcher. 
Pupils’ aspirations, attitudes, interests, relationships with 
parents and teachers, dègrèe'o'f'support and encouragement, 
home background, and so on, all vary so enormously that one 
might be dubious about finding consistent patterns of persona­
lity or ability over any length of time.
The fact that some abilities such as intelligence do 
appear to be stable over long periods in spite of variations 
in people’s experiences gives weight to their psychological, 
social and educational significance. The wider the range of 
some ability in a population however, the more likely it is 
to be detectable after some length of time, and if, as in the 
case of I.Q. measurements, they are themselves responsible 
for different treatment being given to high and low scorers, 
the stability is open to objections as being a self-fulfilling 
index rather than an underlying trait. The answer is likely 
to be a matter of degree, though it is obvious that in the 
case of I.Q., variations in pupils’ experiences, particularly 
in different types of schools are likely to enhance rather 
than diminish its long-term stability. Any study of the
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reliability of I.Q. tests should therefore look closely at 
the nature of the sample used, especially if it constituted 
a collection of sub-groups selected on the basis of the 
variable being investigated.
With divergent thinking abilities the situation is some­
what different. At Primary School level it has been sugges­
ted that different types of teaching styles can be identified 
(Gardner, 1966; Bennett and Jordan, 1975) and that such dif­
ferences in approach can affect children’s divergent thinking 
abilities (Haddon and Lytton, 1968) . In the Secondary School 
however Lytton and Cotton (1969) found it impossible to iden­
tify any homogeneous teaching patterns, and concluded that 
the variation in styles adopted by individual teachers result 
in there being no readily identifiable situational affect at 
the secondary stage.
Although over the whole range of intelligence there is 
inevitably some correlation between divergent thinking and
I.Q. scores, especially in the verbal tests, any sample with 
a restricted I.Q. range is likely to have a considerable mix 
of divergent abilities. It is unlikely therefore that any 
long-term stability of divergent thinking abilities will be 
due to differential effects of school groups selected by I.Q. 
or academic ability.
In contrast to I.Q. therefore, it appears that divergent 
thinking abilities are unlikely to be systematically influen­
ced by teaching methods or organisation in the secondary 
school, and it is feasible to investigate their stability 
over the whole population suggested. Any subsequent evidence 
for reliability over a long period of time will be all the 
more significant.
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Following the raising of the school leaving age, none of 
the children tested in 1.969 could leave school before the 
Easter of the school year in which they became sixteen, i.e. 
Easter 1974. It was decided therefore to try to make arrange­
ments to carry out the follow-up testing during the school 
year 1973-74. Having obtained the permission and guidance of 
the Local Education Authority most of the children were 
traced to one Grammar School and one Bi-lateral School. After 
an interval of nearly five years it was satisfying to locate 
150 of the original 173 pupils within these two schools.
The exercise was not without its traumas however as the 
school containing the largest proportion of the children was 
the last school visited out of four possible schools. In 
fact, after two schools had been visited, only one pupil had 
been traced. Including this pupil, who was allowed to join 
one of the testing sessions in another school, a total of 151 
children out of the original 173 were eventually traced. Of 
these 139 were present and able to attend for the subsequent 
testing. Details of this final sample are shown in Table 13.
Number 139 (63 boys, 76 girls)
Mean Age (s.d.) 15y 9.8m (3.47m)
Mean I.Q. (s.d.) 101.51 (12.00)
Table 13 Details of Final Sample
It is important to consider whether the reduction of 
about 18% from the original sample is a random one across all 
ages and abilities or whether it introduces some systematic 
bias into the sample. In the only other comparable study 
reported in this country (Haddon and Lytton, 1971) a close 
scrutiny of the data reveals a bias in the sample which was
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not discussed by the writers. In an earlier study, Haddon 
and Lytton (1968) noted that in 1965, "211 children, 11-12 
years old, were tested and the whole ability range in the 
schools was covered". In 1969 "as many as possible of the 
initial sample were traced to their secondary schools where 
they had completed three years and two terms" (Haddon and 
Lytton, 1971). Of the original 211 children, 151 were traced, 
who had then "attained, or nearly attained the statutory 
school leaving age". What the writers do not comment on is 
that out of the 25% who could not be traced a large propor­
tion would no doubt have exercised their option and already 
left school. It is also likely that these pupils would have 
been the less academically able group and the resulting sample 
would not have covered the whole range of ability present in 
the 11-year-old sample. The mean I.Q. and age of the new 
sample was not given, though of the 148 children finally tes­
ted, 52 came from Grammar Schools and 96 from Secondary Modern 
Schools - over 35% from Grammar Schools.
Comparing the age and I.Q. of the initial and final sam­
ples in this study indicates that the reduction in numbers 
has not affected the overall balance of the sample, the mean
I.Q.’s being almost identical and the standard deviation being 
only slightly reduced. The testing took place in early 
January 1974, four years and six months after the original 
testing and the mean age (less four years, six months) is, 
like I.Q., almost identical in the two samples. The findings 
confirm the results of the writer’s general enquiries into 
the educational progress of children in the area over the 
five years in question. There was nothing to suggest that 
the children who could not be traced came from any particular
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group; there had, for example, been no marked change in hou­
sing conditions, such as large scale demolition; or in the 
employment situation, such as factory close-down, and the 
regulations governing school leaving ensured that none of the 
children concerned could officially leave school before the 
Easter following the testing. Some of the absentees may have 
considered themselves as unofficial leavers, but there were 
absentees from both Grammar and Secondary pupils, and apart 
from this possible explanation for the slight reduction in 
variance there was no marked effect on the final sample.
9.2 TESTS AND PROCEDURES
9.21 Divergent Tests
The three divergent tests investigated in this study.
Uses, Consequences and Circles, were chosen, as described in 
Chapter 5, partly because of their widespread use in other 
investigations and partly because of their prior inclusion in 
earlier work of the writer. In this follow-up study they 
were administered in an identical format and with the same 
time limits as in 1969. Details of the tests and the scoring 
procedures have already been given and the tests themselves 
are reproduced in the Appendix. When discrepancies arose 
between the present recommendations for scoring (adopted with 
the new 11-year-old investigation) and that applied in 1969, 
the latter were adopted. This occurred mainly in the percen­
tage of uncommon responses credited with originality marks 
and has already been detailed when scoring for originality 
was discussed in Chapter 6.
The Circles Test was scored for fluency, flexibility and 
originality and the two verbal tests for fluency and originality.
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The distinction between figurai and verbal scores has been 
maintained throughout, though the three figurai and four ver­
bal measures were standardised and added to give additional 
composite scores for figurai and verbal measures of divergent 
thinking. This was carried out for the data from both the 
11-year-olds and 15-year-olds. In the 1969 investigation the 
Uses Test was also scored for flexibility, but this score 
correlated 0.95 with the fluency score and was omitted from 
the retesting procedures.
9.22 Intelligence Tests
Two intelligence tests, Moray House Verbal Reasoning 
Test 81, and Test 82 (1968) had been given in 1969 as part of 
the County’s 11-year-old transfer procedure, and the results 
had been made available to the writer. In view of the impor­
tant part that intelligence might play in divergent test per­
formance its effect will be investigated. To sum the two 
I.Q. scores to give an average I.Q. for each child however 
would increase its reliability and its predictive effects, 
and the intelligence score adopted here is therefore that of 
the first test (designated as I.Q.l in the 1969 investigation).
9.23 Administration
The pupils were located in three main buildings, the 
grammar school, and two separate parts of the bi-lateral school. 
One testing session, involving 40 minutes of testing time took 
place in each school, the pupils being allowed out of their 
normal classes. In two cases the sessions took place in a 
working area of the school library, and in the third in the 
school hall.
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All three sessions were administered by the writer, 
though in the case of that in the school hall the deputy 
headmaster, who had arranged the seating, was also in evidence. 
Adopting an encouraging manner the writer introduced the test­
ing by reading informally the following ’introduction’ which 
appeared on the test booklet:
This is not an examination, it is part of a 
SURVEY to find out how good pupils are at 
thinking up new and interesting ideas.
Some years ago a similar survey was carried 
out in junior schools and most of you were 
involved then, now we want to see how you do 
when you are older.
There are no right or wrong answers so write 
down as many ideas as you can think of.
Work quickly, each part will be timed.
If you need more space continue your answers 
opposite on the back of the previous page.
DO NOT TURN OVER UNTIL YOU ARE TOLD.
Each test was introduced separately as described in Chap­
ter 5, and the complete testing booklet is reproduced in the 
Appendix.
Having located and gathered the pupils together it was 
tempting to widen the scope of the investigation. Even for 
the procedures adopted here however the writer had caused 
considerable upheaval in the schools, the pupils being spread 
over a range of classes and subjects. With C.S.E. and ’0 ’ 
levels less than a term away, and a number of visits already
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having taken place to set up the arrangements, it might have 
interfered with the cooperative way in which the present 
investigation took place, had the writer attempted any exten­
sion. It would not be impossible however to locate the pupils 
again at some future point in their careers.
9.3 RESULTS
9.31 Introduction
Complete data for each of the 139 pupils, including their 
sex (63 boys, 76 girls) and whether they were in ’grammar’ or 
’secondary’ streams is available from the writer. It has been 
suggested that unlike considerations of the stability of 
intelligence, the effect on divergent thinking of types of 
school and internal organisation is not likely to be systema­
tic and the results are pooled for this investigation.
Whether to combine the data for boys and girls is a more open 
question.
Cronbach (1968) argues that until definite trends to the 
contrary are suggested it is more profitable to consider 
children’s thinking abilities in a combined population. With 
the exception of Vernon (1972) previous researches have often 
remarked on the similarity between the sexes on divergent 
performance (e.g. Cropley and Maslay, 1969; Dewing, 1970; 
Bennett, 1973). Others have conventionally adopted combined 
populations (e.g. Haddon and Lytton, 1971; Hargreaves and 
Bolton, 1972). While the inclusion of personality variables 
would incline the writer to Vernon’s view, only cognitive 
variables are included in this section. Measures taken to 
look at this question more closely will be returned to shortly.
Overall the statistical nature of the data is such that
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the total number of cases (n = 139) can be regarded as a 
fairly large sample, the scores for the same test constitute 
independent pairs, they are essentially continuous, and they 
result in unimodal distributions which are sufficiently sym­
metrical not to undermine the assumption of a linear relation­
ship between the variables which underlies the use of the 
Pearson product-moment coefficient of correlation. Both zero- 
order Pearson product-moment coefficients and first-order 
partial coefficients will be calculated to express this rela­
tionship.
Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations between 
the variables are given in the Appendix and these will be 
extracted for discussion where appropriate.
To help clarify the question of sex differences a nominal 
dichotomous variable (boy 0, girl 1) was also included in the 
correlation analysis purely on an exploratory basis. At least 
with only two categories such a distribution lends itself to 
questions of linear correlation more appropriately than a three 
category variable, but no claims are being made for precise 
levels of the correlations obtained. Its use however revealed 
an interesting variation in boy/girl effects on the variables 
under discussion which was felt worthy of further investigation.
9.32 Sex Differences in Divergent Thinking - 1969 and 1974
The following table (Table 14) presents the pattern of 




















Uses I Flu. 0.21 Uses II Flu. 0.27
(1969) Orig. 0.11 (1974) Orig. 0.18





Table 14 Pattern of Tentative Correlations of 
Divergent Tests and I.Q. with Subjects’ Sex 
(boy 0, girl 1)
Values of r > 0.174 are significant at 5% for 125 degrees 
of freedom and give an indication of the likely significance 
of the above correlations. Only five out of the fifteen 
coefficients exceed this value and they form a clearly sepa­
rate group from the other correlations which are well below 
this level. They are also distinguishable in psychological 
terms, deriving from the fluency scores for the verbal diver­
gent tests. Uses and Consequences, in both 1969 and 1974, 
and the verbal originality score for Uses in 1974.
Had there been an equal correlation with the verbal Intel 
ligence quotient it would have been tempting to explain this 
effect in terms of verbal reasoning superiority of girls.
The correlation with intelligence however is small and non­
significant, a fact that is borne out by the following mean 
I.Q.’s of the boys and girls separately.
(i) Boys n = 63 Mean I.Q. = 100.25 (s.d. = 11.3)
(ii) Girls n = 76 Mean I.Q. = 102.55 (s.d. = 12.5)
(No significant difference, t = 1.14)
While the slight I.Q. superiority of the girls is likely
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to be part of the explanation for their superior performance 
on some of the verbal divergent thinking measures, the latter 
may also reflect a more persistent effort by girls when 
written responses are required.
The effect of intelligence will be controlled for later, 
but in the meantime the consistent differences in performance 
between the sexes on the verbal fluency scores from 1969 to 
1974 could result in any long-term stability being interpre­
ted as a consistent boy/girl group difference in divergent 
thinking rather than as a matter of individual ability.
This will depend on the level of stability reported, but 
even though the correlations with sex are not great, they 
raise sufficient doubts to suggest that long-term stability 
should be investigated within each sex as well as in the 
whole population.
9.33 Long-term Test-retest Reliabilities 1969-1974
9.331 Pearson product-moment correlations were there­
fore calculated between the results obtained in 1969 and 
1974, for boys and girls separately and for the whole sample. 
Coefficients of stability for the seven divergent thinking 
measures, for combined scores for each test, and for an 
overall verbal score, are reported in Table 15. Combined 
scores were arrived at by standardising and adding the indi­
vidual scores for each pupil.
The table as a whole provides quite an impressive set 
of reliabilities after 4J years. The highest coefficient,
0.57, is for the combined score of the two verbal tests, 
though all the coefficients, including those for the separate 
sexes, are greater or equal to 0.35.
Although there are some slight variations between the
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sexes they are not consistently in either direction. While 
the reliabilities for the Uses Test (fluency), for example, 
are 0.35 (boys) and 0.47 (girls), the corresponding values 
for the Consequences Test are 0.48 (boys) and 0.35 (girls).
The level of long-term stability is in fact very similar for 
both boys and girls and the overall coefficients cannot 
therefore be interpreted simply as a measure of group differ­
ences between the sexes.
The coefficients for the whole population, while simi­
lar in magnitude to those from the single sex groups, are 
more significant due to the increase in the number of degrees 
of freedom. The single sex coefficients are all significant 
p < 0.01, but those from the combined population are signifi­
cant at the 0.001 level. Adopting Cronbach’s (1968) recom­
mendation to combine data from the sexes unless there are 
substantial grounds for not doing so, the stability coeffi­
cients will therefore be looked at more closely for the popu­
lation as a whole.
9.332 Comparison with Previous Researches
Direct comparisons are possible with the researches of 
Haddon and Lytton (1971) and Cropley and Clapson (1971), 
noted earlier, both studies having looked at the stability 
of divergent tests over a similar 4 to 5 year period between 
the ages of 11 and 17.
Cropley and Clapson reported reliabilities for the 
Circles and Consequences Tests, for a sample of 110 seventeen- 
year-olds, five years after the initial testing. Cropley’s 
scoring procedure has been discussed earlier and although he 
used only an originality score in the above study it is very
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similar to that adopted here. He also compared both boys and 
girls separately and together. While Cropley applied some 
correction for restriction of range (the mean I.Q. of the 
sample was 119) the present sample is representative of a 
complete ability range. The parallel results between this 
study and that of Cropley are compared below in Table 16.
Circles Consequences





0.48 0.40 0.44 
(n=57) (n=53) (n=110)
0.48 0.37 0.41
0.58 0.33 0.45 
(n=57) (n=53) (n=110)
0.41 0.37 0.40
(n=63) (n=76) (n=139) (n=63) (n=76) (n=139)
Table 16 A Comparison of Long-term Reliabilities 
for the Circles and Consequences Tests scored for Originality
There is a remarkable degree of similarity between these 
results and this adds considerably to the confidence that can 
be placed in them. The findings of isolated experiments are 
naturally treated with a good deal of caution and it is 
encouraging to find independent investigations yielding simi­
lar results.
Although Cropley’s coefficients are slightly higher than 
those in the present study the numbers in his experiment are 
smaller and the net result is that the results of the present 
study are slightly more significant.
All the coefficients are significant at the 1% level 
except for that of the Consequences Test for girls in Cropley’s 
study which is significant at 5%.
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A comparison with Haddon and Lytton’s (1971) investiga­
tion is also possible (Table 17) though their composite figu­
rai and verbal scores are arrived at from a variety of scor­
ing procedures, discussed earlier in Chapter 6, and from two 
figurai tests and three verbal tests. One of the figurai 
tests, however, was the Circles Test, and one of the verbal 
tests ’Uses’, and this improves the comparability of the 
results. Haddon and Lytton’s final population consisted of 
148 children first tested at 11 years of age and again four 
years later.
Figurai Verbal
(n = 148) 
Haddon and Lytton (1971) 0.41 0.57
(n = 139) 
The present study 0.49 0.57
Table 17 A Comparison of Long-term Reliabilities 
for Figurai and Verbal Tests of Divergent Thinking
Once again Table 17 shows a very high level of agreement 
and gives weight to the generality of the present results. 
There seems little doubt that divergent thinking has a very 
consistent, if moderate, degree of long-term stability.
The values of the coefficients are lower than those of 
Dalbec (1966), but her 3-year reliabilities of 0.59, 0.35, 
and 0.73 for the fluency, flexibility and originality scores 
of Torrance’s tests, were obtained with a population of 
college students (n = 43), and considering her more mature 
population and smaller numbers the difference is not as marked 
as appears at first sight.
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Although the present stability coefficients are not high, 
the property of stability, as pointed out in Chapter 1, should 
be associated with the underlying trait rather than the test 
itself, and the coefficients should not be evaluated in direct 
comparison with short-term reliabilities. For established 
tests of mental abilities the latter, as noted earlier, usu­
ally fall in the 0.80’s and 0.90’s (Anastasi, 1968), but these 
should not be used as a yard-stick to judge long-term data.
As noted in Chapter 1 test-retest reliability usually 
decreases as the interval between testing gets larger.
Cronbach (1970) retesting 200 y-year-old children reported 
reliabilities for the Stanford-Binet scale of 0.91 after one 
week reducing to 0.74 over four years and 0.68 after eleven 
years. Also reporting on the Stanford-Binet scale, Thorndike 
and Hagan (1969) present somewhat lower retest correlations.
In comparison with I.Q. assessed at around 17 years of age,
I.Q. assessed two years earlier correlated in the region 0.70 
to 0.80, tests taken from three to six years earlier around 
0.60 and seven or eight years earlier around 0.50.
It should also be recognised that, in contrast to the 
composite score given by standardised tests based on a large 
number of sub-scales or groups of items, the results of 
divergent thinking tests are more comparable with those of 
sub-tests of standardised scales, unless added to form an 
overall divergent score. Cropley (1964) reporting two-year 
reliabilities for the sub-tests of the Wechsler (W.I.S.C.) 
Scale gave reliabilities ranging from 0.12 to 0.50 and the 
present reliabilities over a 4J year interval fall at the 
higher end of this range. They are also higher than several 
of those reported for the new ’P.Q.’ Personality Questionnaire
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(Eysenck and Eysenck, 1973) after a 1-year retest, though 
generally the latter are in the 0.55 to 0.65 region.
In assessing long-term reliabilities Cronbach (1970) 
points out that reliabilities are likely to be higher over a 
period of little developmental change in the subject, in com­
parison with a time interval over important formative years. 
The period from 11 to 16 years of age covered by the present 
study is clearly in the latter category and the degree of 
stability reported is thus all the more significant.
In considering the development of divergent thinking 
ability over the period in question it is also appropriate 
to consider whether over and above the relative ranking of 
the subjects, there is any change in the level of their per­
formance.
9.34 Levels of Performance on Divergent Tests 1969-1974
It is suggested that like other mental abilities diver­
gent thinking should increase as children develop between 
the ages of 11 and 15, and this is clearly shown by comparing 
the mean scores in Table 18.
Putting the above statement, suggesting a development in 
divergent thinking ability, into the form of a null hypothe­
sis and applying a t-test for correlated pairs (2-tail), each 
of the differences in Table 18 shows a highly significant 
increase well beyond the 0.1% level in all cases.
The children concerned were therefore more fluent, flex­
ible and original in their responses at 15 than they were at
11. One could expect an increase in the fluency score partly 
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does not necessarily imply an increase in flexibility or ori­
ginality. Remembering that the latter is assessed relative 
to its own particular population it is appropriate to infer 
a real improvement in each ability.
The increase in standard deviations from 11 to 15 are 
consistent with the increases in mean scores, though it is 
noticeable that in the case of the Circles Test for fluency 
and flexibility, and the Uses Test for fluency, the standard 
deviation is reduced. Not only, therefore, is average level 
of performance raised but the group is more closely grouped 
around the mean. Taking a complete ability range it is 
likely that at eleven years of age some of the children are 
unduly handicapped by limited writing skills, but by the age 
of 15 this variation in psychomotor skill is considerably 
reduced.
Taking the increase in the level of divergent thinking 
together with the consistency in relative ranking as demons­
trated by the stability coefficients, it is reasonable to 
conclude that divergent thinking abilities develop with moti­
vation in a similar way to other mental abilities. Whatever 
their relationship to other variables, the results therefore 
suggest that divergent thinking tests measure a trait which 
shows some definite stability, and reasonable development 
over time.
9.35 Correction for Attenuation
The level of stability is only moderate but it has been 
demonstrated in a number of other studies and suggests that 
divergent thinking could be a useful factor in predicting 
future behaviour. As the instruments used to assess the
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stability of divergent thinking are not perfect however, it 
is possible to consider further the maximum theoretical sta­
bility of the underlying construct that might be achieved 
were the tests more reliable.
In discussing reliability in the last chapter it was 
noted that unreliability in test scores inevitably reduces 
the correlation between variables but that a 'correction for 
attenuation’ can be applied to give the maximum value of the 
correlation that could be expected if the tests were free 
from chance errors. It must be remembered however, that this 
is a theoretical not an empirical value and that it should 
not be used to make a test appear to be more reliable than 
it actually is. A bare statement of reliability therefore 
has to reflect the limitations of the test and the corrected 
values to be calculated here are not being suggested as an 
alternative to the empirical values of stability already 
established. They can however provide additional information 
about the construct underlying the test by making allowances 
for the shortcomings of the test itself. Correlations correc­
ted for errors of measurement give a better notion of the 
intrinsic relationship between the variables (Garrett, 1966).
Thorndike and Hagan (1969), in an example of the value 
of the correction, assume that a test of arithmetic and one 
of reading correlate 0.56 before correction for attenuation 
and 0.70 afterwards, and they conclude that ’’in thinking of 
these two funotionsj it would be appropriate to think of the 
correlation as .70 rather than .56, though the tests correlate 
only .56’’ (original emphasis).
It is sometimes difficult, as Guilford (1973) observes, 
to decide on the value of the reliability coefficient to be
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used in correcting for attenuation and it is possible to 
under-correct or over-correct. Guilford suggests that an 
alternate-form coefficient, with no time between test and 
retest, probably the best to use for a conservative correc­
tion, but that whatever estimate is adopted the interpreta­
tion of the results will have to be made accordingly.
The ’net' reliability estimates arrived at in the last 
chapter were designed to include all the major sources of 
error and are likely, as noted then, to be slightly over- 
rigorous estimates. In correcting the long-term stability 
coefficients however, no allowance for scorer variation will 
be made as both sets of tests were marked by the same scorer 
and any errors from this source are already included in the 
test-retest coefficients.
The test-retest reliability of the tests for the 15- 
year-old population are not known, though as suggested ear­
lier the evidence of other studies points to increasing relia­
bility with age. This is based however on evidence from com­
posite scores over a number of tests, and no specific relia­
bilities for the present tests are available for a comparable 
15-year-old population. The known 11-year-old reliabilities 
will therefore be adopted for both initial and final tests 
even though there is acknowledged that this is likely to 
overestimate the correction but it will enable an approximate 
estimate of the theoretical stability to be made.
The corrected long-term stability coefficients r^^i are
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Table 19 Estimates of Maximum Long-term Stability 
Coefficients for ’True’ Divergent Thinking Measures
The theoretical stability values show a marked increase 
over the obtained values and give further support to the 
presence of an underlying construct of divergent thinking 
that remains stable in relative ranking over a period of years.
Even after correction however the theoretical maximum 
values for the Circles and Consequences tests indicate that 
there is no likelihood of perfect agreement between divergent 
measures over this time. The considerable increase in the 
stability coefficient for the Uses Test suggests that either 
the proportion of variance which is stable over a short per­
iod of time is relatively more stable than that of the other 
tests over longer periods, or that the short-term reliability 
is an underestimate.
In the short-term retesting with the Uses Test may be 
more prone to error than the other tests. The fact that in 
spite of its lower reliability the long-term stability of the 
Uses Test is similar to that of the other tests gives some
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weight to the writer’s suggestion that its retest reliability 
may be influenced by short-term attitudinal variables in a 
way in which the Circles and Consequences Tests are not. On 
the other hand the low level of reliability reported by the 
writer is not uncommon, and there are therefore some grounds 
for believing that, over the long term, the divergent think­
ing ability underlying the Uses Test is more stable than 
that of the other tests.
Even though the actual values of the theoretical stabi­
lity coefficients are likely to be overestimated due to the 
choice of a stringent level of reliability, their general 
magnitude indicates that it is reasonable to expect divergent 
thinking tests to be able to play a considerable role in the 
long-term prediction of children’s abilities.
The evidence presented earlier in this study however 
leads one to consider whether the long-term reliability 
demonstrated for the divergent tests is due in whole, or in 
part to its overlap with general intelligence. To investi­
gate this possibility we turn to the original long-term 
coefficients and the parallel correlations of the divergent 
thinking tests with intelligence.
9.36 Relationship with Intelligence
That there is some overlap between divergent thinking 
and I.Q. can be seen from the following table (Table 20), 
giving the long-term reliabilities of the three divergent 
tests and the combined verbal score, together with the corre­
lations of each measure with I.Q. as assessed in 1969.
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Divergent Thinking Tests, 1974
Circles Uses Consequences CombinedVerbal
Test-retest
correlations 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.57
Correlations with 
I.Q. (1969) 0.20 0.35 0.42 0.43
Table 20 Correlations of Divergent Thinking Abilities (1974) 
with Corresponding Tests (1969) and I.Q. (1969)
The correlations between intelligence and the divergent 
thinking tests are particularly substantial for the verbal 
tests, though even the correlation of 0.20 between the Circles 
Test (1974) and I.Q. is significant at the 5% level. In each 
case however the divergent score obtained in 1969 is a better 
predictor than I.Q., of the corresponding divergent score in 
1974.
The important question however is whether the long-term 
stability is a ’true’ relationship between the divergent 
scores or largely the effect of both scores being related to 
general intelligence. It is possible to deal with this ques­
tion by controlling for the effects of intelligence via the 
technique of partial correlation.
As Guilford (1973) points out, this is the basic way of 
dealing with a three (or more) variable problem - the sort 
of problem which McNemar (1964) maintains is so badly handled 
by researchers who, in ’half-blind’ designs, look at the 
relationship between divergent thinking and a further variable 
without considering the effect of the intervening variable of 
intelligence. While Guilford suggests that partial correlation 
techniques are most useful for partially out variables such as
310.
chronological age and intelligence, there is a danger of 
over-compensating by removing the effects of intelligence.
It would be difficult, for example, to interpret the 
relationship between tests such as mathematics and reading 
comprehension with the influence of general intelligence 
removed. Both verbal and mathematical understanding enter 
with heavy, but unknown, weight into most I.Q. tests and 
partial correlation between the two with I.Q. held constant 
could not be interpreted in any clear-cut and meaningful way 
(Garrett, 1966; Lewis, 1967).
To some extent the removal of I.Q. from any psychological 
test tends to remove more than it reasonably should, including 
a variety of test-taking abilities that it would be unreason­
able to associate with I.Q. tests alone. The dice are conse­
quently slightly loaded against new tests, though if they are 
to be worthwhile developing, they need to demonstrate their 
ability to predict relationships over and above those due to 
intelligence.
To assess the long-term stability of divergent thinking 
with the effect of intelligence removed, it is necessary to 
know the correlations between all three variables concerned. 
The correlations between I.Q. and the Circles, Uses, Conse­
quences and Combined Verbal scores obtained in 1969 are 0.26, 
0.52, 0.44 and 0.54 respectively. Taking these together with 
the correlations in Table 20 the effect of intelligence can 
therefore be removed from the long-term test-retest correla­
tions. The result is to reduce the stability coefficients as 
shown in the following table (Table 21).
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Circles Uses Consequences CombinedVerbal
Zero order 
correlations 0.49 0. 50 0.47 0.57
First order 
partials 0.47 0.40 0.35 0.45
Table 21 Long-term Stability Coefficients Before and After 
Being Controlled for the Effect of Intelligence
Even after this reduction there is still a significant 
relationship between divergent measures over the Ag-year per­
iod (p < 0.001 for n - 3 degrees of freedom) though in terms 
of common variance the reduction is more marked. It must be 
remembered that correlation is not a linear index and while 
the reduction in common variance between the Circles Tests in 
1969 and that in 1974 is only down from 24% to 22%, ((0.49)^ • 
(0.47)2), that for the Consequences Test is reduced from 22% 
down to 12%.
Had this analysis taken place on the corrected reliabi­
lities however, the reduction due to intelligence would have 
been proportionally lower, the correlations with the more 
reliable I.Q. test having less correction than those between 
divergent scores.
The effect of intelligence is so often suggested, but 
less often investigated, as a possible source of the relation­
ship between divergent tests, that it was felt appropriate to 
examine its relationship to the long-term test-retest reliabi­
lities. Having shown that there are no grounds for believing 
that the relationship is simply one of intelligence, the ori­
ginal analysis is able to stand more firmly as an indication 
of the stability of divergent tests.
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9.37 Intercorrelations between Divergent Thinking Tests
1969 and 1974
In addition to the level and relative ranking of pupils’ 
performance on individual tests from 1969 to 1974, an import­
ant aspect of the stability of divergent thinking is the rela­
tionship between the three tests which purport to measure the 
same construct, firstly in 1969 and then in 1974. These rela­
tionships are now examined. Intercorrelations between the 
tests are presented in Table 22(a) and 22(b) for the 1969 and 
1974 data respectively. In 1969 the Uses Test was also scored 
for flexibility but this correlated 0.95 and 0.84 with the 
corresponding fluency and flexibility scores and was omitted 
from the 1974 analysis. For ease of comparison it is also 
omitted from the 1969 table.
The correlations between all the measures are high, and 
very similar patterns exist for both sets of data. This com­
bination of both level and pattern is the most significant 
feature in the comparison and gives considerable additional 
weight to divergent thinking as a stable construct.
Some minor variations in the pattern are also worthy of 
note, the main difference being in the greater consistency in 
the 1974 results. Correlations between the two verbal tests 
(shown within the small squares in the table) ranged from 
0.42 to 0.63 in 1969 and from 0.53 to 0.59 in 1974. The 
pattern is still the same however, the higher correlations 
existing between fluency scores and the lower ones between 
originality scores. Looking at the rectangular block of 
correlations between the verbal tests and the Circles Test, 
the 1969 correlations varied from 0.41 to 0.61 and the 1974 





















Correlations > 0.30 are significant p < 0.001 
(Decimal points are omitted in the tables)
Table 22 Intercorrelations between Divergent 
Scores in 1969 and 1974
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by the low correlation in 1969 between the originality score 
for Circles and the other measures. It suggests that there 
is some difference in the type of performance at 11 and 16 
on the Circles Test and this is substantiated by looking at 
the correlations within the Circles Test. (Within-test cor­
relations are enclosed by triangles.) Originality has similar 
correlations with fluency of 0.64 and 0.67 in 1969 and 1974 
respectively but has a considerably higher correlation with 
flexibility in 1969 than in 1974. It appears that in 1969 
the flexibility score played a more intermediary role between 
fluency and flexibility than in 1974 when it was closely rela­
ted to fluency. It suggests that in 1974 the older children 
tended to change category more consistently rather than per­
severe with a number of responses in the same category. This 
in fact reflects the type of development that could be 
expected.
The comparatively low within-test correlations of 0.64 
(1969) and 0.67 (1974) between fluency and originality are 
not dissimilar to the between-test correlations, and this 
gives some support to maintaining more than just a fluency 
score. There is a less strong case for keeping the two scores 
in the Uses and Consequences Tests with within-test correla­
tions in the region of 0.80. Final comments on this question 
will be better made after the final factor analysis in the 
last section of this study when divergent tests will be looked 
at in relation to other variables.
There is some support for the contentions of Yamamoto 
and Frengel (1966) and Plass et at (1974) that the abilities 
of fluency, flexibility and originality are not clearly rela­
ted across tests, correlations between fluency scores, for
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example, being less than correlations between different abi­
lities derived from a single test. To summarize the data 
and to compare it with other studies total scores (after 
standardisation) have already been calculated for the indi­
vidual tests rather than by adding all the fluency or origi­
nality scores, and the intercorrelation analysis suggests 
that this procedure is appropriate. A composite score for 
the verbal tests is also included where it is thought to be 
useful, but the correlations between tests are not high 
enough to suggest that divergent thinking is a unidimensional 
construct.
For convenience it is often useful to adopt a single 
score but to do so would be to set up a concept of divergent 
thinking with a unitary flavour in much the same way as has 
been the case with intelligence. The separate test scores 
will therefore be maintained throughout this study though in 
addition a composite verbal score may be utilized if illumi­
nating. Figurai and verbal divergent scores will be kept 
separate throughout. Although the Circles Test correlates 
with the verbal tests almost as well as they do between them­
selves (particularly in the 1969 sample) an earlier factor 
analysis of the writer (Richards, 1970) showed that the Cir­
cles Test has some factorial separation from the verbal tests. 
As Vernon (1971) observes the Circles Test has often shown 
different patterns of response from other tests and he would 
omit it from a divergent test battery. This is slightly 
reminiscent however of Terman’s (1906) deletion of ’imagina­
tive’ tests from his I.Q. battery and the very differences 
shown by the Circles Test makes it valuable in a study of 
this type. Considerations of its validity and that of the
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verbal tests, will be dealt with in the next two chapters.
The magnitude of the intercorrelations in the two sets 
of data provides considerable evidence for convergent vali­
dity and is similar to that found in a number of other stu­
dies (Hargreaves and Bolton, 1972; Richards, R.L., 1976; 
Atkinson, 1977). It does not support the findings of some 
other researchers (Hudson, 1966; Nuttall, 1971) who report 
low correlations between divergent measures. The overall 
range of correlations between the three tests, excluding the 
within-test correlations, is from 0.41 to 0.64 in 1969, and 
from 0.46 to 0.59 in 1974. In contrast the correlations 
between the divergent thinking measures and I.Q. are consi­
derably lower, from 0.17 to 0.53 in 1969, and from 0.13 to 
0.43 in 1974. In each case the lower correlations occur 
between the Circles Test and I.Q. The complete intercorrela­
tion table is given in the Appendix.
The intercorrelations between the three divergent tests 
are, in fact, similar to those reported by Heim (1970) 
between the verbal/numerical and diagrammatic halves of the 
AH5 which range from 0.49 to 0.62. Heim’s comments that the 
two parts, though designed to give a total ’operative’ I.Q. 
score, are concerned with somewhat different qualities and 
should have a significant positive relationship rather than 
an identical function; could be modified to support the 
adoption of the present tests into a battery designed to give 
a single divergent thinking score. Although this is contrary 
to the writer’s position, the three tests used appear to have 
some potential in this respect. Further evidence will be 
forthcoming from the investigation of their separate claims 
to concurrent and construct validity.
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9.4 SUMMARY
Three tests of divergent thinking, Circles, Uses, and 
Consequences were readministered to 139, 15-year-old children, 
4J years after they had originally taken the tests. Coeffi­
cients of long-term stability were calculated for the whole 
sample and for boys and girls separately. These were all 
significant and were similar in magnitude for both boys and 
girls.
Stability coefficients for the whole sample ranged from 
0.40 to 0.47 for the individual abilities, and from 0.47 to 
0.57 for combined scores. Although not exceptionally high, 
these were considered large enough to indicate that divergent 
thinking ability shows some definite stability over time.
This conclusion was given support by the close agreement shown 
to exist between the present results and those of other simi­
lar studies.
A consideration of levels of performance in 1969 and 
1974 showed that divergent thinking ability showed reasonable 
development over time, and together with the stability in 
relative ranking, suggested that divergent thinking develops 
in a similar way to other mental abilities.
A correction for attenuation due to the unreliability 
of the tests indicated that the results could be potentially 
even more significant. Assuming, as indicated in the last 
chapter, that the short-term reliability of the Uses Test is 
not as great as the other tests, there were some grounds for 
believing that, over the long term, the divergent thinking 
ability underlying the Uses Test is more stable than that of 
the other tests.
Although there was some overlap with general intelligence.
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the latter was not sufficient to account for the long-term 
stability of the divergent thinking measures. After the 
effect of intelligence was removed the stability coefficients 
were still very substantial, ranging from 0.35 to 0.47 for 
the individual tests.
Intercorrelations between the divergent thinking tests 
in 1969 and between the same tests in 1974 showed a very 
similar pattern, and gave further support to the stability 
of the underlying construct. On both occasions the level of 
intercorrelations between the divergent thinking tests was 
also shown to be greater than between the divergent tests and 
intelligence.
Overall, the comparison of divergent thinking performance 
in 1969 and 1974 yields a large amount of evidence in support 
of a construct of divergent thinking which shows sufficient 
stability over time to be a significant factor in predicting 
future behaviour. It also suggests that there are grounds 
for extrapolating any concurrent validity that may be demon­
strated in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TEN
RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 
CONCURRENT V A L ID ITY  OF TESTS OF DIVERGENT THINKING
10.1 INTRODUCTION
The basic hypothesis to be investigated in this chapter 
is that divergent thinking abilities have some predictive 
validity in relation to a number of criteria of creative 
behaviour. The criteria to be used have already been desc­
ribed in Chapter 5, and comprise five main measures:
(i) Teacher Rating Scale: 'Indicators of Creative
Behaviour'.
(ii) Torrance’s Creative Interests Checklist: 'Things
You Have Done in your Spare Time’.
(iii) The Golann Creative Motivation Scale: 'Things I
Would Like to do Most’.
(iv) 'Interests’ questionnaire: including Imaginative,
Logical/analytic, and General components.
(v) The Board Game.
These yield seven individual measurements and it is sug­
gested that divergent thinking abilities, if they have rele­
vance to creative activity, should be significantly related 
to these criteria. This contention put in the form of a null 
hypothesis for each of the criteria used, will be assessed in 
the following pages.
Creativity, however, as pointed out in Chapter 2, is not 
an unidimensional activity but relates to a broad category of 
intellectual and other variables, and it is possible that 
some of the divergent abilities will show greater relation­
ships with some criteria than others. The three tests of
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divergent thinking themselves yield even different ability 
measures and, without the composite scores, there are conse­
quently 49 correlations between the criteria in the divergent 
tests. This in itself gives a good chance of finding some 
significant correlations, so that isolated coefficients of 
limited size will be treated with some caution.
The validity coefficients are given as basic zero-order 
coefficients of correlation but an assessment of their prac­
tical value is more realistically made if the effects of 
intelligence are controlled. First-order partial coefficients 
controlling for intelligence will therefore be presented 
alongside the basic validity coefficients.
Each of the scales, except for the Board Game, has a 
good distribution of scores which are consistent with the 
use of Pearson’s product-moment method of correlation. The 
scale with the smallest range is that of Logical/Analytical 
Interests, but the scores were well distributed on a nine- 
point scale from 0 to 8 . Guilford and Fruchter (1973) note 
that there is nothing that demands that Pearson ’r ’ be com­
puted only with normal distributions, and that even rectangu­
lar distributions, with frequencies nearly equal along the 
range of measurements, would be acceptable. The scores for 
the Board Game range on a six-point scale from 0 to 5, but 
the respective frequencies for the whole population, 59, 31, 
2 1 , 2 2 , 16 and 1 2 , while being roughly rectangular from o to 
5, are heavily weighted in the ’0 ’ category, the asymmetry 
being more marked for girls than for boys. With the result­
ing lack of symmetry and with so few categories, they are not 
considered suitable for reliable investigation using Pearson 
’r ’. The latter may reveal some indications of its possible
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relationship to the divergent-thinking abilities and the Board 
Game score will be included in the initial analysis on this 
basis, but at this stage its statistical analysis for signifi­
cance will only be made on a tentative basis. It will be 
investigated in a separate categorical analysis later in this 
chapter, and this more detailed treatment should also do more 
justice to its role in the present study.
When considering children’s interests and creative beha- 
vious it is possible that sex will be a significant variable 
and the validity coefficients are discussed for each sex 
separately as well as for the whole population.
10.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
10.21 Intercorrelations between the Divergent Tests, and
between the Creative Criteria
Intercorrelations, means and standard deviations of all 
the basic variables, for both sexes separately and for the 
whole population are given in the Appendix, data relevant to 
the present discussion being extracted or calculated separa­
tely where appropriate.
In discussing the validity coefficients of the different 
divergent measures with the various criteria, some indication 
of the relationships within each batch of measures will be 
illuminating and will affect the way in which their inter­
relationships are viewed. Before proceeding with this dis­
cussion therefore a general picture of the correlations within 
each battery are given in Tables 23 and 24 respectively.
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(a) Boys n = 77
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Teacher Ratings 1 . 17 28 09 03 25 43 69
Torrance Checklist 2 18 22 14 15 21 09
Creative Motivation 3 03 07 12 11 17
General Interests 4 81 52 17 05
Imaginative Interests 5 17 03 02
Logical/Analytic Interests 6 21 20
Board Game 7 38
I.Q.
(b) Girls n = 84
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Teacher Ratings 1 25 35 18 28 14 14 69
Torrance Checklist 2 29 52 51 34 01 18
Creative Motivation 3 35 51 21 24 33
General Interests 4 74 69 05 24
Imaginative Interests 5 26 00 22
Logical/Analytic Interests 6 24 21
Board Game 7 29
I.Q.
(decimal points are omitted in the tables)
Table 24 Correlations between the Creative Criteria 
and between the Creative Criteria and I.Q.
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The general pattern of the correlations in Table 23 is 
similar to those between the divergent thinking measures in 
the investigation of long-term stability presented in Chapter 
8 , and the correlations between the divergent abilities from 
different tests, ranging from 0.33 to 0.62 are not so high as 
to suggest that they are measuring identical abilities. The 
within-test correlations can also be interpreted in this way, 
with the exception of Circles (fluency) and Circles (flexibi­
lity), and are lower than those given in Chapter 8 .
In the present sample the correlation between the fluency 
and flexibility scores for Circles is 0.83, compared with 0.86 
and 0.92 for the 11 and 15-year-old populations respectively 
in the stability investigation, and it consequently appears 
that the flexibility score is so consistently and highly 
related to fluency as to be largely superfluous. The correla­
tion of 0.63 between the fluency and originality scores for 
the Uses Test, however, is lower than those of 0.81 and 0.86 
for the populations in Chapter 8 ; and similarly the inter­
correlation of 0.49 for the Consequences Test is considerably 
lower than the corresponding correlations of 0.78 and 0.78. 
This gives some support for the modified scoring procedures 
adopted with the present sample as described in Chapter 6 .
With comparatively low intercorrelations even within 
tests, there is consequently a chance that the different abi­
lities will show different relationships to creative criteria 
and this is important in this section on concurrent validity.
As noted earlier the creative criteria also cover differ­
ent types of creative interests and activities and this is 
borne out by the correlations in Table 24. The only exception
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is the measure of General Interests which was formed from the 
same scale as Imaginative and Logical/Analytic Interests and 
includes both the latter scores. As a result it is highly 
correlated with both, particularly Imaginative Interests.
Its value to the subsequent analysis is therefore in some 
doubt and its position will be returned to again shortly.
There is a low positive relationship between most of the 
other measures and they are clearly not assessing identical 
activities.
The chief differences between the correlations for boys 
and girls centres on the scales for Imaginative and Logical/ 
Analytic Interests. The former is more clearly related to 
the other criteria for girls, while the opposite is true for 
the boys. I.Q. gives an identical correlation with Teacher 
Ratings for each sex, and otherwise shows slightly stronger 
relationships for girls. On the Board Game however intelli­
gence is a more significant factor for boys. Apart from 
Teacher Ratings the creative criteria are not so highly rela­
ted to intelligence as to be largely a reflection of the 
latter, and this gives some support to their construct validity.
10.22 Basic Validity Coefficients
The basic validity coefficients indicating the relation­
ship between the predicting variables of divergent thinking 
and the creative criteria, for the whole population are presen­
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161 values of r ^  0.16 are significant p < 0.05 / .
values of r ^  0.21 are significant p < 0.01 j ai es .
(Correlations significant at 5% are underlined)
Table 25 Validity Coefficients between Divergent 
Thinking Tests and Criterion Variables
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Without including the combined scores, 29 out of the 
49 validity coefficients are significant, 18 at 1% and 11 at 
5%, adopting a two-tail test. At a less stringent level of 
1 0% a further nine coefficients are significant. Overall this 
provides a fairly convincing picture of the relevance of 
divergent thinking abilities to creative activity and provides 
some real evidence of concurrent validity. The results conse­
quently give weight to studies which have found support for 
the concurrent validity of divergent thinking tests rather 
than the negative evidence reported by Kogan and Pankove (1974).
The level of the coefficients is not high however, the 
significant correlations ranging from 0.16 to 0.36. These 
compare with the range of significant validity coefficients 
from 0.32 to 0.48 reported earlier from Torrance (1969) bet­
ween composite fluency, flexibility, originality and elabora­
tion scores and three criterion of creative achievement 
obtained from a questionnaire. With only 46 subjects however, 
the level of significance is similar to that obtained here, 
though only one out of twelve coefficients did not reach sig­
nificance in Torrance’s study. Combining the divergent data 
into a single measure Torrance was able to raise the level of 
validity coefficients, and the resulting values of 0.46, 0.50 
and 0.51 compared well with those of 0.42 (girls) and 0.52 
(boys), also with combined measures of divergent thinking and 
creative activities, reported by Cropley (1972).
Vernon (1972) obtained significant coefficients ranging 
from 0.24 to 0.46 for boys and 0.25 to 0.53 for girls in the 
study reviewed earlier in Chapter 4. The coefficients were 
obtained between test scores and a single combined criterion 
of creativity formed by adding together ten measures including
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essay ratings, teacher and peer judgements, and leisure-time 
artistic and scientific activities. The validity of the 
total divergent thinking (D.T.) battery against the combined 
creativity criterion was 0.51 for boys and 0.63 for girls 
respectively. Some of the correlations between the D.T. 
battery and some of the individual measures however, fell as 
low as 0.08 for boys and 0.02 for girls. The lowest correla­
tion between a combined divergent test score and the criteria 
in Table 25 is 0.07 between the Consequences Test and the 
Board Came. Apart from one slightly negative correlation of 
-0.01, between Consequences (fluency) and the Board Came, the 
correlations are all positive and suggest that a combined 
verbal plus figurai divergent thinking score, and a combined 
creativity criterion would produce results consistent with 
those of Torrance, Cropley and Vernon.
Dewing (1970) also evaluated the validity of her diver­
gent thinking tests against a combined criterion, and the 
latter included both Torrance’s Checklist and the Colann 
Creative Motivation Scale. Dewing investigated the validity 
of the D.T. measures by comparing the performance of a highly 
divergent group with a ’control group’ formed from the remain­
der of the sample, but she reported a relationship between 
the groups and the creative criteria significant at the 0 .1 % 
level in favour of the divergent group.
In order to compare the present results more directly 
with these studies using a composite criterion, a ’total’ 
validity measure for figurai plus verbal divergent thinking 
tests, against the total battery of creative activities and 
interests is computed here using the ’pooling square’ method 
of Thomson (1950) described by Wiseman (1966).
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The composite validity coefficients for the figurai, 
verbal and total divergent battery are given in Table 26.
Boys Girls
n = 77 n = 84
Figurai D.T. 0.38 0.37
Verbal D.T. 0.42 0.47
Whole Battery D.T. 0.44 0.46
(all correlations significant p < 0 .0 0 1 )
Table 26 Validity Coefficients of the Battery of 
Divergent Thinking Tests with the Battery of Creative Criteria
The validity coefficients of the whole battery are 0.44 
for boys and 0.46 for girls. These are very similar in mag­
nitude to those reported by Torrance (1969) and Cropley (1972), 
and with the greater number of subjects in the present study 
the coefficients are slightly more significant. Although not 
as high as those of Vernon (1972) , they provide some positive 
support for his findings.
Like Dewing’s (1970) relationship which was evaluated 
by means of a test, the present composite validity coeffi­
cients are significant beyond the 0.1% level. Although not 
directly comparable with Pearson ’r ’. Dewing also reported a 
contingency coefficient of 0.39 for 2 d.f. giving an alterna­
tive indication of the strength of the relationship.
The derivation of a composite validity coefficient from 
the results of several D.T. tests and creative activities, 
while giving a measure of the overall relationship tends to 
obscure relationships which are present, to a greater or 
lesser extent, between individual D.T. measures and particular
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criteria. Although the general level of validity coefficients 
between individual tests and specific criteria are likely to 
be lower it is suggested that they will provide a clearer pic­
ture of the validity of the tests. Those obtained in the 
present study will therefore be looked at in more detail 
shortly.
Putting the overall level of prediction in perspective 
however, it appears from the present results that, while indi­
vidual divergent thinking tests appear able to predict a 
fairly consistent amount of variance in creative criteria the 
actual proportion of variance is small. The median correla­
tion of the 29 significant coefficients is 0.29, and this for 
example, predicts only 8.4% of the variation in the criterion, 
and the highest individual correlation of 0.36 between the 
originality score for the Consequences Test and Teacher 
Ratings predicts only 13%. Correcting for attenuation due to 
unreliability of the predictors and the criteria however 
would raise this estimate.
Guilford and Fruchter (1973) suggest that many a vali­
dity coefficient reported in the literature fails to take 
into account errors of measurement, and although one may be 
compelled to deal with fallible tests one should at least 
allow for unreliability in the criterion itself. The relia­
bility of ratings they point out is characteristically about
0.60, though they also give an instance of teacher ratings 
of students’ creative ability in design as high as 0.82.
Thorndike and Hagan (1969) also warn that the reliabi­
lity of rating procedures is generally low, though the effec­
tiveness is improved, they suggest, when the rater’s response 
is called for on a structured rating instrument. The latter
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procedure was adopted in the design of the present Teacher 
Rating scale and Thorndike and Hagan note that such rating 
scales, put into the form of a behaviour checklist with a 
three-point appraisal scale, have been found to yield retest 
reliabilities between 0.77 and 0.93, and an interscorer 
reliability of 0.83.
Assuming, to avoid over-correction, that the teacher 
ratings here have a reliability of 0.85, and adopting the 
test-retest reliability of 0.60 for Consequences (originality) 
as given in Table 7 (Chapter 8), the above validity coeffici­
ent of 0.36, after correction for attenuation, is raised to
0.51. This increases the amount of predicted variance from 
13% to 26%. Applying the same correction to the non-significant 
correlation of 0.13 between the Consequences (originality) 
score and the Board Game, assuming that the reliability of the 
latter is the same as for Teacher Ratings, the validity coef­
ficient is raised to 0.18. Such a correction would bring a 
number of the lower correlations into the significance cate­
gory, and bearing in mind the dangers of underestimating the 
validity of divergent thinking tests because of their unrelia­
bility, it can be suggested that the overall pattern of the 
correlations in Table 25 is indicative of a consistent if low 
degree of concurrent validity.
The extent to which this degree of validity is likely 
to be useful depends on whether there are other variables 
that predict the same variance, and whether any unique vari­
ance is of sufficient magnitude to make a significant contri­
bution.
Even after correction for attenuation however, there is 
certainly a great deal of variance which might be attributable
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to other variables and an obvious candidate for a source of 
common variance is I.Q. Looking at the correlations between
I.Q. and the criterion variables at the foot of Table 25, 
four out of the seven correlations are significant, but only 
that with Teacher Ratings is larger than those achieved by 
the divergent tests. Apart from the latter, intelligence 
does not appear likely to swamp the effect of the divergent 
tests, though whether the correlations imply a common or com­
plementary source of variance awaits to be seen.
Intelligence is however a very substantial predictor 
of children’s creative behaviour as assessed by the Teacher 
Ratings. The type of behaviour assessed can be seen in the 
rating scale ’Characteristics of Children’s Creative Behaviour’ 
shown in the Appendix, and includes descriptions of the crea­
tive child as curious, non-conforming, flexible, willing to 
try different approaches, unwilling to give up, self-sufficient, 
original, imaginative and willing to experiment.
The writer has already presented some evidence regarding 
the use of teacher ratings as criteria of creativity (page 
and although some doubts were expressed, the writer felt that 
the alternative views were sufficient to warrant their inclu­
sion. It would consequently be wrong at this stage to attri­
bute their relationship to intelligence as a ’halo effect’ due 
to the more conventional abilities of the children with high
I.Q.
The scale might have been better constructed however, 
if some of the traits have been worded in a positive fashion 
and others in a negative way so that the distinctness of 
each trait would be emphasised. Alternately the ratings for 
each characteristic might have been worded differently.
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instead of the consistent A to E rating which the teachers 
were asked to apply to all the traits. Although such modifi­
cations would have made the scale less easy to score, they 
might have encouraged the rater to assess each descriptive 
statement carefully, and hence have reduced the ’halo' ten­
dency for raters to mark a similar position for all traits 
according to a general rather than specific assessment of the 
children’s creative behaviour.
The ’halo’ effect is therefore likely to be part of the 
explanation for the high correlation between the Teacher Rat­
ings and Intelligence, but the class teachers, as argued ear­
lier, have an unique opportunity of being closely involved 
with the children in a range of activities over a considerable 
period of time, and some considerable weight has to be given 
to their evidence. The high correlation of 0.69 is conse­
quently viewed as evidence of the concurrent validity of 
intelligence tests in predicting characteristics of creative 
behaviour.
It is also noteworthy that all but one of the divergent 
thinking measures in Table 25 are also significantly related 
to the Teacher Ratings. Whether this can be explained in 
terms of a common relationship with intelligence will be in­
vestigated shortly.
The correlations between the three scales derived from 
the Interests questionnaire have already been noted. General 
Interests being particularly related to Imaginative Interests. 
A consideration of the validity coefficients with the three 
scales suggests further that the ’General Interests’ measure 
is superfluous. As noted in Chapter 5, Barker-Lunn (1970)
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distinguished only two "consistent sub-scales" in the Interests 
questionnaire, but the writer suggested that seven out of the 
remaining nineteen items also appeared relevant to creative 
thinking abilities. These consisted of drawing, collecting 
stamps, writing a daily diary, doing crossword puzzles, 
sewing, gardening and dancing, and they were included with 
the sum of the other two scales into an overall interest mea­
sure. Considering the extensive analysis given to the scale 
by Barker-Lunn, this action of the writer took some liberties 
with remaining items and it is clear that the result adds 
very little information to that provided by the two sub­
scales. There are more items in the imaginative sub-scale 
than for logical interests and the overall score is largely 
a reflection of the score for imaginative interests.
As suggested by Barker-Lunn the imaginative and logical 
scales show some different patterns of results and this is a 
further reason for treating an overall score with some sus­
picion.
The negligible extra value of the overall score is in 
fact a good indication of the validity of Barker-Lunn’s ana­
lysis and of the limited value of personal judgements when 
it comes to the construction of scales of interests and atti­
tudes. There are consequently no grounds for retaining this 
score as a criterion measure, and although its relationship 
to the other variables will be looked at again in the factor 
analysis in the next chapter, it will be omitted as a criter­
ion of creative activity in the following section.
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10.23 An Appraisal of the Validity Coefficients for each
Divergent Thinking Measure in Conjunction with Sex
Differences and the Effect of Intelligence
The basic zero-order validity coefficients for each 
divergent thinking ability, and the corresponding first-order 
partial coefficients after controlling for intelligence, are 
looked at in this section for each criterion measure in turn, 
beginning with Teacher Ratings in Table 27. Both sets of 
coefficients are presented for each sex and for the whole 
population. The combined score for the Circles Test was 
arrived at by standardising and adding the individual scores 
for fluency, flexibility and originality, and a similar pro­
cedure was used for each verbal test, and to form an overall 
verbal score.
10.231 Validity Coefficients with Teacher Ratings of 
Children’s Creative Behaviour
As can be seen from Table 27, before controlling for 
the effects of intelligence, six out of the seven validity 
coefficients for the individual divergent thinking abilities 
are significant for the whole population, and so are the 
coefficients for all four combined scores.
For girls, three out of the seven coefficients were 
significant, for Circles (fluency). Uses (originality) and 
Consequences (originality). Another three correlations of 
0.21 however were on the borderline of significance at the 
5% level, and taken together, provide further evidence of a 
consistent degree of validity. For boys five coefficients 
were significant, three of them for the same abilities as for 
girls, and the other two for Circles (originality) and Con­
sequences (fluency). Both the latter were of borderline
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(Decimal points are omitted in the table)
Values of r are significant at the 5% and 1% levels as follows:
for n = 161 r 2  0.16 and r 2  0.21 respectively )
for n = 84 r 2  0.22 and r 2  0.28 respectively > (2-tail test),
for n = 77 r 2. 0.23 and r 2  0.29 respectively )
Basic coefficients have n - 2 d.f. and first-order coefficients
n - 3 d.f.
Significant coefficients are underlined.
Table 27 Validity Coefficients for the Divergent Thinking 
Tests with Teacher Ratings, and First-order Partial Coefficients
Controlling for Intelligence
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significance for girls so that overall the pattern with each 
sex is broadly similar. The originality score for the Circles 
Test however was a considerably better predictor of creative 
behaviour for boys rather than girls.
With the common variance due to intelligence removed 
from the criterion and the divergent thinking measures, the 
picture changes considerably. Instead of all the validity 
coefficients for the combined scores for each test being sig­
nificant, both within each sex and for the whole population, 
none of the partial validity coefficients for combined scores 
are significant. For the whole population, only one out of 
the seven individual divergent thinking measures. Consequen­
ces (originality), shows a significant partial correlation 
with the criterion, and none of the partial validity coeffi­
cients are significant for boys and girls separately. It is 
clear that the evidence for the concurrent validity of the 
divergent tests shown by the basic validity coefficients is 
largely due to the effects of intelligence, and that apart 
from this divergent tests do not predict characteristics of 
children’s creative behaviour as seen by their teachers.
It should be recognised however that, as discussed in 
Chapter 9, removing the effects of intelligence from both 
criterion and predictor may remove more common variance than 
is reasonable, and this is particularly true when, as at 
present, the I.Q. test is likely to be the most reliable of 
the tests used. The lower reliabilities of the divergent 
tests and the criteria, also limit the size of the correlation 
coefficients which exist between them. A number of the par­
tial validity coefficients, which show some positive residual 
correlation with the criterion, therefore deserve looking at
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more closely after correcting for attenuation to allow for 
the low reliabilities of the tests used. Although such vali­
dity coefficients are of little practical predictive value 
they can contribute evidence of construct validity between 
the measures under discussion.
With a large number of correlations to choose from, it 
would not be appropriate simply to correct any of the larger 
coefficients which appear in the table, but consistent group­
ings of correlations deserve further attention. The partial 
validity coefficients for the Circles Test (Boys), the Uses 
Test (Girls), and the Consequences Test (whole population) 
show some consistent positive validity and are therefore looked 
at more closely.
Assuming, as earlier in this chapter, that the reliabi­
lity of the Teacher Ratings is 0.85, and adopting the test- 
retest reliabilities of the divergent tests given in Table 7, 
a correction of the residual validity coefficients for attenua­
tion gives the following indication (Table 28) of the maximum 
relationship which might exist between the selected divergent 
abilities and the teachers' assessments of the children's 
creative behaviour.
Out of the seven measures looked at four remain non­
significant, one becomes significant at 1% rather than 5% and 
two others become significant, one at 5% and the other at 1%. 
Each of the significant coefficients is for originality and 
this suggests that efforts to construct more reliable measures 
of divergent thinking may meet with some moderate success in 
predicting creative behaviour. The level of the correlations 
is still low however and effort might better be used in attemp­
ting to isolate that element in divergent tests which is res­















0.11 0 .2 2 ** 
(0.09) (0.16*)
(Boys Only) (Cirls Only) (Whole Population)
*Signi£icant at 5%
**Signi£icant at 1 %
(Coefficients for the uncorrected data are given in parenthesis)
Table 28 Selected Partial Validity 
Coefficients Corrected for Attenuation^
(Teacher Ratings)
While the Consequences Test had a similar pattern of 
correlations for boys and girls the originality score for the 
Circles Test was only a predictor for boys and Uses (origina­
lity) only for girls. The difference was most marked in the 
Circles Test where the partial validity coefficients for 
girls were negative for flexibility and originality. The 
function of the Circles Test in this respect will be looked 
at in relation to the other creative criteria which follow.
 ̂ The correction for attenuation was applied directly to the 
partial coefficients, and gives only an estimate of the 
corrected coefficient which would have been obtained by cor­
recting the original correlations before finding the first- 
order partials. Assuming the I.Q. test to be perfectly reli­
able this gives an approximation which can be shown by simple 
algebraic substitution to be always less than or equal to 
that obtained by correcting the original correlations. An 
approximation in this direction is convenient for use here.
If the partial coefficients had been calculated using the 
approximate method used by Vernon (1972) the corrections for 
attenuation would, in fact, have been identical if applied 
before or after calculating the partials.
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10.232 Validity Coefficients with Torrance's Leisure 
Interests Checklist
The low correlation of 0.13 between I.Q. and Torrance's 
Checklist of Creative Leisure Interests, taken in conjunction 
with only moderate correlations between the divergent abili­
ties and I.Q., means that the partial validity coefficients 
are only slightly less than the basic zero-order coefficients, 
as can be seen in Table 29. Compared with the I.Q. correlation 
of 0.13 the overall level of the coefficients indicates that 
divergent tests have considerably more validity than intelli­
gence tests in predicting children's creative interests.
Six out of the seven basic validity coefficients are 
significant and only one of these, for Consequences (origina­
lity), is not significant after the effect of intelligence is 
removed. The only non-significant zero-order coefficient is 
for Uses (originality) but this is significant for girls alone. 
Consequences (originality) is also significant for girls and 
not for boys, but the reverse is true for Circles (originali­
ty) . Once again the figurai test appears to be more strongly 
associated with boys and the verbal tests with girls, though 
Circles (fluency) is an exception. All of the basic validity 
coefficients for combined scores, except for the Uses Test 
for boys, are significant, and they all remain significant 
after the effects of intelligence are removed.
In contrast to the very low partial validity coefficients 
reported in relation to Teacher Ratings, the present partial 
coefficients remain quite substantial and give some definite 
evidence for concurrent validity. Unlike the small coeffi­
cients which did exist for Teacher Ratings, the present coef­
ficients are highest for fluency rather than originality scores.
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Torrance Checklist


















































































































(Decimal points are omitted in the table)
Values of r are significant at the 5% and 1% levels as follows: 
for n = 161, r >_ 0.16 and r _> 0.21 respectively )
for n = 84, r ^  0.22 and r ̂  0.28 respectively > (2-tail test),
for n = 77, r ^  0.23 and r ̂  0.29 respectively ;
Basic coefficients have n - 2 d.f. and first-order coefficients
n - 3 d.f.
Significant coefficients are underlined.
Table 29 Validity Coefficients for the Divergent Thinking 
Tests with Creative Leisure Interests, and First-order 
Partial Coefficients Controlling for Intelligence
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This points to an association between the number of 
interests and activities children pursue in their leisure 
time and the fluency of their ideas on divergent tests. In 
asking children to indicate interests and activities from a 
prepared list there is a danger however that some children 
will tick the items with less discrimination and evaluation 
than others. As noted when describing the test earlier, 
there is no means of assessing the level at which an interest 
may function, though the writer discussed their completed 
checklist with some of the children.
Utilizing some of the teachers' judgements about their 
pupils' general abilities it seemed likely that some of the 
children had indicated interests which they were not likely 
to pursue in any great depth. Although this was evidently 
the case with some pupils who had ticked a large number of 
activities, they showed an interest and enthusiasm for the 
activities which the writer considered generally justified 
their inclusion.
Different children interpreted the activities different­
ly and this is part of what appears to be assessed by the 
test. Instead of being an objective list of activities, they 
become relevant to the subjects who take the test and it is 
their interpretation which is recorded. Some children indi­
cated that they had 'made up or organised a play or sketch' 
(No.12) on the basis of sketches at Boy Scout meetings or 
parties, while others who had also taken part in such activi­
ties, were less ready to claim that they had made them up or 
organised them. 'Kept a science scrapbook' (No.47) was 
interpreted quite reasonably by one less able girl in terms 
of her scrapbook of "space-travel and things like that" but
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’science’ was more narrowly interpreted by others. One boy 
noted that he had ’Organised or helped to organise a club*
(No.55) because he belonged to a ’gang’ and helped to orga­
nise it, and another claimed to have ’Made an electric motor’ 
(No.29) because he had taken one out of an old toy car and 
built it into a boat.
A large number of low scorers could also have been made 
to realise that they had also done something to justify tick­
ing certain items, but their reluctance to do so is obviously 
part of what the test is measuring. Total scores on the test 
ranged from 12 to 82 out of 95 listed activities.
Although some researchers (e.g. Eysenck, 1967; Ausubel, 
1968; Shouksmith, 1970) might view uninhibited responses to 
the interests questionnaire as evidence of the same illconsi- 
dered dilletantism of which they have criticised responses to 
divergent tests, the writer is inclined to view the list of 
interests in a more positive light.
High scorers appear to be those who are most able to 
recognise something that they had done as fitting into the 
description of the activity, while low scorers tend to inter­
pret the activities more narrowly and literally. The check­
list may consequently be functioning more as a test of ’crea­
tive imagination’ than as an inventory of creative activities, 
but it is suggested that in either case it has some validity 
as a criterion instrument. Its significant correlations with 
the divergent tests then give, in turn, some concurrent vali­
dity to the latter.
With basic validity coefficients in excess of 0.40 and 
partial validity coefficients as high as 0.38 there is a good 
deal of evidence for concurrent validity. A consideration of
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construct validity by correcting for attenuation in order to 
explore the possibility of a significant underlying relation­
ship is therefore not necessary, but there is obviously some 
scope for increasing the present validity coefficients by 
making the tests and the criterion more reliable.
10.233 Validity Coefficients with Golann’s Creative 
Motivation Scale
The validity coefficients with creative motivation are 
given in Table 30. All the basic zero-order validity coeffi­
cients, except for Circles (flexibility), are significant for 
the population as a whole, four of them at a 1 % level, though 
the overall level of the coefficients is low. Within the 
sexes the coefficients are quite substantially positive, but 
are significant only for girls in the two verbal tests.
After controlling for intelligence the criterion still 
has significant residual correlations with the verbal tests 
for the population as a whole, with three out of four of the 
individual abilities and with each of the combined measures. 
None of the partial validity coefficients for the Circles Test 
are significant however, neither within sexes nor for the 
whole population. The reduction is due chiefly to the effects 
of intelligence being more marked for girls than for boys and 
this trend also existed for Teacher Ratings and Leisure Inter­
ests. Once again the verbal tests also tend to be better pre­
dictors of the creative criterion for girls rather than boys.
Only the combined verbal score is significant for boys 
alone, though there is a consistent pattern of relationships 
with the other abilities bordering on the 1 0 % level of signi­
























































































































(Decimal points are omitted in the table)
Values of r are significant at the 5% and 1% levels as follows: 
for n = 161, r 2. 0.16 and r ̂  0.21 respectively )
for n = 84, r >_ 0.22 and r _> 0.28 respectively / (2 -tail test),
for n = 77, r 2. 0.23 and r ̂  0.29 respectively )
Basic coefficients have n - 2 d.f. and first-order coefficients
n - 3 d.f.
Significant coefficients are underlined
Table 30 Validity Coefficients for the Divergent Tests with 
Golann’s Creative Motivation Scale, and First-order Partial 
Coefficients Controlling for Intelligence
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scores usually give a better indication of any underlying 
relationship, and the differences between the sexes are also 
small enough to rely on coefficients from the whole popula­
tion.
There are no marked differences between the correlations 
obtained with individual abilities within tests, except for 
the low correlations with Circles (flexibility). Overall the 
whole pattern is one of a positive but rather weak relation­
ship which gives some slight evidence of concurrent validity.
The results are not unlike those obtained by Golann 
(1962) in validating the scale against a revision of the 
Barron-Welsh Art Scale. With eight groups of children of 11 
and 13 years of age, the size of the group varying between 15 
and 55, Golann found seven positive correlations ranging from 
0.16 to 0.41, four of which were significant at 5% or better. 
He concluded that while the magnitude of the relationship was 
not large it showed a stable positive relationship between 
the B-W scale and the creative motivation scores.
Golann did not correct his correlations for attenuation, 
though he quoted a test-retest reliability coefficient of 
0.66 for the 1 1-year-old groups over a period of three weeks. 
Applying a correction for attenuation on the basis of this 
reliability coefficient and those given in Table 7 for the 
divergent tests the validity coefficients obtained for the 
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Significant at 1%
(Validity coefficients for the uncorrected data are in parenthesis)
Table 31 Validity Coefficients with the Creative 
Motivation Scale (corrected for attenuation)
With this correction, the one zero-order validity coefficient 
not initially significant becomes significant at 5%, and the 
coefficients rise as high as 0.45 for Uses (originality). The 
level of the correlations now indicates quite a high potential 
level of association between creative motivation and divergent 
tests. Only two of the partial validity coefficients remain 
non-significant, for the Circles Test (flexibility and origi­
nality). As a result of the lower reliability of the Uses 
Test the partial validity coefficient for originality rises 
from 0.20 to 0.35.
Golann (1962) reports a higher test-retest reliability 
for his scale with older children (r = 0.86 for 13-year-olds), 
and the potential coefficients indicated by the above correc­
tion for attenuation is therefore not entirely academic.
Although the present coefficients are not as high as 
those between the B-W Art Scale and divergent abilities (0.44 
to 0.49) given by Lang and Ryba (1976), the latter experiment 
was conducted with an able population of university students 
mainly studying courses in creative arts. Considering the age
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and range of ability of the children in the present study and 
the possible over-compensation by removing the effects of 
intelligence, the small but consistent relationship between 
Golann’s scale and the verbal divergent thinking abilities in 
particular, provides some positive evidence for concurrent 
validity even if the level of the relationship is small.
10.234 Validity Coefficients with Imaginative Interests
The basic zero-order validity coefficients and the 
first-order partial coefficients controlling for intelligence 
are given in Table 32. There are clear differences in this 
set of correlations between the verbal and figurai tests and 
between sexes.
None of the validity coefficients for the Circles Test 
are significant though there is a low positive overall rela­
tionship. Both verbal tests however are significantly corre­
lated with the imaginative interests criterion, for the popu­
lation as a whole, the combined scores being significant at 
1% before controlling for intelligence and at 5% afterwards. 
Only Consequences (originality) is not significant for the 
individual verbal scores. The overall effect however is due 
very largely to the relationship for girls alone. In fact 
of all the individual coefficients for boys, only that for 
Circles (originality) is in any way appreciable, and consider­
ing its isolated nature it could have been a chance associa­
tion.
By contrast all the zero-order coefficients except 
Consequences (originality) are significant for girls though 
none of them reach the 1% level. After controlling for intel­
ligence they become non-significant at 5% though five out of
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(Decimal points are omitted in the table)
Values of r are significant at the 5% and 1% levels as follows: 
for n = 161, r ^  0.16 and r 2. 0.21 respectively )
for n = 84, r ^  0.22 and r 2  0.28 respectively /(2-tail test),
for n = 77, r ^  0.23 and r ̂  0.29 respectively )
Basic coefficients have n - 2 d.f. and first-order coefficients
n - 3 d.f.
Significant coefficients are underlined.
Table 32 Validity Coefficients for the Divergent Tests with
Imaginative Interests, and First-order Partial Coefficients
Controlling for Intelligence
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the seven coefficients remain significant at 10%. Correcting 
for attenuation would in turn increase the significance of 
the latter and the overall level of the coefficients, though 
the coefficients for boys would remain non-significant for 
all the tests. None of the partial coefficients for the Cir­
cles Test reach significance after correction though the 
corrected basic validity coefficient for fluency becomes sig­
nificant at 5%.
Barker Lunn (1970) pointed out that the Interests Scale 
showed differences between the scores of boys and girls, ima­
ginative interests appealing more to girls than boys. A 
similar picture emerges here with girls having a mean score 
of 8.30 (s.d. 2.35) and boys 6.00 (s.d. 2.62). The within- 
sex analysis however allows possible relationships with diver­
gent abilities to emerge separately, and it is clear that 
divergent thinking abilities have some validity in predicting 
imaginative interests for girls, and that this relationship 
is not dependent on intelligence to more than a very small 
extent.
Barker Lunn suggested however that children of above 
average intelligence seemed to choose imaginative activities 
of a more demanding nature, though girls of less than average 
ability tended to have a higher overall score. As discussed 
in relation to Torrance’s checklist, the relationship between 
divergent thinking abilities and children’s self-report ques­
tionnaires of creative interests, could be regarded as a 
common facility for making indiscriminate associations or as 
a deficiency of self-criticism and evaluation.
On the other hand children of high intelligence do not 
have a monopoly of interest in creative activities, and
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children of primary school age are generally willing to exp­
ress their enthusiasm for an activity even if they are not 
able to fully assess their level of accomplishment. The 
scale asked for the degree of enjoyment of various activities 
rather than any specific level of performance and it seems 
that children, irrespective of their level of intelligence, 
show different capacities to involve themselves creatively in 
a variety of activities and that this is reflected to a small 
but significant extent by tests of divergent thinking.
Gardner (1950) found in a study of the interests of 10-year- 
old children, that those from classrooms in which the curri­
culum was 'interest orientated' showed a higher level of 
activity in pursuing their interests than children from more 
'traditional' classrooms; and it is consequently likely that 
the degree of children's enthusiasm for creative activities 
can also be developed with appropriate teaching.
As in Wallach and Wing’s (1969) study of talented college 
students, the present results indicate slightly more associa­
tion between the fluency scores and creative activities than 
for originality scores. This is true for both Torrance’s 
checklist and the Imaginative interests, though there are 
also some significant validity coefficients for the originality 
scores. The latter are less open to objection on the grounds 
of common irrelevant fluency, though in spite of the objec­
tions the writer would also claim some considerable validity 
from the fluency coefficients.
10.235 Validity Coefficients with Logical/Analytic 
Interests




























































































































(Decimal points are omitted in the table)
Values of r are significant at the 5% and II levels as follows: 
for n = 161, r _> 0.16 and r ^  0.21 respectively )
for n = 84, r 0.22 and r ^  0,28 respectively > (2-tail test),
for n = 77, r _> 0.23 and r > 0.29 respectively )
Basic coefficients have n - Z  d.f. and first-order coefficients
n - 3 d.f.
Significant coefficients are underlined.
Table 33 Validity Coefficients for the Divergent Tests with
Logical/Analytic Interests, and First-drder Partial
Coefficients Controlling for Intelligence
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coefficients are presented in Table 33, though only one of 
the coefficients, the basic coefficient for Circles (origi­
nality), is significant (p < 0.05) for the whole population. 
Unlike most of the coefficients with other criteria however, 
most of the coefficients with logical/analytic interests are 
less significant for the whole population than for boys and 
girls separately. This reflects their different levels of 
preference for these interests, the mean score for boys being 
5.60 (s.d. 1.70), and for girls 4.02 (s.d. 1.73). Within 
sexes there are some significant relationships for girls but 
not for boys. The trend of coefficients for boys is generally 
positive, with that for the fluency score for Uses being sig­
nificant at 1 0 % for the zero-order coefficient, but like the 
coefficient between Circles (originality) and imaginative 
interests in the last section this is an isolated coefficient 
which might have occurred by chance.
On the other hand it appears that girls who have logi­
cal and analytic interests do tend to have higher divergent 
thinking scores. All the basic coefficients are consistently 
positive, those for Consequences (originality). Consequences 
(combined score) and Verbal Tests (combined score) being sig­
nificant at 5%. The combined scores for Circles and Uses are 
both significant at lOj, and with substantial, though non­
significant, coefficients remaining for all the scores after 
the effects of intelligence are removed, the evidence for the 
girls provides some concurrent validity.
Even for girls however, the level of the coefficients 
is not high, though a correction for attenuation would inc­
rease their magnitude to a potentially more useful level. 
Assuming a reliability of 0.85 for the interests scale, the
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validity coefficient for Consequences (originality), for 
example, would increase from 0.24 to 0.34.
As well as considerations based on the significance 
and magnitude of the validity coefficients the weight that 
one gives to the results depends to a large extent on the 
value that one can place on the validity of the criterion 
itself. Like its imaginative counterpart on the Barker Lunn 
scale it is the children's own expression of interest in the 
activities, rather than any assessment of the level of their 
performance, which is measured by the list of logical/analy­
tic interests, and the views expressed in the last session 
regarding the imaginative scale apply similarly to this cri­
terion.
Although the writer has suggested that considerable 
weight can be given to the evidence of concurrent validity 
already considered, the objections that have been acknowledged 
regarding criteria which depend on children's responses to 
self-report inventories are not applicable to the next criter­
ion, and it is suggested that the validity coefficients deri­
ved in relation to the following practical criterion deserve 
special recognition.
10.236 Concurrent Validity of Divergent Thinking Tests 
in relation to the Board Game
The nature of the data derived for the Board Game has 
already been outlined in Chapter 5, and the distribution of 
the results described earlier in this chapter (page 320). In 
view of the asymmetry of the distribution validity coefficients 
derived using Pearson 'r ' are not likely to be very accurate
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though it is not possible to estimate exactly what error is 
involved in such correlations. Coarse grouping tends to 
result in correlations which are underestimates of a true 
underlying relationship, though the effects of skew distri­
butions are not so consistently predicted. Wylie (1976) has 
investigated the effects of both on the Pearson product mom­
ent coefficient however and produced some relevant findings.
Taking a normal bivariate distribution with known cor­
relation, he grouped the data to form 24 categories in each 
variable, then gradually reduced the number of categories, 
incorporating different degrees of asymmetry, and computing 
a Pearson 'r ' for each new set of data. As an example, he 
found that with one variable reduced to only two categories 
and with extreme skew in opposite directions, the theoretical 
correlation of 0.40 was nearly halved to 0.21. With the same 
variable reduced to six categories however (as in the present 
Board Game experiment) the Pearson 'r ' was a fairly accurate
0.393.
For all the varying degrees of skewness and numbers of 
categories the value of Pearson ’r ’ ranged from 0.37 to 0.41 
provided one variable had at least twelve categories and the 
other at least six. Corrections for coarse grouping narrowed 
this range to 0.39 to 0.41, but a larger number of correla­
tions were then slightly overestimated. To reduce the possi­
bility of the latter no correction for grouping is made to 
the data in the present study. The data supplied by Wylie 
however gives some idea of the accuracy of the Pearson coeffi­
cients for the Board Game, the error very likely being consi­
derably less than 10%. If precise significance levels were 
required this degree of error would be unacceptable, but with
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only one coarsely grouped variable and with some caution in 
interpreting the general levels of significance, correlations 
between the divergent thinking measures and the Board Game 
should give some useful information about their relationship. 
This will be followed by a categorical analysis in the next 
section. The 'tentative’ validity coefficients of the diver­
gent tests with the Board Game are therefore presented in 
Table 34, with coefficients of possible significance under­
lined. As in the case of logical/analytic interests boys 
score more highly than girls on this variable, the mean score 
for boys being 2.22 (s.d. 1.77) and for girls 1.11 (s.d. 1.43). 
Some variation in performance between the sexes was expected, 
but the extent of this difference was not revealed by the 
pilot investigations with a comparatively small number of 
children. The within-sex correlations may therefore be more 
revealing, and the subsequent analysis will pay particular 
attention to the validity of the Board Game for each sex 
separately.
With cautious reference to the significance levels of 
5% and 1% as indications of the significance of the validity 
coefficients in question, there is considerable evidence of 
some concurrent validity particularly .for boys. Considering 
the more even distribution of performance by boys their vali­
dity coefficients are likely to be more accurate than those 
for girls, and the values of 0.32, 0.38, 0.23 and 0.36 for 
the combined scores for Circles, Uses, Consequences and Com­
bined Verbal, respectively, are all significant, the three 
larger coefficients at well beyond 1%. Apart from the Conse­
quences score these remain significant after the removal of 
the effects of intelligence, and suggest that divergent tests
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(Decimal points are omitted in the table)
Tentatively, values of r are significant at the 5% and 1% levels
as follows:
for n = 161, r 2. 0.16 and r 2. 0*21 respectively )
for n = 84, rr 2. 0,22 and r 2. 0*28 respectively > (2-tail test).
for n = 77, r 2. 0*23 and r 2  0.29 respectively )
Basic coefficients have n - 2 d.f. and first-order coefficients
n - 3 d.f.
Coefficients of likely significance are underlined.
Table 34 'Tentative' Validity Coefficients for the
Divergent Tests with the Board Game and First-order
Partial Coefficients Controlling for Intelligence
358.
can play a significant role in evaluating the type of ability 
needed for success on experimental tasks such as the Board 
Game.
There is no clear pattern to suggest that one of the 
attributes of fluency, flexibility or originality is particu­
larly important, all three figuring prominently in one test 
or another. For boys the validity coefficient for originality 
is greatest in the Circles Test, that for fluency in the Uses 
Test and the combined score in the Consequences Test. For 
girls the validity of the originality measures is more marked, 
and it is the only ability significant in two tests, namely 
the Circles Test and the Uses Test.
The flexibility measure which was included in the Cir­
cles Test with the Board Game in mind, is significally rela­
ted to performance on the latter for girls and for the popu­
lation as a whole, but is only of borderline significance 
for boys. For girls it is in fact the highest individual 
validity coefficient. However, as discussed in connection 
with Guilford’s Model of the Intellect in Chapter 3 and in 
the scoring procedures in Chapter 6 , credit for originality 
also demands a considerable degree of flexible thinking, with 
the added demand for quality of response.
The amount of weight to give to the tentative correla­
tion coefficients in Table 34 is not yet clear however and 
an alternative method of analysis is needed to throw further 
light on this question.
10.24 Categorical Analysis of the Validity of the Divergent
Tests in Relation to the Board Game
This analysis will be carried out for a selection of 
the divergent measures and the results generalised to cover
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the remainder of the validity coefficients in Table 34 not 
directly checked by categorical analysis. As boys and girls 
show differing patterns of results they will be treated 
separately in this section.
Two measures are chosen for investigation within each 
sex, one figurai and one verbal. There is no special signi­
ficance about the choice, but only measures whose coefficients 
appear significant in Table 34 are selected. For the verbal 
tests these are those with the highest tentative validity 
coefficients, namely Uses (fluency) for boys and Uses (origi­
nality) for girls. To represent the figurai measures the 
combined score for Circles is used for both boys and girls.
The children were ranked in each sex separately accord­
ing to performance on each of these divergent thinking measu­
res and three groups formed for each measure. These were 
comprised of boys or girls in the top 30% (High group), 
middle 40% (Average group) and bottom 30% (Low group) on each 
of the respective distributions. The performance of the chil­
dren in each of these groups on the Board Game is illustrated 
in Tables 35, 36, 37 and 38.
When tied ranks occurred at boundary points the indivi­
duals concerned were allocated to whichever group needed the 
greater proportion of the tied group.
The data in each table is analysed using the test.
The significance of depends only upon the degrees of 
freedom in the table, no assumptions being made as to the form 
of the distribution of the variables classified (Garrett, 1966; 
Guilford and Fruchter, 1973). The null hypothesis for each 
table is that there is no relationship between divergent think­








3/y Y i Y 2 Totals
High D.T. 6 3 8 3 1 2 23
Average D.T. 3 3 6 4 8 7 31
Low D.T. 3 2 3 3 2 10 23
Totals 12 8 17 10 11 19 77
Table 35 Children’s Performance on the Board Game 
at Different Levels of Divergent Ability
(circles Test (Combined Score). Boys, n = 77)
y  ̂ Analysis (Table 35)
The data is reduced to a 3 x 3 table for the calculation 
of in order to make the expected frequency in each cell 
exceed 5 (Nesbitt, 1966).
Performance on the Board Game was therefore reduced to 
three classifications. High, Medium and Low, by adding the a 
and 3 i categories, the 32 and 3/y categories and the yi and 
Y 2 categories respectively.
As a result = 9.588 for 4 d.f.
This is significant (0.01 < p < 0.05) and the null 
hypothesis of no association between performance on the Board 
Game and Divergent Thinking is rejected.
As an indication of the degree of the relationship, the 






3/y yi Y 2 Totals
High D.T. 1 2 3 6 6 7 25
Average D.T. 2 2 2 4 8 16 34
Low D.T. 1 0 0 1 6 17 25
Totals 4 4 5 11 20 40 84
Table 36 Children’s Performance on the Board Game
at Different Levels of Divergent Ability 
(circles Test (Combined Score). Girls, n = 84)
y  ̂ Analysis (Table 36)
For the calculation of the data is reduced to a 
3 x 2  table with two classifications for the Board Game, 
’success’ (a, 3 i, 3 2 » and 3/y) and ’failure’ (yi and yz). 
y^ = 9.82 for 2 d.f. (0.005 < p < 0.01).
The null hypothesis of no association is rejected. 









3/y Y i Y 2 Totals
High D.T. 7 2 5 5 1 3 23
Average D.T. 3 5 10 4 5 5 32
Low D.T. 2 1 2 1 5 11 22
Totals 12 8 17 10 11 19 77
Table 37 Children’s Performance on the Board Game 
at Different Levels of Divergent Ability
(Uses Test (Fluency). Boys, n = 77)
Analysis (Table 37)
The data was reduced to a 3 x 3 table as for Table 35 
= 16.55 for 4 d.f. (0.001 < p < 0.005)
The null hypothesis of no association is rejected.









3/y Yi Y 2 Totals
High D.T. 1 2 1 5 6 9 24
Average D.T. 2 2 4 4 8 14 34
Low D.T. 1 0 0 2 6 17 26
Totals 4 4 5 11 20 40 84
Table 38 Children's Performance on the Board Game 
at Different Levels of Divergent Ability
(Uses Test (Originality). Girls, n = 84)
Analysis (Table 38)
The data was reduced to a 3 x 2 table as for Table 36.
= 5.39 for 2 d.f. (0.05 < p < 0.1)
The null hypothesis of no association is in doubt.
As an indication of some relationship between the 
variables C = 0.25.
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The results of the analyses shown in Tables 35 to 38 
lead to the same conclusions as the Pearson ’r* validity 
coefficients in Table 34. The validity coefficients for Uses 
(fluency) and Circles (combined score) both for boys, which 
are significant at 1% in Table 34 are of a similar, but 
slightly lower level of significance by x^ analysis at 1 % and 
5% respectively. The relationship for Circles (combined score) 
for girls is slightly more significant by x^ analysis than for 
the correlation coefficient (p < 0.01), and Uses (originality) 
for girls is rather less significant, p < 0.07, compared to 
p = 0.05 exactly for the correlation coefficient.
Overall the levels of significance are slightly reduced 
but considering that non-parametric tests are less ’powerful’ 
than parametric tests with the same data the categorical ana­
lysis provides convincing support for the general level of 
validity coefficients in Table 34, in spite of the skewness 
and coarse grouping in the Board Game distribution.
As an illustration of the lack of power of the non- 
parametric tests it is interesting to note that in the case 
of Uses (originality) for girls, three girls with tied diver­
gent thinking scores appeared on the borderline between the 
top and middle groups and were all successful at the Board 
Game with scores of 5, 3 and 1 respectively. In choosing 
the top 30%, one of these children should have been placed 
in the top group, but with tied scores all three were placed 
in the middle category as originally decided. Had they been 
placed in the top category the value of x^ would have been 
increased markedly, and the value actually obtained, signifi­
cant at approximately 7% is therefore regarded as of border­
line significance comparable to that obtained for ’r ’.
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Parametric tests use more of the detail from the data than is 
used by non-parametric tests and the fact that this group of 
children had comparatively high divergent scores would have 
been utilized in the former method of analysis.
Coefficients of contingency, C, are also given as an 
alternative expression of the value of and give some indi­
cation of the magnitude of the relationship. Under certain 
conditions, of fine grouping, underlying normality in the 
categorised variables and large samples, C is a good estimate 
of 'r’, but in the present case these conditions are not fully 
realised. C is therefore included only as a general indica­
tion of the likely underlying value of ’r ’. There is a 
general level of agreement between C and the values of *r' in 
Table 34, C values of 0.33, 0.32, 0.42, and 0.25 correspond­
ing to values of ’r ' of 0.32, 0.29, 0.39 and 0.22 respectively.
Reduction of the divergent thinking scores into three 
categories loses a considerable amount of information, but 
in addition to making the data convenient for x^ analysis it 
has the advantage of being able to illustrate the nature of 
individuals’ performances on the Board Game. Looking at Table 
36 for example it illustrates that although the high divergent 
thinking girls, as assessed by the Circles Test, are not 
guaranteed successful performance on the Board Game, the 
higher their performance the greater their likelihood of 
success. In the high D.T. category 12 children were success­
ful and 13 unsuccessful while in the middle category these 
figures were 10 and 24 respectively, and in the low category 
only two were successful out of 25. While the latter category 
was also below average in I.Q., five of the girls had I.Q.’s 
greater than 1 0 0 , and the girl with an ’a ’ performance in the
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Board Game had an I.Q. of only 8 8 .
Although divergent ability is not a criterion for suc­
cess on the Board Game for individuals such as the latter, 
further study of individuals in depth might reveal other 
characteristics that might enable them to gain success, and 
the Board Game could provide a useful technique to help in 
such an investigation. Evidence regarding other abilities 
that might be relevant to success on the Board Game will be 
looked at in the next chapter when the general relationships 
between the variables are examined.
In particular the characteristics of the above girl 
suggest that her extraverted nature might be one factor con­
tributing to her success in the Board Game, though it did not 
enhance her performances on the divergent tests which were 
consistently low. She was above average in extraversion and 
rated as very lively and seldom shy of her teacher. She was 
also far less neurotic than the average girl and had slightly 
above average self-image regarding school work, and self- 
concept in general. She had relatively few interests however, 
as assessed by all the interest scales and she was rated very 
low by her teacher for characteristics of creative behaviour.
She appears more of a doer than a thinker and a ’scanner' 
rather than a ’focusser’ (Bruner et al^ 1956). Her spontane­
ous actions resulted in success at the Board Game though her 
I.Q. and divergent performance and the ’average’ ratings for 
school work suggest that her powers of concentration might be 
limited. The danger with scanners is that they rely a great 
deal on trial and error action and find sequential work diffi­
cult. As a result they tend to be relegated in the more con­
ventional levels of school work. Further research utilizing
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the Board Game might help reveal some of the characteristics 
of scanners and focussers and provide further information 
regarding the general trend established above relating diver­
gent thinking ability to successful performance.
With reference to the classification of boys’ perform­
ance in Table 37 it can be seen that 19 out of the 23 high 
divergent thinkers have some success on the Board Game as 
opposed to only 6 out of 23 in the low group. Of the 12 a- 
solutions by boys, 7 were obtained by the high group.
As can be seen from the correlations in Table 25, and 
by the significant partial validity coefficients in Tables 26 
to 34, the divergent thinking measures are not highly corre­
lated with I.Q., and this indicates that the individuals in 
a high divergent group are not those who could have otherwise 
been selected, on the basis of intelligence. The fact that 
children in the high divergent groups on various divergent 
thinking measures tend to perform significantly better on the 
Board Game than those in lower groups gives considerable 
weight to the concurrent validity of the tests. This claim 
of divergent thinking tests to possess incremental validity 
over and above that of I.Q. is looked at further in the next 
session.
10.25 Relative Performance of Convergers ana Divergers
on the Board Game
A closer look at the children who appear in the top 30% 
on the intelligence test or divergent thinking, or both, can 
provide a clearer indication of the positive value of diver­
gent thinking ability in comparison with I.Q. For the purpose
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of this illustration the Board Game will be used as the cri­
terion measure and the Uses (fluency) score for boys alone 
will be used to select the divergent thinking group. The 
Uses (fluency) score is the best predictor of success at the 
Board Game for boys, and its correlation with I.Q. is only 
moderate (r = 0.39), so that it should be possible to demon­
strate its power of prediction over and above that achieved 
by the I.Q. test. The same general principle holds for each 
of the other divergent measures and criteria and this point 
will be returned to shortly.
The performance of the two groups at the Board Game is 
shown in Table 39.
Board Game Responses
a 31 3 2 3/Y Yi Y 2 Total
High I.Q. 5 5 7 2 3 2 24
High D.T. 
(Uses,fluency) 7 2 5 5 1 3 23
Table 39 Performance at the Board Game of Boys
in the Top 30% on I.Q. or Divergent Thinking
That both I.Q. and divergent measures are clearly rele­
vant to success at the Board Game is shown by the table, and 
more generally, by their correlations of 0.38 and 0.39 res­
pectively with Board Game performance. The extent to which 
the same children are registering success in both groups 
however is not clear from Table 39 and a consideration of the 
following Genn diagram (Figure 8) is more illuminating. It 
illustrates the Board Game performance of the two groups of 
boys selected by I.Q. and D.T. (divergent thinking) respecti­
vely.
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The two loops represent the top 30% of boys on each 
measure, and the numbers inside the loops give the Board Game 
score of the children within each group. The overlapping 
area represents those children who appear in both groups - 
the all-rounders, and the remaining areas are those of the 
convergers (those in the top 30% on I.Q. but not in the top 








Fig.8 . Performance on the Board Game of Boys 
in the Top 30% on I.Q. or Divergent Thinking (or both)
It is evident from Figure 8 that the validity of diver­
gent thinking in predicting boys performance on the Board 
Game is not simply a duplication of that of intelligence. In 
contrast to Hasan and Butcher (1966) who found it difficult 
to establish groups of convergers and divergers due to the
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substantial overlap between the measures of I.Q. and D.T., 
two such groups are readily distinguishable in the above 
distribution, though the present cut-off points are set at 
30% rather than 20%. Overall the Board Game performance of 
the convergers and divergers is very similar, though the 
divergers included more of the very best solvers. Both groups 
included a number of boys who failed to achieve a successful 
outcome but this was a smaller proportion than in the sample 
as a whole. In the latter 30 out of 77 boys did not gain a 
successful solution, being in categories yi or Y 2 , though 
only 4 out of 23 divergers and only 5 out of 24 convergers 
were in these categories. In the group of all-rounders how­
ever none of the boys failed to achieve some success, 3 out 
of the 7 achieving a-solutions.
In general terms the average performance of the all- 
rounders (mean 3.86, s.d. 113) is considerably better than 
that of both the convergers (mean 2.71, s.d. 1.56) and the 
divergers (mean 2.63 s.d. 1.76). The differences are signi­
ficant at just over and just under the 5% level (t = 2.054 
d.f. 22, and t = 2.085, d.f. 21) respectively using the t- 
test for small samples.
If the 23 boys in the top 30% on the Circles Test (com­
bined score), whose performance on the Board Game is shown in 
Table 35, were added into Figure 8 , 5 new children would be 
added, 11 would appear in common with those already chosen by
I.Q., and 11 in common with D.T. (Uses, fluency). Four boys 
would appear common to all three groups, being in the top 30% 
on all three measures. Each of these four obtain successful 
solutions, three achieving a-solutions and one a 32-solution.
Divergent thinking tests clearly have considerable 
validity in predicting success at the Board Game, and function.
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to a substantial degree, independently of I.Q. in choosing 
potential solvers. As a result the combination of I.Q. and 
divergent thinking tests provided an even more marked effect 
in predicting the Board Game performance and this suggests 
that combined measures could provide considerable information 
about children's abilities. Although the Venn diagram analy­
sis has been conducted for boys only, comparable effects 
would occur whenever there are significant validity coeffi­
cients in Tables 35-38.
10.26 An Illustration of the Potential of Divergent Thinking
Tests and I.Q. in Forming a Multiple Validity Coefficient
In statistical terms the maximum combined effects of 
more than one measure in predicting another can be presented 
in terms of their multiple correlation. As a more general 
expression of their combined effect than was illustrated by 
the Venn d agram, the effect of both intelligence and diver­
gent thinking scores in predicting boys performance on the 
Board Game can therefore be indicated by their multiple 
correlation, R, with the Board Game. For practical use the 
scores on both tests would be combined according to a multiple 
regression equation, which weights the scores so as to achieve 
maximum prediction. Provided that the two independent vari­
ables do not correlate highly there can be a considerable 
gain in validity by combining them in this way.
For example the multiple validity coefficient for a 
combined predictor of I.Q. and Uses (fluency) in relation to 
performance on the Board Game for boys is 0.51. This compares 
with individual correlations with the Board Game of 0.38 and 
0.39 respectively, and a partial correlation of 0.37 between
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Uses (fluency) and the Board Game with the effect of the 
first variable (intelligence) removed.
For girls the correlation between I.Q. and the Board 
Game is 0.29, and it is also 0.29 between the Board Game and 
divergent thinking (assessed by Circles (combined score) as 
in the analysis). The latter validity coefficient is 
reduced to 0.20 after the effect of intelligence is removed 
but the subsequent multiple R, combining I.Q. and D.T. is 
raised to 0.35. The borderline validity coefficient of 0.22 
for Uses (originality) for girls is reduced to 0.16 after 
controlling for intelligence but even this small residual 
effect increases the validity of I.Q. alone (0.29) to give a 
multiple R of 0.33.
In the first of these examples there is quite a marked 
increase in predicted variance of 13%, but in the other two 
cases the increase is only 4% and 2^% respectively. Although 
considerable evidence has therefore been presented in this 
chapter to show that divergent thinking tests possess statis­
tically significant amounts of concurrent validity the actual 
magnitude of the predictions has not been high.
Some further prediction might be gained however by 
adding other tests to the calculation of multiple correlation. 
Guilford and Fruchter (1973) point out that the addition of 
tests to a predictive battery which have intercorrelations of 
about 0.60 or more adds little to the overall predictive 
effect. For example, assuming validity coefficients of 0.30 
for each test in the battery and intercorrelations ot 0.60, 
the multiple R for two tests is 0.34 but for 20 similar tests 
is only 0.38. Although some of the correlations between the 
individual divergent thinking abilities in the present battery
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are as high as 0.62, most of them are in the region of 0.50 
as can be seen in Table 23. Some, in fact, particularly 
between figurai originality and the verbal measures, are as 
low as 0.33 and, provided they have significant validity 
coefficients, these could make valuable contributions to 
extending the multiple correlation of the battery.
The additional effect of considering Circles (combined 
score) in the prediction of boys performance on the Board 
Game has already been mentioned in the Venn diagram analysis, 
and it is a suitable measure to add to the multiple correla­
tion approach to predictive validity. It has correlations of 
only 0.28 and 0.46 with I.Q. and Uses (fluency) and a validity 
coefficient of 0.32. Calculating the correlations ri% 
between the Board Game (B.C.) and I.Q., rig ,2 between B.C. 
and Uses with I.Q. removed, and ri%,2 3 between B.C. and Cir­
cles with both I.Q. and Uses removed, the multiple correlation 
^1(234) between the Board Game and a combination of the other 
three variables can be determined. This gives a value of 
R = 0.57, and shows a substantial increase on that of 0.51 
for I.Q. and a verbal D.T. measure alone.
The addition of a second divergent test contrasting with 
the first therefore accounts for an additional 6 J% of the 
variance in the criterion, and the multiple R predicts appro­
ximately 3 2 of the criterion variance. This is a substan­
tial improvement on the prediction of 14a% by I.Q. alone.
Not all of the divergent tests are as effective predictors as 
those chosen for this example, but it points to the consider­
able potential of divergent thinking tests in this respect.
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10.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
10.31 General Evidence for Concurrent Validity
The main conclusion from the evidence presented is that 
divergent thinking abilities have some positive validity in 
relation to a number of criteria of creative behaviour.
Considering the six creative criteria finally selected, 
and the seven divergent thinking abilities, three from the 
Circles Test, two from the Uses Test and two from the Conse­
quences Test, a substantial proportion of the validity coef­
ficients are significant. For the population as a whole 27 
out of the 42 coefficients are significant, 16 at 1% level 
and 11 at 5%. A further 6 would be significant at 10%, or 
if a 1-tail test had been adopted.
Creative activity in one sphere does not necessarily 
imply creativity in another and it was not intended to estab­
lish an unidimensional battery of tests of creative behaviour. 
Apart from one coefficient however, there was a low positive 
relationship between the measures for both boys and girls 
(Table 24) and a combined criterion score allows an overall 
validity index to be calculated. For a whole battery of 
divergent thinking tests the resulting validity coefficients 
are 0.44 for boys and 0.46 for girls, both highly significant 
(p < 0.001). Separate validity coefficients for the figurai 
and verbal measures of divergent thinking are also significant 
at this level, the relationship being stronger for verbal 
tests, particularly for girls.
The results consequently give support to studies which 
have found positive evidence for the concurrent validity of 
divergent thinking tests, and the general level of the rela­
tionship is also similar to a number of other studies.
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As found by Vernon (1972) the overall divergent battery 
appears to be a better predictor for girls than for boys, 
though in this study this is due chiefly to the better vali­
dity of the verbal divergent thinking measures for girls.
10.32 The Effect of Intelligence on the Validity Coefficients
of the Divergent Tests
First-order partial validity coefficients controlling 
for the effect of intelligence demonstrated that part of the 
validity of the divergent tests was equally well accounted 
for by intelligence. Out of the 27 validity coefficients 
which were significant for the whole population however, 13 
remained significant at the 5% level or greater, and substan­
tial positive correlations remained in many of the others. 
Considering the possible over-compensation by removing I.Q. 
effects, it was suggested that the distinct divergent think­
ing effect was still of importance, and correction for attenu­
ation for the greater unreliability in the divergent tests 
than in I.Q. (see Tables 28 and 31), reinstated a number of 
the coefficients in the significant category.
These results compare well with those of Milgram and 
Milgram (1976) who in the study referred to in Chapter 4, 
looked at the concurrent validity of a summed divergent 
thinking score based on fluency measures alone, in relation 
to nine areas of creative activity as assessed from a self- 
report inventory given to 145 high-school students. Partiall- 
ing out intelligence they found significant validity coeffi­
cients in two out of the nine areas for boys and in two areas 
for girls. Two further coefficients were significant at 10%, 
and an overall correlation with a combined score for creative
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performance was significant at 1 % for both boys and girls 
separately. Using the combined figurai and combined verbal 
scores from the present study, four out of the twelve partial 
validity coefficients were significant for boys, and three 
for girls. A further three coefficients were on the border­
line significance at 5%.
Milgram and Milgram concluded that their results showed 
that students reporting high creative performance were charac­
terised by a higher level of creative thinking - though they 
noted that the relationship was not high. A similar conclu­
sion, on a slightly firmer basis, can be made for the results 
in this study.
The effect of intelligence was considerably more marked 
in some criteria than others and a clearer picture of its 
effect is gained by considering the individual criteria.
With the exception of Teacher Ratings I.Q. was no more 
highly related to the creative criteria than were the diver­
gent variables, as can be seen from Table 25. As a result 
removal of I.Q. had a greater effect on validity coefficients 
with Teacher Ratings than on the other coefficients. Only 
one of the six significant validity coefficients with Teacher 
Ratings remained significant after I.Q. was removed, though 
in contrast, of the six significant validity coefficients 
with Torrance's Checklist five partial coefficients remained 
significant, 4 at the 1% level. A number of features of 
these criteria were discussed to explain these results, and 
it is important to accept that I.Q. and divergent thinking 
can both be related to various criteria, in different ways 
and to different degrees.
This is shown clearly in the analysis of the result of
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the Board Game in which I.Q. and divergent thinking abilities 
showed similar levels of correlation but by no means identi­
fied the same individuals. It is suggested that I.Q. and 
divergent thinking abilities can therefore play complementary 
roles in identifying creative talent. As an illustration the 
multiple correlation between a combination of I.Q. and diver­
gent thinking (Uses, fluency), and the Board Game for boys 
was 0.51, as opposed to individual validities of 0.38 and 
0.39 for I.Q. and D.T. respectively.
Correlations between the different divergent thinking 
measures (Table 23) show that divergent abilities, even for 
the same tests, though quite highly correlated, are by no 
means identical, and further prediction can be gained for a 
battery of tests by considering their optimal combination 
rather than by simply finding a total divergent thinking 
score. As an example, when the combined score for Circles 
was added to the above predictor of success on the Board Game 
the multiple correlation was raised to 0.57, the combination 
of divergent abilities contributing an extra 18% of the var­
iance, compared to 14^% by I.Q. alone. A good deal of the 
evidence for concurrent validity therefore remains, over and 
above the effect of intelligence.
10.33 Sex Differences and Validity Coefficients with
Individual Criteria
Some sex differences in creative activities and inter­
ests remarked on by a number of writers (e.g. Barker Lunn, 
1970; Vernon, 1972) were confirmed in the present analysis, 
and these existed not only in terms of some differences in 
level of performance, but in the pattern of validity correla-
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tions with the divergent tests. Although the validity coef­
ficients were generally positive for both sexes the magnitude 
of some of the correlations varied considerably and the 
effect of intelligence was usually more marked for girls than 
for boys.
As shown in Table 26 the overall validity coefficients 
were slightly higher for girls than for boys, but this is not 
true of the figurai score which was a slightly more valid 
predictor for boys. The verbal measures on the other hand, 
possibly reflecting the more consistent effect of intelligence 
for girls, was considerably higher for girls.
In comparison with the 27 coefficients out of 42 signi­
ficant to the population as a whole, 14 are significant to 
boys alone (8 at 1%) and 21 for girls (7 at 1%).
The differences were most marked on the Imaginative 
Interests scale, none of the divergent tests having more than 
a nominal degree of validity for boys, but both verbal tests 
having significant coefficients for girls. This was also 
true to a lesser extent on the Golann scale, all the verbal 
scores showing significant validity coefficients for girls 
but not for boys. The reverse was true for the Board Game, 
both combined verbal scores being significant predictors for 
boys but not for girls. Validity coefficients with Teacher 
Ratings and Torrance’s Checklist, and to a lesser extent 
Logical/Analytic Interests showed less sex differences than 
the other criteria.
It appears, as might have been expected, that divergent 
tests function best as predictors of creative activities that 
are most relevant to the experiences of the subjects. If 
self-report inventories are considered by the subject to be
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lacking in relevance to his own experience or situation then 
his replies are not likely to do justice to his real creative 
interests. External ratings, provided the rater has suffi­
cient experience of the children and the rating scale is 
sufficiently wide, seem able to overcome this difficulty, 
but the Board Game, which was designed as the major criterion, 
suffers slightly in this respect.
Although some researches (e.g. Sharpies, 1969) have 
suggested that "general assumptions about girls’ subjects and 
boys’ activities" are not as well founded as one might think, 
the result of the present study suggest that even in the 
present era of unisex, batteries of creative activities and 
interests might serve as better criteria if they were designed 
more specifically with boys and girls interests in mind. As 
with the problems of reliability discussed in Chapter 8 , moti­
vation has to be sustained over both the initial test and the 
criterion test (or retest) in order to gain the maximum pre­
dictive validity, and this might have to take boys’ and girls’ 
varying preferences into account.
This aspect should not be overstated however as a con­
siderable degree of concurrent validity extends across both 
criteria and sex differences. Validity coefficients are 
strongest when the subjects bring the same abilities to bear 
on both criteria and predictors and motivation is just one of 
the common variables. The present results provide evidence 
of a good deal of association between divergent abilities and 
the creative criteria, even when the association is stronger 
in one sex rather than another, and there are a number of 
validity coefficients which assume greater significance in 
the whole population than with either sex alone.
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As discussed earlier it should also be noted that apart 
from Teacher Ratings and the Board Game the criteria of crea­
tive activities carried no evaluation for quality of response. 
Milgram and Milgram (1976) give some support to the use of 
self-report inventories scored according to quantity of crea­
tive interests, finding a high correlation between their 
quantity index and a quality measure based on details supplied 
with the initial information. Their finding however is likely 
to be more true of their able high school pupils than of the 
11-year-olds in this study.
10.34 The Board Game
The Board Game experiment was given particular atten­
tion, partly because of the nature of the data, and partly 
because of the greater weight that the writer suggests should 
be given to this criterion.
As pointed out when the individual validity coefficients 
were considered only the Teacher Ratings and the Board Game 
carry credit for quality of response. Teacher Ratings do so 
implicitly and subjectively and, as shown, rely to a very 
large extent on abilities covered by the conventional intelli­
gence test. The Board Game, on the other hand, was designed 
to involve thinking abilities that called for some hard analy­
tical thinking in "trying to penetrate, to realise and to 
trace out the main relations between form and task", Werthei­
mer (1949, 1961), fluency and originality in thinking of 
unusual ideas and uses for objects, and the flexibility to 
try them out in different ways.
The writer has already discussed the theoretical back­
ground and the practical application of the task in Chapters
381.
3 and 5 respectively, and on this basis the results, particu­
larly for boys are claimed as important evidence of concurrent 
validity for divergent thinking tests.
This is especially true of the Circles and Uses tests 
which both gained substantially significant validity coeffi­
cients for both boys and girls, as high as 0.39, Uses (fluency), 
for boys and 0.29, Circles (flexibility and combined score), 
for girls. These results were confirmed and clarified by a 
analysis.
The Consequences Test was a significant predictor for 
boys having substantial validity coefficients for the indi­
vidual abilities and a significant combined coefficient. For 
girls however Consequences was much less successful, provid­
ing a positive correlation for originality but one of the few 
negative coefficients for fluency. This suggests that adding 
scores from several different tests is not always appropriate 
and a far better predictive effect is gained by considering 
the multiple correlation of the individual variables with a 
criterion. Combining scores for I.Q., Uses (fluency) and 
Circles (combined score) in this way achieves a multiple 
correlation of 0.57 between these three measures and the 
Board Game. This provides a very substantial multiple vali­
dity coefficient and illustrates the potential of divergent 
thinking tests in this respect.
10.35 Individual Variations in the Validity of the Divergent
Tests
Apart from the function of the flexibility score, no 
clear pattern emerges regarding the differing validities of 
the separate divergent abilities within tests. Validity
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coefficients for flexibility however were closely related to 
fluency coefficients, on all tests and for both sexes, with 
the fluency score generally being the better predictor of the 
two. There is consequently little evidence to support the 
use of separate flexibility scores, and taken together with 
the correlation of 0.83 with fluency reported in Table 23, 
the present findings support the views of Wallach (1970) and 
Hargreaves and Bolton (1972) that the flexibility score is 
not likely to supply any additional information to that given 
by the fluency score.
The relationship between fluency and originality is 
more equivocal. Considering the 18 instances in which they 
appeared for each sex (3 tests and 6 criteria), 36 pairs of 
validity coefficients were reported altogether. On 11 occa­
sions the coefficients were significant for both, on 5 occa­
sions they were significant for fluency only and on 5 occa­
sions for originality and not fluency. In the 10 cases show­
ing differences, most of these were slight, the non-significant 
correlations being substantially positive. In 4 cases however 
the differences were more marked. On Torrance’s Checklist the 
verbal fluency scores for boys were considerably better pre­
dictors than the corresponding originality scores, 0.29 com­
pared to .05 for Uses, and 0.32 compared to 0.12 for Conse­
quences, while on Teacher Ratings boys originality scores 
were better predictors on Circles and Uses than the correspon­
ding fluency score. For the Board Game the originality score 
on the Uses Test was a considerably better predictor than the 
fluency score for the girls, and though neither coefficient 
was significant a similar pattern was present on the Conse­
quences Test.
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There is a suggestion that fluency scores are more rela­
ted to self-report inventories, and that originality scores 
are a better predictor when quality of creative performance 
is assessed. For this reason the writer would support the 
continued use of originality scores for assessing divergent 
abilities. Fluency scores have a comparable level of vali­
dity however, and for some exercises the time saved by omitt­
ing the originality score may be considered worthwhile.
Although there is some slight evidence of these abilities 
being related across tests, the stronger relationship appears 
to be with the tests themselves, as suggested by Wallach
(1970) and Plass et al (1974). This question will be looked 
at again in the factor analysis in the next chapter.
A more positive conclusion can be made in respect of 
the value of the Circles Test in assessing divergent think­
ing abilities. Previous opinions regarding its inclusion in 
a divergent battery have been varied, and it has showed some 
factorial separation from other divergent tests in a previous 
study of the writer (Richards, 1970). The latter was taken 
as a positive indication of its role in a battery of diver­
gent tests, though Vernon (1971) suggests that its discrepan­
cies with the results of other divergent tests makes it a 
poor member of a divergent battery. While Vernon therefore 
suggests that it should be omitted from a divergent thinking 
battery, Hargreaves and Bolton (1972) , as a result of research 
into selecting 'creativity' tests for use in research, recom­
mend its inclusion.
The results of the present study support the latter 
view, particularly if verbal and figurai tests are combined
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as multiple predictors rather than by simply adding their 
scores.
Validity coefficients for the Circles Test were more 
evenly distributed between the sexes, apart from Imaginative 
Interests it had one or the other of its scores significantly 
related to each criterion. It was the only test significant 
for both boys and girls in predicting success in the Board 
Game. It was less successful than the verbal tests however 
in predicting Imaginative Interests and the creative activi­
ties on the Golann Scale, both which had a considerable 
emphasis on creative writing activities.
None of the tests were more than moderately related to 
intelligence, the highest correlation with I.Q. for the popu­
lation as a whole being that of 0.38 for Consequences (origi­
nality). Considering its lower reliability reported in 
Chapter 8 , the validity coefficients for the Uses Test assume 
greater significance than those for the other tests if correc­
ted for attenuation, and give some positive evidence for its 
position, as described by Hudson (1966) as almost the conven­
tional divergent thinking test.
Without the flexibility score for Circles, each test 
has scores for two abilities which, with six criteria, gave 
rise to 36 validity coefficients in all. Of the 25 which 
were significant for the whole population (see Table 25), 9 
were for the Circles Test, 9 for Uses and 7 for Consequences. 
Within the separate sexes, 6 of the validity coefficients 
for Circles Test scores, excluding flexibility, were signifi­
cant for boys and 5 for girls. For the Uses Test 4 were sig­
nificant for boys and 8 for girls, while for the Consequences 
Test the figures were 3 and 7 respectively. Vernon (1972)
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reported higher validity coefficients for his battery for 
girls and Cropley (1972) for boys. Overall the present 
battery gives a similar pattern to that of Vernon, though 
the figurai measures from the Circles Test are slightly 
better predictors for boys. As suggested in Section 10.33 
it is not always possible to provide a criterion which is 
free of bias towards one sex or the other, and it is sugges­
ted that the possible predominance of either girls or boys 
will therefore depend on the constitution of both the testing 
battery and the criterion measures.
With some care in regard to the motivational effects 
which, as suggested in Chapter 8 , might have reduced the 
reliability of the Uses Test, the writer would recommend the 
Circles and Uses Tests for future research, as an effective 
complementary pair of tests, one figurai and one verbal.
10.36 General Appraisal of the Evidence Presented
Wallach and Kogan (1966) examining their evidence for 
effects of divergent thinking ability (creativity) and intel­
ligence on other variables of achievement and personality 
tested approximately 200 separate hypotheses. They found 42 
relationships which they regarded as significant, accepting 
a significant level of 1 0% and sometimes even beyond this.
With as many as 20 (10%) likely to be ’significant’ by chance 
alone they nevertheless interpreted the evidence as being 
sufficient to have important implications for education.
Some reviewers (e.g. Shulman, 1966) commended their interpre­
tations, others (e.g. Cronbach, 1968) regarded their attempt 
to draw out implications and applications as premature.
This variation in views illustrates the difficulty of assessing
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the weight that should be given to research results. While 
some reviewers might place more store by the experimental 
design and the power of the statistical analysis, others 
might give more weight to a sound theoretical basis and 
tentative generalisations.
In establishing the present evidence for validity the 
writer has acknowledged that there is likely to be some vari­
ation in the amount of validity one can claim for the differ­
ent criteria. While some misgivings might be felt about the 
value of self-report inventories, the writer has argued that, 
even though they do not assess the quality of children’s res­
ponses they still provide evidence of creative activity.
Special emphasis however is placed on the Board Game, and 
with its theoretical background and practical nature, it adds 
a more realistic dimension to the type of data arrived at 
from the results of self-report inventories and questionnaires. 
As noted earlier the writer feels that the significance of the 
divergent tests in predicting the children’s level of perfor­
mance on this criterion is particularly important evidence 
for their concurrent validity. The other criteria add up to 
a more conventional measure and the overall validity coeffi­
cients are of a similar magnitude to those found by other 
researchers.
Evaluating the evidence statistically, the overall 
validity coefficients are significant beyond the 0 .1 % level. 
Excluding Circles (flexibility), 25 out of the 36 separate 
coefficients for the individual divergent thinking abilities 
are also significant (p < 0.05). The level of significance 
chosen, a two-tail test at 5%,is not lenient, and considering 
the unreliabilities of both tests and criteria, the relation-
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ships are sufficient to reject the null hypothesis of no 
association between tests and criteria with considerable 
confidence.
While statistically significant however the magnitude 
of the relationships is not high enough to suggest that 
divergent thinking abilities play more than a small part in 
predicting creative activity. The median value of the 25 
significant validity coefficients, 0.29, predicts only 8.4% 
of the variance in a particular criterion, though the compo­
site divergent score predicts 19.4% of the total creative 
criterion score for boys, and 2 1% for girls.
Both Anastasi (1968) and Cronbach (1970) point out 
that even tests with validity coefficients as low as 0.20 
can make a valuable contribution to a battery of tests, 
especially if they are not highly correlated with other tests 
in the battery, and it is in this light that the level of 
concurrent validity established in the present study can 
best be interpreted. There has been a consistent residual 
effect after controlling for intelligence, and this suggests 
that divergent tests can provide an ’incremental’ factor 
(Sechrest, 1963; Lewis, 1974) in recognising creative poten­
tial.
Had convergent abilities, as assessed by I.Q., showed 
a relationship with the creative criteria to a far greater 
extent than that of the divergent abilities, the proportion 
of variance contributed by the latter might have been compara­
tively unimportant. As it was however, the relationship of
I.Q. to the criteria, apart from Teacher Rating, was of a 
similar magnitude to those achieved by the divergent thinking 
measures. This might have been expected in the self-report
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inventories and questionnaires where quality of performance 
was not assessed, but it is particularly significant in the 
case of the Board Game, with its demands on children’s con­
structive, analytic and imaginative thinking ability.
In the latter a multiple prediction from I.Q. and two 
divergent thinking measures. Uses (fluency) and Circles (com­
bined score) accounted for 32J^ of the variance in boys per­
formance on the Board Game, and a very appreciable proportion, 
18%, was contributed by the D.T. measures.
There are, nevertheless, no grounds for equating high 
divergent thinking abilities with high performance on any of 
the creative criteria, including the Board Game, and such 
abilities are able to predict only a limited amount of the 
variance in children’s creative activities. This proportion 
however is significant and relatively consistent, and it is 
suggested that the results give considerable weight to estab­
lishing that divergent thinking abilities are worth fostering 
and developing in relation to creative activity. It may be 
that alternative and easier ways will be found of assessing 
this divergent aspect of children’s thinking ability, but in 
the meantime the evidence suggests that divergent thinking 
tests can play a part in recognising such ability.
As Anastasi (1968) points out, any concurrent validity 
which is established also provides additional evidence of 
construct validity for the underlying psychological trait, 
and although the actual magnitude of the present concurrent 
validities may, in general, be limited to only a moderate 
incremental effect in practical applications, they also pro­
vide support for a model of the intellect such as that of 
Guilford (1956, 1967) which includes a category of divergent
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thinking abilities.
Further information on the construct validity of the 
divergent tests will be provided in the next chapter, in a 




RESULTS OF THE FACTORIAL INVESTIGATION OF 
CONSTRUCT VA LID ITY
11.1 INTRODUCTION
This investigation is designed as an exploration of the 
relationships between divergent thinking tests and a range of 
other variables. In all scores on 31 variables were derived 
from the experimental procedures as described in Chapter 5. 
These consist of the seven separate divergent thinking scores, 
three for Circles, two for Uses and two for Consequences; 
four measures of convergent thinking, namely two I.Q. tests 
and end-of-year assessments by the teacher for English and 
Mathematics; seven attitude scores covering attitude to 
school and school work, academic self-image and self-concept; 
the seven creative criteria used in the investigation of con­
current validity, five measures of personality comprising the 
Extraversion, Neuroticism and Lie scales of the Junior Eysenck 
Personality Inventory and ’shy’ and ’lively’ ratings from the 
children’s class teacher; and a general assessment of the 
children’s pleasurability in class, again given by the res­
pective class teacher.
Placing the latter variable in a ’personality’ category 
for the present, there are consequently five general categor­
ies, divergent thinking, convergent thinking, attitudes, per­
sonality and creative criteria. Having several tests purpor­
ting to represent common abilities make the data amenable to 
factor analysis, in which tests having common variance help 
to establish recognisable factors. With this in mind the 
second I.Q. test, which was not used in the previous sections.
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and the General Interests score from the Barker-Lunn Interests 
questionnaire have both been retained in the present analysis.
As a pre-requisite for factor analysis the data has to 
fulfil the normal conditions for the calculation of Pearson 
product-moment coefficients, and with the exception of the 
Board Game these are broadly satisfied by all the other vari­
ables. The teacher’s assessments of end-of-year performance 
in English and Mathematics, and the ratings for shyness, live­
liness and pleasurability however, were on only a five point 
scale, but each of the distributions was approximately normal 
and the resulting coefficients of correlation with other vari­
ables should not be gross underestimates of their true corre­
lations. Considering the ratification of the Pearson ’r ’ 
validity coefficients for the Board Game in the last chapter, 
it too is deemed suitable for inclusion in the present analy­
sis, the factor structure being unlikely to suffer from such 
small variations in isolated variables.
To study the intercorrelations without the aid of factor 
analysis would mean that over 900 separate correlation coeffi­
cients would have to be considered, or rather, double this 
number, as each sex is to be looked at separately. Factor 
analysis however enables a ’parsimonious reinterpretation’ of 
the data to be made, a comparatively small number of factors 
being calculated to account for common relationships in the 
original set of variables. There is no single ’best’ system 
of factor analysis however and different pictures of the same 
data are produced by different techniques. The use of a par­
ticular system depends, as Fruchter (1954) points out, on the 
purposes and theoretical approach of the individual factor 
analysis, and this is amply illustrated as noted in Chapter 3
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by different approaches to the study of intelligence [Vernon, 
1961; Guilford, 1967; Cattell, 1971).
As both Vernon and Cattell point out however methods of 
multiple factor analysis have developed a great deal since 
Spearman’s early investigations, and with a common second 
order factor underlying the primaries extracted using oblique 
axes, some reconciliation has been possible between the oppo­
sing theories of either one general ability or distinct pri­
maries. Cronbach (1970) suggests that the important thing is 
that different methods of looking at certain psychological 
traits, like different methods of mapping Greenland, can be 
constructive and illuminative, without denying the underlying 
existence of the phenomenon in question. Cattell (1971) 
nevertheless maintains that the most superior method from the 
psychologist’s point of view is that of rotation of oblique 
axes to Thurstone’s simple structure. This has the advantage 
of being uniquely determinable and hence not subject to bias 
on the part of the experimenter, but it results in factors 
which are themselves intercorrelated.
By contrast an objective mathematical solution can also 
be achieved by extracting successive linear combinations of 
the variables, the first combination having the maximum amount 
of variance, the second as great a proportion of the residual 
variance as possible, and so on. This direct ’principal axes’ 
method of factor analysis fits in well with a ’general ability’ 
theory of intelligence, as the first factor claims the major 
share of common variance. It has been widely used to develop 
hierarchical models of the intellect (Vernon, 1961) , but 
Guilford (1967) suggests that it is more of a statistical 
artefact than an illustration of the natural order of things.
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As something of a compromise the use of a varimax rota­
tion (Kaiser, 1958) of principal axes "is a precisely defined 
method which indeed approximates to orthogonal simple struc­
ture" (Harman, 1967). Thurstone’s recommendations for simple 
structure, summarised by Harman, include having as many zeros 
in each column of the factor matrix as there are common fac­
tors, several variables whose entries vanish in one column 
but not in the other for every pair of columns in the factor 
matrix, and at least one zero in each row. While, as Harman 
notes, these have compelling intuitive value, they lack the 
precision necessary for mathematical computation. The varimax 
method however, with an emphasis on maximising and minimising 
the entries in each column, provides one method of approximat­
ing to simple structure, and has become the procedure most 
often used today (Cronbach, 1970).
The method is obtainable in factor analysis packages at 
most computing centres, and was employed by the writer via the 
Computing Unit at the University of Bath using the SPSS pro­
grams (Nie et al, 1975).
The varimax rotation is applied to an initial principal 
axes solution and there are two options open for the latter. 
Following Harman’s (1967) nomenclature the initial factor mat­
rix can be either a principal-component solution if unities 
are placed in the diagonals of the correlation matrix or a 
principal-factor solution if estimates of communalities are 
used instead.
As noted in Chapter 1 (1.34) total test variance (o^^)
can be divided into two components, true variance (o^^) and
error variance (a ^), so that = a.  ̂ + o ^. Some of the  ̂ e ' 1 t e
true variance however is likely to be specific to the test
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itself and a more general expression for the purposes of fac­
tor analysis is that where is com­
mon variance shared with other tests and is variance spe­
cific to the test itself.
Placing unities in the diagonal of the correlation mat­
rix in effect assumes that all the test variance in common 
variance and this total variance is distributed amongst the 
factors extracted. The factors therefore include both common 
variance and some unknown proportion of unique variance. The 
latter becomes greater as later factors are extracted, and 
Cattell (1952) suggests that the proportion becomes so great 
as to swamp the common variance. An estimate of the common 
variance or communalities of each test, however, if placed 
instead of unities in the diagonal, automatically builds into 
the factor model an allowance for unique variance. This is 
likely to give a truer picture of the underlying relationships 
between the tests and the resulting factors are known as 
’inferred’ rather than ’direct’ factors.
There is no agreed upon method of calculating communa­
lities though they cannot be greater than one or less than 
the squared multiple correlation between a variable and all 
others in the set. Employing the latter as a first estimate 
the PA2 program for a principal-factor solution uses an itera­
tive process which continues until the best estimates of com­
monality have been found. This is the program adopted here, 
the final varimax solution being a rotation of the initial 
principal-factor analysis.
In spite of the sophistication of the mathematical 
techniques, common factors, as Burt (1940) emphasises, are
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only statistical abstractions, not concrete entities, and fac­
tor analysis is more suitable for creating hypothesis than 
testing them. Eysenck (1953) however argues that when simple 
structure principles are applied it also has a role to play in 
investigations of a hypothetico-deductive nature. Commenting 
on orthogonal methods of solution in particular, Cattell (1971) 
nevertheless emphasises that the initial choice of tests can 
be made to influence the resulting factor matrix in predeter­
mined ways, and he notes that Guilford "makes the initial 
choice of tests fit a subjective academic framework rather 
than a naturalistic sampling of existing behaviour".
Factors should not therefore be reified as eternal veri­
ties (Fruchter, 1954) , but they serve to represent the under­
lying sources of variation common to a given set of scores 
in a way which makes it easier to make psychological inter­
pretations about the relationships between the variables. It 
is important to realise that conclusions are therefore reached 
via interpretations of the data, and as Guilford (1950) points 
out, the degree of confidence that can be given to them depends 
upon the compellingness of the factor structure and the repea­
ted verification of a result, rather than on any statistical 
test of significance.
The absence of the latter is one of the reasons for 
McNemar’s somewhat exaggerated attacks on factor analysis as 
a tool of 'Psychological Regress' (McNemar, 1951, 1964). 
Warnings about the fallibility of the technique however, are 
salutary when there is a danger that with the widespread pro­
vision of computer facilities it could become too 'convenient' 
a technique with, as McNemar (1964) points out, bigger but not 
necessarily better factor-analytical studies.
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Factor analysis is normally applied in the hope that 
the first few factors will account for most of the variance 
so that the remaining factors become of little importance.
When all the variance is to be distributed in a principal- 
components solution there are as many factors as there are 
variables, unless any variable is an exact linear combination 
of some of the others. Only a relatively small number however 
are usually worth investigating, though the decision regarding 
the number to extract is a matter for the investigator. In 
this study Kaiser’s (1958) criterion is used, only factors 
with eigenvalues greater than 1,0 being retained. This ensu­
res that only factors accounting for at least a proportion 
of the total variance equal to that of a single variable, 
i.e. 3.2%, will be extracted. This condition is applied 
before the removal of the unique variance, and with communa­
lities in the diagonal the actual proportion of variance 
allocated can be less than 3.2%.
There are a number of criteria for estimating the sig­
nificance of factor loadings (Harman, 1967; Burt, 1952;
Rippe, 1953) but they are not directly applicable to rotated 
factor solutions, particularly when only non-unique variance 
is distributed. Though he compiles a table of standard errors 
of factor loadings, Harman acknowledges that they are not 
entirely reliable. Butcher (1969) observes that "No very 
satisfactory answer appears to have been found to the problem 
of determining the statistical significance of a rotated fac­
tor loading". He adopts an arbitrary figure of 0.35 to dis­
tinguish high loadings which, with 70 variables and a popula­
tion of 1,000 he considers likely to be a conservative esti­
mate of significance.
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In view of the uncertainty surrounding the assessment 
of significance in factorial work Child (1970) suggests that 
it would be safer to adopt a stringent rather than lenient 
level; and suggests that provided the sample is greater than 
50, loadings above 0.30, accounting for 91 of the variance 
in that variable, are likely to be significant at quite a 
rigorous level. Alternatively, he points out that one can 
interpret the significance of loadings in the same way as 
Pearson product-moment coefficients, though in this case he 
suggests one should adopt the 1% level rather than 5%. A 
single level of significance based only on the sample size, 
however, makes no allowance for the number of variables or 
the factor under consideration. Using the Burt-Banks formula 
(Burt 1952) , Child compiles significance levels of factor 
loadings for different numbers of variables and factors, 
demonstrating that the acceptable value for a loading increa­
ses as the factor number increases. This is chiefly neces­
sary because, as noted earlier, the proportion of unique 
variance which creeps into all factors is so great in later 
factors as to swamp the common variance.
With sample sizes of 77 (boys) and 84 (girls) the sig­
nificance levels of Pearson’s ’r' correlation coefficients 
are 0.22 and 0.23 at 5% and 0.29 and 0.31 at 1% for boys and 
girls respectively. Considering, however, that the unique 
variance in the present analysis has been extracted before 
computing the factor loadings, the level at which a loading 
becomes significant is likely to be reduced accordingly.
The 1% level is therefore likely to be unnecessarily stringent, 
and a ’middle’ arbitrary figure of 0.25 is therefore taken as 
a basic level at which loadings are likely to become significant
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in the present study.
A larger sample size would give more power to the 
results, but with the previous evidence suggesting differences 
in the creative interests and activities of boys and girls, 
and the inclusion of personality and attitude variables, a 
factor analysis is undertaken for both sexes separately. The 
results are considered in the next section.
11.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Results of the factor analysis and the associated cor­
relation matrix, for both sexes, are reproduced in full in 
the Appendix. For ease of discussion the factor matrices are 
also presented in Tables 40 and 41, giving only those loadings 
which are of significance, near-significance or particular 
psychological interest. The tables are divided into five main 
areas of convergent thinking, attitudes, divergent thinking, 
creative criteria and personality variables, reading from top 
to bottom.
Before the extraction of unique variance, the analysis 
yielded eight factors for girls and nine for boys accounting 
for 72.0% and 74.5% of the total variance respectively. These 
percentages were reduced to 62.7% and 64.1% respectively when 
only common variance was considered, illustrating a consider­
able increase in the ’purity’ of the factors from the ’hybrid’ 
factors arrived at by Principal-Components analysis.
Factors from the Boys and Girls analysis will be iden­
tified by the letters ’B ’ and ’G ’ respectively and will be 
considered jointly whenever their identity is similar.
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Attitude to School 
Importance of Doing Well 
Conforming
Relationship with Teacher 






































































































































Percentage of Common 
Variance 
Percentage of Total 
Variance
25.0 21.4 11.5 10.5 9.6 9.1 6.5 6.2 
15.7 13.4 7.2 6.6 6.0 5.7 4.1 3.9
Common Variance extracted = 62.7%
(decimal points are omitted in the table)
Table 40 Principal-Factor Analysis with 
Varimax Rotation
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Percentage of Common 22,4 17.9 11.2 10.5 9.7 9.4 7.2 5.8 5.0Variance
Percentage of Total g 11.5 7.2 6.7 6.2 6.0 4.6 3.7 3.2Variance
Common Variance extracted = 64.1%
(decimal points are omitted in the table)
Table 41 Principal-Factor Analysis with 
Varimax Rotation
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11.21 Identification of the Factors
An initial inspection of the factor loadings shows that 
most factors appear broadly in parallel, in both sexes, though 
there is also some variation in the loadings. The general 
identity of the factors can be summarised as shown in Table 42, 




1 General convergent 
ability
1 General convergent 
ability
2 Divergent thinking 2 Divergent thinking
3 Creative Interests 
[Imaginative)












8 Creative Interests 
[logical)
8 Creative Interests 
(logical)









Table 42 Initial Inspection 
Major Loadings or General Description of Factors
Each of the main groups of tests, convergent, divergent, 
attitudes, personality and creative activities is represented
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by one or more factors, and the main concern of this study is 
with the divergent factors and the relationship between diver­
gent thinking and the other main groups of tests. These will 
be the main issues in the subsequent discussion, though inter­
esting relationships between the other abilities will be noted 
in passing,
11.22 Discussion
11.221 Convergent Thinking and Divergent Thinking 
For both boys and girls the first factor, provisionally 
labelled 'general convergent ability’ is identified by its 
very high loadings for intelligence, English and Mathematics, 
all in the region of 0.85. The end of year assessments for 
English and Mathematics appear as clearly as those of intelli­
gence and the factor fits Vernon’s (1961) description of a 
’g + v:ed’ ability including both ’g ’ and a general verbal/ 
numerical/educational ability. In terms of the present study 
the nature of the school assessments and the tests of intelli­
gence put the factor into Guilford's category of convergent 
thinking and for each sex it shows only a slight degree of 
overlap with factors 2G and 2B respectively which can be iden­
tified as divergent ability. The latter are clearly recogni­
sed with substantial loadings on all seven divergent measures 
as high as 0.86 for girls and 0.91 for boys.
Together the first two factors account for a large pro­
portion of the common variance, though only 11 out of 31 of 
the variables are specifically designated as convergent or 
divergent ability. For girls 46.4%, and for boys 40.3% of 
the common variance is associated with these factors, the 
major proportion loading on the convergent ability factor
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along with the four convergent tests. Apart from Circles 
(flexibility) for boys the divergent tests all have some posi­
tive loadings on the convergent factor, particularly for the 
originality scores. For girls the latter are of some inter­
est as a group (0.16, 0.17 and 0.23), though they do not 
individually load significantly. For boys the same scores 
load 0.26, 0.32 and 0.43 and indicate that Guilford’s dimen­
sion of divergent production of transformations (see Chapter 
3), for both verbal and figurai content, shares some common 
variance with convergent thinking abilities. Fluency scores 
are not in evidence in the same way, and the originality 
loadings cannot, therefore be explained simply in terms of 
verbal fluency. The most likely explanation is that unusual 
responses to divergent tests involve a process of evaluation 
as to their appropriateness which utilizes a certain degree 
of reasoning ability.
The divergent factor is most strongly associated with 
the figurai divergent thinking abilities assessed by the 
Circles Test, and it is clear that the suggestion made in 
the last chapter that the flexibility score is closely related 
to fluency, is borne out by these results. Although there are 
minor fluctuations it shows little separation from fluency and 
with almost identical amounts of variance accounted for, and 
no evidence of different validity associations in the last 
chapter, there are no grounds for recommending its retention.
In view of the theoretical basis for such an ability 
argued for in Chapter 3 this result is disappointing, but as 
pointed out earlier, the scoring procedure for originality 
automatically demands a high degree of flexibility, and it 
appears that the latter is more distinct from a fluency ability
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than the simple change of category involved in the flexibility 
score itself.
The verbal divergent tests load heavily on the divergent 
factor but they also, particularly for boys, show some substan­
tial loadings on other factors. These will be discussed when 
these factors are identified in terms of other variables, 
but Factor 7B is in fact most clearly recognised by its high 
loading 0.71 for Uses (fluency). This will also be returned 
to again later but at present it indicates that divergent 
thinking is not an unitary ability. While the divergent 
tests appear more homogeneous for girls, divergent abilities 
for both sexes load on other factors including that of con­
vergent ability.
In turn the four convergent tests also show positive 
loadings on the divergent factor, including three loadings 
of 0.17, 0.21 and 0.25 for girls, and 0.23 for boys. The 
English assessments are responsible for the loadings of 0.21 
for girls and 0.23 for boys and though only on the borderline 
of significance suggest that teachers do recognise some 
divergent ability in their assessments of English performance. 
This provides a slender amount of 'academic validity’ similar 
to that found by Bennett (1973) in relating divergent abili­
ties to conventional English attainment. The conventional 
English assessments in the present study were of a fairly 
traditional nature and it is possible that if the attainment 
was geared to more imaginative assessment, divergent abilities 
might play a greater part.
In terms of the present results however the most reali­
stic conclusion is that divergent abilities play little part 
in conventional academic attainment in English and Mathematics,
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and the latter bears out an earlier conclusion of the writer 
(Richards and Bolton, 1971).
The relative independence of factors 1 and 2 for both 
boys and girls and their clear interpretation in terms of 
convergent and divergent ability allays some of the doubts 
expressed by Butcher (1972). There is evidence in the present 
study that a "general factor of divergent thinking" is readily 
distinguishable from the corresponding factor of convergent 
thinking.
The results can be interpreted, to some extent, in 
support of Wallach and Kogan’s (1966) conclusion that they 
had succeeded in defining a dimension of individual differen­
ces which showed both generality and pervasiveness and at 
the same time independence of traditional measures of general 
intelligence. While Wallach and Kogan claimed that their 
dimensions were quite distinct however the present results 
indicate that there is also some degree of overlap between 
divergent thinking and intelligence, and that divergent 
thinking is also not as unidimensional as they suggest.
Similar conclusions have been reached with data from 
high ability samples (e.g. Ward, 1967; Cropley, 1968; Starr 
and Nicholl, 1975), and from unrestricted groups by the writer 
(Richards, 1970) and Hargreaves and Bolton (1972), but not by 
Hasan and Butcher (1966). The present finding is slightly 
more pronounced than in the earlier study of the writer, 
though a similar interpretation is possible, namely that 
divergent thinking ability appears as a dimension of intel­
lectual ability, which, while not independent of intelligence, 
exists as a "consistent complementary activity".
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On the earlier occasion the tests were largely cognitive, 
but the majority of tests in the present study are of a non- 
cognitive nature and in view of the suggestions by a number 
of researchers that attitudinal and personality variables are 
likely to play a large part in divergent performance the rela­
tively distinct nature of the divergent factor is more remark­
able.
Some relationship with the non-cognitive variables will 
be noted shortly when these variables are considered more 
specifically but there is no suggestion in the present results 
that divergent thinking is largely a function of attitude or 
personality. Rather it has been seen to exist largely as a 
cognitive variable both in terms of its long-term stability 
and with the present evidence for its construct validity. It 
is not, as noted above, an entirely unidimensional variable 
though there is sufficient common variance to suggest the 
presence of a oohesive dimension of divergent thinking abili­
ties.
The predominance of the figurai abilities on the diver­
gent factor and the separate loadings noted for the verbal 
tests on other factors indicate that it would be possible in 
a modified battery to ’blow u p ’ these aspects in order to 
emphasise Guilford’s multivariate view of the intellect 
(Guilford, 1967, 1976). While some researchers, e.g. Cattell
(1971) maintain that this would be to distort a natural samp­
ling picture of human abilities, it might serve to distinguish 
some of the main components in ’general divergent ability’ in 
a way which would make prediction easier.
For multiple correlation purposes one would not wish all
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divergent tests to load on a single factor as this would only 
duplicate correlations with other variables, and as suggested 
in the last chapter, further attention might be given to com­
plementary rather than parallel tests of divergent thinking.
Unless one wishes to manufacture a narrow, unitary con­
cept of divergent thinking, it is not true, as Hargreaves and 
Bolton (1972) suggest, that it is obviously preferable "in
selecting divergent creativity tests, ...... to select tests
which load most highly on a general ’creativity' factor, and 
which have minimal loadings on others". Starr and Nicholl 
(1975), for example, demonstrate a considerable factorial 
separation between verbal and figurai tests in high ability 
subjects, and the present results indicate that different 
tests can yield different relationships with creative criteria.
At present the distinction between the various divergent 
abilities is not great, but although there is some basis in 
the divergent factor for Richards R.L.’s (1976) conclusion 
that divergent test intercorrelations argue for a "relatively 
simple description of the creative thinking domain, supporting 
the Wallacji-Kogan position of a unitary and independent dimen­
sion", it is not a valid interpretation of the total picture, 
and ignores the small amount of factorial separation of the 
divergent abilities both within tests and between the tests 
themselves. Although there is a stronger grouping of loadings 
within each test, there is also some separation of these abi­
lities and some evidence that scores, for originality in par­
ticular, are related across the test boundaries.
There are slight differences between boys and girls in 
these respects, but the interpretations of factors 1 and 2 
are very similar for both sexes and suggest that, when cognitive
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tests are being analysed, an overall factor analysis would be 
appropriate. This reinforces similar conclusions by Cropley 
and Maslany (1969), Hargreaves and Bolton (1972) and Bennett 
(1973).
In general the evidence of the convergent and divergent 
factors provides construct validity of the discriminant/con­
vergent variety, but also suggests that while there is an 
integrated range of abilities represented by the divergent 
tests which is relatively distinct from general convergent 
ability, it is not an entirely unitary concept. This finding 
fits in well with the theoretical interpretation of creativity 
in Chapter 2 as a broad rather than an unidimensional trait, 
and also with the concurrent validity findings in the last 
chapter.
11.222 Attitudes and Divergent Thinking
For both sexes attitudes load quite heavily on three 
main factors, on the general ability factor, and on two fac­
tors defined by various attitude scores themselves. The 
latter are defined in a very similar fashion for each sex.
Factors 5G and 4B accounting for 9.6% and 10.5% of the 
common variance for girls and boys respectively both have 
their major loading for ’conforming’, 0.76 in each case, 
reflecting children’s positive response to good behaviour in 
the classroom as opposed to ’fooling about’ and ’liking noisy 
children’. Children with conforming attitudes also tend to 
have good attitudes to school and school work, to be introver­
ted rather than extraverted, to see themselves as trying hard 
to do well, and as having a good relationship with the teacher.
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This is substantiated by the teacher’s expression of pleasure 
to them in class, loading 0.34 for girls and 0.33 for boys on 
the respective factors. The loading from the Lie Scale of 
the Junior Eysenck Personality Inventory, of 0.52 for girls 
and a more moderate 0.17 for boys gives some support to the 
interpretation of the Lie Scale as an index of the children’s 
attempt to present themselves in a good light, and as a mea­
sure of ’’conformity to social pressures" (Eysenck, S. , et al^ 
1971) .
In view of the unconventional attitudes and aspirations 
associated with the divergent pupil, by Getzels and Jackson 
(1962) , and Hudson (1966) , the loadings for divergent and 
convergent abilities on the above factors (5G and 4B), could 
have been expected to be negative and positive respectively. 
None of the loadings are significant however, though for boys, 
there is a slight trend in this direction. Non-conforming 
attitudes are also only very slightly related to divergent 
thinking on the main D.T. factor for each sex, and over the 
whole range of ability in this study, it has to be concluded 
that non-conforming attitudes are not a positive influence 
on divergent ability. Vernon (1972) reported a similar find­
ing and even an indication of conforming rather than non- 
conforming attitudes amongst divergent boys. It is possible 
that such an influence if it exists, is only apparent amongst 
groups high in general ability.
Factors 6G and 3B form the other pair of attitude fac­
tors accounting for 9.1% and 11.2% of the common variance for 
girls and boys respectively. Both are well defined by a high 
loading for self-concept, academic self-image and extraversion, 
and reflect an accompanying good attitude to school and per­
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ceived relationship with the teacher. In contrast to the 
other factor, the confident, outgoing characteristics asso­
ciated with this hypothetical trait might be thought to be 
associated with high dlveTgent performance. Only an isolated 
loading of 0.27 for Consequences (fluency) for girls suggests 
that this might be so, and for boys there is quite a substan­
tial negative loading of -0.20 for Uses (originality). The 
overall pattern has to be interpreted as showing no appreciable 
relationship with divergent ability.
An interesting difference between boys' and girls' atti­
tudes in the classroom is shown by a high loading of 0.65 
indicating 'lack of anxiety' on factor 3B, but no correspond­
ing loading on 6G. Lack of anxiety for girls comprises 
instead, the major loading on factor 8 for girls. In both 
cases lack of anxiety on the Barker-Lunn scale is also reflec­
ted by a negative loading for neuroticism on the Junior Eysenck 
Personality Inventory, indicating relaxed and carefree rather 
than anxious behaviour.
For boys, lack of anxiety is associated with high self- 
concept, extraversion and good attitudes to school, but for 
girls it shows little relation to other attitudes about school 
work. The only associated loading with this easy-going beha­
viour in girls is a negative value of -0.28, indicating a lack 
of acknowledgement of the importance of working hard at school 
work. Looked at from the point of view of low scorers it 
appears that anxiety is more related to boys' attitudes than 
girls' attitudes at this age, anxious boys appearing to be 
intraverted with poor attitudes to school. Which, if any, of 
these are causal factors is a matter for further study, but 
the results may be relevant to the finding of Eysenck and
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Cookson (1969), that the commonly reported link between neuto- 
ticism and poor attainment at primary school was particularly 
marked for boys.
In addition to these specific attitude factors, attitu­
des load quite extensively on factor 1 for both boys and girls, 
though by contrast there are no significant attitudinal vari­
ables loading on the divergent factor.
Children's attitudes and convergent ability are related
by their positive expression of the 'importance of doing well' 
(e.g. 'I work and try very hard in school') and a high level 
of academic self-image (e.g. 'I'm good at sums'). It appears 
that the successful children by school standards both work 
hard and achieve self-recognition for their performance.
They also tend to be seen by the teacher as being a pleasure 
to have in class, loading 0.47 for girls and 0.33 for boys 
on factor 1. While the teacher's interest is recognised by 
the girls ('Perceived relationship with the Teacher') it is 
not recognised by boys. The more able girls also tend to 
have better attitudes to school though again this is not true 
of boys. The relationships with the convergent variables are 
generally similar to those of Barker Lunn (1970). Although 
her analysis was conducted for a combined population, a cor­
relation between sex and the variables in question also
suggested that like here, the relationship between 'attitude 
to school' and academic work is stronger for girls than boys.
Though not significant, there is an indication on the 
divergent factor for boys that a good attitude to school is 
associated with better divergent performance (0.20), and a
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further small but interesting loading of -0.18 suggests that 
the higher boys divergent performance the less likely they 
are to feel that 'Teacher is interested in me'. This is borne 
out by the corresponding correlation coefficients, all seven 
coefficients between the divergent tests and boys' perceived 
relationship with the teacher being quite substantially nega­
tive, two, with the Uses Test, being significant at 5%. Even 
if the teacher is in fact interested, there is a suggestion 
that divergent boys are less likely to perceive it and that 
there might consequently be need for more encouragement for 
divergent type responses.
Teachers' ratings of pleasurability are also closely 
related to convergent rather than divergent ability, and the 
loadings on factors 1 and 2 for both boys and girls could be 
interpreted as giving support to the findings of several wri­
ters, (Getzels and Jackson, 1962; Hasan and Butcher, 1966; 
Cropley, 1967), that teachers find divergent children less 
desirable as pupils than convergent children. As defined by 
these researchers and earlier in this study by the writer, 
the term 'divergers' however excludes the 'all rounders' cate­
gory and automatically means that divergers do not appear in 
the top 20% or 30% on I.Q. The evidence of the present study 
suggests that it is the absence of high intelligence rather 
than the possession of high divergence that is an important 
factor in teachers' ratings of pleasurability.
As Biggs et al (1971) points out however, even if teach- 
ersers see high divergers as undesirable pupils, the more 
important issue is whether this is because they cannot perceive 
children with high divergent ability realistically, and conse­
quently underestimate their ability and misinterpret their
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classroom behaviour. As discussed earlier, with regard to 
teacher ratings in Chapter 4, Biggs found that teachers did 
perceive children with divergent ability veridically, evalua­
ting their abilities and behaviour as positively and realis­
tically as those of the convergers.
Though the ratings for ’mechanicalism’ were not very 
clear-cut, Biggs concluded from the ’conceptualism’ rating 
that teachers took both convergent and divergent ability into 
account, and he also noted that ’good’ behaviour did not app­
ear to be especially related to convergence, nor ’nuisance’ 
behaviour to divergence.
The loadings for teacher ratings of ’pleasurability’ 
and ’creative behaviour’ on factors 1 and 2 suggest an inter­
pretation mid-way between the positive findings of Biggs and 
the contrary suggestion that divergent ability is discrimina­
ted against. There is no indication in the present findings 
that divergent thinking ability is a handicap to either rat­
ing, but it is also clear that unlike Biggs’ conclusion diver­
gent thinking is not seen as a positive advantage, and pleas­
ant relationships and creative behaviour are clearly associa­
ted with general convergent ability.
Considering the predominantly traditional methods of the 
teachers however the modest positive nature of three out of 
the four ratings in question leans slightly towards Biggs’ 
findings, and with teachers less formally inclined the recog­
nition of divergent ability might be more marked.
11.223 Creative Activities and Divergent Thinking
It was noted in the last chapter that although divergent 
tests had a significant degree of concurrent validity in relation
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to creative activities there was a good deal of variation in 
the pattern of relationships. This is borne out by the factor 
analysis which underlines the multidimensional nature of 
’creativity’. Although all the creative criteria has positive 
loadings on the divergent factor for both boys and girls these 
vary in size, and most of the creative activity variance is 
spread over other factors, in some cases with accompanying 
loadings from the divergent tests.
For girls Torrance’s leisure interests has a loading of 
0.38 and four out of the remaining six ’creative’ loadings,
0.16, 0.17, 0.20 and 0.22 are substantially positive, the 
latter two being of borderline significance. Creative acti­
vities also load on the convergent factor, but apart from 
Teacher Ratings these are overall no more marked than on the 
divergent factor. Factor 3G is a clear creative activities 
factor but like 7G it is somewhat ’artificially’ produced by 
the inclusion of both part scores and total scores for the 
Barker Lunn Interests questionnaire.
Factor 3G links together the self-report inventories of 
creative interests and motivation with several moderate load­
ings on the verbal divergent tests (0.23, 0.19, 0.23, 0.09), 
which though not individually significant comprise a group of 
likely psychological significance. It must be remembered 
that with uncorrelated factors this common variance exists 
over and above that already extracted by the convergent and 
divergent factors and, with the low loading of 0.17 for English 
ability suggests an underlying imaginative ability of a verbal 
nature, some of which is recognised in the small residual load­
ing (0.17) on the Teacher Ratings for Creative Behaviour.
Factor 7G emphasises some of the independence of logical
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interests from imaginative interests, but exists largely 
because of its overlap with the total interests score. It 
has a significant loading from the Board Game (0.27), indi­
cating that logical/analytic interests increased girls’ 
chance of success at the Board Game, but has no other signi­
ficant loadings.
Performance on the Board Game, for girls in particular, 
is well spread between the factors and only a relatively small 
proportion of its variance is extracted. This exemplifies 
Guilford’s (1976) conclusion that not even a collection of all 
the divergent production abilities, will completely account 
for creative aptitude. While Board Game performance has mode­
rate positive relationships with girls’ convergent and diver­
gent performance it also has loadings on several other fac­
tors which have no significant divergent loadings, and in the 
case of factors 6G and 8G has some negative but non-significant 
associations with certain aspects of divergent performance.
In the latter cases and on factor 5G, success at the Board 
Game is more closely related to attitudes and personality 
variables than divergent thinking but in no case is the rela­
tionship very marked. The overall pattern however gives some 
limited support to the views of several writers (e.g. Butcher, 
1972; Nuttall, 1972) that attitudinal and personality factors 
are likely to be of importance in practical creative activity.
For boys the loadings for creative activities are simi­
larly diffuse, but with some different patterns of relation­
ships. On factors 1 and 2 similar interpretations can be made 
as those for girls, with a high loading for Teacher Ratings 
on factor 1 and otherwise small but overall positive relation-
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ships, but the remaining picture is rather different. Factor 
5B like 3G is an imaginative interests factor but unlike 3G 
has no relationship with divergent abilities. Factor 8B con­
tains the same 'artificial’ pairing of logical interests with 
the total interests score as on 7G, but it is also associated 
with stable and conforming behaviour, and a negative relation­
ship with Uses (originality). While logical interests have 
some negative association with divergence on this factor, 
creative motivation on factor 9B is positively associated with 
the same divergent score. Although the variance extracted by 
these factors is small their different relationships with 
divergent thinking indicates the multifactorial nature of 
both creative activities and divergent thinking.
The most significant relationship between the creative 
criteria and the divergent abilities is shown on the secondary 
divergent factor for boys, 7B, which is predominantly a verbal 
divergent factor but has high loadings from the Board Game 
(0.52) and moderate loadings of 0.25 and 0.23 from logical/ 
analytic interests and Torrance’s leisure interests respec­
tively. Considering that boys performance on the Board Game 
is also related to a limited extent with convergent and diver­
gent abilities as shown by factors 1 and 2, this is the most 
significant link between a distinct ability involving the 
fluent and original production of ideas and practical crea­
tive performance. It cannot be interpreted in terms of 
general exuberance or extraversion but is instead weakly rela­
ted to introversion, a lack of anxiety, logical interests and 
to a small extent I.Q.
The Board Game called for a combination of unusual uses 
for objects, an evaluation of their suitability, and the
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ability to put the ideas into practice. It appears that a 
combination of such abilities can be recognised in terms of 
a hypothetical trait underlying divergent production on the 
Uses Test, a degree of thoughtful introversion, lack of 
anxiety, reasoning ability, and logical/analytic interests.
This accounts for 25% of the variance in the Board Game, 15% 
of which is provided by the fluency score for Uses. This 
provides additional -support for the concurrent validity estab­
lished in the last chapter and suggests that divergent tests 
do more than credit "mere glibness, uninhibited self-expression 
and deficiency of self-criticism" (Ausubel, 1968).
11.224 Divergent Thinking and Personality Variables
A number of significant personality loadings have already 
been mentioned, but their influence on divergent thinking per­
formance has been slight. The mainly attitudinal factors, 6G 
and 3B, with high loadings for extraversion (E), and for boys, 
an emotionally stable loading for neuroticism (N), had to be 
interpreted as showing no appreciable relationship with diver­
gent thinking in spite of their confident, outgoing charac­
teristics. The other pair of attitude-factors, 5G and 4B, 
reflected intraversion and, for girls, neurotic behaviour, 
but again showed no relationship to divergent thinking. While 
personality variables are therefore related in quite interest­
ing ways to various of the attitude scales, they have so far 
appeared to exert little influence on divergent performance.
Extraversion has a low loading of 0.17 on the divergent 
factor for girls and the corresponding correlation coefficients 
are similarly low but positive, one of the seven coefficients 
reaching significance at 5% and three others being borderline.
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For boys there is a tendency the other way, extraversion load-
/
ing -0.12 on the divergent factor, 2B, and the accompanying 
correlations also low and generally negative. Taken together 
with the above findings for the attitude factors carrying 
loadings for E, children's level of extraversion is clearly 
not a deciding factor in determining their divergent perfor­
mance, though it appears to be slightly more of an advantage 
for girls.
Though it has a zero loading on the divergent factor 
for boys, neuroticism is a significant variable for girls’ 
divergent performance, loading 0.27 on 2G. This is contrary 
to the general finding that neuroticism tends to have a nega­
tive effect on performance at primary and lower secondary 
level (Eysenck, 1972; Entwistle, 1972) though performance is 
generally assessed in terms of academic attainment. Neuroti­
cism is in fact slightly negatively related to convergent 
performance for boys on factor IB (loading -0.16) and there 
is also limited support on both IB and IG for the general 
finding that extraverts seem to have an advantage in general 
academic work.
The positive advantage given by neuroticism to girls 
divergent thinking is also indicated on factor 8G. In this 
case it is related to verbal rather than figurai aspects of 
divergent performance and this is borne out by the correlations 
between N and DT. All four of the verbal test correlations 
are positive and significant, two at 5% and two at 1%, while 
those with the figurai tests are also positive but with only 
one coefficient nearing significance.
It is interesting to speculate that this change from 
the normal negative relationship of neuroticism to academic
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performance reveals a consistent difference in performance 
when the material requires divergent rather than convergent 
performance. The ’drive’ that comes from mild anxiety may be 
indicative of ’creative energy’, though for both boys and 
girls there is only a very slight indication that success at 
the Board Game, for example, is enhanced by a degree of neuro­
ticism.
The relationship between divergent performance and neuro­
ticism deserves further investigation in relation to Eysenck’s 
(1972) emphasis of Hull’s general learning theory in terms of 
performance as a product, D x H, of motivation/drive, D, and 
learning/habit, H. If as Eysenck suggests, learning depends 
on the strength of existing habits as well as on the degree 
of drive, then a variation in performance when the stimulus 
calls for divergent rather than convergent performance might 
be expected. It is also possible that the finding that neuro­
ticism is an advantage to older students is related to the 
same aspect, performance at the primary and secondary stage 
normally being assessed in terms of convergent ability, while 
at high levels more imaginative and divergent performance may 
gain credit.
Entwistle (1972) reports on a number of studies that 
have associated neuroticism with subject choice, and Hudson 
(1968) while suggesting that neuroticism in convergers and 
divergers takes different forms, found divergers to be signi­
ficantly more neurotic.
Hudson’s study was with a group of sixth-form boys 
however, and his findings were not supported by Smithers and 
Child (1974) with a sample of university students of both 
sexes. The present findings extend those of Hudson to a sample
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of 11-year-old girls but do not confirm his conclusion for 
boys.
Teacher Ratings of the degree to which their children 
appeared to be ’Shy’ or ’Lively’’, were included in the belief 
that they might help to establish a personality dimension, 
and make it easier to interpret subsequent relationships 
between such a dimension and divergent thinking. The result 
however is largely confined to a bipolar personality factor 
with ’Shy’ at one extreme and ’Lively’ at the other. Without 
details of the emotional behaviour and activities that the 
writer felt would be associated with these descriptions it 
was perhaps unreasonable to have expected teachers to do 
other than see them as almost mutually exclusive.
For both boys and girls the corresponding factors 4G 
and 6B carry loadings of only borderline significance from 
the Extraversion and Neuroticism scores on the JCP I. As one 
might expect loadings for extraversion are in the direction 
of ’lively’ for both sexes, and shy as opposed to lively 
girls appear as slightly neurotic. Somewhat surprisingly the 
opposite trend appears for boys. The terms ’lively’ and ’shy’ 
may however convey somewhat different meanings to teachers 
depending on which sex the terms are used to describe.
In spite of rating shy girls as being more of a pleasure 
to have in class, teachers still rate the lively girl highly 
in terms of creative characteristics, giving some further 
weight to the belief that teachers ratings of performance are 
not dictated by personal preferences. There is no association 
between the ’shy’ or ’lively’ characteristics and pleasurabi­
lity for boys, though lively boys are also seen by teachers
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as potentially more creative.
This popular association of liveliness with creative 
activity is not given much support by the present study, none 
of the creative criteria being associated with liveliness in 
girls. For boys however success at the Board Game has a sig­
nificant loading of 0.32 towards the ’lively’ pole of factor 
B6, reflecting correlations of 0.33 and -0.30 with ’lively’ 
and ’shy’ ratings respectively. There is also an accompanying 
loading of 0.22 from Circles (originality). Whether a lively/ 
shy rating will predict success on any other practical criteria 
is a matter worth investigating further, and any similar 
relationships for girls may be more likely to appear if the 
criterion were designed with more of a feminine flavour.
Apart from the one borderline loading of 0.22 on B6 however 
there are no links between the shy/lively dimension and 
divergent thinking.
It is noticeable that apart from the heavy loading for 
extraversion on the attitude factor 3 for boys, both extra­
version and neuroticism are characterised by several moderate 
loadings rather than by any specific factor, and that the 
Board Game, especially for girls, is rather similar,. The 
amount of variance extracted for these variables is also 
relatively small and it is clear that both practical perfor­
mance on the Board Game - the criterion nearest to a ’real- 
life’ situation - and measures of extraversion and neutoticism, 
are far from being related to other variables in any close or 
clear-cut way.
Their inter-relations as measured by the correlation 
coefficients are low and in three cases out of four negative, 
but in the factor analysis some positive groupings are also in
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evidence. This suggests that the relationship may not be 
linear or that the effects of E and N depend on their group­
ing with other variables. Lynn and Gordon (1961) suggested 
that a curvilinear relationship to attainment was a feature 
of neuroticism, though there is no suggestion of such a 
relationship in the results of Eysenck and Cookson (1969) , 
and Entwistle and Cunningham (1968) demonstrated linearity 
of regression among their findings. Grouping of contrasting 
personality types in both studies however revealed Tcsults 
differing from the overall picture and between the two stud­
ies. As Eysenck (1972) notes, knowledge of the relations 
between academic attainment and personality is far from cer­
tain, though he suggests that the evidence indicates that 
there are likely to be important relationships in this area.
It is likely that relationships between divergent thinking 
and personality may also be revealed in a study of selected 
groups contrasting on other variables.
Over the whole range of ability represented in the 
present study however it has to be concluded that personality 
variables do not play a major part in divergent thinking per­
formance. Though there is some significant association 
between neuroticism and divergent thinking for girls.
Eysenck’s (1967) suggestion that divergent thinking is largely 
a function of children’s extraversion is firmly rejected.
11.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions in this chapter can be summarised 
as follows;
1. There exists a cohesive dimension of divergent thinking 
abilities which is relatively distinct from general convergent 
ability.
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2. While divergent thinking abilities have a great deal of 
common variance they do not form an entirely unidimensional 
variable, and further attention might be given to complemen­
tary rather than parallel tests of divergent thinking. This 
is particularly true of figurai and verbal aspects of diver­
gent ability, and different divergent thinking abilities may 
be found to be relevant to different creative criteria, as 
suggested in the last chapter.
3. The flexibility score for the Circles Test adds so 
little information to the fluency score for the same test 
that its retention in future studies cannot be recommended. 
Fluency and originality scores, while strongly related within 
tests, are by no means identical and though a fluency score 
is likely to indicate a considerable proportion of children’s 
divergent potential, the originality score is recommended for 
any detailed study.
4. Attitudes fall into two main categories, positive atti­
tudes to school going with conformity, effort to do well at 
school work and slight introversion on the one hand; and 
self-concept, extraversion and academic self-image on the 
other. Although this dichotomy appeared to reflect charac­
teristics of two different types of children within each 
sex, neither had more than minor relationships with divergent 
performance.
5. There was no indication that children with high diver­
gent thinking ability are discriminated against when teachers 
assess their desirability as pupils. Teachers preferences 
were on the other hand positively related to children’s con­
vergent thinking abilities, conformity and good attitudes to 
school.
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6 . The factor analysis underlined the multi-dimensional 
nature of creative activities, and the fact that such acti­
vity is unlikely to be accounted for by any particular group 
of variables divergent or otherwise. Divergent thinking abi­
lities nevertheless accounted for a significant amount of 
creative variance, though this was due to some extent to the 
corresponding multi-dimensional nature of the divergent abi­
lities rather than to the two main divergent factors. Factor
2 for girls, however, indicated the presence of an imaginative 
ability linked to verbal tests of divergent thinking and crea­
tive interests, and factor 7 for boys provided a strong link 
between the divergent production of fluent and original ideas 
and practical performance on the Board Game.
7. Over the whole range of ability represented in this 
study, personality variables do not exert a major influence 
on divergent performance. In particular Eysenck’s (1967) 
suggestion that divergent thinking is largely a function of 
children’s extraversion is firmly rejected. Hudson’s (1968) 
finding that neuroticism was positively related to divergent 
thinking performance in boys was not confirmed, but a similar 
finding was established for girls.
The latter is in the opposite direction to the commonly 
reported influence of neuroticism on convergent performance 
at this age, but in the same direction as that found for 
older students. It is suggested that the effect of persona­
lity may depend on the type of material dealt with, and that 
some of the age variation may therefore be due to a change of 
emphasis in the type of performance required. This deserves 
investigation within selected groups with different combina­
tions of personality.
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8. Teachers tend to rate lively children as more creative, 
and in the case of boys this was borne out by the boys' per­
formance on the Board Game. Teacher ratings in this respect 
deserve further investigation.
9. Considering the similarity of the factor patterns for 
each sex an overall analysis would have given rise to very 
similar conclusions regarding the relationships between 
convergent and divergent thinking. A number of the relations 
between these variables, creative activity, personality vari­
ables and attitude however would have been obscured in a com­
bined group. As noted in the last chapter, when creative 
activities and interests are concerned there is still a good 
deal of truth in the assumption that there are activities 
'typical' of either boys or girls.
These findings provide a picture of the construct vali­
dity of divergent thinking tests in terms of a dimension of 
cognitive abilities, relatively independent of intelligence 
and not, as some writers have suggested as a function of per­
sonality and attitudes. While, as Hudson (1968) observed, 
some lack of convergent and discriminant validity has led to 
arguments that divergent thinking cannot be a coherent human 
trait at all, the present results indicate otherwise. Though 
not as unidimensional a trait as suggested by Wallach and 
Kogan (1966) or Richards R.L. (1976) divergent thinking is 
clearly an aspect of intellectual ability that deserves 
attention in its own right.
Taken in conjunction with the earlier evidence regard­
ing reliability and long-term stability, the present results 
give support to the realistic nature of a concept of divergent
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thinking as one component in a broad conception of the intel­
lect .
That divergent thinking is not highly correlated with 
personality or attitudinal variables does not mean that the 
latter do not exert some influence or are unimportant. On 
the contrary the influence of personality on divergent think­
ing appears to be of a similar order to its influence on 
academic attainment and I.Q., and though small in an unres­
tricted population no one would deny the importance of the 
latter. With the evidence of this chapter supporting a con­
struct of divergent thinking as a cognitive dimension, it is 
likely that like other cognitive variables its effect will 
be mediated in numerous ways by the variations in children's 
attitudes and personality. Further investigations of diver­
gent thinking, creative performance and personality variables 
will be needed to discover particular groupings that may be 
most advantageous for different types of learning and crea­
tive activity.
It would not be realistic to suggest that divergent 
thinking is a major influence on creative activity, but the 
present evidence gives some basic support to teachers who 
regard the fostering of divergent thinking abilities as a 




In many ways it is easy and enjoyable to be carried along 
on the bandwaggon of the latest psychological fad or education­
al fashion, and the subject of creativity as it emerged during 
the early 1960's was something of both. Since reading 
'Creativity and Intelligence' (Getzels and Jackson, 1962),
'Modes of Thinking in Young Children' (Wallach and Kogan, 1966) 
and 'Contrary Imaginations' (Hudson, 1966) nearly ten years ago, 
the writer has enthused about the virtues of divergent thinking 
and the open-ended, flexible and child-centred methods of 
teaching that, as indicated at the beginning of this study, 
have been associated with the concept of creativity.
Having had a long run however there are now signs that 
the bandwaggon is slowing down, having, some critics suggest, 
run markedly out of control in the meanwhile (e.g. Pole, 1969). 
Enthusiasm is certainly no longer sufficient to sustain devel­
opments, and criticisms, whether of classroom practice or 
associated psychological principles, have to be appraised 
honestly. Differences in the allegiance, tradition and tem­
perament of researchers however make completely honest apprai­
sal difficult, and the search for meaning in data, as Hudson 
(1972) observes, is likely to involve all of us in distortion 
to a greater or lesser degree. It is hoped that in spite of 
his wide use of divergent tests the writer's attempt at an 
honest appraisal has not been so self-deceptive as to promote 
one particular view of reality at the expense of all others.
The particular criticisms and doubts which provided the 
focus for the present research centre on the reliability and
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and validity of tests of divergent thinking and their labell­
ing as tests of "creativity*.
In many ways, as outlined in Chapter 2, the concept of 
creativity has been closely related in educational and psycho­
logical practice, Torrance (1963), for example, suggesting 
that in order to develop his creative abilities a child should 
learn by "questioning inquiry, searching, manipulating, 
experimenting, even by aimless play; in short, by always 
trying to get at the truth", and Rogers (1954, 1970) defining 
creativity in terms of "emergence in action of a novel rela­
tional product, growing out of the uniqueness of the individual 
on the one hand, and the materials, events, people or circum­
stances of his life on the other".
In terms of his definition Rogers sees creativity as a 
personal construct, different only in degree between a child 
inventing a new game and Einstein formulating the theory of 
creativity, and this personal level creativity as something 
possessed by all of us to some degree, is also fundamental to 
Guilford's (1950) hypotheses regarding creative ability and 
to Bruner's emphasis on discovery learning (1960, 1961). It 
also underlies much of the change of emphasis in teaching 
methods and curricula that has taken place over the last 
twenty years, but both the psychological principles and class­
room practice have been criticised as being trivial, confusing, 
meaningless and even anti-educational interpretations of the 
term 'creativity' (e.g. White, 1968; Shouksmith, 1970).
As noted in Chapter 2, to accept the desirability of 
teaching for creativity is a long way from knowing how best 
to recognise and foster creative abilities, and it was sugges­
ted that an emphasis on the types of thinking that appear to
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be involved in a broad conception of creativity would be more 
profitable than an attempt to narrow the definition of creati­
vity, based for example on a product judged by society to be 
original and valuable.
Adopting in turn a view of creative thinking as a multi­
faceted activity it was suggested that thinking abilities 
that have been variously labelled as ’productive’, ’adventur­
o us’, ’lateral’, or ’divergent’, and also ’convergent’ think­
ing, could all claim relevance to the creative process, though 
in the first instance the degree to which they appeared to be 
worth investigation in this context would depend on establish­
ing a theoretical basis for their construct validity (Cattell, 
1964) .
In line with a broad multi-dimensional view of creativity 
it was argued (2.2) that the wide use and identification of 
divergent thinking tests as tests of ’creativity’ (e.g.
Wallach and Kogan, 1966; Torrance, 1974; Brown, 1976) was 
unwarranted, and that it might well be anti-educational if 
divergent thinking was to be regarded as synonymous with crea­
tive thinking to the exclusion of other dimensions in Guilford’s 
Structure-of-Intellect model (Guilford, 1956, 1967).
It was maintained however that this did not mean that the 
distinctive feature of divergent thinking tests, the ability 
of subjects to produce a large number of varied and unusual 
responses to some stimulus situation, was not relevant to 
creative activity. On the contrary it was argued in Chapter 3 
that there is a great deal of theoretical and anecdotal evid­
ence to suggest that such an ability is an ingredient in the 
thinking processes which have been described as characteristic 
of those whose creativity is beyond doubt, and which others
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maintain are essential for cognitive excellence.
Reviewing the theoretical basis for this claim to cons­
truct validity the writer concluded that theoretical approa­
ches to creative thinking lent support to the earlier defini­
tion of creative thinking as a broad rather than an unitary 
trait, and also that divergent thinking, with an emphasis on 
fluent, imaginative, and flexible thinking is likely to be an 
important element in the process of creativity in its broad 
sense. While providing grounds for believing that creative 
activity is unlikely to be encapsuled within the conventional 
view of intelligence and I.Q. tests, it also emphasised that 
the latter have an important role to play and that, as Guil­
ford (1976) has been at pains to point out, creative ability 
is not tied exclusively to his divergent category.
It was also noted that creative aptitude is likely to be 
related to attitudinal and temperamental variables and that 
such variables may also affect divergent thinking performance, 
Eysenck (1967) in particular suggesting that the latter may be 
largely a function of children's extraversion. Within the 
more cognitive approaches to creative thinking, it was sugges­
ted that the Gestalt approach to problem solving offered a 
great deal of relevant information, problems, as Wertheimer 
(1949, 1961) points out not being confined to the schoolroom. 
The emphasis on a type of thinking which needed to get away 
from a one-sided inflexible view, and to appreciate changes 
in meaning of the constituent ideas in accordance with differ­
ent relationships to the whole structure, was noted as corres­
ponding to a number of aspects of divergent thinking, and to 
be of relevance to a practical exercise, the Board Game, to 
be constructed for the experimental part of the study.
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While the theoretical evidence provided encouragement 
for believing that divergent thinking is of relevance for 
creative thinking it was emphasised that empirical evidence 
was needed to justify the hypothesis.
The basic nature of the procedures involved in validat­
ing psychological tests and the associated problems where 
D.T. tests are concerned had been discussed in Chapter 1; 
and a review of previous practical investigations into the 
reliability and validity of D.T. tests was made in Chapter 4. 
Considering the problems involved in scoring divergent think­
ing tests, the varied nature of reliability information, and 
the limited reports of long-term stability, and predictive 
validity, it was decided to attempt an investigation of each 
of these aspects. The predictive validity was confined to 
concurrent aspects however, but a practical exploration of 
concurrent validity was also planned to investigate divergent 
tests in relation to a range of other variables.
It is appreciated that one could justify a separate 
study of any one of these aspects, but they are so interrela­
ted that it was felt that a single study could look at each 
of these aspects to a worthwhile degree and still remain of 
reasonable proportions. In particular the writer was some­
what sceptical of the reliability and validity of scoring 
procedures especially when based on standard lists of Ameri­
can responses, and an investigation of methods of scoring 
should, it was felt, be a necessary part of any investigation 
of reliability and validity.
This was consequently undertaken as the first part of 
the practical investigations, and included reviewing and 
establishing scoring procedures for fluency, flexibility and
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originality, as well as an assessment of inter-scorer relia­
bility. This section of the investigation was based on the 
'main' population of 176 local 11-year-old school children, 
as were the other sections except for the investigation of 
long-term stability. The latter involved a follow-up study 
after an interval of approximately five years, of 173 pupils 
previously tested in 1969, and of mean age 15 years 10 months 
when retested in 1974. Details of both samples, the tests 
used and the experimental procedures are given in Chapters 5 
and 8 respectively.
It is hoped that the discussion and clarification of 
scoring procedures carried out in Chapter 6 will be of use to 
other researchers scoring divergent tests, and particular 
attention is drawn to the principle suggested for awarding 
originality marks, which was considered more valid than 
methods adopted by some investigators. This maintains that 
specific responses such as a King's face, a golf ball or 
Mars, should be recorded in terms of their general grouping 
as 'faces', 'balls' and 'planets' respectively, and given 
originality marks according to the frequency of the group 
rather than that of the individual response - unless the 
latter possesses some special defining characteristic that 
identifies it in a different relation to the requirements of 
the test than other members of the group.
A synopsis of scoring details is given in Section 6.5, 
and these were subject to investigation for interscorer 
reliability. Though a number of researchers (e.g. Hudson, 
1968; Vernon, 1971) point out the subjectivity involved in 
scoring divergent tests, most researchers tend to accept the 
claims of Torrance (1974) that divergent tests can be scored
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with reasonable consistency. Considering the labour involved 
in scoring D.T. tests the writer was somewhat suspicious, 
however, of the 'convenient’ assumptions of scorer reliability.
In spite of this concern and comments that "there are 
still serious problems in deciding when responses are differ­
ent or unusual" (Vernon, 1971), the results indicated that the 
writer's doubts were largely unfounded. All seven coefficients 
of interscorer reliabilty exceeded 0.90, and the three fluency 
coefficients equalled 0.99.
Variations in the scores awarded to certain individuals 
however, were noted, and some explanations offered in terms 
of the grasp of the scoring procedures and, perhaps more 
importantly, in the different degrees of tolerance and appre­
ciation shown by the scorers for responses that at first 
sight might appear silly or irrelevant. It was suggested 
that if information on particular scripts is required they 
should be marked in conjunction with a second scorer, though 
in general the overall agreement between the scorers was very 
encouraging and was considered more than sufficient to allow 
the next stage of the study to proceed on a well-founded and 
reliable basis.
' The coefficients of test-retest reliability were not as 
encouraging and were, as expected, less than the coefficients 
of 0.90 and over, frequently reported for internal consistency 
methods. The limitations of the latter as applied to D.T. 
tests were discussed in Chapter 1, and the test-retest coef­
ficients were considered to be more realistic estimates of 
the reliability of divergent tests.
Though not consistently high however, the size of the 
coefficients which ranged from 0.50 for Uses (originality) to
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0.82 for Circles (fluency), were considered to be sufficient 
to indicate that divergent thinking tests can play a signifi­
cant part in making decisions about groups of children, 
though their use in identifying individuals is more doubtful. 
It was suggested that the lowest coefficients, for the Uses 
Test, were possibly affected by the motivational differences 
between the first and second testing sessions and that they 
may be an underestimate of the test’s reliability. Motiva­
tional effects in general were felt to be an important vari­
able as suggested by Torrance (1974).
The level of the coefficients were within the range of 
test-retest reliabilities reported by other studies, however, 
and direct comparisons were possible with a number of studies 
involving the same tests with a similar age group. In general 
the pattern of correlations, means and standard deviations was 
similar to that which would be expected of most cognitive 
variables and the level of reliability not dissimilar to 
that reported for more established tests.
Having arrived at a measure of their reliability the 
writer was in a position to make a correction for the attenua­
tion of subsequent correlations with the divergent tests, and 
this enabled an ’ideal’ estimate to be made of the intrinsic 
relationship between the variables in the validity and long­
term stability investigations.
After an interval of nearly five years it was satisfying 
to locate 150 of the original 173 pupils chosen for the long­
term investigation. Data was finally obtained from 139 of 
these and coefficients of stability for the whole sample and 
for boys and girls separately were all significant, and 
similar in magnitude for boys and girls. Although not excep-
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tionally high the coefficients ranged from 0.40 to 0.47 for 
the individual D.T. abilities and from 0.47 to 0.57 for the 
combined scores.
These were in close agreement with the only comparable 
English study found reported, and the present sample was more 
representative of the whole ability range. Although there 
was some overlap with general intelligence, partially 
out the effects of the latter still left very substantially 
coefficients ranging from 0»35 to 0.47 for the individual 
abilities and it was concluded that the stability could not 
be put down to the effects of intelligence. Correction for 
attenuation indicated that the results were potentially even 
more significant, and intercorrelations between the D.T. 
tests in 1969 and again in 1974 showed a very similar pattern 
and gave further support to the stability of the underlying 
construct.
A consideration of the levels of performance in 1969 and 
1974 showed that the divergent abilities underlying the tests 
showed reasonable development over time and together with the 
stability in relative ranking suggested that divergent think­
ing develops and functions in a similar way to other mental 
abilities.
At this stage of the experiment it remained to be seen 
whether any concurrent validity could be demonstrated, but if 
so, divergent thinking could be regarded as an ability worth 
further attention not only in psychological investigations 
but in recognising and developing children’s creative potential.
Concurrent validity was investigated in Chapter 10 in 
relation to three independent measures of children’s creative
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interests, teacher ratings of their creative behaviour, crea­
tive motivation, and an experimental task, the ’Board Game’ 
designed to involve flexible and imaginative aspects of child­
ren’s thinking. Details of the testing instruments and the 
development of the Board Game, including a preparatory lesson 
on a simple electric circuit and things that conduct electri­
city, were given in Chapter 5. Apart from teacher ratings 
and the Board Game the other criteria were assessed by self- 
report inventories, while the teacher ratings were given on 
a structured questionnaire constructed by the writer from 
Torrance (1967). Each child’s performance on the Board Game 
was assessed individually and the quality of performance 
assessed as described in Chapter 5, from ct-responses which 
involved insight and a fine grasp of the problem, to 3-res- 
ponses which did not end in any constructive result. Up to 
about 35 minutes was allowed for each child, and photographs 
of some typical solutions are given in the Appendix.
In attempting to establish evidence for concurrent vali­
dity it was acknowledged that there is likely to be some 
variation in the amount of weight that can be given to differ­
ent criteria, and their relative merits were discussed when 
the results were presented. Special emphasis was placed on 
the Board Game which added a more realistic dimension than 
found in most validation studies. The main conclusion from 
the evidence presented was that divergent thinking abilities 
have some positive validity in relation to creative behaviour.
It was not intended to establish an unidimensional 
battery of creative criteria, but all the intercorrelations 
except one were positive for both boys and girls, and the 
overall validity index of the divergent test battery in relation
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to a combined creative criterion was 0.44 for boys and 0.46 
for girls, both highly significant (p < 0.001). The results 
gave support to previous studies which had found positive evi­
dence for the concurrent validity of D.T. tests, and the 
general level of the relationship was very similar to that in 
the small number of studies in which direct comparison was 
possible.
A number of variations in the validity of the individual 
divergent abilities were also observed, and though a consider­
able degree of validity was common to each ability and to both 
sexes, some different associations would have been obscured 
in an exclusive use of combined scores and combined sexes.
It was suggested that to gain maximum predictive validity from 
D.T. tests the activity being predicted should be related to 
the varying interests of boys and girls, and that different 
D.T. abilities might also be more closely related to certain 
activities than others. Verbal but not figurai tests for 
girls, for example were closely related to their imaginative 
interests. As noted in the reliability investigation the 
question of motivation is again likely to be of considerable 
importance.
While statistically significant however it has to be 
emphasised that the magnitude of the validity relationships 
is not high enough to suggest that D.T. abilities play more 
than a small part in predicting creative activity and there 
are no grounds for believing that divergent thinking is syn­
onymous with creative ability. As both Anastasi (1968) and 
Cronbach (1970) point out however even tests with validity 
coefficients as low as 0.20 can make a valuable contribution 
to a battery of tests especially if they are not highly
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correlated with other tests in the battery, and it was sugges­
ted that it is in this light that the level of concurrent 
validity established in this study can best be interpreted.
Had the I.Q. scores showed a much greater relationship 
with the creative criteria than the D.T. scores the proportion 
of variance contributed by the latter might have been compara­
tively unimportant. Apart from teacher ratings however, the 
magnitude of the relationship between I.Q. and the criteria 
was similar to that achieved by the D.T. scores and this was 
considered particularly important in the case of the Board 
Game (B.G.). In designing the latter, the writer attempted 
to incorporate demands on children's constructive, analytic 
and imaginative thinking ability, but had half expected con­
ventional measures of intelligence to account for the differ­
ences in children's performance. The pilot work however 
indicated that this might not be the case and this was con­
firmed in the main experiment.
The results indicated that practical performance on such 
a task makes demands on a wide range of abilities, not con­
fined to convergent thinking, and that divergent thinking abi­
lities can make an important contribution. Forming a multiple 
predictor from I.Q. and two D.T. measures. Uses (fluency) and 
Circles (combined score), for example, the multiple correla­
tion with boys' performance on the Board Game was 0.57, 
accounting for 3 2 2% of the variance, 18% being contributed by 
the D.T. scores. It is unfortunate that having read the descrip­
tion and rationale of the B.G. in Chapter 5, a reader will not 
be in a position to try out on himself the principles involved. 
Studying children's, and even adults' approaches to the task, 
is in many ways more fascinating than their final solution.
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and although the method of approach was a contributory factor 
in the final performance category, and characteristic types 
of performance were described in Chapter 5, it is felt that 
the potential of the B.G. is not fully realised in this study.
Observing some children apparently siezing on properties 
of articles and functions of the material which were quite 
different from their habitual use, but appropriate to the 
problem in hand, and other children consistently failing to 
make appropriate associations, provided convincing examples 
of differences in children’s thinking.
It is hoped to provide video-tape recordings of children’s 
attempts at the B.G. for future teaching purposes, and the 
Board Game could also provide a basis for further research 
into children’s thinking. Transcripts of the children’s 
verbalisation of their thoughts and feelings at regular stages 
of their attempts, as utilized by Goor and Sommerfeld (1976), 
may provide useful insights into their creative behaviour in 
this respect.
For the purposes of this study however the Board Game 
demonstrated that D.T. abilities play a significant part in 
children's performance on such an exercise, and though the 
actual magnitude of the validity coefficients was not high, 
the writer maintains that they are of particular importance 
in illustrating the concurrent validity of divergent tests.
The results of the factorial investigation of construct 
validity gave further support to the existence of a cohesive 
dimension of divergent thinking abilities, which was relative­
ly distinct from general convergent ability. It also demon­
strated that divergent thinking could not be construed simply 
as a function of personality variables or attitudes. While
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a number of relationships were shown to exist between the 
latter and the tests of divergent thinking, convergent think­
ing, and the creative criteria, these were generally not very 
marked over the whole range of ability tested. In particular 
the absence of any relationship with extraversion enables 
Eysenck’s (1967) suggestion, that divergent thinking is largely 
a matter of the latter, to be rejected.
With the evidence of the study as a whole supporting a 
construct of divergent thinking as a cognitive ability with 
reasonable reliability and stability over time, it is sugges­
ted that like other cognitive variables its application to 
other activities will, however, be mediated in numerous ways 
by variations in children’s attitudes and personality. As 
indicated by Wallach and Kogan (1966) and Hudson (1966, 1968), 
particular subgroups chosen on the basis of contrasting or 
complementary abilities may reveal different relationships to 
personality and other variables, depending, for example, on 
whether high divergent thinking is accompanied by high or low 
intelligence, and vice versa. Both the concurrent and cons­
truct validity investigation indicated, however, that diver­
gent thinking is not an entirely unidimensional activity, and 
more attention might be given to complementary rather than 
parallel tests of divergent thinking, verbal and figurai abi­
lities in particular showing some different associations with 
other variables. It is also possible that, having established 
a divergent thinking dimension, different types rather than 
levels of responses may, as Hudson (1968) and Hargreaves (1974, 
1977) suggest, be worthy of study in their own right.
The amount of common variance extracted for the Uses Test 
and its comparable level of long-term stability with the other
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tests, suggested that its low test-retest reliability might 
have been an underestimate of its ’true’ reliability. Its 
validity coefficients were generally higher than those for 
the Consequences Test, and with attention to motivation fac­
tors in any retest, it is suggested that the Uses Test and 
the Circles Test, representing verbal and figurai aspects of 
divergent thinking respectively, would be a good complementary 
pair of tests in assessing divergent thinking abilities.
A number of other features have also been noted which 
might be confirmed with further investigation, and it may be 
possible to discover particular groupings of abilities and 
personality variables that may be particularly related to 
different types of learning and creative activity.
The final conclusion is that divergent thinking tests 
have emerged, after considerable scrutiny, as reasonably 
reliable measures of an intellectual ability which is rela­
tively independent of intelligence, shows development and 
stability of relative ranking over time, and is positively 
related to creative behaviour.
It is consequently suggested that divergent thinking be 
recognised as one category in a broad conception of intellec­
tual abilities such as proposed by Guilford (1956, 1967).
The identification of divergent thinking tests as ’crea­
tivity’ tests is rejected, both theoretically and experimen­
tally, but a limited amount of association between divergent 
thinking and creative behaviour has been demonstrated, and 
the evidence should provide some basic support for teachers 
who regard the fostering of divergent thinking abilities as 
a realistic and worthwhile aim.
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4 5 6 7 8 h^
I.Q.1 85 25 09 -02 -12 04 13 08 82I.Q.2 85 13 01 -05 -12 11 08 16 80
English 85 21 17 -02 02 1 6 -07 -01 82
Maths 87 17 01 06 01 09 -12 02 82
Attitude to School 36 08 30 00 42 37 05 14 57Importance of 
Doing Well 47 11 05 09 27 39 10 -28 55Conforming -03 -07 05 06 76 -02 05 —06 59Relationship 
with Teacher 39 -04 17 22 48 25 -04 08 54Lack of Anxiety 08 01 11 -06 -05 06 -03 59 37Academic Self-Image 47 07 -01 -02 23 54 14 05 60Self-Concept 15 04 18 -08 13 72 -01 04 60
(Elu. 10 86 -02 -03 -03 04 05 12 77Circles (Flex. 13 82 -04 11 08 05 06 09 73(Orig. 16 67 -07 -03 -03 -05 08 18 55
Srig.
08 75 23 01 09 03 -01 -23 69
17 67 19 -13 05 -02 02 -17 56
Consequences (Qrig. 12 61 23 -04 —09 27 -01 -19 5623 54 09 -12 -15 07 10 -05 41
Board Came 34 22 -12 00 26 -21 27 26 43Interests (overall) 09 05 74 1 6 00 18 57 -01 94Imaginative Interests 14 10 87 00 14 11 06 09 84Logical/analytical 
Interests 04 17 24 02 02 04 83 02 78
Creative Behaviour 
Teacher Ratings 69 16 17 -37 -1 1 09 06 -03 70Leisure Interests 
Torrance -03 38 46 -12 -17 30 19 03 54Creative Motivation 
G-olann 28 20 46 -21 20 03 05 19 46
Extraversion 19 17 12 -23 -23 47 00 32 51Neuroticism 00 27 -02 22 -27 -06 -11 -53 49Lie Scale -23 03 01 24 52 13 -04 06 40Shy 04 -02 -08 93 06 —06 02 -15 90Lively 10 12 -02 -73 -19 12 -03 08 62Pleasurability 47 13 14 38 24 17 08 -02 50
Percentage of
Common Variance 25.0 21 .4 11 .5 10.5 9.6 9.1 6.5 6.2Percentage of
Total Variance 15.7 13.4 7.2 6,6 6 .0 5.7 4.1 3.9
Conmion ‘V'ariance extracted = 62.7^ 
(decimal points are omitted in the table)
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5 6 7 8 9 h^
86 12 05 07 00 14 16 -09 -03 82
79 12 15 21 -01 05 23 -04 07 77
87 25 05 01 03 08 -06 01 11 83
85 05 18 05 03 04 02 08 04 77
05 20 45 60 1 6 09 00 09 -01 63
' 52 -09 -01 65 08 -03 1 1 -10 00 57
-05 -10 -05 7 6 -03 -03 00 05 07 60
10 -18 42 48 07 -01 -14 21 05 52
27 08 65 14 03 -01 26 05 -06 60
55 15 40 18 -07 14 02 29 06 61
04 04 70 14 15 16 -09 18 19 64
09 90 05 -04 03 11 19 00 01 87
-07 91 -05 —06 -08 07 12 00 -03 87
26 67 -07 00 1 1 22 10 00 09 6006 44 -02 —06 04 -11 71 -04 10 73
52 26 -20 -08 05 -03 40 -34 20 53
25 72 09 -05 04 10 13 -1 0 05 63
45 49 01 -08 08 04 -08 -09 12 47
25 17 -05 16 00 32 52 13 -01 51
04 06 11 00 93 05 15 30 -01 99
-04 06 12 15 85 16 -07 -01 09 80
28 01 06 -08 31 -10 25 54 10 56
69 10 10 -01 -04 48 12 07 24 81
01 27 15 -27 13 21 23 01 05 29
L
11 14 15 -05 02 -02 13 -04 57 40
16 -12 68 -26 1 1 18 -19 —06 22 70—1 6 00 -51 14 00 21 -01 -31 23 33
-17 -10 14 17 13 —06 -08 43 03 30
-15 -19 -10 04 -25 -76 01 06 -02 7i
25 20 12 -05 -01 79 02 -12 -06 77
55 -07 05 35 15 02 -1 1 30 57 67
22.4 17.9 11 .2 10.5 9.7 9.4 7.2 5.8 5.0
15.0 11 .5 7.2 6.7 6.2 6,0 4.6 3.7 3.2
Common Variance extracted = 64.1% 
(decimal points are omitted in the table)




Marks awarded by Scorer 1 and Scorer 2
Users test (n=42)
Fluency Originality























































































































































































































































































































































îorer 1 Scorer 2 Scorer 1 Scorer 2 Scorer 1 Score
16 16 14 13 20 23
24 24 18 19 16 23
34 31 20 23 15 11
11 11 8 8 9 8
24 24 19 21 39 34
16 14 10 10 14 6
17 16 .10 10 7 3
13 13 13 13 11 10
30 29 22 21 42 32
26 26 18 18 45 38
11 14 11 12 16 12
12 12 6 8 2 1
19 19 15 16 12 12
16 16 12 11 23 24
16 17 11 12 7 6
16 15 11 12 5 4
23 23 17 15 6 2
15 15 13 14 19 19
10 10 10 9 9 7
21 21 16 14 22 25
10 10 6 6 2 7
21 21 15 15 21 16
22 22 19 18 22 18
20 20 16 15 28 27
18 18 13 13 8 7
29 29 20 21 37 46
17 17 12 12 17 18
25 25 15 15 21 19
12 12 9 9 7 7
16 16 16 15 19 22
31 31 18 20 31 33
22 22 14 14 9 11
18 18 12 15 32 34
14 14 10 8 11 9
17 17 11 12 15 21
19 18 9 8 0 0
22 22 15 14 26 25
19 19 12 12 23 21
11 11 9 10 13 12
41 42 26 31 82 71
17 16 8 9 19 8
12 12 6 6 0 0
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Flexibility Categories for use with the Circles Test 
and the Squares Test__________________________________
1. Balls ; football, golf ball, ball of wool, bolas etc
2. Balloons: air balloon, toy balloon, bubbles etc
3. Bats and racques: tennis racket etc
4. Books and stationery: book, comic, birthday card,
exercise book, writing paper etc
5. Bottles and jars : jam jar, bottle, vase etc
6. Boxes : toy box, lunch box, cereal packet, parcel etc
7. Buildings : houses, block of flats, light-house, tent,
igloo etc
8. Cages : animal cages, kennel, hutch, jail etc
9. Clothing: skirt, hat, shoe etc
10. Coins
11. Containers for carrying : bag, shopping basket, bucket,
handbag etc
12. Other containers : bin, barrel etc
13. Crockery: tea-cup, plate,saucer etc
14. Cross-section/end of 'open' objects : tunnel, pipe, manhole etc
15. Cross-section/end of solid objects : tree, log, post, worm, bone
etc
16. Dials : Clock, watch, compass etc
17. Electric light and fittings : light bulbs, headlights,
plug, torch etc
18. Electrical appliances : cooker, washing machine;, refrigerator etc
19. Faces (Human): pirate, king, queen, sad face etc
20. Faces (animal): cat, dog, rabbit, pig etc
21. Figures (human): fat man, baby, humpty dumpty etc
22. Figures (animal): cat, octopus, spider etc
23. Flowers : sunflower, poppy etc
24. Food : fried egg, cake, hot X bun, Christmas pudding etc
25. Fruits : apple, orange, bunch of grapes, berries etc
26. Furniture : table, chair, stool etc
27. Games: ludo. O's and X's, crossword puzzle etc
28. Geometrical shapes and patterns : circle, compass pattern,
spiral, hexagon, square, 
triangle etc
29. Head of a nail : screw, pin etc
30. Heavenly bodies : star, sun, moon, planet, globe etc
471 .
31. Jewellry: ring, necklace, hair slide, crown etc
32. Land forms : volcano, crater, island etc
33. Optical instruments; binoculars, magnifying glass,
spectacles, goggles etc
34. Lids : top of jam jar, tobacco tin etc
35. Linen and mats : table cloth, mat, towel etc
36. Microscopic views : bloodcell, germ, dust particle,
amoeba etc
37. Musical instruments; bagpipes, banjo, trumpet etc
38. Parts of the body ; eye, mouth, nose, hand etc
39. Parts of a building ; door, window, chimney, turret etc
40. Pictures; pictures, photographs, paintings etc
41. Pots and pans ; frying pan, saucepan, mixing bowls etc
42. Rotors ; propellor, helicopter, fan, etc
43. Signs; (i) road signs, shop signs etc
44. Signs ; (ii) emblems, badges etc
45. Sound and television ; radio, television, microphone,
record player etc
46. Sweets ; toffee, gob-stopper, lollipop etc
47. Symbols ; Letters of alphabet, numerals, musical notes etc
48. Target: dartboard, bull's eye etc
49-52. Transport and vehicles ;
49. Vehicles needing propulsion ; pushchair, wheelchair 
shopping trolley, bicycle etc
50. Land travel; car, lorry, train, tank etc
51. Sea Travel : ship, submarine etc
52. Air and Space travel; aeroplane, rocket, satelite, 
spaceship etc
53. Trees ; fruit tree, Christmas tree etc
54. Water; pond, puddle, swimming pool etc
55. Weapons; gun, bomb, mine, gun,turret etc
56. Wheels ; steering wheel, water wheel etc
57. Vegetables; beetroot, turnip etc
472.
Ereguencv Distribution of Responses to the Circles Test
11 year old sample, n = 165 
Allocation of Originality Marks
Frequency
(percentage)






2-8 9-16 17-24 24
Originality Mark 5 3 2 1 0
NOTE:
Some of the common responses could he considered for 
originality marks if they have some special defining feature 
in relation to a circle that removes them from an unspecified 
category - e.g. Kojak (human face), crystal hall (hall).
humpty dumpty (human figure) - see discussion in the text.
Ori^. Orig:.
Response Mark Response Mark
Air halloon 1 Bat/racquet 0
Aerial view of Bicycle 0








































Back view of pig/ 
elephant

































































Response Mark Response Ma:
Cotton reel 3 Cartoon hand 5
Cooker ring 3 Cylinder 5
5Op coin 3 Chemical apparatus 5
Chimney pot 3 Dartboard 1
Cannon/attlery gun 3 Dumbells 2
Caterpilla 3 Doorknob 2
Cloud 3 Dog basket 3
Counter 3 Drum 3
Compass pattern 3 Diamond 3
Cartridge 3 Doughnut 3
Cabbage/cauliflower 3 Door number plate 3
Cuckoo clock hole 3 Dog biscuit 5
Cross-section of worm 3 Face of a Die 5
Crab 3 Flight end of a Dart 5
Cheese 3 Round Door (submarine) 5
Catseyes 3 Discus 5
Cobweb 3 Dust particle 5
Cherries 3 Diving bell 5
Conker 3 Demolition weight 5
Crystal ball 5 Eye 0
Cork 5 Egg/egg cup 2
Camera 5 Ear ring 3
Candle 5 Electric plug 3
Cloud over the moon 5 Egg hatching 5
Cave 5 Eye of a needle 5
Coal shute 5 Eye hole for shoe lace 5
Corn plaster 5 Elephants trunk (tip) 5
Caravan 5 Elephants footprint 5
Crown 5 Exhaust pipes (end) 5
Cigarette 5 Electron 5
Christmas pudding 5 Face (human or animal) 0
Citreon car badge 5 Flower 0
Candy floss 5 Fruit 0
















































Helmut (diver etc) 3



























Response Mark .Response Mai
Key 3 Map 3
Kite 3 Mask 3
Kojak 3 Mete^rite/comet/
Keep (of a castle) 5 shooting star 3
Knot 5 Music note 3
Letter of alphabet/ 
numeral 0 Microphone 3
Light switch 0 Top of Monks head 3
Lollipop 0 Medal 3
Light bulb 1 Mobile 5
Lid 2 Megaphone 5
Ladybird 2 Magnet 5
Letter box 3 Meatball 5
Lens 3 Mop 5
Lampshade 3 Moon crater 5
Locket 3 Mace and chain 5
Leaf 3 Necklace 2
Lifebelt 3 Nest 2
Ladle 5 Nuts (screw) 3
Loaf of bread 5 Name disc 3
Link in a chain 5 Net 3
Lantern 5 Nostril/nose 3
Lorry (cement mixing) 5 Number on racing car 5
Leg of meat 5 Nut (fruit) 5
Ladies fan 5 Octopus 3
Ludo 5 Olympic sign 3
Mouth 0 Pots and pans 0
Magnifying glass 1 End of Pencil 1
Mirror 1 Porthole 1
Marble 2 Polomint 2
Monocle 3 Pencil sharpener 2
Manhole cover 3 Pinhead 2
Mine 3 Picture/painting 2






























Plug (for aerial) 5
Pearl 5
Press-stud 5
Poached egg holder 5










Red Cross sign 3
Rocket 3
Rabbit hole 3
Rope (end of) 3
Radar 3
Ring (rubber) 3







































Seal balancing a ball 5 
Skipping rope handle 5 














































































Washing machine (door) 3
Weighing scales 3









Frequency Distribution of Responses to the Squares Test
t1 year old sample, n = 65 
Allocation of Originality Marks
Frequency
(percentage)






2,3 4,3,6 7,8,9 10
Originality Mark 5 3 2 1 0
NOTE:
Some of the common responses could be considered for 
originality marks if they have some special defining feature 
in relation to a square that removes them from an unspecified 
category - e.g. Jack-in-the-box (box), block of flats (house), 




Abacus 5 Comic/newspaper 1
Animal face 0 Folder 5
Animal body 0 Printed paper/
Test paper/
Bat 3 Timetable 2
Bale of hay 5 Envelope 0
Bread and butter slice 5 Writing paper 0
Breadboard 5 Notice 2
Brick i, Calendar 2
BOOKS and STATIONARY Blotting paper
holder 5Book (reading) 0
Blackboard 0Book (exercise) 0
Battery 5Birthday card/






Bow/bowtie 2 Teapot/kettle 1
Button 2 Tin can (round) 2
Buckle 3 Tin biscuits/cake
Brush 5 tin 2
Bolt (screw) 5 Crossword puzzle 2
Bonnet of car 5 Chip (end view) 5
Bird table 5 Cushion 3
Bar chocolate 2 CLOTHES
BOXES Shirt/shorts 2
Box (no labels) 0 Hat/tophat/soldiers
Box (carton for hat 1
food etc) 0 Boot 3
Letter box 3 Door 0
Jack-in-the-box 2 Door knob/handle 2
Toy box/work box Dice 2
(with hinged lid) 2 Doorbell 3
Lunchbox 3 Draughts board/
Box matches/cigatettes 3 chess board 3
Box for Xmas tree 5 Drain cover 3
Bin (wastebin/dustbin) 2 Electric plug 0
Jute box 5 Electric light switch 0
Parcel 0 Field 3
Balance 3 Fish tank 1
Cage 2 Frame (e.g. around
Camera 2 dartboard) 2
Cake 3 Flag 0
Chimney 2 Fireplace/electric
Carpet/mat 2 fire 3
Cheese 3 Float 5
Control panel 3 Finger nail 5
CONTAINERS Fractions of a square/
Cup/glass 1 triangle 2
Water tank/petrol tank 2 FURNITURE
Pan/pai1/bucket 2 Chair/stool 0
Jars 2 Table 0

















Block of flats/tower 
block/church/castle/ 






























Palette for Paints 3
















Record (in jacket) 3
Rubber 0
Ruler 5








Screen (for films) 3











Sausage on Tomorrow's 
World 5









































Pane of Glass 3
Frequency Distribution of Responses to the Uses Test
(Uses for a Spoon)
484
Main 11-year old population (25% sample, n=42) 
Allocation of Originality Marks
Frequency
(percentage) f:̂ 3% 3%-:f^5%






2 3,4 5,6 7






Armour 15 Dig with it 1
Breaking boiled egg 1
Break/smash things 1
Baby to bite on (chew) 3
Bend it 1
Bend like Uri G-eller 3
Bend into circle for 









Cake tin for baking 5
Clean up mess, scoop 
up spilt things 2
Catch tadpoles, small 
fish from pond 2
Ca rry/pick up small 
insects etc. 2
in Chemistry set 3
(c.f. mixing paints etc.)
Collect (old spoons) 5
Dig weeds up, plant 
things with it, use as 
trowel in garden
Decoration
make patterns with it 
paint different 
colours and hang it up 
draw on it, etc.
Draw round it for shapes, 
make shapes









Float it (as boat)
Flick things (catapult)




Get stuff out of tin/jar 
(e.g. dog food)
Get clay out of bin
Games
play with it, use it
for tricks
egg and spoon race
Give as a ’free spoon’ 
for buying a product
Hitting with (on head, 





spinning by hitting end
Lever (for tyres)
to get tin lids off 
to open windows/ 
doors






Making xylophone from 





Mould for lollipop, etc.
Make a hole in things
Make a doll
Melt it down for metal
Make a modern metal 
model/sculpture
Make a blindfold/pair 
of spectacles














Play - see Games 1
Pendulum 3
Paddles 5
Play harp/guitar with 3
Present (give as one) 2
Paper weight/weight 3
Plastering 5
Put down your back 
to cool off 5
Prop something up,
(e.g. plants) 2
Putting powder paints 







Reflect light/make it 
shine in the sun 2
Rolling pin 1
Spread/smooth some­
thing out with it 3
Scoop up mess - see
Glean 2




Stick for homemade 
lollies 5
Spade - see Dig 1
Shovel for making sand 
castles, mud pies etc. 2
Stop boiling water 
cracking a glass 5






Specific spoons (e.g. egg, 
desert, teaspoon etc.) 
c.f. Eating/drinking 1
Shaping clay 3




Wooden spoon (prize) 5
Wedge 1
Weight/paper weight 3
Wickets for cricket 5
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Frequency Distribution of Responses to 
the Consequences Test
(Consequences of having no hair) 
Main 11-year-old population (25% sample, n=42)













2 3,4 5,6 7
Originality Mark 5 3 2 1 0
Response
Artists would find 
it much easier to 
paint or draw people 5
Advertisements for 
hair spray etc, - out 5
No need for Articles 













Would all look same 




Couldn't tell old 






0Head would get Cold
Cool in Summer
wouldn't get so hot
and sweaty 1
Clown would not need a 
bald wig 5
Dandruff - none 2
Wouldn't have Dry or 
greasy hair 3
Eyelashes/Eyebrows gone too 1
Easier to wash head 
than hair, have to wash 
our head, easier to keep 
head clean, difficult to 
keep head clean 1
Easier to perform 
operations to head and 
brain 5
Easier to scratch head 5
Wouldn't get Fleas/Lice 1
Feel ashamed (not go out) 2
Factories would have to 








Would G-lue dogs’ hair 
on, wig on, grass on 2
Graphs of hair
colour out 5
Wouldn’t go Grey 3
Wouldn’t need to Groom 
hair in some way:-
keep hair tidy, put 
it up, cut it, perm 
it, put curlers in, 




hair, curls, plaits) 0
Hair - could not chew 
it, pull fingers 
through it 2
Hair would not:-
blow in your face 
get in the way 
get in your eyes 
get over your ears 
be a tangle/have 
knots 2
Hats needed to keep 
head warm 2
Have to wear Hats 0
Hats/Wigs sold out 1
Hats/Wigs on easier
and off more easily 3
Hats would be too big 5
No need for Hat/ 
umbrellas to keep hair 
tidy/dry 3
No need for swimming
Hats 3
Horse Hair would be 
used more 5
Indians would have no 
scalp to take 5
Kojak, Kimg fu, Yul 
Brynner would be like 
the rest of us 0
Kojak wouldn’t be so 
popular, pleased, very 
happy, would go out 1
of business
We would Look ugly,
silly 0
No one would admire
Look of friend’s hair 5
Wouldn’t have trouble of 
saying "Your hair Looks 
nice" 5
Laugh at people who
Look funny 0
Lollypops would be in 
demand 2
Save Money/time on 
haircuts 2
No problems about 
long/short hair 5
No longhaired hooligans, 
no hippies 3
No worry about hair,
going out to a party,
out in the wind 2
Protection for head lost, 
from injury (would get 1
bruised or cut more easily)
Protection for eyes lost 
(with no eyebrows) 1
Could Polish our heads 
(instead of brushing) 5
Couldn’t Play at 
hair-dressers 5
R.A.F.. wouldn’t be known 
as the ’Brylcream Boys’ 5
Razors/shavers, after­
shave lotion, shaving 
cream - all not needed 1
No need to Shave 1
We would Swim/run faster 5
We could Stay in bed 
longer (no need to do 
hair) 5
Head would be Sunburnt 3
We would get Sunstroke 5
Shops/firms would lose 
money/go out of business, 
lose jobs 0





(children etc. could not 
pull hair) 1
Teasing people about/ 
without hair would not 
be possible 2
Toys would not have
real hair 3
Hair would become 
Valuable 5
It would be
Uncomfortable to stand 




be sold out 1
(see ’Hat')
Wig firms would make a 
lot of money 3
No need for Wigs 3
Wigs would go up in price 3
Couldn't have Wigs, as 
there would be no hair 5
We would be able to
Write shopping lists on
our heads 5
We could Wear head 
lotion to make our heads 
smell nice 5





Responses to the Board Game (cont.)
- response
response
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1. Changed battery round?
2. Prepared to change ends?
3. Prepared to change round to improve solution?
at beginning? 
near end?
4. Worked from both ends?
3. (Straight line/small steps/logical) v. (Flair/insight)
Summary
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NAME ...............................  SCHOOL
This is not an examination, it is part of a SURVEY to find 
out how good pupils are at thinking up new and interesting 
ideas.
Some years ago a similar survey was carried out in junior 
schools and most of you were involved then, now we want to 
see how you do when you are older.
There are no right or wrong answers so write down as many 
ideas as you can think of. Work quickly, each part will he 
timed.
If you need more space continue your answers opposite on 
the hack of the previous page.
DO NOT TURN OVER UNTIL YOU ARE TOLD.
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Circles Game
I want to see how many objects you can make from the circles 
in fifteen minutes. With a pencil add lines to the circles 
to complete your picture. Your lines can be inside the circle, 
outside the circle, or both inside and outside.
Make as many DIFFERENT things as you can.
Do not spend much time on any one drawing - you may add titles
under your drawings if you do not think they are clear enough.
Look at the two examples on the next page and make as many of 
your own as you can.
Here are the two examples
You lhave 15 minutes to make as many of your own as you can.
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I f  y/ou finish this page draw some more circles opposite,
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Uses for Things Time: 15 minutes
The names of THREE objects are written below. I want you to write down as many 
DIFFERENT uses as you can for each object. Write down anything that comes into 
your mind, no matter how strange it may seem. Here is an example
A BUCKET hold water, sit on. make a helmet with________________________________
2 A SPOON_____________________________________________________________________'
;3 A PIECE OF STRING
499,
Consequences Time: 10 minutes
Herre is an example of some things that would be different if everyone had only one hand:-
we could not use a bow and arrow, we might count in fives instead of tens,
we would not need a pair of gloves, could not thread a needle.
I vwant you to pretend that the two changes given below suddenly happened. Write down as
manny different results of the changes as you can think of.
If we had no hair on our heads
If we did not need to eat or drink
500.
SQUARES GAME
Make as many DIFFERENT objects as 
you can from the squares below.
Here are two examples :
window d
If yyoiu finish this page ask for another.
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WHAT I THINK ABOUT SCHOOL
I have been talking to lots of boys and girls and they have told me things 
they like and dislike about school.
Over the page you will see some of the things they have said. I should like 
you to indicate what you feel and think about these things - whether you 
agree or disagree with what other boys and girls have said. Only I will see 
your answers.
This is not a test and is not going to be looked at by your school.
There are NO RIGHT and NO WRONG answers.
Just say what you think is most true of you. Please answer as truthfully as 
you can.
Here is an example :
A. I like watching television
YES, OFTEN SOMETIMES NEVER
If you often like watching television, put an X in the box 
marked often.
If you sometimes like watching television, put an X in the 
box marked sometimes.
Here is one for you to try:
B. I like staying in bed late
YES NOT SURE NO
502. - 2 -
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1. If I missed a games lesson I should be 
disappointed
1-------
Yes Not sure No
2, I'm sorry when school is over for the day
Always Sometimes Never
'
3. It's nice to fool about in class
Often Sometimes Never
1


















7. I think I'm pretty good at school work
Yes Not sure No
X I
8. School lessons are boring
Most of 
the time Sometimes Never
( 1
9. My class is nicest of all
Yes Not sure No
10. I have no one to play with at playtime
True
often Sometimes Never
11. I should like to be better at games 
than at school work
Yes Not sure No
/ %






13# I'd rather be in my class than the other(s) 
for my age




14. I sometimes think I'm no good at anything
Yes,true Not sure False
) X
15* Other classes think we're nice in my class
Yes Not sure . No .
16. I think a lot of children of my age would 
like to be in my class
Yes Not sure No
17. My teacher thinks I'm clever
Yes Not sure No
X 1
18. I bet going out to work is better than 
school
Yes Not sure No
1 1
19. I shall be sorry to leave my class
Yes Not sure No
Yes,
often Sometimes Never
20. I'm scared to ask my teacher for help 
when I don't understand 1 1
21. I have no friends I like very touch in 
my class
Yes,true Not sure False
?2. I like people who get me into mischief
Yes Not sure No
1
13. I like doing hard sums
Yes,often Sometimes Never
>2̂
4« Teacher is always nagging me
Yes Not sure No
/
p. School is boring
Always Sometimes. Hardlyever
)
». I'm happy to be in the class I'm in now
Yes Not sure No
504.
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27# School work worries me
Yes Not sure No
Yes,often Sometimes Never
28. I feel scared when teacher asks me 
questions about my work
Yes,true Not sure False
29. Other children think we're very 










31. We have interesting lessons in school 1
Yes Not sure No
32, Children who can't do their schoolwork 
feel ashamed
Yes Not sure No
33# 1 dislike children who are noisy in
class
Yes Not sure No
34# I hate being in the class I'm in now
Yes Not sure No
35# I like children who get into trouble X
Yes Not sure No
36. Teacher iô interested in me
Yes,true Not sure False
37# My class gets blamed for things we 
don't do
Yes Not sure No
38. I should feel a little afraid if I got 
my spellings or sums wrong
Yes Not sure No
39, I think the other children in my class 
like me
- 5 - 503.
.0. I'd prefer to be in another class
Yes Not sure No
Always Sometimes Hardlyever





.2, I find a lot of school work is difficult 
to understand X
3. I should like to be one of the 
cleverest pupils in the class
Yes Not sure No
z
4* I work and try very hard in school
Always Most of the time Sometimes
z
5. I'm very good at sums
Always Sometimes Hardlyever
%
6. I don't always get on well with some 
of the children in my class
Yes,
true Not sure False
7. I enjoy most school work
Yes Not sure No
8, (Going to school is a waste of time
Yes Not sure No









L, STeacher thinks I'm a trouble-maker
Yes Not sure No
I
X
I, ]I should like to be very good at 
Eschool work
Yes Not sure No
X
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54. I think my teacher likes me
No
Yes Not sure
55. When people ask what class I'm in I 
always feel happy to tell them
No
Yes Not sure




57» I don’t seem to be able to do 
anything really well in school
No
Yes Not sure




59» I like being in my class
No
Yes Not sure
60. I would leave school tomorrow if I could
No
Yes Not sure




52. Other classes think they're better than us
No
Yes Not sure




At school they make you do things you 
don't want to do
No
Name :
A B C D E F G H I J
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WHAT I AM LIKE
The words on this page describe what children are like. Read the words 
next to each number. Put a tick (v^ in ONE space on each line to show whether 
you think you are that way MOST OF THE TIME or ABOUT HALF THE TIME or 
HARDLY EVER. There are no right or wrong answers. Just try to say honestly 
what you are like.




2 . a big help at home 3
3. bright in school 3
4. shy 1
5. a pest 1
6. very good in art 3
7. scared to take chances 1
8 . full of fun 3
9. a hard worker 3
10. polite 3
11. trying my best 3
12. nice looking 3
13. lazy 1
14. full of questions about new things 3
15. going to do well 3
16. sad 1




21, good at making things 3
22. bad f
23. liked by other children 3







CHILDREN'S SCHOOL WORK AND PERSONALITY
Please rate the children in your class on the two aspects of school work 
and the three personality questions given below.
A. Attainment in school work
1. English
This should be an overall rating of the pupil's attainment in 
English (including written work, comprehension etc.)
2. Mathematics
This is a rating of the pupil's overall attainment in Mathematics 
topics (including number work, measurement, shapes etc.)
For these ratings please use the following grades
A B C D E




5. Is a pleasure to have in class?
For these questions please use the following grades
A B C D E





Shy? Lively? Is a pleasure , 
in class?
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INDICATORS OF CREATIVE BEHAVIOUR
RATING SCALE
Please score the children on each of the characteristics given below. Do 
not spend too much time assessing the children but enter your impressionistic
mark from your experience of teaching the child this year.
The children are listed overleaf, with one column given to each characteristic 
Please enter
2 if the child has shown the characteristic to a great extent
1 ” " " " " " " sometimes
0 " " " ” ” " " very seldom or not at all
CHARACTERISTICS
1. FULL OF IDEAS, ready with suggestions etc.
2. CONSTRUCTS, good at building, making things
3. PERSISTENT, persevering, unwilling to give up
4. IMAGINATIVE, fantasy creating, story telling etc.
5. CURIOUSITY, inquiring, inquisitive, penetrating questions etc.
6. NON-CONFORMING, not bothered by acceptance, or otherwise, by others
7. FLEXIBLE, in ideas and thoughts, not a 1-track mind, tries differing
approaches
8. ORIGINAL, unusual answers or solutions, unusual approach to problem
solving, artistic creation etc.
9. INDEPENDENT, self-sufficient, individualistic
10. EXPERIMENTER, investigates, tries out new ideas, new equipment etc.
NName








THINGS I WOULD LIKE TO DO MOST
For each pair of activities given below choose the one you would prefer.
Put a tick (\X ) in the space next to your choice.
Please do every one. There are no right or wrong answers. So just pick 
the one you would like to do most.
HERE ARE TWO EXAMPLES:
1. a. Go swimming on a hot day ( )
b. Dig a ditch on a hot day ( )
2. a. Go swimming on a cold day ( )
b. Sit by a fire on a cold day ( )
Now do the rest. Just tick the one you would like most.
1. a. Work on a mask ( ) (L
b. Work on a jigsaw puzzle ( )
2. a. Draw a picture ( ) a
b. Colour in a colouring book ( )
3. a. Write a short story ( ) a
b. Do a crossword puzzle ( )
4. a. Be a good lawyer ( ) b
b. Be a good author ( )
5. a. Play cards ( ) b
b. Act in a play ( )
6. a. Arrange a display in a book shop window ( ) a
b. Put books on the right shelf in a book shop ( )
7. a. Memorise a poem ( ) bb. Write a poem ( )
8. a. Write a short story ( ) CLb. Practise handwriting ( )
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9. a. Memorise the names of the new African countries ( ) . b
b. Make up new names for new countries ( )
10. a. Trace a drawing with tracing paper ( ) ^
b. Paint something on paper ( )
11. a. Be a rich, successful artist ( ) 4
b. Be a rich, successful banker ( )
12. a. Learn to cook a good recipe ( ) ^
b. Think up a new recipe ( )
13. a. Collect stamps ( ) ^
b. Make a model aeroplane ( )
14. a. Play a musical instrument ( )
b. Own a record collection ( )
15. a. Work on a topic chosen by the teacher ( ) ^
b. Work on a topic you choose yourself ( )
16. a. Try to write a good book ( )
b. Try to read a good book ( )
17 a. Write a neat careful account of a visit ( )
b. Write an original story ( )
18. a. Look after the goods in a shop ( ) ^
b. Sell things in a shop ( )
19. a. Make a rock collection ( ) Iq
b. Carve a rock into a figure ( )
20. a. Read famous books ( ) C(
b. Learn the names of famous books ( )
21. a. Repeat an important experiment ( ) ^
b. Try a new experiment ( )
22. a. Have the teacher tell you how to do something ( ) {3
b. Figure out how to do something yourself ( )
23. a. Play music ( ) q
b. Listen to music ( )
24. a. Solve a problem with a group of classmates ( ) ^
b. Try to solve a problem yourself ( )
25. a. Practise spelling ( ) ^
b. Write a story ( )
26. a. Do something you're used to ( ) b
b. Do something new ( )
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27. a. Work with clay ( ) (Xb. Collect post cards ( )
28. a. Be a good shop proprietor ( ) kb. Be a good musical composer ( )
29 a . Summarise what is in a book ( ) bb. Criticise what is in a book ( )
30. a. Try to invent something ( ) <xb. Try to fix something ( )
31. a. Learn about something from the textbook ( ) bb. Learn about something on your own ( )
32. a. Teach a friend how to play a game ( ) bb. Make up a game of your own ( )
33. a. Make a model from a kit ( ) b
b. Make a model without a kit ( )
34. a. Think up a new way to do something ( ) Ab. Learn the best way to do something ( )
35. a. Have a job where the boss tells you how to do the work ( ) ub. Have a job where you decide how to do some things ( ) u
36. a. Write a play with some classmates ( ) Lb. Write a play yourself ( ) b
515.
Name :
THINGS YOU HAVE DONE IN YOUR SPARE TIME
Below is a list of activities boys and girls sometimes do in their spare 
time. Indicate the ones you have done by putting a tick (v^) in the space 
at the left. Tick only the things you have done for yourself, NOT the 
things you have been given or told to do.
1. Written a poem
2. Written a story
3. Written a play
4. Kept a collection of my writings
5. Written a song or jingle
6. Made a puppet show
7. Kept a diary for at least a month
8. Played word games with other boys and girls
9. Used an encyclopedia or some other book in addition to a 
dictionary
10. Found mistakes in books or newspapers
11. Acted in a play or sketch
12. Made up or organised a play or sketch
13. Made up and sung a song
14. Made up a musical composition for some instrument
15. Made up a new game and taught it to someone else
16. Acted out a story with others
17. Written a letter to a member of family or a friend away
from home
18. Made up an original dance
19. Played at guessing mimes
20. Visited a zoo
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Things done in your spare time (continued)
21. Explored a cave
22. Read a science magazine
23. Read a science book
24. Mixed colours
25. Grown crystals
26. Made a leaf collection
27. Made a wildflower collection
28. Made an electric circuit
29. Made an electric motor
30. Made a musical instrument
31. Planned an experiment
32. Dissected an animal
33. Grown plants from seeds
34. Grown plants by taking cuttings
35. Distilled water
36. Used a magnifying glass
37. Made ink
38. Made leaf prints
39. Started a fire with a lens
40. Used a magnet
41. Raised rats, mice, rabbits, or guinea pigs
42. Collected insects
43. Collected rocks
44. Kept a daily record of weather
45. Been a bird watcher
46. Kept a science notebook
47. Kept a science scrapbook
48. Attended a science fair or display
49. Used a chemistry set
50. Produced static electricity
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Things done in your spare time (continued)
51. Constructed a model aeroplane
52. Counted annual rings in a log
53. Made a stamp collection
54. Made a collection of post marks
55. Organised or helped to organise a club
56. Served as officer in a club organised by boys and/or girls
57. Figured out a way of improving a game we play at school or
home
58. Figured out a way of improving the way we do something at home
59. Figured out a way of improving the way we do something at school
60. Figured out a way of improving the way we do something in a club,
Scouts, etc.
61. Solved a problem about getting along with other boys and girls
62. Solved a problem about getting along with my parents
63. Helped act out some historical event
64. Found out about the history of my city or community
65. Found out about the way some government agency (post office,
court, etc.) operates
66. Wrote a letter to someone in another country
67. Made a map of my street or district
68. Made my own decision about the use of money
69. Asked questions about the way some business works
70. Made a poster for some club, school or other event
71. Organised or helped organise paper drive, jumble sale, etc.
72. Sketched landscape with pencil and/or charcoal
73. Designed stage settings for play or sketch
74. Made up a design for jewellry
75. Made up a design for cloth
76. Illustrated a story of my own or one in a book
77. Taken colour photographs
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Things done in your spare time (continued)
78. Taken black and white photographs
79. Made plaster objects from a mould
80. Drawn cartoons
81. Designed greeting card for Christmas or special event.
82. Made linoleum cuts
83. Made block prints in colour
84. Made a watercolour painting of a familiar scene
85. Made an oilcolour painting of some type
86. Made things from papier mache
87. Made a toy for a child
88. Built a scale model of a park, playground, farm, etc.
89. Made a wood carving
90. Made a soap carving
91. Made a basket for ornamental purposes
92. Drawn up plans for an invention, apparatus etc.
93. Constructed a model of an invention
94. Made up recipe for some kind of food dish (meat, salad, 
dessert, etc.)




Below you will see some of the things boys and girls of your age find interesting. 
You are to give marks to the things you like doing either in or out of school.
Here is an example : Swimming
If  you like swimming very much, put a 2 in the box.
If  you quite like swimming, put a 1 in the box.
If  you don't like swimming or have never tried it, put a 0 in the box.
Like very much =  2 Quite like =  1 Never tried it or don’t like it
Now give marks to the activities below making sure you put a mark in each box.
1. Watching TV
2. Writing stories
3. Playing football ..
4. Drawing
5. Reading comics ..
6. Making up plays
7. Reading adventure stories
8. Going for walks
9. Collecting stamps
10. Making up poems
11. Playing cricket
12. Sewing .........................









18. Playing the recorder or
other musical instrument
19. Going to the cinema
20. Gardening
21. Reading poetry
22. D a n c in g .........................
23. Playing chess
24. Doing science experiments
25. Playing hopscotch
26. Making models
27. Doing crossword puzzles
28. Writing a daily diary





30. Reading encyclopedias .. | ^
B.
1. When you are not at school what hobby do you like best of all ?
2. What do you think you would like to do when you grow up ?
